Skip to content
← Back to results

A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ISCR Case No. 25-00238

Appeal Board

Decided Sep 23, 2026 · Administrative Judge Moira D. Modzelewski · Appeal

Appeal at a glance

The appeal involved a denial of security clearance based on allegations of personal conduct related to timecard fraud. The Applicant contested the extent of the misconduct but acknowledged some wrongdoing. The Board affirmed the Administrative Judge's decision, finding no harmful error in the Judge's conclusions regarding the Applicant's lack of full acceptance of responsibility and the reliability of the employer's investigation.

Descriptive structured reading of this decided, public Appeal Board decision: what the case says, not a prediction or advice.

Full decision

Open original PDF

The complete official text, footnotes and signatures included, is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

Appearances

FOR GOVERNMENT Andrea M. Corrales, Esq., Deputy Chief Department Counsel

Appearances

Pro se The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On July 17, 2025, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On August 3, 2026, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Mark Harvey denied Applicant national security eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. Judge’s Findings of Fact and Analysis Applicant, in his mid-50s, has been employed as a field service engineer assisting in training military pilots since June 2024. Stemming from his prior employment of almost 20 years was the SOR’s one concern, namely that Applicant was terminated in January 2024 after a workplace investigation concluded that he routinely mischarged his time, having falsely claimed to work approximately 90 hours during a period though his computer showed no activity and he produced no work product during that time.

During his 2024 national security investigation, Applicant disclosed his recent January 2024 termination and that it followed an allegation of mischarged time; however, he “denied any misuse or mischarging time,” explaining instead that his position afforded the “flexibility to enter and exit the facility on breaks and lunches as long as his 40 hour a week requirement was met.” Government Exhibit (GE) 2 at 6. Utilizing this flexibility to go home for lunch and to take his child to school resulted in Applicant badging in and out several times each day, which his employer misconstrued as mischarging time, especially because he had exhausted his annual and sick leave to address certain health struggles. Conflicting with Applicant’s explanation was information drawn from his employer’s investigation, which began with his supervisor’s December 2023 report to human resources about Applicant’s “labor compliance and performance concerns.” GE 4 at 1. Noting his observations over the prior year, the supervisor reported that Applicant “does not communicate when he will be out, goes missing for long periods of time, and cannot be found on site,” was not responsive by chat or to his supervisor’s texts trying to locate him, and had “been spotted leaving the building, does not communicate where he is going, and still logs the same number of hours.” Id. His supervisor further noted that Applicant had already been counseled about the communication concerns and had charged 40 hours per week to a project that “often does not merit 40 hours of work.” Id. The ensuing investigation determined that the allegations of mischarging were substantiated, finding that the investigative data supported that Applicant “was frequently missing from the workplace during midday hours,” “revealed daily extended departures,” and confirmed “late arrivals and early departures,” which absences Applicant posted as time worked. Id. at 4. During the investigative interview, Applicant “confessed to the unauthorized midday workplace departures,” attributed his absences “to attempts to alleviate pain and discomfort associated with a medical condition (gout),” and “admitted to the resultant overstated and mischarged hours.” Id. at 5. In a written statement provided during the investigation, Applicant wrote, “I take full responsibility for these mistakes I made and understand the importance of accurate time reporting. I am committed to rectifying these mistakes promptly.” GE 3 at 3. The investigation concluded that, during the six weeks between November 6, 2023, and January 10, 2024, Applicant overstated and mischarged approximately 90 hours, which carried a monetary value of about $18,000. In response to the SOR and at hearing, Applicant acknowledged overcharging time during the period in question, but estimated it was only seven or eight hours, and denied the 90-hour calculation as “absurd.” Answer at 1. He believed that the investigation was flawed because it relied on when he entered the building and his computer activity to determine the number of hours worked during the day and therefore failed to consider that he “worked almost exclusively in the lab” and “attended countless meetings throughout the day/week,” which is why his computer would show no activity. Id. The Judge credited the foregoing explanation to a minor extent, finding that “[t]he amount of Applicant’s timecard fraud is likely to be somewhat less than 90 hours, as Applicant likely performed some work and attended some meetings when his computer was not being used.” Decision at 10. He ultimately gave greater weight to the employer’s investigation, however, and, relying heavily on Applicant’s minimization of the extent of his misconduct and his resulting 2

failure to take full responsibility for it, the Judge concluded that none of the mitigating conditions applied and resolved the allegation adversely. Discussion During the proceedings below and again on appeal, Applicant concedes that he violated his employer’s time-reporting requirements, but he again contends that he mischarged significantly fewer hours than the 90 calculated in the internal investigation. He charges that the Judge mischaracterized his disagreement with the employer’s hours calculation as a failure to accept responsibility, arguing that “disputing the accuracy of an employer’s numerical estimate while admitting the underlying misconduct is not the same as refusing to accept responsibility.” Appeal Brief at 2. Applicant also argues that the Judge failed to properly consider that two years have passed since the alleged conduct without “comparable disciplinary or timekeeping problems.” Id. at 4. Both arguments implicate the concepts of reform and rehabilitation, and, for the following reasons, we are unpersuaded by them. Regarding the calculation of hours, the Judge noted the competing evidence, including that Applicant believed he overcharged seven or eight hours of time but “did not maintain a personal record of the hours he worked.” Decision at 6. Conversely, the “investigative record included 74 pages of printouts of dates and times, which his employer used to calculate the mischarged hours.” Id. In examples from January 2024, Applicant’s time of arrival, time of departure, and time disengaged or away from the site were assessed to determine that he overstated four and five hours of work on two specific days alone. Noting the deference afforded to a company’s findings and conclusions in its internal investigations,1 the Judge weighed the competing evidence as required,2 and he reasonably found that Applicant’s timecard fraud was “substantially more than the seven to eight hours he admitted that he committed.” Decision at 10. Having found the employer’s investigative findings more reliable, the Judge went on to conclude that Applicant was minimizing his conduct, which precluded mitigation through acceptance of responsibility under AG ¶ 17(d) or the passage of time under AG ¶ 17(c).3 An applicant’s acceptance of responsibility for concerning conduct carries significant weight in national security eligibility determinations, and it is well settled that the failure to do so impacts upon the individual’s case in mitigation, such as through the passage of time without incident and other evidence of rehabilitation.4 Applicant’s minimization of the extent of his 1 See ISCR Case No. 15-08385, 2018 WL 2925658 at *3 (App. Bd. May 23, 2018). 2 See ISCR Case No. 98-0507 at 4 (App. Bd. May 17, 1999). 3 AG ¶¶ 17(c): the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 17(d): the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur. 4 See ISCR Case No. 96- 0360, 1997 WL 1882602 at *3 (App. Bd. Sep. 25, 1997) (“Where an applicant is unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for his or her own actions, such a failure is evidence that detracts from a finding of reform and rehabilitation.”); ISCR Case No. 97-0625 at 3 (App. Bd. Aug. 17, 1998) (“Whatever mitigating value attaches to the passage of time since the [alleged misconduct], it is seriously diminished by Applicant's failure to acknowledge his misconduct or accept responsibility for it.). 3

timecard fraud – in the face of both his own apparent contemporaneous admissions to more significant conduct and the employer’s thorough investigative findings – avoids full responsibility and undercuts his evidence of reform and rehabilitation under the Adjudicative Guidelines and the Whole-Person Concept. The Judge’s explanation for his adverse resolution of the Guideline E concern is supported by the record and Appeal Board precedent to which he cites, and we find no basis to disturb that decision on appeal. Conclusion Applicant has not established that the Judge’s conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The Judge examined the relevant evidence, weighed the disqualifying and mitigating evidence, and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision. The record is sufficient to support that the Judge’s findings and conclusions are sustainable. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). Order The decision in ISCR Case No. 25-00238 is AFFIRMED. Signed: Moira Modzelewski Moira Modzelewski Administrative Judge Chair, Appeal Board Signed: Allison Marie Allison Marie Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: Eric H. Borgstrom Eric H. Borgstrom Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board 4