ISCR Case No. 25-01478

______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 25-01478 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Cynthia Ruckno, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Katie Quintana, Esq. 09/28/2026 Decision DRISKILL, A. M., Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guidelines H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) and E (Personal Conduct). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case On April 2, 2026, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guidelines H and E. Applicant responded to the SOR on April 21, 2026 (Answer) and requested a decision on the written record in lieu of a hearing. The Government’s written case was submitted on July 15, 2026. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was provided to Applicant, who was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns. Applicant received the FORM on July 22, 2026, and she did not respond. The case was assigned to me on September 15, 2026. Items 1 and 2 are the pleadings in the case. The Government exhibits included in the FORM (Items 3-7) are admitted in evidence without objection. Findings of Fact The SOR alleges that Applicant used marijuana in about September 2018, while granted access to classified information (SOR ¶ 1.a); that she sold marijuana from about

November 2020 to December 2021, while granted access to classified information (SOR ¶ 1.b); that she was fired from Company A in about February 2022 for violating the company policy regarding the possession and selling of marijuana in a corporate space (SOR ¶ 2.a); that she falsified material facts on her security clearance application (SCA) in 2021 when she failed to disclose her marijuana use and sale (SOR ¶¶ 2.b, 2.c). In her Answer, Applicant admitted the drug use allegation and denied the drug-dealing allegation. She admitted being fired but denied possessing or participating in the sale of marijuana. She denied failing to report her drug use, explaining that she did not think her accidental use was reportable, and she admitted that failing to disclose her participation in the sale of marijuana was “inaccurate,” but denied intentionally concealing the information from the Government. Applicant is 36 years old. She married on April 20, 2026, and has one minor child. She earned a bachelor’s degree in 2017. She has been working for her current employer since November 2022. She was first granted a security clearance in 2016. (Item 3) Applicant completed an SCA in September 2021. In Section 23 – Illegal Use of Drugs or Drug Activity, she was asked whether, in the last seven years, she had illegally used any drugs or controlled substances. She answered, “No.” She was then asked whether, in the last seven years, she had been involved in the illegal purchase, manufacture, cultivation, trafficking, production, transfer, shipping, receiving, handling or sale of any drug or controlled substance. She answered, “No.” (Item 5) A February 2022 incident report from Company A states that Applicant’s co­ worker, R, reported that Applicant sold him small quantities of marijuana at least once a month between November 2020 and December 2021. It further states that, when questioned by Company A’s security, Applicant admitted to selling R marijuana from her vehicle while parked in parking lots located on the Company A facility property. She also admitted that she sold R marijuana inside the Company A classified facility at least one time during that time span. (Item 7) In her May 2023 SCA, Applicant reported working for Company A from December 2020 until February 2022. She stated both that she “walked off from the job” and that she left by mutual agreement following charges or allegations of misconduct. She described being an “in-between connection” between R and her boyfriend, N, for the sale of marijuana. She explained that the exchanges were made at the home she shared with N for two grams of marijuana in exchange for twenty dollars, information which she stated she had to confirm with N in filling out the SCA because she did not previously know the details—she was “truly just the messenger.” She stated there were seven exchanges in total between R and N. She acknowledged that R gave a date range of November 2020 to December 2021, but she stated that was incorrect and that the transactions actually occurred from March to December 2021. She explained that R was a liar and a terrible co-worker, and that his reporting her was his angry response to her receiving a promotion. She stated she had also reported him for harassment and abuse the day before his email. She admitted to using marijuana once in 2018 when she used a friend’s vape pen, which she did not realize had marijuana in it. It appears she first reported this prior marijuana 2

use when asked about her usage of marijuana during the course of Company A’s investigation. (Item 4) Applicant also reported her use and sale of marijuana while possessing a security clearance in Section 23 – Illegal Use of Drugs or Drug Activity of the 2023 SCA. She stated her friend, D, usually just smoked cigarette replacements in his vape, so she did not think to ask what she was vaping. He did not inform her what it was until after she had used the vape pen. She was emphatic that she did not intend to use marijuana or any other drugs in the future. Regarding the sale of marijuana, she stated she would leave before R came in their house to do the exchange. She said she had no involvement with these exchanges in their home, and she was just the one who got R to meet N. She stated that, after hearing how sad R’s life seemed and dealing with his difficulties as a co-worker, she talked to N and he suggested offering R a small amount of marijuana to calm him down. She said R continued being abusive and increasingly pushy about needing marijuana. She eventually reported him for harassment and abuse and was then interviewed about R’s accusations against her. She stated she took full responsibility for her actions pertaining to selling marijuana to R. (Item 4) Applicant was interviewed by a background investigator (SI) in June 2023. She disclosed that she was “technically fired” from her position with Company A. Her discussion with the investigator was consistent with what she reported on her 2023 SCA. She explained that her motivation for acting as the “middle man [sic]” between her R and N was because she felt threatened and pressured by R. She stated that R had been asking multiple people i n the office to provide him with marijuana and, after listening to Applicant’s daily complaints about R, N offered to sell it to him to help improve her relationship with R. R later reported Applicant and alleged she was selling to other co- workers as well. She was suspended without pay for one to two weeks before being fired. She told the investigator that she was extremely remorseful for her actions. She stated she was still dating N because she loved him and that he only ever sold to R. At the time of the SI, N was using marijuana a few times a week. (Item 6) Applicant was asked about her marijuana usage in the SI. Her answers were consistent with the information on her 2023 SCA. She confirmed that she held a clearance at the time. She stated that she still associates with the friend because they have been friends for a long time. She stated this was the one and only time she ever used marijuana. (Item 6) In her June 2026 SCA, Applicant reported working for Company A from December 2020 until she was fired in February 2022. She reported leaving by mutual agreement following charges or allegations of misconduct, which she described as “alleged sale of controlled substance.” In the optional comment, she described her 2018 one-time use of marijuana. She also reported her use and sale of marijuana while possessing a security clearance, with essentially the same details as the 2023 SCA, in Section 23 – Illegal Use of Drugs or Drug Activity. (Item 3) 3

In her Answer, Applicant’s maintains the same explanations that she gave in her prior statements. She does not address the contents of the Company A incident report, nor does she provide any insight into why, if all she did was merely introduce R and N, Company A would fire her for a policy violation. She stated she no longer associates with people who use drugs. She submitted a signed declaration of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. (AE D) She also submitted a May 2026 negative hair follicle drug test. (AE E) She submitted to a psychological evaluation in May 2026, which concluded that she does not meet the diagnostic criteria for a substance use disorder and noted that, “she appears to possess numerous protective factors that would mitigate concerns about future substance-related abuse or dependence.” (AE F) Applicant submitted her college transcript, reflecting a grade point average of 3.71. (AE H) A performance summary from her current employer shows that she is a highly regarded employee, described by her manager as, “one of the best team members” and “a true rockstar in the making.” (AE I) Applicant submitted 16 letters of support from colleagues, associates, and family. They consistently praise her reliability, integrity, accountability, and selflessness. She is universally admired for her generosity, kindness, and supportiveness as a colleague, friend, wife, and mother. Her neighbor noted that she has never observed any illegal substances or activities in Applicant’s home. (AE K) Policies This case is adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on June 8, 2017. “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy” to have access to such information. Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” EO 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 4

The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” EO 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan at 531. Analysis Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 24: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may 5

lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns. The following are potentially applicable in this case: AG ¶ 25(a): any substance misuse (see above definition); AG ¶ 25(c): illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; and AG ¶ 25(f): any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position. SOR ¶ 1.a alleges that Applicant used marijuana in 2018 while granted access to classified information. In her Answer, she admitted SOR ¶ 1.a. In Item 4, Applicant reported that she unknowingly ingested marijuana once in 2018. However, without corroborating evidence, and given her credibility issues discussed in detail below, I do not find that Applicant refuted the allegation – an allegation she also admitted. AG ¶¶ 25(a), 25(c), and 25(f) apply to SOR ¶ 1.a. Applicant denied SOR ¶ 1.b and denied being an active participant in the drug deals between R and N. Her statements to Company A security, however, reflect that she did in fact personally sell marijuana to R on more than one occasion. AG ¶ 25(c) applies to SOR ¶ 1.b. The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 26(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; AG ¶ 26(b): the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a p attern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and 6

(3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. Applicant has been untruthful about, and has not taken full responsibility for, her role in the sale of marijuana to her co-worker. Although she has repeatedly stated that she was merely a “middleman” and a “messenger,” the investigation into the accusations against her reveals a very different story, with her admitting to directly selling drugs to R in the Company A parking lot and in a classified facility. Furthermore, under Applicant’s version of events, it is difficult to see what justification Company A would have for firing her if she merely connected R and N and then stayed out of their relationship, with all transactions occurring off company property; in contrast, the firing makes immediate sense given the version of events that she provided to Company A’s investigator. I credit Company A’s conclusion about what happened more than Applicant’s later explanations. Further, her later explanations demonstrate that not only has she refused to accept responsibility for her actions, she has continued to lie about them. Applicant’s continuing falsifications regarding her drug involvement demonstrate that her prior behavior remains an ongoing concern and it casts doubt on her current reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. This extends to concerns about her drug use; while the passage of time and the infrequent nature of the use would normally be mitigating, I have low confidence in Applicant’s self-reporting and am unable to rely on it to find that she has mitigated the concern. In light of her dishonesty, her signed statement of intent and her declaration that she no longer associates with drug-using individuals is of minimal mitigating value. Neither mitigating condition is established for either allegation. Guideline E, Personal Conduct The security concern for personal conduct is set out in AG ¶ 15: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns. The following are potentially applicable in this case: AG ¶ 16(a): deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment 7

qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; and AG ¶ 16(d): credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or government protected information; (2) any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations. Applicant was fired from Company A for selling marijuana to her co-worker on company property, in violation of company policy. AG ¶ 16(d) is established for SOR ¶ 2.a. Applicant failed to report her marijuana use and sale on her 2021 SCA, as required, in answering questions on the application that called for disclosure of that information. She stated that she did not think she had to report her use because, according to her, the use was accidental. She conceded that failing to report her sale of marijuana was “inaccurate.” AG ¶ 16(a) is established for SOR ¶¶ 2.b and 2.c. The following mitigating conditions potentially apply in Applicant’s case: AG ¶ 17(a): the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; AG ¶ 17(c): the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and AG ¶ 17(d): the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur. 8

As discussed above, Applicant’s credibility is a serious issue in evaluating the SOR allegations. Her decisions and actions that led to her firing from Company A, specifically selling marijuana on company property and inside the Company A classified facility also reflect extremely poorly on her judgment and trustworthiness. As discussed under Guideline H, her failures to take true responsibility for her actions and to be truthful render her behavior an ongoing concern that continues to cast doubt on her reliability. None of the mitigating conditions apply to SOR ¶ 2.a. Whether innocent or not, Applicant was aware of her past marijuana use when she completed her 2021 SCA, and she chose not to report it. This use apparently did not come to light until Company A’s 2022 investigation into her involvement with selling marijuana. This was not a prompt, good-faith effort to correct her omission, and it was only revealed after she was confronted with even more serious criminal activity. AG ¶ 17(a) is not established for SOR ¶ 2.b. Applicant was also clearly aware of her participation in the sale of marijuana when she completed her 2021 SCA, and she chose not to report it. She did not disclose it until being confronted with accusations against her during Company A’s investigation, and she continues to not be fully truthful regarding her involvement. AG ¶ 17(a) is not established for SOR ¶ 2.c. As already discussed throughout this analysis, Applicant’s dishonesty about her role in selling marijuana undercuts any possible mitigation for these two falsifications because it illustrates an ongoing issue with her credibility. Her current lack of integrity overshadows the positive changes in her life and her excellent reputation. AG ¶¶ 17(c) and 17(d) are not established for SOR ¶¶ 2.b and 2.c. Whole-Person Concept Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole- person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 9

________________________ I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines H and E in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). I reviewed every positive character letter and gave significant weight to the high praise Applicant received from so many people. I also considered her accomplishments and her obvious enthusiasm for the work she does. Unfortunately, as discussed above, this strong mitigating evidence was insufficient to outweigh the ongoing concerns about her honesty and integrity. Further, since Applicant elected to waive her right to a hearing, I also had no opportunity to question her about her actions or her state or mind, or to observe her demeanor, and thus, to better assess her credibility. See ISCR Case No. 01-12350 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Jul. 23, 2003). “Once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 09-01652 at 3 (App. Bd. Aug. 8, 2011), citing Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 4999 U.S. 905 (1991). Applicant has not overcome this presumption. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines H and E and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by her drug involvement and substance misuse and personal conduct. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline H (Drugs/Misuse): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a-1.b: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline E (Personal Conduct): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 2.a-2.c: Against Applicant Conclusion I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. A. M. Driskill Administrative Judge 10