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A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ISCR Case No. 25-00581

Denied

Decided Oct 14, 2026 · Administrative Judge Wilford H. Ross · Hearing

Case headnote

Summary

The applicant, a 33-year-old single female with a background in the U.S. Army and U.S. Space Force, faced security clearance denial under Guideline E due to personal conduct involving forgery and false statements. The judge found that the applicant's actions demonstrated questionable judgment and lack of candor, which were not sufficiently mitigated by her claims of bullying and mental health issues.

Why the applicant was denied

  • The applicant engaged in forgery and provided false statements regarding her promotion status.
  • She was not forthcoming during the investigation and failed to provide documentation supporting her claims of bullying or mental health issues.
  • The applicant's character references did not adequately address her misconduct, raising doubts about her reliability and trustworthiness.

Conditions referenced

Disqualifying

  • E2.a Deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant factsraised
  • E2.b Deliberately providing false or misleading informationraised
  • E2.d Credible adverse informationraised

Key rule quoted

Procedural posture

SOR issued
April 16, 2026
Answer filed
May 13, 2026 Requested decision on written record.
Hearing held
No hearing; decided on written record.
Decision date
October 14, 2026

Cite for

  • Denial of Security Clearance Due to Personal Conduct Under Guideline E
  • Impact of Forgery and Dishonesty on Security Clearance Eligibility
  • Lack of Mitigating Factors in Cases Involving Personal Misconduct

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

From the decision

Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.

Applicant Age
33
Years in Industry
2
Prior Clearance
held
Bankruptcy
none

Allegations under Guideline E

Reading the 2 per allegation rows needs a free account.

2 rows in this decision.

It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.

Full decision

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The complete official text, footnotes and signatures included, is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS _____________________________________

In the matter of: )

)

) ISCR Case No. 25-00581

)

) Applicant for Security Clearance ) _____________________________________ ) Appearances For Government: Nicole A. Smith, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 10/14/2026 Decision ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guideline E (Personal Conduct. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions on February 22, 2024 (Questionnaire). On April 16, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline E (Personal Conduct). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within DoD after June 8, 2017.

On May 13, 2026, Applicant responded to the SOR in writing (Answer) and requested that this case be decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. In her Answer, Applicant admitted to both allegations in the SOR. She also provided a personal statement and eight character statement letters now marked as Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through H. On August 10, 2026, Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case in a File of Relevant Material (FORM). A complete copy of the FORM, consisting of Government Exhibits (GE) 1 to 6 and the Government’s arguments in support of the SOR, was received by Applicant on August 13, 2026. She was afforded 30 days to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns, but did not respond. The case was assigned to me on October 9, 2026, and all exhibits were admitted without objection. Findings of Fact Applicant is 33 years old, single, and has no children. She earned a bachelor’s degree in 2015. She has been employed by a defense contractor as a network technician since February 2024 and applied for a security clearance in connection with this employment. She previously held a security clearance during her service in the U.S. Army from 2018 to 2022, and then in the U.S. Space Force (USSF) from 2022 to 2023. Her clearance was suspended in March 2023 following the imposition of nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for forgery and false statements. She was separated with a General (Under Honorable Conditions) discharge. (GE 3 at 5, 14-16, 25-26, 29, 55; GE 4 at 9) SOR Paragraph 1 (Guideline E: Personal Conduct) The Government alleged that Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance because she engaged in conduct that involved questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. The following facts pertain (SOR paragraph order has been altered for chronological consistency): 1.b. Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP) for forgery and false official statements misrepresenting promotion status (6 March 2023): Applicant served in the U.S. Army from February 2018 to August 2022, after which she transferred to the USSF in September 2022 as

a Sergeant (E-5). Shortly after arriving at her new command, Applicant reviewed her Enlisted Record Brief (ERB) and, according to her calculations, had not been properly credited with the correct amount of advancement points to qualify her for promotion to the next paygrade (E-6). Rather than bring the matter to her chain of command for assistance, on or about October 25, 2022, Applicant took it upon herself to alter her ERB, which she then submitted to obtain a promotion and pay increase. She took this action after verbally representing to leadership that she had “made points” from her Army time. 2

Applicant’s fraud was uncovered on or about January 20, 2023, by her Chief Master Sergeant, who turned the matter over to the Security Forces Squadron (SFS) for investigation. When Applicant was questioned by an SFS investigator on January 26, 2023, she was initially not wholly forthcoming about her culpability – and even insisted she was justified in her actions. She later admitted to the misconduct. On or about March 6, 2023, Applicant received NJP. Though she had been wearing the insignia of a Staff Sergeant (E-6), she was not yet receiving E-6 pay. She was found to have committed both of the offenses charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ): Article 105 (Forgery); and Article 107 (False Official Statements). The evidentiary record is silent as to what, if any, punishment was subsequently imposed. Applicant contended that she was “bullied” by members of her unit. She also stated that as the only enlisted member, part of her motivation in altering her record for promotion was that she felt she “needed to be accepted as soon as possible to be a part of this team.” She also averred that she suffered from “deteriorated” mental health at the time of the offense, with “anxiety and depression flooding [her] mind.” She did not provide documentation to support these diagnoses or documentation to support her assertion that she was authorized additional points. She likewise did not provide documentation reporting bullying or a hostile work environment to her chain of command or elsewhere within the USSF. (GE 3 at 25-26; GE 4 at 7; GE 6 at 1-5, 8-9, 11) 1.a. Letter of Reprimand (LOR) for misrepresenting duty status in multiple leave requests (27 March 2023): A month after being questioned about the fraud issue, and while the investigation remained active, Applicant submitted a leave request on February 28, 2023, requesting time off for a cruise with her family from March 13 to 17, 2023. When it was later determined that her leave request did not correspond with the time frame of her actual departure, she was instructed by her Master Sergeant to resubmit an accurate leave request. Applicant resubmitted a leave request for March 12 to 18, 2023. In truth, the actual dates of the cruise were from March 11 to 18, 2023 (both March 11 and 12, 2023, were weekend days). Applicant was issued a LOR on March 27, 2023. Applicant responded to the LOR on March 30, 2023, and contended she had been confused about the differences between the leave calculation policies at her old Army command and her new USSF command. She argued that her new command had failed to brief her about the policy and denied any intent to deceive. Her commanding officer replied the same day and noted a lack of personal responsibility in her presentation. He upheld the LOR and found her reasoning “disingenuous at best.” He went on to note: AFI 36-3003 para 3.1.1.5 states: …Charge leave for duty days and non- duty days (for example, Friday through Monday) when members take leave on the day before and the day after non-duty days… Stating that you do not understand the Air Force leave rules after you have been in the service for over 7 months is not an excuse. Additionally, as both the Army and Air Force have the same rules there is no valid basis for your argument. (GE 5 at 1, 4-5) 3

Whole Person Evidence Applicant honorably served in the Army for over four years. During her time in Advanced Individual Training, she was given student leadership positions to assist both instructors and fellow students. She served overseas, where she was awarded an Army Commendation Medal for her work in public affairs. She also worked with the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program and volunteered at the United Service Organizations (USO) facility on post. For these efforts, as well as others, she was awarded the Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal. Applicant submitted a personal statement with her Answer, as well as eight character statement letters – all of which were carefully reviewed. The letters uniformly praised her technical skills, reliability, and work acumen. They spoke generally about the quality of her character, but six of the eight did not mention the basis for her security clearance issues. The author of AE D characterized her ERB forgery as “a clerical error,” which was “not due to misconduct,” despite Applicant’s acknowledgment to the contrary. This calls into question the accuracy of the information Applicant provided to the author of AE D and indeed all of her character witnesses. Only the author of AE H mentioned having any knowledge of misconduct, referencing Applicant’s NJP but not the LOR. The author of AE H noted surprise at the UCMJ violations and felt they were “out of character,” and opined she was “worth giving another chance.” In Applicant’s personal statement, she took full accountability for the actions that led to both her NJP and LOR, as well as her initial lack of full honesty during questioning. She attributed her lapses in honesty to being in an environment where she “struggled with confidence, felt isolated in [her] position, and allowed that pressure to influence [her] decision-making.” She avers that she has now taken deliberate steps to ensure she does not repeat these mistakes. (Answer; AE A – H; GE 6 at 11) Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the AG. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 4

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis SOR Paragraph 1 (Guideline E: Personal Conduct) The security concerns relating to the guideline for personal conduct are set out in AG ¶ 15, which states: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. The facts of this case establish the following potentially disqualifying conditions set forth in AG ¶ 16: 5

(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; (b) deliberately providing false or misleading information; or concealing or omitting information, concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical or mental health professional involved in making a recommendation relevant to a national security eligibility determination, or other official government representative; (d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or government protected information; (2) any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and (4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer's time or resources; and (e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress by a foreign intelligence entity or other individual or group. Such conduct includes: (1) engaging in activities which, if known, could affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing; (2) while in another country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country; (3) while in another country, engaging in any activity that, while legal there, is illegal in the United States. 6

Applicant acknowledged receiving both an LOR and NJP for providing false official information to the United States. The burden therefore shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline E. The guideline includes the following conditions in AG ¶ 17 that can mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s personal conduct: (a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and (e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. While the receipt of an LOR or NJP by itself is not per se a matter of the greatest concern, the underlying misconduct in both instances revolves around incidents of falsehood, deceit, or untruthfulness. And these matters are at the heart of the Guideline E discussions of questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, and an unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. The timeline of events is troubling. Applicant had been at the command for only a month before quixotically deciding that the best way to fit in with the officers in her unit was to be a Staff Sergeant (E-6) – though as a Sergeant she was already, by definition, a staff noncommissioned officer (NCO). She verbally represented having “made points” before later falsifying an official document. When confronted, Applicant was not initially forthcoming. After she did reveal the entire scheme, she then decided to claim she had been bullied and was suffering from anxiety and depression. Applicant provided no documentation of having ever reported a hostile work environment or having sought mental health care – though as a staff NCO with SHARP training, presumably she would have been well-versed in these avenues of support. Approximately a month after being questioned by an SFS investigator about fraud, she submitted an inaccurate leave request. Assuming for the sake of argument her initial submission was merely errant, it was incumbent upon her to ensure the absolute accuracy of her resubmission. She did not and lamented instead that her command had not briefed her on how the leave systems differ in the USSF. Her commanding officer found her response to be “disingenuous at best,” which is not a ringing endorsement for 7

any staff NCO. But for one who was at the time under investigation for forgery, it represents profoundly questionable judgment – at best. Applicant avers to having taken “deliberate steps” to avoid future mistakes of this nature, but it is unclear exactly what these steps are. Moreover, most of her character witnesses do not appear to have been informed about her situation, which does not work to reduce vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. None of the AG ¶ 17 mitigation factors, viewed separately or jointly, applies as this series of actions, one after the other, presently casts doubt on Applicant’s reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. Paragraph 1 is found against Applicant. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s national security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security eligibility must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the AG and the whole-person concept. I considered the above whole-person factors and the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have also given the appropriate weight to Applicant’s statements in her interrogatories and Answer – as well as those statements in her character witness letters. Because Applicant requested a determination on the written record without a hearing, I had no opportunity to question her or evaluate her credibility based on demeanor. Overall, the Guideline E issues leave me with questions and doubts as to Applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT 8

Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.b: Against Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Eligibility is denied. WILFORD H. ROSS Administrative Judge 9