ISCR Case No. 25-00732

FOR GOVERNMENT Andrea M. Corrales, Esq., Deputy Chief Department Counsel

Pro se The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On March 2, 2026, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On July 24, 2026, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Mark Harvey denied Applicant national security eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. Background Applicant, in her mid-30s, has never been married and has two minor children. She graduated from high school and has taken some college courses, but she has not completed a degree. Applicant seeks initial national security eligibility for her employment with a government contractor, for whom she has worked since February 2026.

The SOR alleges criminal conduct security concerns arising from 15 incidents between July 2009 and September 2023 and personal conduct security concerns based on five employment terminations and cross-alleged criminal incidents. The Judge found for Applicant on all Guideline E allegations and seven concerns alleged under Guideline J, and the facts and analysis surrounding those allegations will not be discussed further. The Judge found adversely on the remaining eight Guideline J concerns, which included charges of simple burglary (SOR ¶ 1.a), criminal trespass (SOR ¶ 1.b), disturbing the peace (SOR ¶¶ 1.e, 1.g-1.i), simple battery (SOR ¶ 1.f), and harassing or threatening phone calls and text messages (SOR ¶ 1.j). Because Applicant’s appeal only challenges the Judge’s findings as to SOR ¶ 1.b and his reliance on Applicant’s statements about the incidents referenced in SOR ¶¶1.a, 1.b, and 1.f as the basis for his credibility determination, only the facts concerning these three incidents will be addressed in detail. In September 2023, Applicant was arrested and charged with simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, a felony. She denied the allegation in her Answer, wherein she stated that she “entered the home using a key” to retrieve her personal belongings. Answer at 18. At hearing, Applicant initially denied breaking into her former boyfriend’s residence, until the Government confronted her with evidence of the video of her using a metal object to force her way into the residence. Transcript (Tr.) at 49. She then conceded that she used a metal tire-changing tool to remove the burglary bar and “bolt lock off the door.” Id. at 53, 57. After breaking the outer door or security barrier, she used a key to open the inner door. Applicant pled guilty to the reduced charge of disturbing the peace, a misdemeanor. She was fined $195, required to pay restitution for the damaged door, and sentenced to 90 days in jail (suspended). In November 2022, Applicant was charged with criminal trespass due to an incident during a custody exchange between Applicant and her children’s father. The custody agreement required the exchange to occur at a police station unless both parties consented to a different location. In the past, the children’s father had consented to the exchange occurring at his residence. The criminal trespass offense was based on the father’s withdrawal of consent and requiring the exchange at a police station, after which Applicant allegedly drove a vehicle onto his driveway. Government Exhibit (GE) 6 at 60. Law enforcement interviewed Applicant and reviewed text exchanges between Applicant and her children’s father. Id. The police report states that Applicant told police officers that “she let the kids get out [of her vehicle] and backed out and left.” Id. at 60­ 61. At hearing, Applicant denied driving onto the driveway and claimed that the interviewing officer falsified that information in the report. Applicant was charged with criminal trespass, a misdemeanor; however, the prosecution declined to prosecute the matter further due to the unavailability of a necessary witness. In February 2016, Applicant was arrested and charged with simple battery. At hearing, Applicant admitted that she exchanged blows with another woman, V. “I punched her and she may have fell to the ground, but she was also holding me and we were both on the ground punching each other.” Tr. at 91. In the police report, V accused Applicant of kicking her while V was on the ground, including kicking her in the abdomen. GE 6 at 36. V was four-weeks pregnant at the time, and the officer observed facial bruises and abrasions to her arm and leg. Id. V was taken to the hospital after she reported bleeding from her vaginal area. Id. When questioned by law enforcement, Applicant denied that she had seen V on the day of the altercation. Id. At hearing, Applicant did not recall making such a statement to police. Tr. at 90. Applicant was found guilty and was sentenced to 60 days in jail (suspended) and two years of probation. 2

In his Guideline J mitigation analysis, the Judge concluded that none of the mitigating conditions fully applied because Applicant’s recent false statements – the omission of the November 2022 charge on her security clearance application and during her security interview; her denial of driving onto the driveway during the November 2022 criminal trespass; and her false testimony at hearing about not breaking into the residence in September 2023 – undercut her evidence of successful rehabilitation given her criminal conduct spanning nearly 15 years. Decision at 18. Discussion On appeal, Applicant challenges only one finding of fact – whether the criminal trespass conduct alleged in SOR ¶ 1.b was established by substantial evidence given record evidence to the contrary. The remaining three issues on appeal, in effect, argue that the Judge did not articulate adequate explanations for concluding that Applicant did not demonstrate successful rehabilitation (AG ¶ 32(d))1 of the remaining criminal conduct security concerns within the Guideline J and Whole-Person analyses. For the following reasons, Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive, and we affirm the Judge’s decision. Turning first to the criminal trespass incident, Applicant acknowledged in her brief that the application of AG ¶ 31(b)2 does not require a criminal conviction. She contends that the prior permission to conduct exchanges at the residence, her denials as to entering the driveway, and the non-prosecution of the charge refute the alleged criminal conduct. When an applicant denies an allegation, the Government’s burden is to present “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.” Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1. In his Decision, the Judge comprehensively discussed the November 2022 incident, relying upon Applicant’s Answer, her hearing testimony, the police report, and court records. The Judge noted that the text exchanges between Applicant and her children’s father reflect he withdrew permission to conduct the exchange at his residence; the police report included Applicant’s admission that she “backed out” of the driveway; and Applicant’s testimony that the law enforcement officer included false information in the police report to state that Applicant admitted entering the driveway. Decision at 4-5. The Judge also considered that Applicant “lied at her hearing when she falsely denied that her car went onto his driveway.” Id. at 16-17. The Judge’s finding that the record evidence established Applicant’s criminal conduct under SOR ¶ 1.b is supported by substantial evidence. Applicant, in effect, also argues that the Judge did not adequately explain the nexus between “successful rehabilitation” and the Judge’s adverse credibility determination or why 1 AG ¶ 32(d): there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited to, the passage of time without recurrent of criminal activity, restitution, compliance with the terms of parole or probation, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community involvement. 2 AG ¶ 31(b): evidence (including, but not limited to, a credible allegation, an admission, and matters of official record) of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the individual was formally charged, prosecuted, or convicted. 3

Applicant did not demonstrate successful rehabilitation within the Guideline J and Whole-Person analyses. We disagree. First, the Judge identified three critical instances in which he found Applicant failed to provide truthful, candid statements to law enforcement or during the security clearance process. In February 2016, Applicant told law enforcement that she had not seen V on the day she, in fact, beat V. On her security clearance application and during her background interview, Applicant did not disclose her November 2022 criminal trespass charge, claiming that she did not know she was charged, despite her lengthy history of arrests, charges, and court proceedings. At hearing, Applicant lied about entering the driveway of her children’s father in November 2022, and she deliberately omitted that she had used a metal bar to break a burglary bar and part of an exterior door in September 2023. Applicant’s false statements reflect significant security concerns and were properly considered by the Judge regarding whether Applicant demonstrated successful rehabilitation. See ISCR Case No. 01-03132 at 3, 2002 WL 32114509 at *2 (App. Bd. Aug. 8, 2002) (“An applicant who deliberately fails to give full, frank, and candid answers to the government in connection with a security clearance investigation or adjudication interferes with the integrity of the industrial security program.”). See also ISCR Case No. 96-0360 at 5, 1997 WL 1882602 at *3 (App. Bd. Sep. 25, 1997) (“Where an applicant is unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for his or her own actions, such a failure is evidence that detracts from a finding of reform and rehabilitation.”). In addition, the Judge explicitly discussed the absence of criminal conduct since September 2023, Applicant’s character-reference letters, and favorable performance evaluation, and he quoted at length Applicant’s closing statement regarding her growth in “maturity, judgment, emotional control, and personal responsibility.” Decision at 12-13. The Judge articulated an adequate and rational explanation for his conclusions within the Guideline J and Whole-Person analyses that, notwithstanding some mitigating evidence, Applicant had not sufficiently established successful rehabilitation: None of the mitigating conditions fully apply to all of the disqualifying conduct because Applicant made recent statements, which damaged her credibility. She has not established a sufficient period of abstinence from criminal conduct. Her multiple decisions to commit criminal conduct over the last 15 years is an indication she lacks the qualities expected of those with access to national secrets and continues to cast doubt on her current reliability, trustworthiness, and judgment. Criminal conduct security concerns are not mitigated. Decision at 18. Although Applicant frames her appeal as challenging the adequacy of the Judge’s explanations, these arguments, in fact, advocate for an alternative weighing of the evidence. Her disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence or her ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. See ISCR Case No. 04-08975, 2006 WL 2725032 at *1 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006). 4

Conclusion Applicant has not established that the Judge’s conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The Judge examined the relevant evidence, weighed the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision. The record is sufficient to support that the Judge’s findings and conclusions are sustainable. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). Order The decision in ISCR Case No. 25-00732 is AFFIRMED. Signed: Moira Modzelewski Moira Modzelewski Administrative Judge Chair, Appeal Board Signed: Allison Marie Allison Marie Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: Eric H. Borgstrom Eric H. Borgstrom Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board 5