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A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ISCR Case No. 21-02859

Denied

Decided Oct 16, 2026 · Administrative Judge Gina L. Marine · Hearing

Case headnote

Summary

The applicant, a 63-year-old male with a history of multiple marriages and arrests, faced security clearance denial under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) and Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) due to a pattern of criminal behavior, including felony and misdemeanor charges. The judge found that the applicant's admissions of past arrests and his failure to disclose significant criminal history on security clearance applications raised substantial security concerns, leading to the denial of his application.

Why the applicant was denied

  • The applicant had multiple arrests and charges, including felony assault, embezzlement, and domestic violence incidents.
  • The applicant admitted to failing to disclose significant criminal history on his security clearance applications.
  • The applicant's explanations for his conduct were inconsistent and lacked corroborating evidence.

Conditions referenced

Disqualifying

  • J1 Criminal conductraised
  • E2 Personal conductraised

Key rule quoted

Procedural posture

SOR issued
August 22, 2022
Answer filed
September 29, 2022
Hearing held
November 1, 2023 via videoconference
Decision date
October 16, 2026

Cite for

  • Denial Based on Failure to Disclose Criminal History Under Guideline E
  • Impact of Multiple Arrests on Security Clearance Eligibility Under Guideline J
  • Inconsistencies in Applicant's Testimony Affecting Credibility

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

From the decision

Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.

Clearance Level
sci
Prior Clearance
held
Bankruptcy
none

Allegations under Guideline E

Reading the 4 per allegation rows needs a free account.

4 rows in this decision.

It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.

Allegations under Guideline J

Reading the 7 per allegation rows needs a free account.

7 rows in this decision.

It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.

Full decision

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The complete official text, footnotes and signatures included, is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: Applicant for Security Clearance ) ) ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 21–02859 Appearances For Government: Sakena Farhath, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 10/16/2026 Decision MARINE, Gina L., Administrative Judge: This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted his security clearance application on January 29, 2020 (2020 SCA). On August 22, 2022, the Department of Defense (DOD) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guidelines J and E. On September 29, 2022, Applicant responded to the SOR (Answer) and requested a hearing. The Government was ready to proceed on January 25, 2023. The case was assigned to me on July 17, 2023. On August 8, 2023, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that his hearing was scheduled for October 4, 2023, via videoconference. On October 3, 2023, his hearing was rescheduled for good cause. On October 12, 2023, DOHA notified Applicant that his hearing was rescheduled for November 1, 2023, as agreed by both parties (DOHA Hearing). The DOHA Hearing was convened as rescheduled.

At the DOHA Hearing, Applicant testified and offered no documents beyond the five documents attached to the Answer, which were admitted into evidence as Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through E, without objection. Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 10 were admitted into evidence, without objection. GE 11 was admitted into evidence over Applicant’s objection. The Government’s exhibit list was appended to the record as Hearing Exhibit (HE) I. Applicant declined the opportunity to submit post-hearing documents and the record closed upon the adjournment of the hearing. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on October 12, 2023. SOR Amendment At the DOHA Hearing, the SOR was amended to conform with record evidence by modifying SOR ¶ 1.f under Guideline J to replace the year “2002” with “2001,” without objection. Applicant amended his responses to SOR ¶ 1.f to reflect the revised date; SOR ¶ 1.b to replace “June 15, 2019” with “February 5, 2015;” and SOR ¶ 2.a to admit the allegation. (Tr. 152–153, 167–169, 196) Evidentiary Matters The following exhibits are duplicates: (1) AE A, GE 7, and GE 8 at 41–42; (2) AE B and GE 6; and (3) AE C and GE 5. For ease of reference, citations refer only to the AEs. Applicant was interviewed on multiple occasions by a DOD-authorized investigator in connection with his 2020 SCA background investigation, including on March 5, April 27, May 12, June 16, and July 13, 2020 (2020 Interviews). He previously submitted an SCA on November 2, 2012 (2012 SCA) and was similarly interviewed on July 9, 2013 (2013 Interview). In July 2021, he responded to DOD-issued interrogatories (2021 Response). (GE 8, 9) Findings of Fact At the time of the DOHA hearing, Applicant was 63 years old and had been married four times: Wife 1 (1987–1992); Wife 2 (1998–2008); Wife 3 (2010–2016); and Wife 4 (since 2017). He testified that he separated from Wife 4 on or about June 15, 2019, following the incident alleged in SOR ¶ 1.a, and that he was trying to file for divorce. However, during his March and April 2020 interviews, he stated that they separated in February 2020. Applicant has six adult children, including Sons A through D. (GE 1; GE 9 at 5, 7, 17, 19, 36; Tr. 140–141, 143, 225–229, 230–232) Applicant graduated from high school in 1977, received an associate degree in computer science in 1997, and has worked in the information technology (IT) field since then. He was employed by a DOD contractor (Company A) as a deskside support technician from May 2014 until he was terminated in November 2018. He has been employed by another DOD contractor (Company B) as a cybersecurity analyst since May 2

2016. During the period of overlap, he worked day shifts at Company A and night shifts at Company B. He has maintained a DOD security clearance since 2000, with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) since 2015. (GE 1, 2; GE 9 at 6, 31; Tr. 8, 128–129, 142, 197, 200) SOR Allegations The SOR alleged under Guideline J, and cross-alleged under Guideline E, that Applicant was arrested seven times between the ages of 27 and 58 on charges of felony assault in 1987 (SOR ¶¶ 1.g, 2.a), felony embezzlement in 2001 (SOR ¶¶ 1.f, 2.a), felony forging public records in April 2006 (SOR ¶¶ 1.d, 2.a), misdemeanor contempt of court in 2015 (SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 2.a), and three misdemeanor assault and battery charges against a family member in 2003, December 2006, and 2019 (SOR ¶¶ 1.e, 1.c, 1.a, 2.a). In his Answer, he admitted the arrests and charges but denied committing any of the charged conduct. The SOR further alleged under Guideline E that Applicant deliberately failed to disclose his 1987, 2001, and 2006 felony charges on his 2020 SCA (SOR ¶ 2.c), and his 1987 and 2001 felony charges on his 2012 SCA (SOR ¶ 2.d). It also alleged that his employment was terminated in 2018 due to a security violation (SOR ¶ 2.b). He admitted SOR ¶ 2.b but denied committing the security violation for which he was terminated. He admitted the omissions alleged in SOR ¶¶ 2.c and 2.d but denied they were deliberate. Accordingly, those responses are construed as denials. (Tr. 23) 1987 Felony Assault (SOR ¶¶ 1.g, 2.a) In 1987, Applicant was arrested and charged with felony assault involving a former coworker. He was subsequently found not guilty. His 2020 Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Record (FBI Record) documents the arrest, charge, and disposition but not the basis for the charge. As to the basis, the record reflects only Applicant’s uncorroborated accounts at the DOHA Hearing and in prior statements, which were unrebutted and consistent. He acknowledged engaging in a physical altercation but stated he acted in self-defense, and that his self-defense claim was supported by the testimony of two eyewitnesses at the criminal trial. (GE 3; Answer; Tr. 73–75, 170–173) 2001 Felony Embezzlement (SOR ¶¶ 1.f, 2.a) In 2001, Applicant was arrested and charged with felony embezzlement in connection with an incident at a store where he worked part time as a cashier. His 2014 and 2020 FBI Records document the arrest and charge but not the basis for the charge or its disposition. As to both, the record reflects only Applicant’s uncorroborated accounts at the DOHA Hearing and in prior statements, which were unrebutted and consistent. The charge arose because he was suspected of colluding with a customer who was caught shoplifting during his shift, based on surveillance footage showing the two of them speaking. He denied any collusion, stating he had merely greeted the customer whom he 3

did not otherwise know. He maintained that his arrest was motivated by racial and national-origin bias, rather than any criminal conduct on his part. He went to court twice. The first judge found the felony charge had been improperly pleaded and remanded the matter to a lower court. The second judge dismissed the matter for lack of evidence connecting him to the customer. (Answer; GE 3; GE 4; GE 9 at 25; Tr. 85–86, 139, 165– 170, 175) April 2006 Felony Forging Public Records (SOR ¶¶ 1.d, 2.a) In April 2006, Applicant was arrested and charged with felony forging public records. He was subsequently convicted of misdemeanor fraudulently providing false information on a driver’s license application. His 2020 FBI Record documents the arrest, charge, and disposition but not the basis for this charge. As to the basis, the record reflects only Applicant’s uncorroborated accounts at the DOHA Hearing and in prior statements, which were unrebutted but inconsistent. (GE 3) Applicant stated the charge arose from a police report filed by Wife 2, who alleged that he signed her name without her permission on a vehicle-registration renewal application (Application) submitted to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) for their jointly owned vehicle. He admitted that he went to the DMV in person without her to renew the vehicle’s expired registration and executed her name on the Application because she was on record as a co-owner. He did not address any conduct involving a driver’s license application. (Answer; GE 9 at 13, 24–25, 32, 38–39; Tr. 82–84, 96–99, 158–160) Applicant acknowledged Wife 2 told the investigating detective she did not know he was registering the vehicle in her name. He did not claim she had prior knowledge of, or consented to, his actions. Instead, he asserted his actions were consistent with a routine established during the marriage, based on a mutual understanding that he bore sole responsibility for managing household finances, including signing documents. He stated that she had never objected to similar actions in the past but did so in this instance because of the state of their marriage. In his 2013 Interview, he described them starting to have marital problems; in all subsequent accounts, he described them as being in the process of divorcing. He consistently framed Wife 2’s motivation for filing the police report as retaliation, but his account of how she sought to retaliate changed from claiming in his 2013 Interview that she wanted to get him in trouble with the law to asserting at the DOHA Hearing that she colluded with Mr. X, whom he described as her boyfriend, in an effort to have him arrested. (Answer; GE 9 at 24, 39; Tr. 82–83, 156) Applicant also stated that he submitted the Application during a period when he and Wife 2 were living separately, following a domestic violence incident in which he identified her as the aggressor (Incident X). In his May 2020 Interview, he estimated the vehicle registration was renewed sometime in 2006, but he could not recall the date of Incident X. In his July 2020 Interview, he estimated Incident X occurred in approximately 2001 to 2002. (GE 9 at 24–25, 32) 4

Applicant admitted he signed his own name on the “owner” line of the Application but gave varying descriptions of how he executed Wife 2’s name on the “co-owner” line. In his 2013 Interview, he referenced both using and including her name, without addressing whether he signed her name. In his May 2020 Interview, he admitted signing her name. In his Answer, he stated that he wrote her name rather than signed it. At the DOHA Hearing, he denied signing her name and maintained that he merely wrote it on the co-owner line. He further asserted that the detective’s review of their joint DMV registration history revealed that Wife 2 had “sometimes” done the same thing, including on an application for another jointly owned vehicle, on which she wrote, rather than signed, his name on the co-owner line. (Answer; GE 9 at 24, 38–39; Tr. at 83, 98) Applicant’s varying accounts of the disposition are summarized below: 2013 Interview. Applicant appeared in court where the judge charged him with a misdemeanor, suspended his license for one year, and ordered him to pay a $67 fine. (GE 9 at 39) May 2020 Interview. The investigating detective requested Applicant appear at the DMV and told him the case would be dropped to a misdemeanor. His only consequence was the DMV suspending his license for one year. He denied he had been found guilty but later mentioned paying court fees of approximately $40 to $80. (GE 9 at 24–25) Answer. The judge reduced the charge, noting that spouses routinely sign financial documents for one another without a power of attorney. Applicant had been “asked to pay a court fee of $85.” (Answer) DOHA Hearing. Applicant acknowledged paying a $65 fine and receiving a one- year license suspension but denied he had been convicted. He appeared in court twice; the first judge dismissed the felony, the second dismissed the misdemeanor, and neither judge found him guilty. He attempted to obtain court records confirming he was not convicted, but his attorney was unavailable, and the clerk’s office advised him that the records had been destroyed. (AE E; Tr. 82–84, 96–99, 158–160) 2015 Misdemeanor Contempt of Court (SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 2.a) In 2015, Applicant was arrested and charged with misdemeanor contempt of court. The charge was subsequently dismissed. His 2020 FBI Record and court records document the arrest, charge, and disposition but not the basis for the charge. As to the basis, the record reflects only Applicant’s uncorroborated accounts at the DOHA Hearing and in prior statements, which were unrebutted and consistent. (Answer; AE B; GE 3; Tr. 153–154, 225) The charge arose following an argument Applicant had with Son A, then age 20, during which Son A “threw . . . a pot and it hit [Applicant].” Another son called the police and Son A was subsequently arrested. Applicant was summoned to appear as a victim 5

witness at Son A’s trial. He elected not to appear because he did not wish to pursue charges and believed, based on advice from others, that his absence would result in a dismissal of Son A’s charges. He informed the prosecutor of his intentions in advance of the trial. He now understands that he must appear in court when summoned, regardless of whether he wishes to pursue the charges. (Id.) 2003, 2006, and 2019 Misdemeanor Assault and Battery Charges (SOR ¶¶ 1.e, 1.c, 1.a, 2.a) Applicant was arrested and charged three times for misdemeanor assault and battery, twice against Wife 2 in July 2003 and December 2006, and once against Wife 4 in June 2019. Each charge was subsequently nolle prosequi. His 2020 FBI Record documents all three arrests and charges, as well as the 2003 and 2006 dispositions, but does not reflect the 2019 disposition. Court records document the 2003 and 2019 proceedings; none were produced for the 2006 charge. The court records reflect magistrates’ findings of probable cause to believe Applicant committed the charged offenses, based on the sworn statements of the arresting officers. Neither his FBI Record nor court records establish the bases for the charges or the reasons they were nolle prosequi. The court records contain notations that may bear on the reasons the charges were nolle prosequi, but they are not clearly legible or decipherable. As to the bases of the charges, the record reflects only Applicant’s uncorroborated accounts at the DOHA Hearing and in prior statements, which were unrebutted but inconsistent. (AE A, C; GE 3) Neither Wife 2 nor Wife 4 testified at the DOHA Hearing, and there is no indication either testified in connection with the criminal proceedings. Applicant stated he could not recall whether either he or Wife 2 testified in the proceedings arising from the 2003 or 2006 charges, while confirming that neither he nor Wife 4 testified in the proceedings arising from the 2019 charge. He further stated, “[Wife 4] didn’t come to court because she knows she lied . . . That’s why the case was dismissed. It was just an accusation.” (Tr. 63–64, 163–164, 149) Applicant denied assaulting or otherwise abusing either Wife 2 or Wife 4 and denied that a domestic violence protective order was ever issued against him, whether in connection with the three charges or at any other time. The record contains no police reports or domestic violence protective orders relating to the three charges. Applicant asserted his arrests were motivated by gender and racial bias, rather than any criminal conduct on his part. (Tr. 62, 148, 157, 160, 252, 264–265) His statements regarding each incident are summarized below. Wife 2 The July 2003 incident (SOR ¶¶ 1.e, 2.a) occurred during a period when Applicant and Wife 2 were married but living separately, with pending child custody and support matters. Wife 2 came to Applicant’s residence, where they engaged in a verbal argument. She called the police and falsely reported that he had pushed her, which he denied and 6

characterized as one of several attempts she made during that period to gain leverage in the pending matters. (Answer; Tr. 71–72, 157, 160–165) The December 2006 incident (SOR ¶¶ 1.c, 2.a) occurred while the Applicant and Wife 2 were married and living together. Applicant’s varying accounts of the incident are summarized below: 2013 Interview. Wife 2 hit Applicant, then called the police and falsely accused him of hitting her. He was arrested, briefly detained, and released the same night after police discovered he was innocent. (GE 9 at 39) Answer and DOHA Hearing. Applicant arrived home and found Mr. X, whom he believed to be Wife 2’s boyfriend. Wife 2 denied Mr. X was her boyfriend, stated he was visiting her mother, and objected to Applicant’s request that Mr. X leave. A verbal argument ensued among Applicant, Wife 2, and Mr. X. Wife 2 called the police and falsely reported that Applicant had hit her, which he denied. In neither his Answer nor DOHA Hearing testimony did he state that Wife 2 hit him. In his Answer, he stated Wife 2 was also arrested; however, at the DOHA Hearing, he stated he could not remember whether she was arrested. (Answer; Tr. 155–158, 163–164, 226) Applicant described his marriage to Wife 2 as volatile, marked by frequent disputes and confrontations that regularly resulted in law enforcement intervention. According to him, he initiated most of the police calls, though she also repeatedly called police to falsely report that he had attacked her. He asserted that Wife 2 was abusive toward him, was arrested more than 20 times for her physical violence against him, and had been incarcerated twice, including a two-month sentence for a stabbing incident. At the DOHA Hearing, he testified that the stabbing left him with injuries requiring 23 stitches and permanent scarring on his head. He pointed to two locations on his head that he identified as scars and stated that the incident prompted him to file for divorce. Regarding Incident X, he stated Wife 2 struck him with a fan while he was asleep, police were called, and she was removed from the marital residence. He also testified that Son C and Son D began living with him two years prior to the DOHA Hearing, following a confrontation with Wife 2 (their mother) that left them with nowhere else to go because “she was in jail.” (Answer; GE 9 at 24–25, 32, 39; Tr. 71–72, 155–158, 160, 163–164, 231–232) Wife 4 The June 2019 incident (SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 2.a) occurred while Applicant and Wife 4 were married and living together. The verbal argument, which began when Applicant requested Wife 4’s cellphone and she refused to give it to him, escalated into a physical altercation. (Answer; GE 8 at 12; GE 9 at 12, 25; Tr. 61–64, 141, 143–149, 157, 176, 224, 264) His varying accounts of the incident are summarized below: 7

(1) Reason for Requesting Phone: March 2020 Interview. Maintaining Wife 4’s phone and her daughters’ phones on Applicant’s account had become too expensive and, because they were not paid off, he had a deadline to return the phones that day. (GE 9 at 12) 2021 Response. Applicant had to return the phones because they were not being used. (GE 8 at 12) DOHA Hearing. Applicant had three phones on his account and would be charged an additional month if he did not return Wife 4’s phone that day. (Tr. 62, 63). “[I] think she [had] some bad information that she [did not] want me to see.” (Tr. 63) “[I] don’t know, I don’t care whether she was cheating or whatever it was. All I wanted was to take the phone and return it . . . when the police gave me the phone, I [found] out why she was on it, [and] I [did not] care.” (Tr. 176) (2) Nature of Argument and Physical Contact: March 2020 Interview. Wife 4 placed her phone on a counter, and Applicant picked it up. In trying to snatch the phone from him, she ripped his shirt. She then blocked herself in front of the bedroom door. He yelled for his sons, Son C, then age 18, and Son D, then age 17, to help and call the police. (GE 9 at 12) 2021 Response. Wife 4 held Applicant back by his pants to get her phone back and “[p]ushed me on the side of the door and fell on my face.” He asked his son to call the police. She locked the bedroom door, leaned her back against it, removed all her clothes, and remained unclothed until police arrived. (GE 8 at 12) Answer. Applicant walked over to the dresser and unplugged Wife 4’s phone. She grabbed his shirt collar, pulled him toward her, and kept pulling tightly. He called for his sons to call the police. When police knocked on the door, she let go of his shirt and removed her clothes before he could open the door. (Answer) DOHA Hearing. “[Wife 4] refused to give me the phone. So I took the phone.” (Tr. 62) Applicant was in the bedroom with her, and she locked the door and refused to let him out. (Id.) He called for his two sons to call the police. (Id.) Upon learning police were called, she “pulled [his] clothes” and held him “by the neck,” tearing up his “clothes,” while also taking off her clothes and stating, “[if] the police are going to come, they’re going to take both of us.” When police arrived, his clothes were “all cut up” and she “took off her top.” (Tr. 62–63) He was afraid and called for his son because he was trying not to get arrested. (Tr. 175) He described her as “a petite five foot” and stated, “[I] can push her. But I was trying not to touch her when she touched my face and hit me . . . I locked the door . . . [I] told my son to call the police, trying to save myself.” (Tr. 176) “[I] could have hit her, I could do anything to free myself from [Wife 4]. But I did not want a confrontation. And that's why I kept calling my son to call the police.” (Tr. 264) 8

Upon cross-examination at the DOHA Hearing, Applicant initially affirmed that Wife 4 grabbed his shirt, then later testified that she grabbed both his shirt and his pants, explaining, “It wasn’t just one,” “she was rough,” “we kept arguing more,” and “[i]t was a lot of stuff [going] on in there.” (Tr. 144–145) He further testified that she forcefully grabbed his shirt and it became ripped, explaining that his prior references to her “grabbing” and “ripping” his shirt were meant to describe the same conduct. (Tr. 147) He also initially affirmed that she removed all her clothes, then later testified that she removed “[j]ust the top, her blouse.” (Tr. 144) (3) Who Called Police: March 2020 Interview. One of Wife 4’s daughters called the police. Neither son responded to Applicant’s call. Son C was not hom

e, and Son D did not respond because he thought A pplicant was calling to ask him to do something around the house. (GE 9 at 12) Answer. Both sons were in the basement and could not hear Applicant but, “after a while,” one son heard him and “immediately” called the police. (Answer) DOHA Hearing. Son D was in the basement and could not hear Applicant; Son C was on the second floor, came to try and open the bedroom door, asked what was wrong, and then called the police. (Tr. 62) (4) Pre-Arrest Communication with Police: March 2020 Interview. Two officers arrived at the residence to speak with Applicant and Wife 4. She told police he pushed her but did not hit her. He told police she pushed him and denied pushing or hitting her. “At the end of the conversation,” Applicant was arrested as the aggressor. (GE 9 at 12) 2021 Response. Upon observing Wife 4 unclothed, police “did not want to hear anything and place[d] me under arrest.” (GE 8 at 12) Answer. Officer A observed Wife 4 unclothed and Applicant’s “ripped apart” shirt and then directed Applicant to speak with Officer B. He told Officer B, “I asked my son to call the police so that I can free myself.” After interviewing Wife 4, Officer A directed Officer B to arrest him “without talking [or] listen[ing] to my or my son’s story.” (Answer) DOHA Hearing. Police first approached Applicant and asked him to explain what happened, which he did. After speaking with Wife 4 and her daughter, who told a different story and “ma[d]e up a big thing,” police stated that he was being arrested as the aggressor because “her clothes her top was off,” to which he responded, “How? You see my clothes. She roughed me. I didn’t touch her.” (Tr. 63) “I was telling [the officers] my clothes are all torn up . . . And [an officer] said calm down . . . And that’s when [an officer] 9

said you’re under arrest, never took my statement . . . never talked to my son who called the police.” (Tr. 176) Upon cross-examination at the DOHA Hearing, Applicant initially affirmed that police arrested him without speaking to him. He later testified that police spoke with him, but only after he arrived at the police station, not at the house before his arrest. (Tr. 147– 148) Failure to Disclose Felony Charges on 2012 and 2020 SCAs (SOR ¶¶ 2.c, 2.d) Applicant reported his 2006 misdemeanor fraud charge on his 2012 and 2020 SCAs. However, he answered “no” to whether he had “EVER been charged with a felony offense” and did not otherwise disclose the related 2006 felony charge or his 1987 and 2001 felony charges on either SCA. In each SCA, the question appeared in a section titled “Police Record (EVER).” He also failed to disclose any felony charges in his 2013 Interview. He acknowledged all three felony charges in his March 2020 Interview, after being confronted with them. (GE 1, 2) Applicant did not address the 2012 SCA omissions in his 2013 or 2020 Interviews, but he did address the 2020 SCA omissions. In his March 2020 Interview, he attributed his omission of the 1987 felony to a misunderstanding of the question. He stated he disagreed with the 2001 felony, without addressing its omission. He denied omitting the 2006 felony because he listed the associated 2006 misdemeanor, which he believed satisfied his reporting obligation. (GE 9 at 13) In his May 2020 Interview, Applicant initially stated he did not recall the 2001 felony but then changed his response and acknowledged that he did recall it. He stated that he had discussed it in prior background investigations, but he did not list it in his 2020 SCA due to oversight and the fact that it fell outside the seven-year reporting window. He attributed his failure to discuss it in his March 2020 Interview to a misunderstanding. Regarding the 2006 felony, he stated that he did not list it on his 2020 SCA because he thought it had been listed and discussed in prior background investigations. (GE 9 at 25) In his Answer, Applicant denied deliberately falsifying either his 2012 or 2020 SCA, providing the same response for each SCA: I misunderstood the question. I asked the investigator for clarification of the question. She told me the question is looking back for information in 10 years. If in 10 years I was not arrest[ed] for [a] felony, the answer [was] NO. I was not trying to be dishonest on my arrest disclosure information. I had disclosed all information on my past [SCA]. At the DOHA Hearing, Applicant acknowledged that the conversation referenced in his Answer occurred after he completed his 2020 SCA. He insisted that he did not intend to “mislead or falsify” either SCA, particularly because he knew at the time he 10

completed each SCA that his criminal record would be reviewed during the ensuing background investigation. He similarly denied any such intent regarding his 2013 and 2020 Interviews. His varying explanations for omitting the felonies are summarized below: • Reliance on pre-populated responses from prior SCAs • Misunderstanding or misinterpreting the relevant questions • Feeling rushed in completing the SCAs • Not paying close enough attention when reading the relevant questions • Following advice he believed to be correct Applicant further testified that he answered the SCA questions to the best of his knowledge, stating: “[T]he question[s] misle[d] me . . . But I wasn't trying to mislead anything, trying to lie, or trying to falsify. Never have done that . . . I never falsif[ied] anything in my life. Never. I was accused of that. It was never proven.” It was unclear whether these explanations applied to the 2012 SCA, the 2020 SCA, or both. (Tr. 32, 86– 87, 139, 179–186, 222, 233–253, 262–263) Applicant testified that he believed, based on his understanding and the advice he received from a coworker, that he was required to report only felonies for which he was convicted. He further stated that he did not report the 2006 felony because he had been convicted only of a misdemeanor. He later acknowledged that he sought the coworker’s advice in 2020 but did not recall seeking any advice in 2012. He could not recall why he felt rushed in 2012 but stated that he felt rushed in 2020 because he had just returned from medical leave following surgery, had a backlog of work, and had only two weeks to complete the SCA. He testified that he plans to take more time to carefully read questions on future SCAs, intends to seek advice solely from his security office, and now understands he was required to report all felonies, regardless of whether he was convicted. (Id.) November 2018 Employment Termination (SOR ¶ 2.b) On November 5, 2018, Company A terminated Applicant for a security violation arising from his duties at a DOD facility (Facility X), where he had been employed through various contracting entities since approximately 2009. The termination occurred during an investigation conducted by Agency A and is documented in Company A’s Memorandum dated November 5, 2018 (Termination Memorandum), and Agency A’s redacted Report of Investigation dated March 5, 2019 (ROI). (GE 1, 10, 11; Tr. 197) The record reflects that Applicant was terminated for a security violation; however, it does not definitively identify the specific conduct constituting the violation. The Termination Memorandum reflects conduct in general terms. The ROI reflects specific conduct identified during the investigation through both witness statements and Applicant’s own statements. In subsequent statements and DOHA Hearing testimony, Applicant addressed the conduct reflected in the Termination Memorandum and the ROI; 11

however, his accounts varied both in describing the conduct and in identifying which conduct constituted the violation. The Termination Memorandum reflects that, on November 5, 2018, Company A was notified of “a security violation/incident involving [Applicant]” and that Agency B investigated and “believe[d]” Applicant was “responsible for mishandling of [information technology (IT)] equipment.” Based on the “serious nature of the incident,” Company A requested that Facility X collect Applicant’s credentials and escort him from the building. Applicant was “conferenced by [a Company A representative] and provided the memo about his misuse of handling IT systems.” “As of this memo, [Applicant] has been separated from [Company A] and has been escorted out of the building.” Company A “will be providing documentation and recording the information as a security incident in [the DOD central security clearance database], as well as notify [Company A’s assigned DOD security representative] of the security incident for their records.” (GE 10) The ROI reflects that, in January 2017, the DOD Inspector General’s hotline received a complaint alleging that Applicant had stolen six DOD laptops from Facility X. The complaint included a photograph of a laptop bearing a “Property of [DOD]” label. The complaint was initially referred to Agency B, which notified Agency A, and Agency A opened a case to investigate whether Applicant removed DOD property from Facility X, and if so, how. Agency A conducted witness interviews in February and May 2018 (2018 Witness Interviews). Agency A jointly interviewed Applicant in June 2018 (2018 Interview) with multiple entities, including Agency B and Facility X, for the stated purpose of discussing “missing computers and property accountability [redacted]” in connection with his duties at Facility X. Redactions in the ROI conceal the identity of the complainant and the identities and number of witnesses interviewed. (GE 11) (redaction in original) The key allegations from the 2018 Witness Interviews, as reflected in the ROI, are summarized below: • Applicant told [redacted] that he stole DOD laptops from Facility X to obtain money to build a home in Country A (which the record reflects is Applicant’s country of origin). • [Redacted] stated that Applicant had a total of six DOD laptops in his possession. • Applicant traveled to Country A in December 2017 to work on the home he was building and took some of the DOD laptops with him. While there, he sold three DOD laptops for approximately $300 to $500 each. Each laptop was encrypted with an administrator password provided by him at the time of sale. • [Redacted] became aware that Applicant was selling DOD laptops taken from Facility X after a friend from Country A called [redacted] in December 2017 12

regarding a dispute involving the sale of those laptops in Country A. (GE 1; GE 11 at 2, 3) (redactions in original) The 2018 Interview, as reflected in the ROI, is summarized below: • When investigators stated that a DOD laptop belonging to Facility X was potentially located in Country A and information had been received that Applicant was responsible for selling DOD laptops there, Applicant denied ever selling DOD laptops in Country A and stated that he did not have a home in Country A and did not intend to build one there. • When investigators stated that records reflected Applicant’s December 2017 travel to Country A and that [redacted] in Country A reported Applicant had sold laptops there, Applicant stated that his DOD laptop had gone missing around that time. When asked whether he had reported it was lost or stolen, he stated that he had not, explaining that he did not know exactly whether it had been lost or stolen because it was a DOD laptop he did not use often. • Applicant initially stated that he never brought DOD laptops into his home but sometimes left them in his car. He explained that, if work ran late and the office may have been closed, he would leave DOD laptops in his car rather than returning them to the office. He reiterated that he left DOD laptops in his car but never in his home. When investigators stated that a DOD laptop had been located inside his home, he stated that he may have brought DOD laptops inside his home for safekeeping on weekends, explaining he had done so only five or six times. The ROI does not reflect whether the identity of the complainant or witnesses was discussed, or whether Applicant was questioned about the remaining key allegations from the 2018 Witness Interviews, including the allegation that he stole laptops from Facility X. (GE 11 at 4–5) (redactions in original) The ROI further reflects that, on January 23, 2019, Agency A received an email from Agency B, in response to an inquiry regarding “action taken by [redacted] Leadership with the results of this investigation.” Agency B stated that Applicant was terminated on November 5, 2018, and included an email from [redacted] who wrote that the termination was a result of “this case and the stolen [DOD laptops].” The ROI states, “This investigation is now closed. Administrative action was taken by [redacted] and documented in the report dated January 25, 2019,” without specifying the date the investigation closed, the nature of that action, or the identity of the person or entity that took it. The referenced report was not attached to the ROI or otherwise included in the record. The ROI does not state a finding or conclusion by either Agency A or Agency B that Applicant engaged in the conduct alleged in the complaint or committed a security violation. (GE 11) (redactions in original) 13

During the current adjudication, Applicant made statements regarding the conduct reflected in the Termination Memorandum and the ROI, the complaint and investigation, and the basis for his termination, including which conduct constituted the security violation. Those statements are summarized below: (1) Facility X Laptop Allegations: DOHA Hearing. Applicant denied stealing any DOD laptops from Facility X, telling anyone that he stole DOD laptops from Facility X, or having six DOD laptops in his possession, as alleged in the 2018 Witness Interviews. He was not asked about the allegation that he sold laptops in Country A and did not otherwise address it. (Tr. 212– 213, 257) (2) Missing Laptop Incident: 2020 Interviews. Applicant discussed a Missing Laptop Incident involving a DOD laptop assigned to him for use in performing his duties at Facility X (Assigned Laptop (AL)). He had been taking the AL home for work purposes for a few years with the knowledge of his supervisor and colleagues. In October or November 2018, he noticed the AL was missing and searched his home but never found it. He did not report it missing when he could not find it because he assumed it was somewhere in his home. Company A learned of the Missing Laptop Incident from Son B, who knew the AL was missing because Applicant had been asking around the house if anyone had found it. (GE 9 at 6– 7, 18, 30) DOHA Hearing. Applicant was permitted to use the AL at home and in the office. He also had access to a separate shared laptop for office use, which he was required to sign out through asset management and return after use. He took the AL home “most of the time,” but used it infrequently, “as needed,” and teleworked from home about one percent of the time. He stated that he was required to be on call outside normal working hours but could not estimate how often, describing it as occurring “sometime[s] . . . many time[s].” He attributed his failure to notice the AL was missing to his infrequent use of it. (Tr. 197–202, 220) Applicant’s testimony regarding when and how he reported the AL missing was unclear. He testified that the 2018 Interview prompted him to look for it. When asked whether that interview was the first time he reported the AL missing, he stated that he did not think so and could have reported it earlier. When confronted with his statement during the 2018 Interview that he had not yet reported the AL missing, he acknowledged, “Yes, I would have said that,” but asserted that he knew the AL “[had] already been reported [missing].” He could not recall when or under what circumstances that earlier report was made. He repeatedly stated that he could not recall the sequence of events and referenced experiencing distress during the 2018 Interview, without clarifying whether he was referring to a report made during that interview or an earlier report. (Tr. 207–218) 14

(3) Customer Laptop Incident: 2020 Interviews. Applicant also discussed a Customer Laptop Incident involving a customer’s DOD laptop (Customer Laptop (CL)). The customer gave Applicant the CL as he was leaving Facility X for the day. Applicant took the CL to his car, intending to return it to his office the next day, but did not return it until a few days later because he had forgotten it was in his car. (GE 9 at 6–7, 30) April 2020 Interview. Applicant did not report the Customer Laptop Incident when it occurred and first disclosed it during the 2018 Interview when asked whether he had ever left a DOD laptop in his car and answered truthfully. He stated that only the investigator to whom he made the disclosure was aware of it and that he did not know whether Son B was aware of, or reported, the incident to Facility X, as Applicant had not been informed what Son B reported (GE 9 at 18–19) July 2020 Interview. Company A learned of the Customer Laptop Incident only after Son B reported it to Facility X. Applicant stated that the question concerning laptops left in his car was one of a series of qu

estions asked during the 2018 Interview. (GE 9 at 30) Answer. The customer gave Applicant the CL “at the [Facility X] exit door” as he was leaving to go home. He took it with him and left it “in [his car] for days” before returning it to asset management. (Answer) DOHA Hearing. Applicant only ever left a DOD laptop in his car one time, in connection with the Customer Laptop Incident. The customer had given him the CL after he had already left his office for the day, passed the security checkpoint, and exited the building. He did not return it to his office the same day because he was “in a rush” and doing so would have made him late, explaining at different points that he was rushing to get home or to his second job. He intended to return it the following day but “forgot all about it.” He had never before left a DOD laptop in his car and, at the time, he was working two jobs and in a constant daily rush between them. He did not remember the laptop was in his car “until one day it clicked in my mind.” (Tr. 203–207, 218, 258) Applicant consistently testified that he was outside of the building when the customer gave him the laptop, though his descriptions of the precise location varied: “at the gate,” “almost at the door,” “at the door,” “at the parking lot,” and “coming down the steps.” He acknowledged that he would not have been allowed to take the CL out of the building had he still been inside, stating “If I was in the building, I couldn’t take [the CL] out because [Facility X security] would see it.” (Id.) (4) Complaint and Investigation: 2020 Interviews. Son B requested Facility X investigate Applicant out of spite following a family dispute between them. During the 2018 Interview, six investigators from 15

various agencies spoke with Applicant regarding the accusations, and he cooperated with their investigation. (GE 9 at 6) There is no indication that Applicant was asked about the allegations that he stole DOD laptops from Facility X or sold them in Country A, or otherwise addressed those allegations. (GE 9) DOHA Hearing. Applicant objected to the admission of the ROI into evidence on the basis that its redactions precluded him from identifying the witnesses, noting “they could all be lying, making a false statement against me.” When asked to clarify whether he was asserting that the witnesses had lied about him, he responded, “Yes. Mostly . . . yes,” without further elaboration. He would never have been terminated but for Son B’s false report to Facility X because “[e]verybody [who] works there would leave a laptop, do some of the stuff that [Son B] alleged.” (Tr. 48–52, 137–138, 218) When investigators eventually named the complainant during the 2018 Interview, Applicant identified him as Son B and described their prior family dispute, neither of which investigators had previously known. When asked whether he had discussed with Son B why he reported that Applicant had stolen laptops from Facility X, Applicant responded that he had not. He then volunteered that he regularly brings goods he purchases to underprivileged children in Country A and suggested that Son B may have misconstrued his accumulation of those items. He described them as shoes and clothes but did not explain how this account related to the allegation that he stole DOD laptops. (Tr. 213– 214, 216, 218–219) Applicant acknowledged that, during the 2018 Interview, he denied ever bringing DOD laptops into his home. He testified that the denial responded to an investigator’s question whether he had ever taken home, or been authorized to take home, a shared laptop. He maintained that it was not intended to deny taking the AL home, which he testified was the only DOD laptop he was permitted to take home and the only one he ever took home. (Tr. 217–218) (5) Basis for Termination: 2020 SCA. Applicant reported he was terminated for: “[f]ailing to report missing computer” and “[f]ailing to provid[e] information of a missing computer,” but made no reference to a security violation. (GE 1) 2020 Interviews. During the 2018 Interview, Applicant was told he would receive a letter regarding what he referred to as the incident, which he confirmed receiving. He could not recall when he received the letter, estimating that he received it in June 2018. Although he acknowledged that Company A terminated him for security violations (plural), he subsequently attributed his termination to the Missing Laptop Incident. He discussed the Customer Laptop Incident but stated that it did not result in any policy violations or other consequences. (GE 9 at 6–7, 30) 16

Answer. Applicant admitted Company A terminated him for a security violation (singular) in connection with a “[DOD laptop] issue,” describing conduct consistent with the Customer Laptop Incident. (Answer) DOHA Hearing. Applicant acknowledged Company A terminated him for a security violation (singular) but testified that he was not told, and did not know, the specific conduct underlying his termination. He discussed both the Missing Laptop and Customer Laptop Incidents but did not indicate that he believed either constituted a security violation or involved wrongdoing on his part. He testified that he was “let go because of the incident” and that his termination resulted from a “misunderstanding,” without further elaboration. He did not receive “any warnings or reprimands or anything of the nature” in connection with the Customer Laptop Incident. He chose not to contest his termination, explaining, “I didn’t want to go through all that . . . I just said, forget it . . . Something happen to you; let it go.” (Tr. 203–207, 220–221, 258–260, 270) Applicant disputed the Termination Memorandum’s statement that he was “provided the memo about his misuse of handling IT systems.” On the day he was terminated, he surrendered his badge, was escorted from the building, and was told that papers would be provided to him; however, he never received them. (Tr. 258–259) In his June 2020 Interview, Applicant stated that he would try to reach out to former Company A coworkers who were aware of his employment issues. In his July 2020 Interview, he provided no additional details or documentation regarding those issues. At the DOHA Hearing, he presented no documentation or witnesses to corroborate his account of the circumstances surrounding his termination. (GE 9 at 27, 30; Tr. 139) Whole-Person Concept During the June 2020 Interview, Applicant asserted that his attitude towards the law and regulations was good and that he followed rules and regulations. He acknowledged making a few mistakes in the past, without identifying any specific conduct, and described himself as a lawful person who works hard. At the DOHA Hearing, he testified that he had been a good employee during his tenure at Company A, denied being a violent person or having any intention to falsify anything, and attributed his arrest history to being in the wrong place at the wrong time. (GE 9 at 28; Tr. 174, 177–178, 221–222, 266, 270) Policies This case was adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented on June 8, 2017. 17

“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Egan at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” EO 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the AG. These AG are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these AG in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off–duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” EO 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Egan at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. ISCR Case No. 15–01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. ISCR Case No. 02–31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 18

An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his [or her] security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01–20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan at 531; AG ¶ 2(b). Analysis Guideline J: Criminal Conduct The security concern under Guideline J is set out in AG ¶ 30: Criminal activity creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Considering all the disqualifying conditions in AG ¶ 31 under Guideline J, the record evidence establishes the following with respect to the 2003 and 2019 domestic assault charges (SOR ¶¶ 1.e and 1.a), the 2006 felony forging public records charge and subsequent misdemeanor conviction (SOR ¶ 1.d), and the 2015 contempt of court charge (SOR ¶ 1.b): (a) a pattern of minor offenses, any one of which on its own would be unlikely to affect a national security eligibility decision, but which in combination cast doubt on the individual's judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; and (b) evidence (including, but not limited to, a credible allegation, an admission, and matters of official record) of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the individual was formally charged, prosecuted, or convicted. No disqualifying conditions are established with respect to the 1987 felony assault (SOR ¶ 1.g), 2001 felony embezzlement (SOR ¶ 1.f), or the 2006 domestic assault charge (SOR ¶ 1.c). Applicant admitted these allegations only insofar as they described the charges; however, he did not admit to the underlying criminal conduct. He was found not guilty of the felony assault, the felony embezzlement was dismissed, and the 2006 domestic assault was nolle prosequi. Absent a conviction or other evidence establishing criminal conduct, I find SOR ¶¶ 1.c, 1.f, and 1.g in Applicant’s favor under Guideline J. Nevertheless, they remain relevant under Guideline E and in evaluating mitigation and the whole-person concept. Conversely, as to the 2003 and 2019 domestic assault charges, I find that the judicial probable-cause determinations that Applicant committed the charged offenses constitute evidence of criminal conduct within the meaning of AG ¶ 31(b), notwithstanding the subsequent nolle prosequi of both charges. 19

Having considered all the factors set forth in AG ¶ 32 that could mitigate the concerns under Guideline J, I find the following warrant discussion: (a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (c) no reliable evidence to support that the individual committed the offense; and (d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited to, the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, restitution, compliance with the terms of parole or probation, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community involvement. Applicant has mitigated the security concerns under Guideline J arising from the 2003 and 2019 domestic assault charges. The record evidence does not reliably establish that Applicant committed the charged conduct. The charges were nolle prosequi, and there are no police reports, domestic violence protective orders, or testimony from either Wife 2 or Wife 4 concerning the alleged incidents. Based on the application of AG ¶ 32(c), I find SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.e in his favor. Applicant has also mitigated the security concerns arising from the 2015 contempt of court charge. His statements concerning the underlying facts and circumstances were consistent, the charge was dismissed, and the conduct arose from isolated circumstances unlikely to recur. This incident does not cast doubt on his reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment. Based on the application of AG ¶ 32(a), I find SOR ¶ 1.b in his favor. Conversely, Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns arising from the 2006 fraud conviction. Most security concerns are predictive in nature, but this one eliminates the need for speculation. He knowingly submitted a falsified official document to the DMV. This conduct is particularly significant in this context because it demonstrates a willingness to deceive a government entity for his own self-interest, striking at the heart of a trustworthiness determination. Given his demeanor at the DOHA Hearing, materially inconsistent statements, and the absence of corroborating evidence, I do not find his testimony and assertions of innocence concerning the 2006 fraud conviction credible. The record reflects additional uncharged criminal conduct that was not alleged under Guideline J: Applicant violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by deliberately falsifying material facts on his 2012 and 2020 SCAs, as discussed further under Guideline E. Such violations are felonies punishable by a fine or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both. Because these falsifications were not alleged under Guideline J, I have considered them solely for the purpose of evaluating mitigation and the whole-person concept. 20

Considering the record as a whole, Applicant has not met his burden to mitigate the concerns under Guideline J. Although significant time has passed since the 2006 conviction, his continued efforts to minimize and misrepresent the underlying conduct, including by denying the conviction, together with his SCA falsifications, reflect poor judgment and a failure to rehabilitate. Accordingly, I do not find a sufficient pattern of modified behavior to conclude that his criminal conduct is unlikely to recur. I have substantial doubts about his reliability, trustworthiness, and judgment. None of the mitigating conditions are established as to SOR ¶ 1.d. Guideline E: Personal Conduct The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes . . . . Having considered all the disqualifying conditions in AG ¶ 16 under Guideline E, I find the following warrant discussion: (a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; (c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole–person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information; (d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or 21

unreliable behavior to include breach of customer confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or government protected information; (2) any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and (4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer's time or resources; and (e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress by a foreign intelligence entity or other individual or group. Such conduct includes: (1) engaging in activities which, if known, could affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing . . . Incorporating my comments under Guideline J, I find SOR ¶ 2.a in Applicant’s favor with respect to SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.f, and 1.g. No disqualifying conditions are established under Guideline E with respect to these allegations. Regardless of my adverse determination under Guideline J, Applicant’s 2006 fraud conviction (SOR ¶ 1.d) raises independent security concerns under Guideline E, as alleged in SOR ¶ 2.a. Specifically, the record evidence establishes AG ¶ 16(e). Despite my favorable determination under Guideline J, Applicant’s three domestic assault charges (SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.c, and 1.e) raise independent security concerns under Guideline E, as cross-alleged under SOR ¶ 2.a. Specifically, the record evidence establishes AG ¶ 16(c) and AG ¶ 16(e). SOR ¶ 2.b alleges “You were terminated from your employment with [Company A] on November 5, 2018, after an investigation by [Agency B] determined you were responsible for a security violation.” However, the record evidence does not establish that Agency B “determined” Applicant was “responsible for a security violation.” Moreover, Applicant’s termination is not independently disqualifying under Guideline E, as it is a consequence of conduct; rather, it is the conduct underlying his termination that serves as the basis of the security concern. Although inartfully drafted, I do not find SOR ¶ 2.b so deficient as to warrant a favorable finding on pleading grounds alone. SOR ¶ 2.b provided Applicant with sufficient notice of the basis of the security concern and afforded him a meaningful opportunity to respond. With respect to SOR ¶ 2.b, the record evidence establishes AG ¶¶ 16(d) and 16(e). Applicant’s falsification of material facts on his 2012 and 2020 SCAs, as alleged under SOR ¶¶ 2.c and 2.d, renders AG ¶¶ 16(a) potentially applicable. Because the falsification allegations are controverted, the Government bears the burden of proving the applicability of AG ¶ 16(a). An omission, standing alone, does not prove falsification. An administrative judge must consider the record evidence as a whole to determine an applicant’s state of mind at the time of the omission. ISCR Case No. 03-09483 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov. 17, 2004). An applicant’s education and experience are relevant to determining 22

whether a failure to disclose relevant information on a security clearance application was deliberate. ISCR Case No. 08-05637 (App. Bd. Sep. 9, 2010). I do not find credible Applicant’s explanations and excuses for falsifying his 2012 and 2020 SCAs, particularly in light of his educational background, employment experience, and security clearance history. On each SCA, he reported misdemeanor charges yet failed to disclose even one of the three felony charges, suggesting an awareness of the potential negative impact a felony charge could have on his security clearance eligibility. That awareness is underscored by his failure to disclose any felony charges in his 2013 Interview and his acknowledgement of them only after confrontation in his March 2020 Interview. Accordingly, I find substantial evidence of an intent on the part of the Applicant to omit security-significant information from both SCAs. With respect to SOR ¶¶ 2.c and 2.d, the record evidence establishes AG ¶ 16(a). Having considered all of the factors in AG ¶ 17 that could mitigate the concerns under this guideline, I find the following relevant: (a) the individual made prompt, good–faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; (b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with professional responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning security processes. Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully; (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and (e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. Consistent with my comments under Guideline J, Applicant failed to mitigate the Guideline E concerns arising from his 2006 fraud conviction. 23

That Applicant’s three domestic assault charges were nolle prosequi does not preclude consideration of the facts and circumstances underlying the alleged conduct. Unlike the criminal conduct analysis, the analysis under Guideline E does not require proof that Applicant committed the alleged domestic assaults; rather, the question is whether the overall record provides credible adverse information relevant to the whole- person assessment. The charges arose from three separate incidents involving two different spouses, spanning more than a decade. While the mere existence of multiple charges is not alone disqualifying, the repetition of similar allegations involving different individuals over an extended period weighs against mitigation. Beyond the allegations themselves, Applicant’s accounts were marked by material inconsistencies and a lack of corroborating witness testimony or documentary evidence. Notably, he did not produce any records to substantiate the extensive history of violence he attributed to Wife 2. Standing alone, the scarring he pointed to on his head during the hearing does not establish that it was caused by Wife 2. Despite the absence of sufficient evidence to establish that the alleged domestic assaults occurred, the nature and pattern of the charges, together with the deficiencies in Applicant’s accounts, cast substantial doubt on his credibility as the sole narrator of the facts and circumstances surrounding the charges. The record evidence does not establish the specific conduct underlying Applicant’s 2018 termination. The Termination Memorandum describes the matter only in general terms as involving mishandling of IT equipment and misuse of IT systems. The ROI references an email suggesting a connection to “this case and the stolen [DOD laptops]” but does not identify the source of that statement, clarify what “this case” refers to, or establish the role of the complaint allegations in Applicant’s termination. Neither document identifies a conclusion by Agency A or Agency B that Applicant engaged in the conduct alleged in the complaint or committed a security violation. Company A considered the matter serious enough to separate Applicant for a security violation. This action is relevant to the Guideline E assessment even though the record evidence does not establish whether Applicant stole DOD laptops. Applicant also gave materially inconsistent accounts of the laptop incidents and the circumstances leading to his separation and presented no documentary or witness evidence to corroborate those accounts. Deliberately providing false information on an SCA is not a minor offense. It strikes at the heart of the security clearance investigation process. Applicant did not correct the omissions before confrontation. His asserted reliance on advice from a coworker does not mitigate the omissions. His stated intentions regarding future SCAs, standing alone, do not establish a sufficient pattern of modified behavior. Considering the record as a whole, Applicant has not met his burden to mitigate the concerns under Guideline E. His continued denial and minimization of the 2006 fraud conviction, deliberate falsifications of the 2012 and 2020 SCAs, handling and reporting of 24

DOD laptops, and materially inconsistent and uncorroborated accounts of the domestic- assault and termination-related matters raise concerns regarding his judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, willingness to comply with rules and regulations, and vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. AG ¶¶ 17(a) through 17(e) are not established as to SOR ¶ 2.a, with respect to SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.c, 1.d, and 1.e, and as to SOR ¶¶ 2.b through 2.d. Whole-Person Concept Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the AG and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines J and E in my whole-person analysis and applied the factors in AG ¶ 2(d). Applicant’s materially inconsistent and uncorroborated accounts, particularly concerning the domestic-assault and termination- related matters, further undermine confidence in his judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines J and E and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude that Applicant has not mitigated the criminal and personal conduct security concerns. Formal Findings Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline J: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a–1.c: Subparagraph 1.d: Subparagraphs 1.e–1.g: Against Applicant For Applicant 25 For Applicant

Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant (except as to subparagraphs 1.b, 1.f, and 1.g, which are found for Applicant) Against Applicant Subparagraphs 2.b–2.d: Conclusion I conclude it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. Gina L. Marine Administrative Judge 26