ISCR Case No. 26-00247

DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: Applicant for Security Clearance ) ) ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 26-00247 Appearances For Government: Karen Moreno-Sayles, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Alan Edmunds, Esq. 10/01/2026 Decision Curry, Marc E., Administrative Judge: Applicant mitigated the personal conduct security concern but failed to mitigate the drug involvement and substance misuse security concern. Clearance is denied. Statement of the Case On April 16, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency Adjudication (DCSA) issued a statement of reasons (SOR) under Guideline H, drug involvement and substance misuse, and Guideline E, personal conduct, as to why it was unable to find it clearly consistent with the national security to grant security clearance eligibility. The DCSA took the action under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the National Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) effective for any adjudication made on or after June 8, 2017. On May 21, 2026, Applicant answered the SOR, admitting SOR subparagraph 1.a, in part, admitting subparagraph 2.a, and denying subparagraph 2.b. She requested a hearing, whereupon the case was assigned to me on July 23, 2026. On July 31, 2026,

the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of video teleconference hearing, scheduling the case for September 8, 2026. At the hearing, Department Counsel amended SOR subparagraph 2.b. As amended, it is as follows: You purchased marijuana from about January 2010 to about March 2025. (SOR subparagraph 2b originally alleged purchase of marijuana to about March 2026). Applicant admitted the allegation, as amended. The hearing was held as scheduled. At the hearing, I received three government exhibits, marked as Government Exhibit (GE) 1 through GE 3, 13 Applicant exhibits, marked as Applicant Exhibit (AE) A through AE M; and the testimony of Applicant. The transcript was received on September 21, 2026. Findings of Fact Applicant is a 31-year-old single woman. She graduated from college in 2018, majoring in environmental science. (AE A at 6) Since July 2025, she has been working for a defense contractor as a program manager. (AE A) Her duties include managing contract portfolios. (Answer at 6) Applicant is highly respected on the job. According to her supervisor, she demonstrates “professionalism, integrity, judgment, and consistent commitment to safeguarding sensitive information while carrying out responsibilities with the utmost discretion and accountability.” (AE J) She recently received a meritorious salary increase. (AE E) Applicant smoked marijuana “a few times a week up to once daily” from 2011 to May 2025. (GE 3 at 7) She typically smoked it by herself, using it primarily at night to help her unwind. (GE 3 at 10) She purchased it at a dispensary in a jurisdiction where it is legal. (Tr. 24) She was aware, however, that it was illegal at the federal level. (GE 3 at 8) Applicant worked for a state government agency during the summer of 2023. (GE 2 at 10) She worked for a federal government agency from August 2023 to March 2025. (GE 1 at 13) She smoked marijuana while she worked at both government agencies. (GE 1 at 12-13) In August 2023, Applicant completed an application for a public trust position. Out of “fear and embarrassment,” she did not disclose her marijuana use, as required. (Answer at 2; GE 2 at 24) After completing the application and withholding her marijuana use, she continued to smoke it through May 2025. (Tr. 32; GE 3 at 7) In August 2025, Applicant voluntarily disclosed her marijuana use on an Electronic Questionnaires for 2

Investigations Processing (e-QIP), completed as part of her current investigation, before being confronted with the earlier falsification on her 2023 public trust application. (GE 1 at 40) Applicant last purchased marijuana in March 2025, and she last used it in May 2025. She has no intent to use marijuana in the future because her job is her top priority. (GE 3 at 11) She voluntarily completed both an online drug abuse education course and an online marijuana education course in May 2026. (AEs F, G) She memorialized her intention to stop using marijuana in a signed statement in which she also expressed her understanding that any future involvement or misuse of marijuana would be grounds for revocation of her national security eligibility. (AE K) On May 18, 2026, Applicant took a urine screen. She tested negative for marijuana. (AE L) Policies The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion the Executive Branch has in regulating access to information pertaining to national security, emphasizing that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are required to be considered in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative j udge’s overall adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of several variables collectively known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 1(d) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . ..” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision. Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must consider the totality of an applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances considering the nine adjudicative process factors in AG ¶ 2(d). They are as follows: 3

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Analysis Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse Under this guideline, “the illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.” Applicant’s use of marijuana from adolescence to her late twenties triggers the application of AG ¶ 25a, “any substance misuse.” The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any further involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. 4

When Applicant used marijuana, she smoked it alone at bedtime. Consequently, AG ¶¶ 26(b)(1) and 26(b)(2) are not relevant and therefore inapplicable. Applicant voluntarily completed two marijuana education classes, and executed a signed, sworn statement that she will not resume marijuana consumption in the future. I conclude AG ¶ 26(b)(3) applies. Applicant has not used marijuana in approximately 15 months. In that time, she has thrived on the job, earning a meritorious salary increase. Conversely, during the last two years that she used marijuana, she knew that it was illegal under federal law and against the policy of her two previous employers. Most important, she knew that it was incompatible with the responsibilities of possessing a public trust position, having completed a public trust application, which required its disclosure. Yet, she falsified her application by failing to disclose her use and continued to use it for another 19 months after completing the application. Given these surrounding circumstances, together with the length of time and the frequency with which she used marijuana before stopping in May 2025, I conclude that not enough time has elapsed for AG ¶ 26(a) to apply. Applicant has not mitigated the drug involvement and substance misuse security concerns. Guideline E, Personal Conduct Under this guideline, “conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information.” (AG ¶ 15) Moreover, [o]f special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes.” (Id.) Applicant’s failure to disclose her history of marijuana use, as required on a public trust position application she executed in August 2023, triggers the application of AG ¶ 16(a), “deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities.” Applicant disclosed her past marijuana use on her August 2025 e-QIP before being confronted with its omission from the previous public trust position application she completed in August 2023. The two-year gap between the falsification and the disclosure is too long to constitute a prompt disclosure and trigger the application of the mitigating condition set forth in AG ¶ 17(a), “the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts.” 5

Nevertheless, absent record evidence of a particular channel outside of the security clearance investigative process where she could have disclosed her marijuana use, I conclude that her pre-confrontation disclosure on her 2025 e-QIP is sufficient to mitigate the personal conduct security concern. (See generally, ISCR Case No. 22-02601 at 6 (App, Bd. Feb.22, 2024) Whole-Person Concept The awarding of a security clearance is not a once in a lifetime occurrence but is based on a current analysis of the disqualifying and mitigating conditions. Under Applicant’s current circumstances, a clearance is not recommended because not enough time has elapsed since her last use of marijuana. Should she be afforded an opportunity to reapply for a security clearance in the future, and she continues to abstain from marijuana use, she may well demonstrate persuasive evidence of her security clearance worthiness. Currently, however, the granting of a security clearance is not warranted. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 2.a – 2.b: Against Applicant Conclusion Considering all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant or continue Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Marc E. Curry Administrative Judge 6