ISCR Case No. 25-01199

______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: Applicant for Security Clearance ) ) ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 25-01199 Appearances For Government: John Renehan, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Sean D. Rogers, Esq. National Security Law Firm 09/23/2026 Decision ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns arising from his failure to comply with rules and regulations for handling protected information and his personal conduct in falsifying a government questionnaire. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case On November 9, 2025, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) and Guideline K (Handling Protected Information). The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on June 8, 2017. Applicant responded to the SOR in writing (Answer) on December 23, 2025, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared

to proceed on February 12, 2026. The case was assigned to another administrative judge on February 19, 2026. The case was reassigned to me on February 23, 2026. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing on March 25, 2026. I convened the hearing as scheduled on May 13, 2026. The Government offered Government Exhibits 1 through 3, which were admitted without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf, called three witnesses, and submitted Applicant Exhibits A through I, which were also admitted without objection. He asked that the record remain open for the admission of additional exhibits. He submitted two additional exhibits on June 1, 2026, and they were admitted without objection. Applicant Exhibit J is a March 3, 2026 email from his security office regarding SOR allegation 2.a. Applicant Exhibit K is a list of workplace awards. DOHA received the transcript of this hearing on May 26, 2026. The record closed on June 1, 2026. Findings of Fact Applicant is 29 years old and single. He has a bachelor’s degree. He has been employed by a defense contractor since June 2020 and is currently a principal software engineer. He has been granted national security eligibility. (Government Exhibit 2 at Sections 12, 13A, and 18.) Paragraph 1, Guideline E (Personal Conduct) The government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he has engaged in conduct that involves questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. Applicant used and purchased marijuana from August 2015 until about November 2018. His use and purchases occurred while he was in college. He stopped using marijuana because he felt that continued use was affecting his schoolwork. He also used Adderall without a prescription during the same period. Applicant has not used illegal drugs, or drugs that have not been prescribed for him, since 2018. There is no evidence of a continued drug problem. He submitted a signed statement of intent not to use drugs in the future. (Applicant Exhibits A, B, and C; Tr. 50-51.) Applicant began working for his current employer in January 2020. As part of the employment process, he filled out an e-QIP on January 23, 2020. (Government Exhibit 1.) Section 23 of Government Exhibit 1 asks about illegal use of drugs or drug activity. He willfully falsified this questionnaire by denying the use and purchase of marijuana and the use of Adderall without a prescription. Applicant stated he falsified this questionnaire because he was concerned that if he was truthful on the questionnaire he would not be hired. (Tr. 47-48, 91.) 2

Applicant completed a second e-QIP on August 15, 2024. (Government Exhibit 2.) He was truthful in responses to this questionnaire’s drug use and purchase questions set forth in Section 23. He provided an “Optional Comment” as follows, “I didn’t disclose my marijuana use in my application for a security clearance in Spring 2020.” Applicant testified that he decided to be truthful on the second questionnaire, “Basically, when it came down to it, when I was thinking about it, I came to the decision that all truth, no matter how bad, needed to be known by them [the government]. (Tr. 49- 50, 81-94.) Paragraph 2, Guideline K (Handling Protected Information) The government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he engaged in conduct that shows a deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for handling protected information. This includes classified and other sensitive government information, and proprietary information. The allegations under this paragraph will be discussed in chronological order. 2.e. Applicant’s first security infraction occurred in approximately June 2021. He entered a secured area with his cell phone. Personal electronic devices (PED), such as a cell phone or smart watch, are not allowed in such areas because they are a security risk. According to Applicant, he quickly realized that he had forgotten to take his phone out of his pocket. He left the room and reported the incident to his supervisor. (Government Exhibit 2 at Section 13; Tr. at 53-55.) 2.d. Applicant’s second security infraction occurred in October 2022. He was working for the same employer in a new location. Once again, he took his cell phone into a secured area. Applicant again quickly realized he had made this mistake and left the room. He subsequently informed his security office and received a verbal warning. (Government Exhibit 2 at Section 13; Government Exhibit 3 at 19-20; Tr. 55-57.) 2.c. Applicant’s third security infraction occurred in January 2024. He did not complete a n after-hours log at his work location. He was required to fill out the log as the primary badge holder of his particular work location on the day in question. His failure was discovered and he r eceived a written reminder to comply with all security procedures. (Tr. 57-60.) 2.b. The fourth security violation committed by Applicant occurred in April 2024. Applicant was required to log off of all of his systems at this work location, or arrange with security to have his computer on after he had gone home. On that occasion Applicant failed to get permission from security and did not log out of his computer at the end of the workday. The coworker who was responsible at the end of the normal workday for closing 3

the room from a security standpoint discovered Applicant’s failure and reported him to security. He received a written warning for this security incident. (Tr. 60-64, 101-102.) 2.a. The fifth, and most recent, security incident involving Applicant occurred in March 2025. On that occasion he was in charge of closing a secured area f or the night. This was a multi-step process that involved both physical activity on the Applicant’s part and filling out two forms stating that the different physical procedures had been done. The last actions involved closing the door into the area, locking the door and spinning the combination lock, and then attempting to enter the room using a pin and key card. These final actions are confirmed by Applicant by checking t hem off on a form. Applicant did not check the form stating that he had attempted to reenter the r oom. Applicant stated that he believes he did attempt to reenter the room but forgot about the form. An email from his security coordinator states, “I can confirm from a previous badge report that you did check at 17:47:49 f or 1200 on 3/24/2025.” (Applicant Exhibit J; Tr. 64-67, 97-100.) Applicant testified that he now has a procedure he goes through so as not to take a PED into a secured area. He also testified about other ways he conducts himself at work that make such incidents less likely. (Tr. at 57, 64, 67, 105-108.) Mitigation Two coworkers of Applicant testified on his behalf. They find him a trustworthy and reliable comrade and friend. The witnesses also discussed their understanding of security processes and procedures. He is recommended for a position of trust. (Tr. 15-43.) Applicant’s father, who works in the defense industry and has national security eligibility, also testified. He discussed the responsibilities of clearance holders and how he had communicated that to his son, the Applicant. (Tr. 109-119.) Applicant submitted documentary evidence showing that he is a successful employee and a respected friend and colleague. He does volunteer work in the community as well. (Applicant Exhibits D, E, F, G, H, and I; Tr. 51-52, 68-70.) Policies When evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 4

factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis Paragraph 1, Guideline E (Personal Conduct) The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an i ndividual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect 5

classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 16. One is potentially applicable in this case: (a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities. Applicant falsified answers on a 2020 e-QIP regarding his drug abuse history. The cited disqualifying condition applies. I have considered the following potentially mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 17: (a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur. None of the mitigating conditions fully apply in this case. Applicant admitted that his conduct in falsifying the questionnaire was intentional and taken because of fear that he would not get a job if he was truthful. He is commended for being truthful on his second e-QIP. However, honesty is a prerequisite for granting access to classified information. His actions preclude a finding in Applicant’s favor at this time. The Personal Conduct guideline is found against Applicant. Paragraph 2, Guideline K (Handling Protected Information) The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 33: 6

Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for handling protected information-which includes classified and other sensitive government information, and proprietary information-raises doubt about an individual’s trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such information, and is a serious security concern. I considered the following disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 34: (g) any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or sensitive information; and (h) negligence or lax security practices that persist despite counseling by management. I have considered the following mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 35: (a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so infrequently, or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (b) the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of security responsibilities. Applicant had five security incidents in four years. The last one occurred just over a year before the hearing in this case. Applicant’s basic argument is that these incidents should be viewed independently of each other and not viewed as showing any pattern. (Tr. 70-72.) In fact, the five incidents have to be viewed together and do show a disturbing pattern of security-related incidents. Applicant is an intelligent and capable young engineer. However, his security awareness and conduct were extremely lax over a period of years. He says that he has learned his lesson and changed his conduct. However, under the circumstances it is simply too soon to say that Applicant will consistently follow all security rules and regulations. The Handling Protected Information guideline is found against Applicant. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for national security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): 7

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. As discussed above, viewing the evidence as a whole, I cannot find Applicant currently eligible for national security eligibility. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline K: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 2.a through 2e: Against Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. WILFORD H. ROSS Administrative Judge 8