A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.
ISCR Case No. 25-00980
Appeal BoardDecided Sep 18, 2026 · Administrative Judge Moira D. Modzelewski · Appeal
Appeal at a glance
The appeal involved a denial of security clearance based on financial considerations and personal conduct. The applicant raised several issues regarding the Judge's reliance on unalleged debts and the application of mitigating conditions. The Board affirmed the Judge's decision, finding no harmful error in the analysis.
Descriptive structured reading of this decided, public Appeal Board decision: what the case says, not a prediction or advice.
Full decision
Open original PDFThe complete official text, footnotes and signatures included, is in the original PDF.
Decision text, by section
Appeal Board Decision
APPEARANCES FOR GOVERNMENT Andrea M. Corrales, Esq., Deputy Chief Department Counsel
Appearances
Pro se The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On November 19, 2025, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On July 31, 2026, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Bryan J. Olmos denied Applicant national security eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. Background The SOR alleges security concerns arising from Applicant’s 14 delinquent accounts, his misuse of a company credit card (CCC) to pay personal expenses, and four falsifications on his August 2023 security clearance application (SCA). On December 30, 2025, Applicant responded to the SOR (Answer), and admitted with explanations all 14 delinquent accounts and his misuse of the CCC, to include the outstanding balance on his restitution payments. He denied any deliberate falsifications on his August 2023 SCA.
Applicant, in his mid-40s, was married in June 2004 and divorced in June 2018. He has three children, ages 19, 16, and 9. He served on active duty in the military from 2000 to 2008, and he earned an honorable discharge. Applicant seeks national security eligibility for his employment with a government contractor, for whom he has worked since July 2023. Following his marital separation in 2018 and the imposition of a $1,800 monthly child support obligation, Applicant’s financial problems ensued. Despite full-time employment with Company A, he was unable to maintain his financial obligations. In violation of a Company A policy prohibiting the use of the CCC for personal expenses, Applicant used it to purchase meals unrelated to any business expenses in early 2019. By mid-2019, he had charged at least two months of rent to the CCC. In June 2019, Applicant’s manager and a human resources partner confronted him about his misuse of the CCC. He admitted his knowing violations, received a written warning, and was required to remit payment for his personal charges in accordance with a payment schedule. Despite an extension, Applicant failed to make the requisite payments, and he was terminated in March 2020. As of September 2025, he still owed $3,240 in restitution to Company A. Government Exhibit (GE) 4. In August 2020, Applicant submitted an SCA in which he reported that he was still employed with Company A and that he had received a written warning because he “[u]sed [the] company card for personal charges.” GE 2 at 38. In response to financial queries, Applicant disclosed that he was working with a debt consolidation firm to address his delinquent accounts following his divorce. The background investigation was not completed because Applicant left the sponsoring employer in December 2020. In August 2023, Applicant submitted an updated SCA in which he did not report his misuse of the CCC, having received a written warning from Company A, or his involuntary termination. Instead, Applicant stated that he left Company A to “start[] a new job.” GE 1 at 16. In response to the financial queries on the August 2023 SCA, Applicant did not disclose any delinquent debts, including his delinquent child support. His only listed period of unemployment was December 2020 through July 2021. During his October 2023 security interview, Applicant confirmed his responses on his August 2023 SCA. He then disclosed that he accidentally used his CCC to pay rent for a few months and for a few dinners in 2019. Applicant claimed it was an “honest mistake” and that he notified his manager once he discovered the error. GE 3 at 5. He did not recall the details regarding the written warning or his termination from Company A. He claimed his departure from Company A was mutual. He then explained that he did not understand all of the queries within the SCA and had rushed through portions of the questionnaire. During the security interview, Applicant admitted that he had not made child support payments from about December 2020 until mid-2023 due to health and financial issues. His wages were being garnished to pay child support and the arrears. He also admitted his awareness of several additional delinquent accounts, including a 2019 vehicle repossession. In his January 2026 Answer, Applicant explained that he experienced ongoing medical problems but remained committed to resolving his delinquent debts. He stated that his omissions on his SCA were not intentional and that he “misunderstood the scope of the questions and did not 2
fully appreciate that past financial and employment matters still required disclosure despite the passage of time.” Answer at 4. At the hearing, Applicant testified that he informed his manager about his misuse of the CCC prior to being investigated; however, correspondence from Company A stated Applicant’s manager initiated the discussion. Transcript at 70; GE 4 at 1. As to his disclosures regarding his CCC misuse, written warning, and termination on his August 2020 and August 2023 SCAs, Applicant testified that this information had been prepopulated from his August 2020 SCA and he intentionally removed it from his August 2023 SCA because he sought to avoid discussing the circumstances that led to his termination. He further admitted that he withheld information about his delinquent debts due to embarrassment and to avoid discussing his financial problems. Applicant’s delinquent child support (SOR ¶ 1.d) decreased from $65,755 to $49,072 between September 2023 and June 2026, and the Judge resolved the allegation favorably. In February 2026, Applicant began working with a debt consolidation company, enrolling two alleged debts (SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.j) and several new, unalleged delinquent accounts. The remaining 11 alleged accounts are not enrolled, and there is no evidence of any debt resolution efforts on these accounts. Applicant testified that he recently contacted Company A and was informed that he did not owe any funds (SOR ¶ 1.p); however, he provided no corroborating evidence. Applicant’s June 2026 credit report reveals several new, unalleged past-due accounts. Under Guideline F, the Judge concluded that mitigating conditions AG ¶¶ 20(a) and 20(b)1 did not apply because Applicant’s CCC misuse, which led to his termination, was within his control and because his financial problems were ongoing. He also concluded AG ¶ 20(d)2 did not fully apply given the recency and limited track record of debt resolution efforts, and AG ¶ 20(e)3 was inapplicable because Applicant did not provide a reasonable basis for his disputed debts (SOR ¶¶ 1.c, 1.i). A critical factor in the Judge’s analysis regarding the CCC misuse specifically was Applicant’s continued denial of any intentional misuse, as recently as the October 2023 security interview, and his false claim at hearing that he informed his manager of his CCC misuse. Under Guideline E, the Judge concluded that none of the mitigating conditions fully applied to Applicant’s CCC misuse or four SCA falsifications: This was not a minor offense, and [Applicant] did not make a prompt good-faith effort to correct his omissions and concealments. Given the extent of his omissions and falsifications, his recent efforts to provide accurate information do not fully 1 AG ¶¶ 20(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and 20(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances. 2 AG ¶ 20(d): the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts. 3 AG ¶ 20(e): the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue. 3
mitigate the security concerns. More time is necessary for him to establish that he can maintain the reliability, trustworthiness, and judgment necessary to hold a security clearance. Decision at 13. Discussion On appeal, Applicant raises four issues: (1) the Judge improperly relied on unalleged delinquent accounts in the Guideline F mitigation analysis; (2) the Judge’s conclusion that Applicant’s misuse of the CCC (SOR ¶ 1.p) was not mitigated by the passage of time was arbitrary and capricious; (3) the Judge’s application of AG ¶ 16(f) was unsupported by the record evidence; and (4) the Judge’s threshold that mitigating conditions must “fully” apply is without support in the Directive and Adjudicative Guidelines. For the following reasons, Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive, and we affirm the Judge’s decision. Turning first to Applicant’s argument regarding unalleged conduct, the Judge cited Appeal Board caselaw outlining the limited purposes for which such conduct may be considered, including when evaluating evidence in extenuation or mitigation. Decision at 3. Contrary to Applicant’s contention, a judge is not required to reiterate the caselaw or the permissible bases for the consideration of unalleged conduct – here, the unalleged delinquent accounts – each time the issue arises. The Judge properly considered Applicant’s new, unalleged debts within the Guideline F mitigation analysis for the limited purposes permitted. Regarding Applicant’s misuse of the CCC and its related consequences, the Judge found that Applicant knowingly and repeatedly violated company policy when he used the CCC for personal expenses, and he was not required to accept Applicant’s uncorroborated claim that the related debt was resolved. See ISCR Case No. 98-0123 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 28, 1998). The Judge explained that, notwithstanding the passage of time since the misconduct, Applicant’s outstanding debt to Company A was ongoing, and his omissions and denials of intentional wrongdoing and false claims that he notified his manager of his misconduct undercut his evidence in mitigation. Decision at 10. We have repeatedly held that both factors are proper for consideration within a mitigation analysis. See ISCR Case No. 01-03695, 2002 WL 32114512 at *2 (App. Bd. Oct. 16, 2002) (an applicant’s ongoing, unpaid debts evidence a continuing course of conduct and, therefore, can be viewed as recent for purposes of the Guideline F mitigating conditions); ISCR Case No. 96-0360 at 3, 1997 WL 1882602 at *3 (App. Bd. Sep. 25, 1997) (“Where an applicant is unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for his or her own actions, such a failure is evidence that detracts from a finding of reform and rehabilitation.”). Applicant next contends that the Judge committed harmful error in his Guideline E disqualification analysis by concluding that AG ¶ 16(f), violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual to the employer as a condition of employment, applied to his CCC misuse. Applicant acknowledges that “[t]he record establishe[d] that [his] credit card charges violated company policy;” however, he argues the Judge may not rely upon AG ¶ 16(f) because an employer’s policy is not equivalent to a written commitment made by an individual as a condition of employment. Appeal Brief at 4. We are not persuaded. 4
The Judge was not restricted to a strict application of AG ¶ 16(f) when he interpreted the company policy as akin to a written commitment underpinning Applicant’s employment. See ISCR Case No. 13-01281 at 4, 2014 WL 4657395 at *3 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2014) (Disqualifying conditions are “illustrative in nature, and, even when none of [them] under a particular guideline can be applied with literal preciseness, it is not improper for a Judge to conclude that an applicant’s conduct sets forth concerns under that Guideline.”). Applicant has not established harmful error in the Judge’s application of AG ¶ 16(f). Applicant’s final argument challenges that, within the Guideline F and Guideline E analyses, the Judge concluded that none of the mitigation conditions “fully” applied. On appeal, Applicant argues that there is no requirement that all doubt be eliminated in mitigation. In fact, it is well settled that “a favorable clearance decision means that the record discloses no basis for doubt about an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.” ISCR Case No. 18 02085, 2020 WL 1321656 at *6 (App. Bd. Jan. 3, 2020) (citing ISCR Case No.12-00270, 2014 WL 583338 at *2 (App. Bd. Jan. 17, 2014)). See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Whenever any doubt is raised about an individual’s judgment or loyalty, it is deemed best to err on the side of the government’s compelling interest in security by denying or revoking clearance.”). Conclusion Applicant has not established that the Judge’s conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The Judge examined the relevant evidence, weighed the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision. The record is sufficient to support that the Judge’s findings and conclusions are sustainable. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). 5
Order The decision in ISCR Case No. 25-00980 is AFFIRMED. Signed: Moira Modzelewski Moira Modzelewski Administrative Judge Chair, Appeal Board Signed: Allison Marie Allison Marie Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: Eric H. Borgstrom Eric H. Borgstrom Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board 6