A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.
ISCR Case No. 25-01393
DeniedDecided Jun 12, 2026 · Administrative Judge Wilford H. Ross · Hearing
Case headnote
Summary
The applicant, a 26-year-old government contractor, faced security clearance denial under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) and Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) due to his history of marijuana and hallucinogenic mushroom use. Despite acknowledging his drug use, he failed to demonstrate sufficient steps to mitigate the associated security concerns, leading to the denial of his application.
Why the applicant was denied
- The applicant's marijuana use was frequent and continued even after being employed in a drug-free workplace.
- He did not demonstrate a clear intent to abstain from drug use or disassociate from drug-using associates.
- The applicant's admissions indicated a lack of good judgment and foresight regarding his drug use in relation to security clearance eligibility.
Conditions referenced
Disqualifying
- AG ¶ 25(a) Substance Misuseapplied
- AG ¶ 25(c) Illegal Possession of a Controlled Substanceapplied
- AG ¶ 16(e) Personal Conduct Creating Vulnerabilityapplied
Mitigating
- AG ¶ 26(a) Infrequency of Behaviorrejected
- AG ¶ 26(b) Acknowledgment and Actions Takenrejected
- AG ¶ 17(c) Minor Offense or Time Passedrejected
- AG ¶ 17(d) Acknowledgment and Counselingrejected
- AG ¶ 17(e) Reducing Vulnerabilityrejected
Key rule quoted
“An individual’s disregard for federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations.”
Procedural posture
- SOR issued
- 01/29/2026
- Answer filed
- 02/17/2026 Requested decision on the written record.
- Hearing held
- No hearing; decision made on the written record.
- Decision date
- 06/12/2026
Cite for
- Denial of Security Clearance Due to Frequent Drug Use Under Guideline H
- Lack of Mitigating Factors for Personal Conduct Under Guideline E
- Importance of Compliance with Federal Drug Laws in Security Clearance Determinations
Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.
Allegations under Guideline E
Reading the 1 per allegation row needs a free account.
1 row in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Allegations under Guideline H
Reading the 2 per allegation rows needs a free account.
2 rows in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
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Full decision
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Decision text, by section
Appearances
)
In the matter of: )
) ISCR Case No. 25-01393
)
) Applicant for Security Clearance
Decision
) ___________________________________ ) ______________ ______________ Appearances For Government: Tovah Minster, Esq., Department Counsel F
Statement of Case
or Applicant: Pro se 06/12/2026 Decision ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on May 2, 2025. On January 29, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guidelines H and E. Applicant answered the SOR on February 17, 2026,
Findings of Fact
and requested a decision on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on April 7, 2026. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was sent to Applicant, who was given an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s evidence. He received the FORM on April 9, 2026, and he did not respond. The case was assigned to me on June 2, 2026. 1
The FORM consists of the pleadings in the case (Government Exhibit (GE) 1), Applicant’s answer to the SOR (GE 2), and the documents in support of the allegations in the SOR (GE 3-5). GE 2 through 5 are admitted into evidence, without objection. Findings of Fact with varying frequency (SOR ¶ 1.a), and that from about March 2022 to March 2023 he used hallucinogenic mushrooms
The SOR alleges under Guideline H that from at least October 2015 to November 2025, Applicant purchased and used THC1 2 with varying frequency (SOR ¶ 1.b). Both allegations are cross alleged under Guideline E. (SOR ¶ 2.a). (GE 1) He a dmits the allegations under Guideline H and denies the allegation under Guideline E. (GE 2) Applicant is 26 years old and earned a bachelor’s degree in 2023. He has lived with a cohabitant since 2024, has never been married, has no children, and has no history of prior military service. He has been employed by a government contractor since December 2023. (GE 3) His employer has a drug and alcohol-free workplace policy, he was required to take a preemployment drug test, and he is subject to random drug testing for his position. (GE 4) Marijuana Use Applicant disclosed his marijuana purchase and use in his SCA and volunteered additional details during his personal subject interview and in response to Government interrogatories. (GE 3-5) He used marijuana recreationally between October 2015 and November 2025. His use was daily while in college from August 2019 to May 2023, and a few times a month since graduating. He purchased marijuana from either a fellow classmate or dispensaries and gas stations in states that had legalized recreational marijuana use. He resides and attended college in a state that legalized recreational marijuana use in July 2021. He feels “calming effects and other benefits” from using marijuana and therefore “cannot rule out using this substance at any time in the distant future.” (GE 3) Although he does not disavow the possibility of future marijuana use, he does assert that he has no intent to use marijuana “while holding an active security clearance.” He has not indicated a willingness to leave or avoid environments where drugs are used or disassociate with friends who use drugs. He believes “no drastic steps [are] required.” If he finds himself in a situation where drugs are being used, he “simply would not use them.” (GE 4) 1 The SOR lists “THC” as the controlled substance. Based on the evidence in the FORM, any reference to “THC” is found to be a reference to either tetrahydrocannabinols or marijuana, both of which are a Schedule I controlled substance. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970). 2 The SOR lists “hallucinogenic mushrooms” as the controlled substance. Based on the evidence in the FORM, any references to “mushrooms” is found to be a reference to psilocybin, a Schedule I controlled substance. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970). 2
Hallucinogenic Drug Use Applicant disclosed his hallucinogenic drug use in his SCA and in response to Government interrogatories. He purchased and used psilocybin twice, in March 2022 and March 2023, respectively. (GE 3-4) He has no future intent to use psilocybin. (GE 3-4) Federal Government Policy o n Marijuana Use On October 25, 2014, the Director for National Intelligence (DNI) issued a memorandum titled, Adherence to Federal Laws Prohibiting Marijuana Use addressing concerns raised by the decriminalization of marijuana use in several states and the District of Columbia. The memorandum states that changes to state and local laws do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines. “An individual’s disregard for federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations.” See ISCR Case No. 14-03734 at 2 (App. Bd. Feb. 18, 2016) (state laws legalizing marijuana use do not alter or preempt the existing Guidelines). On May 26, 2015, the Director of the United States Office
Background
The SOR alleges under Guideline H that from at least October 2015 to November 2025, Applicant purchased and used THC1 2 with varying frequency (SOR ¶ 1.b). Both allegations are cross alleged under Guideline E. (SOR ¶ 2.a). (GE 1) He a dmits the allegations under Guideline H and denies the allegation under Guideline E. (GE 2) Applicant is 26 years old and earned a bachelor’s degree in 2023. He has lived with a cohabitant since 2024, has never been married, has no children, and has no history of prior military service. He has been employed by a government contractor since December 2023. (GE 3) His employer has a drug and alcohol-free workplace policy, he was required to take a preemployment drug test, and he is subject to random drug testing for his position. (GE 4) Marijuana Use Applicant disclosed his marijuana purchase and use in his SCA and volunteered additional details during his personal subject interview and in response to Government interrogatories. (GE 3-5) He used marijuana recreationally between October 2015 and November 2025. His use was daily while in college from August 2019 to May 2023, and a few times a month since graduating. He purchased marijuana from either a fellow classmate or dispensaries and gas stations in states that had legalized recreational marijuana use. He reside
Background
s and attended college in a state that legalized recreational marijuana use in July 2021. He feels “calming effects and other benefits” from using marijuana and therefore “cannot rule out using this sub
Policies
stance at any time in the distant future.” (GE 3) Although he does not disavow the possibility of future marijuana use, he does assert that he has no intent to use marijuana “while holding an active security clearance.” He has not indicated a willingness to leave or avoid environments where drugs are used or disassociate with friends who use drugs. He believes “no drastic steps [are] required.” If he finds himself in a situation where drugs are being used, he “simply would not use them.” (GE 4) 1 The SOR lists “THC” as the controlled substance. Based on the evidence in the FORM, any reference to “THC” is found to be a reference to either tetrahydrocannabinols or marijuana, both of which are a Schedule I controlled substance. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970). 2 The SOR lists “hallucinogenic mushrooms” as the controlled substance. Based on the evidence in the FORM, any references to “mushrooms” is found to be a reference to psilocybin, a Schedule I controlled substance. Controlled Substances Act,
Policies
21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970). 2
Hallucinogenic Drug Use Applicant disclosed his hallucinogenic drug use in his SCA and in response to Government interrogatories. He purchased and used psilocybin twice, in March 2022 and March 2023, respectively. (GE 3-4) He has no future intent to use psilocybin. (GE 3-4) Federal Government Policy o n Marijuana Use On October 25, 2014, the Director for National Intelligence (DNI) issued a memorandum titled, Adherence to Federal Laws Prohibiting Marijuana Use addressing concerns raised by the decriminalization of marijuana use in several states and the District of Columbia. The memorandum states that changes to state and local laws do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines. “An individual’s disregard for federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations.” See ISCR Case No. 14-03734 at 2 (App. Bd. Feb. 18, 2016) (state laws legalizing marijuana use do not alter or preempt the existing Guidelines). On May 26, 2015, the Director of the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) issued a memorandum titled, Federal Laws and Policies Prohibiting Marijuana Use. The Director of OPM acknowledged that several jurisdictions have decriminalized the use of marijuana, allowing the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes and/or for limited recreational use but states that Federal law on marijuana remains unchanged. Marijuana is categorized as a controlled substance under Schedule I of the C
Analysis
ontrolled Substances Act.3 Thus, knowing or intentional marijuana possession is federally illegal, even if the individual has no intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense marijuana. On December 21, 2021, the DNI signed the memorandum, Security Executive Agent Clarifying Guidance Concerning Marijuana for Agencies Conducting Adjudications of Persons Proposed for Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position. It emphasizes that federal law remains unchanged with respect to the illegal use, possession, production, and distribution of marijuana. Individuals who hold a clearance or occupy a sensitive position are prohibited by law from using controlled substances. Disregard of federal law pertaining to marijuana (including prior recreational marijuana use) remains relevant, but not determinative, to adjudications of eligibility. Agencies are required to use the “whole-person concept” stated under SEAD 4, to determine whether the applicant’s behavior raises a security concern that has not been mitigated. 3 On December 18, 2025, an executive order (Increasing Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research) was signed, ordering additional research on marijuana and directing the Attorney General to “take all necessary steps to complete the rulemaking process related to rescheduling marijuana to Schedule III of the [Controlled Substances Act].” As of this writing, recreational marijuana use has yet to be rescheduled. 3
Policies This case is adjudicated under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on June 8, 2017. “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria 4
listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side
Analysis
ontrolled Substances Act.3 Thus, knowing or intentional marijuana possession is federally illegal, even if the individual has no intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense marijuana. On December 21, 2021, the DNI signed the memorandum, Security Executive Agent Clarifying Guidance Concerning Marijuana for Agencies Conducting Adjudications of Persons Proposed for Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position. It emphasizes that federal law remains unchanged with respect to the illegal use, possession, production, and distribution of marijuana. Individuals who hold a clearance or occupy a sensitive position are prohibited by law from using controlled substances. Disregard of federal law pertaining to marijuana (including prior recreational marijuana use) remains relevant, but not determinative, to adjudications of eligibility. Agencies are required to use the “whole-person concept” stated under SEAD 4, to determine whether the applicant’s behavior raises a security concern that has not been mitigated. 3 On December 18, 2025, an executive order (Increasing Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research) was signed, ordering additional research on marijuana and directing the Attorney General to “take all necessary steps to complete the rulemaking process related to rescheduling marijuana to Schedule III of the [Controlled Substances Act].” As of this writing, recreational marijuana use has yet to be rescheduled. 3
Policies This case is adjudicated under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on June 8, 2017. “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship
Analysis
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria 4
listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side
Whole Person Concept
of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. Analysis Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 24: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. Applicant’s admissions and the record evidence establish the following disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 25(a): any substance misuse (see above definition); and AG ¶ 25(c): illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia. The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 26(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and 5
AG ¶ 26(b): the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a p attern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoi
Formal Findings
ding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. AG ¶ 26(a) applies to Applicant’s two-time psilocybin use in March of 2022 and 2023 (SOR ¶ 1.b). His use was infrequent and happened over three years ago. Based on hi
Conclusion
s history of abstinence, recurrence is unlikely, and therefore his previous use no longer casts doubt on his current judgment. None of the mitigating conditions apply to Applicant’s marijuana use and purchase (SOR ¶ 1.a). His purchase and use was regular, frequent, and he only recently ceased u