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A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ISCR Case No. 26-00404

Appeal Board

Decided Oct 29, 2026 · Administrative Judge Moira D. Modzelewski · Appeal

Appeal at a glance

The appeal concerned the denial of a security clearance based on financial considerations. The applicant raised several arguments regarding the Judge's analysis of his debts and financial situation. The Board affirmed the Judge's decision, finding no harmful errors in the analysis or conclusions reached.

Descriptive structured reading of this decided, public Appeal Board decision: what the case says, not a prediction or advice.

Full decision

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Decision text, by section

DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS APPEAL BOARD Date: October 29, 2026 _______________________________________ ) In the matter of: )

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ISCR Case No. 26-00404

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) Applicant for Security Clearance ) _______________________________________)

APPEAL BOARD DECISION

Appearances

FOR GOVERNMENT Andrea M. Corrales, Esq., Deputy Chief Department Counsel

Appearances

Grant Couch, Esq. The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On April 16, 2026, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On September 28, 2026, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge J. Goldstein denied Applicant national security eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. Judge’s Findings and Analysis Applicant, in his mid-60s, is married and has four adult children. He seeks national security eligibility for his employment with a government contractor, for whom he has worked since January 2020. Between 2020 and 2023, Applicant worked a reduced number of hours due to COVID-related staffing reductions and his own medical limitations. Supplemented by income from a part-time position, Applicant earned $45,000 in 2020, and he currently earns $80,000

annually while working 60 hours a week between two jobs. Applicant’s wife is employed, earning $1,800 a month, but she does not contribute towards paying household expenses. The SOR alleged security concerns arising from Applicant’s 11 delinquent debts. In his May 2026 response to the SOR, he denied all of the alleged debts. The Judge found for Applicant concerning seven accounts and adversely on the remaining allegations. Applicant’s four unmitigated accounts consist of a debt consolidation loan (SOR ¶ 1.a) and three credit card accounts (SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.d, and 1.h) totaling over $61,000. He presented evidence of a lump-sum settlement offer from a creditor (SOR ¶ 1.a) and two payment agreements (SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.d) but no payments completed on these three accounts. Applicant completed one $60 payment on SOR ¶ 1.h and, following the hearing, scheduled payments of $3,331 on SOR ¶ 1.b and $1,048 on SOR ¶ 1.c for October 2, 2026. Applicant Exhibit (AE) BB; AE CC. He testified that he had $400 in his savings account, and he estimated that he had approximately $1,500 to $2,000 remaining each month after bill payments to “buy food, shop.” Transcript at 86. Noting that the four unresolved accounts constituted approximately 68% of the total alleged debt, the Judge concluded that neither AG ¶ 20(b) nor AG ¶ 20(d) applied to those four accounts because Applicant had not demonstrated that he had acted responsibly or had made good- faith efforts to resolve those debts: Merely establishing settlement agreements or communicating good-faith intentions without actual payments does not constitute “concomitant conduct” or a “good­ faith effort” to repay overdue creditors. . . . While he is credited for communicating with each of these creditors to work toward their resolution, he does not yet have a viable plan [] to address SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.b, 1.d, and 1.h beyond his stated intent to possibly take a debt consolidation loan. Decision at 8. Incorporating these considerations in her Whole-Person analysis, the Judge determined that Applicant needed to “demonstrate a longer track record of steady payments towards his debts under the settlement agreements he has reached with the creditors.” Id. Discussion Applicant, in effect, raises four intertwined arguments on appeal: (1) whether the Judge failed to consider significant record evidence concerning SOR ¶¶ 1.b and 1.d under AG ¶ 20(d); (2) whether the Judge’s AG ¶ 20(d) conclusions reflect piecemeal analysis; (3) whether the Judge failed to consider Applicant’s financial limitations in evaluating if he acted responsibly under AG ¶ 20(b); and (4) whether the Judge’s Whole-Person analysis runs contrary to the record evidence. For the following reasons, Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive, and we affirm the Judge’s decision. Applicant first asserts that his post-hearing payment agreements and scheduled payments for SOR ¶¶ 1.b and 1.d upend the Judge’s conclusion under AG ¶ 20(d) that Applicant did “not yet have a viable plan [] to address” the four unresolved debts. Id. Although the Judge did not explicitly cite the two scheduled payments, she referenced Applicant’s testimony about creditor contacts and payment agreements on these two accounts and highlighted that no payments had been completed. Id. at 2, 3. The Judge is not compelled to cite every piece of evidence, and the 2

absence of an explicit reference to the scheduled, but not completed, payments is, at most, harmless error. See ISCR Case No. 95-0495, 1996 WL 481030 at *3 (App. Bd. Mar. 22, 1996) (error is harmless when “it was not outcome determinative”). Building upon this first appeal argument, Applicant essentially contends that his recent payment plans and scheduled payments for SOR ¶¶ 1.b and 1.d are a continuing course of his “overall repayment strategy and demonstrated implementation.” Appeal Brief at 7. The Judge determined Applicant mitigated the security concerns as to SOR ¶¶ 1.c, 1.e through 1.g, 1.i, and 1.j under AG ¶¶ 20(b) and 20(d) following a series of payments and resolution efforts beginning in January 2026, because Applicant had “demonstrate[d] a reasonable plan and concomitant conduct to resolve his debts as he [was] able.” Decision at 7. Applicant challenges the disparate treatment as to the adverse findings on the four debts within the AG ¶ 20(d) analysis. The critical assessment is whether Applicant has a reasonable plan accompanied by “actions which evidence a serious intent to effectuate the plan.” ISCR Case No. 09-08462, 2011 WL 2326598 at *2 (App. Bd. May 31, 2011). Applicant testified as to his limited financial resources – $400 in savings and a monthly remainder $2,000 or less before grocery expenses – yet the scheduled payments to be completed four weeks later total over $4,300. With no further information or explanation from Applicant as to how these payments would be fulfilled, the Judge properly concluded that Applicant’s plan did not reflect the requisite “serious intent” under AG ¶ 20(d). Turning next to his challenge to the Judge’s AG ¶ 20(b) analysis, Applicant argues that the Judge acknowledged Applicant’s reduced work hours and medical limitations but failed to consider these restrictions in evaluating whether Applicant acted responsibly. As a starting point, this premise – Applicant’s limited financial resources – actually supports the Judge’s conclusion that the post-hearing scheduled payments were unreasonable. Furthermore, the Judge explicitly noted Applicant’s limited funds available for debt repayment, his reasonable payment plans, and payments in her application of AG ¶¶ 20(b) and 20(d) to six allegations. Decision at 7. The Judge’s determination that Applicant’s two large scheduled payments did not reflect a reasonable plan, given his limited resources even while working increased hours, reflects cogent analysis supported by the record evidence. Finally, Applicant’s challenge to the Judge’s Whole-Person analysis reflects a recitation of favorable evidence in mitigation and a mere disagreement as to the Judge’s weighing of such evidence under Guideline F and incorporated within the Whole-Person analysis. Applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s characterizations and weighing of the evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. See ISCR Case No. 04­ 08975, 2006 WL 2725032 at *1 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006). Conclusion Applicant has not established that the Judge’s conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The Judge examined the relevant evidence, weighed the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision. The record is sufficient to support that the Judge’s findings and conclusions are sustainable. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning 3

personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). Order The decision in ISCR Case No. 26-00404 is AFFIRMED. Signed: Moira Modzelewski Moira Modzelewski Administrative Judge Chair, Appeal Board Signed: Allison Marie Allison Marie Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: Eric H. Borgstrom Eric H. Borgstrom Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board 4