ISCR Case No. 26-00421

______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS _____________________________________

In the matter of: )

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) ISCR Case No. 26-00421

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Applicant for Security Clearance ) _____________________________________ ) Appearances For Government: Daniel P. O’Reilley, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro Se 09/24/2026 Decision CEFOLA, Richard A. Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) and Guideline K (Handling Protected Information). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions on May 13, 2025 (Questionnaire). On May 20, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) and Guideline K (Handling Protected Information). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within DoD after June 8, 2017.

On or about June 2, 2026, Applicant responded to the SOR in writing (Answer) and requested that the case be decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. In his Answer, Applicant admitted to all of the allegations in the SOR. On July 29, 2026, Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case in a File of Relevant Material (FORM). A complete copy of the FORM, consisting of Government Exhibits (GE) 1 to 8, and the Government’s arguments in support of the SOR, was received by the Applicant on August 11, 2026. He was afforded 30 days to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns, but via email he expressly requested that the case be forwarded for adjudication prior to the expiration of 30 days – and without additional comment. The case was assigned to me on September 21, 2026, and all exhibits were admitted without objection. Findings of Fact Applicant is 60 years old, was married from 1999 to 2012, and has three children. He earned a bachelor’s degree in 1991. Applicant has been employed by a defense contractor since April 2025 as a Senior Mission Systems Engineer and reapplied for a security clearance in connection with this employment. He previously held a secret clearance in 2020. (GE 3 at 5, 10-11, 27, 35-36, 43; GE 4) SOR Paragraph 1 (Guideline K: Handling Protected Information) The Government alleged that Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance due to failure to comply with rules and regulations for handling protected information. The following facts pertain: 1.a. Uploading classified information to an unclassified system (July 2024): Applicant admitted to this allegation in his Answer. On July 29, 2024, Applicant uploaded a presentation with classified information to an unclassified company SharePoint site maintained by Defense Contractor A. He explained that he had also intentionally copied classified information in his unclassified, handwritten notes – including portion markings. He was additionally found to have taken classified documents outside of a secure area. Applicant had received training on the protection of classified information in February 2023, April 2023, and January 2024. Following an investigation, he was terminated on November 19, 2024, for violating classification guidance and internal policies via actions determined to be deliberate and representing gross negligence. He later characterized these actions as a mistake. (GE 5 at 3-5; GE 6; GE 7) 1.b. Copying classified information to a handwritten unclassified document (July 2024): Applicant admitted to this allegation in his Answer. SOR ¶ 1.a discussion above pertains. 1.c. Written warning after failing four email phishing exercises (September 2021): Applicant admitted to this allegation in his Answer. On July 26, 2021, Applicant was counseled by human resources (HR) from Defense Contractor B after he had failed 2

internal email phishing exercises sent to him in March 2020, December 2020, March 2021, and June 2021 (by clicking on suspicious links). Applicant denied having ever seen the training emails, even after an investigation revealed the time and date stamps when he clicked on each phishing link. He was also assigned to complete remedial training in July 2021, which was only assigned to individuals who failed the phishing exercises. He received a written warning on September 10, 2021, for violating company policies including standards of conduct, the code of conduct, and IT systems policy. (GE 8) SOR Paragraph 2 (Guideline E: Personal Conduct) The Government alleged that Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance because he had engaged in conduct that involved questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. The following findings of fact pertain: 2.a. Termination from Defense Contractor A for mishandling classified information (November 2024): Applicant admitted to this allegation in his Answer. SOR ¶ 1.a discussion above pertains. 2.b. False Statement in 2025 Questionnaire: Applicant admitted to this allegation in his Answer. On May 13, 2025, Applicant submitted his Questionnaire wherein in Section 13A(3) – Employment Activities, he answered “No” to the question: “For this employment [with Defense Contractor A] have any of the following happened to you in the last seven (7) years: Fired; Quit after being told you would be fired; Left by mutual agreement following charges or allegations of misconduct; Left by mutual agreement following notice of unsatisfactory performance?” He likewise characterized his reason for leaving the job as a “lay off and looking for new opportunity.” When discussing this apparent discrepancy with a defense investigator on October 23, 2025, he suggested that after being terminated, he was indeed looking for a new opportunity – and he considered “let go” and “laid off” to be synonymous. He denied trying to hide anything. SOR ¶ 1.a discussion above pertains. (GE 3 at 13; GE 5 at 7) 2.c. False Statement ONE in 2026 interrogatories: Applicant admitted to this allegation in his Answer. On May 1, 2026, Applicant submitted his responses to interrogatories wherein he answered, “No” to the question: “Other than the incident in July 2024, have you EVER received a written or verbal reprimand, counseling, or warning, by any of your past employers, for security violations?” As discussed in SOR ¶ 1.c above, Applicant received a written warning on September 10, 2021, for violating company policies including: standards of conduct, the code of conduct, and IT systems policy. Applicant was cautioned that employees were expected “to uphold the highest ethical standards, to be honest and transparent in their business dealings and to ensure that their actions do not put our IT systems at risk.” (GE 5 at 10; GE 8) 2.d. False Statement TWO in 2026 interrogatories: Applicant admitted to this allegation in his Answer. On May 1, 2026, Applicant submitted his responses to 3

interrogatories wherein he answered, “No” to the question, “Have you EVER violated company policy, for any of your past employers?” As discussed in SOR ¶ 1.c above, Applicant received a written warning on September 10, 2021, for violating company policies including: standards of conduct, the code of conduct, and IT systems policy. (GE 5 at 10; GE 8) Whole Person Evidence Applicant submitted no comments or explanations in his Answer as whole person evidence in mitigation of the security concerns alleged in the SOR. The comments and explanations Applicant included in his Questionnaire, interrogatories, and response to the defense investigator, however, were reviewed in their entirety. Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” 4

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis SOR Paragraph 1 (Guideline K: Handling Protected Information) The security concerns relating to the guideline for drug involvement and substance misuse are set out in AG ¶ 33, which reads as follows: Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for handling protected information-which includes classified and other sensitive government information, and proprietary information-raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such information, and is a serious security concern. Given Applicant’s admissions in his Answer, the facts of this case establish the following potentially disqualifying conditions set forth in AG ¶ 34 to the allegations under Guideline K: (b) collecting or storing protected information in any unauthorized location; (c) loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or otherwise handling protected information, including images, on any unauthorized equipment or medium; (g) any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or sensitive information; and (h) negligence or lax security practices that persist despite counseling by management. 5

The burden, therefore, shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline K. The guideline includes the following conditions in AG ¶ 35 that could potentially mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s mishandling of protected information: (a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (b) the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of security responsibilities. Security violations are one of the strongest possible reasons for denying or revoking access to classified information, as they raise very serious questions about an applicant’s suitability for access to classified information. ISCR Case No. 03-26888 at 1 (App. Bd. Oct. 5, 2006). In determining whether such a violation has occurred, an employer’s determinations and characterizations regarding security violations are entitled to considerable deference, and should not be discounted or contradicted without a cogent explanation. ISCR Case No. 20-00230 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 10, 2021). In the present case, Applicant was terminated by Defense Contractor A for violating classification guidance and internal policies via actions determined to be deliberate and representing gross negligence. Applicant admitted to the allegation and offered no evidence in explanation or mitigation. Though the incidents occurred over two years ago, Applicant has offered no evidence of counseling or remedial security training that would suggest a positive attitude toward safeguarding classified information – or that such conduct is unlikely to recur. This is particularly pertinent given Applicant’s reticence to acknowledge his failure to follow IT policies in 2021 while employed by Defense Contractor B. As such, neither of the AG ¶ 35 mitigating conditions, whether reviewed separately or jointly, are sufficiently applicable to mitigate the security concerns. SOR ¶ 1 is found against Applicant. SOR Paragraph 2 (Guideline E: Personal Conduct) The security concerns relating to the guideline for personal conduct are set out in AG ¶ 15, which states: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. 6

Given Applicant’s admissions in his Answer, the facts of this case establish the following potentially disqualifying conditions set forth in AG ¶ 16 to the allegations under Guideline E: (a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; (b) deliberately providing false or misleading information; or concealing or omitting information, concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical or mental health professional involved in making a recommendation relevant to a national security eligibility determination, or other official government representative; (c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole- person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information; and (d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or government protected information; (2) any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and (4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer's time or resources. 7

The burden, therefore, shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline E. The guideline includes the following condition in AG ¶ 17 that could potentially mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s false statements: (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment. Regarding Applicant’s termination for violating security policies (SOR ¶ 2.a), the same rationale discussed above regarding SOR ¶ 1 applies to this untrustworthy and unreliable behavior that shows an unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. Applicant has offered no evidence of counseling, remedial security training, or any mitigation during the ensuing two years that would suggest this behavior is unlikely to recur. There are likewise no character statements or evaluations from his present employer to support any mitigation. As such, AG ¶ 17(c) is inapplicable to mitigate the security concerns. SOR ¶ 2.a is found against Applicant. As for the allegations of falsification, it is a well-established premise that “[a] person holding a security clearance has a duty to fully disclose conduct of security concern.” ISCR Case No. 24-00278 at 3 (App. Bd. Jan. 14, 2026) (emphasis in original). Applicant’s claim to a defense investigator that he considered “lay off” to be synonymous with “let go” does not withstand scrutiny considering the very next question asked him if he had been fired from the position – and he wrote, “No.” As Applicant explained to the defense investigator, he knew he had been terminated for violating Defense Contractor A security policies. Moreover, he admitted to the SOR ¶ 2.b allegation in his Answer. This analysis likewise applies to Applicant’s denial of having ever violated a company policy for any employer in SOR ¶ 2.d. He received a written warning from Defense Contractor B in 2021 and written confirmation of termination from Defense Contractor A in 2024 for violating company policies. SOR ¶¶ 2.b and 2.d are found against Applicant. Finally, regarding the allegation in SOR ¶ 2.c that Applicant deceptively answered “No” to the question of whether he had ever received a written or verbal reprimand, other than in July 2024, for a security violation, the evidence is less straightforward. Applicant received a written warning in 2021 f or violating company policies including: standards of conduct, the code of conduct, and IT systems policy. His counseling discussed ethics and honesty – as well as the importance of following IT rules. His counseling did not, however, discuss any security violations. The Government FORM characterized this as a “security- related rule violation,” but Defense Contractor B made no such assertion in its written warning. Therefore, though Applicant likewise admitted to this allegation, given the contrary evidence contained in the record, SOR ¶ 2.c is found for Applicant. 8

Whole-Person Concept Applying the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for national security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the above whole-person factors and the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have given the appropriate weight to Applicant’s statements included in his Questionnaire and responses to interrogatories. A review of the record evidence leaves me with questions or doubts as to Applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility and a security clearance. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline K: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.c: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 2.a – 2.b: Against Applicant Subparagraph 2.c: For Applicant Subparagraph 2.d: Against Applicant 9

Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. RICHARD A. CEFOLA Administrative Judge 10