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A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ISCR Case No. 25-00956

Denied

Decided Oct 22, 2026 · Administrative Judge Jeff A. Nagel · Hearing

Case headnote

Summary

The applicant, a 31-year-old dual citizen of the United States and Israel, faced security clearance denial under Guideline H for drug involvement and Guideline B for foreign influence. Despite mitigating factors regarding foreign influence, the applicant's admissions of illegal drug use while holding a security clearance were deemed significant enough to deny eligibility.

Why the applicant was denied

  • Applicant admitted to using marijuana and hallucinogenic mushrooms while holding a security clearance.
  • The applicant's drug use occurred after he was familiar with the drug policies of his employers.
  • The applicant's actions demonstrated a lack of judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness.

Conditions referenced

Disqualifying

  • H.25(a) Any substance misuseraised
  • H.25(g) Any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive positionraised

Mitigating

  • H.26(a) The behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgmentrejected
  • H.26(b) The individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome the problem, and has established a pattern of abstinencerejected

Key rule quoted

Procedural posture

SOR issued
September 16, 2025
Answer filed
December 16, 2025
Hearing held
August 27, 2026
Decision date
October 22, 2026

Cite for

  • Denial of Security Clearance Due to Drug Involvement Under Guideline H
  • Impact of Illegal Drug Use on Security Clearance Eligibility
  • Foreign Influence Considerations Under Guideline B

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

From the decision

Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.

Applicant Age
31
Prior Clearance
held
Bankruptcy
none

Allegations under Guideline B

Reading the 2 per allegation rows needs a free account.

2 rows in this decision.

It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.

Allegations under Guideline H

Reading the 5 per allegation rows needs a free account.

5 rows in this decision.

It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.

Full decision

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Decision text, by section

Appearances

the matter of: )

)

)

) ISCR Case No. 25-00956

)

Applicant for Security Clearance )

Decision

_____________________________________ ) Appearances For Government: William Miller, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Grant Couch, Esq: 10/22/2026 Decision NAGEL, JE

Statement of Case

FF A., Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse). Applicant did, however, mitigate the security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case On June 20, 2024, Applicant submitted his latest Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Questionnaire). On September 16, 2025, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) and Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within DoD after June 8, 2017.

Findings of Fact

Applicant responded to the SOR in writing (Answer) through his attorney on December 16, 2025, and requested a hearing before an Administrative Judge. The Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on June 2, 2026. The case was assigned to me on June 3, 2026. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing on June 16, 2026. I convened the hearing as scheduled on August 27, 2026. The Government called no witnesses and submitted Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 4, which I admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf, called no other witnesses, and submitted Appellant Exhibits (AE) A through H, which I admitted into evidence with no objection. The record was left open for Applicant to submit additional documentation. On September 8, 2026, he submitted three additional letters of recommendation which I admitted into evidence with no objection as AE I through K. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (TR) on September 5, 2026. Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts with respect to Israel and provided a six-page summary of the facts, supported by nine Government documents. Without objection, I have taken administrative notice of the facts contained in the request. The facts are summarized in the written request and will not be repeated verbatim in this decision. Findings of Fact Applicant is 31 years old and earned a degree in Industrial Technology in 2017. He has worked for various defense contractors since he graduated and began his latest employment in May of 2024 as a Lead Systems Engineer. Applicant has excelled in his career, having received numerous promotions and awards. Applicant first received a security clearance in January of 2019. Applicant admitted he was familiar with the drug policies of the companies he worked with and admitted his use while holding a security clearance. He testified that his use was 100% a mistake and he accepted full accountability for it. He further testified that he was confused with the California and Federal Law on marijuana use. Applicant testified that he has no intent to use marijuana or any other illegal substance in the future. (Tr. at 14-16, 22, 23, 30,31, GE 1, 2, 4) Applicant was born in California and has always lived in the United States. He is a dual citizen of Israel and the United States. Applicant has never voted in an Israeli election, nor does he own property in Israel or have any financial interests there. Both of Applicant’s parents were born in Israel. Applicant’s mother and sister are dual citizens who reside in the United States and his father is deceased. Upon questioning by me, Applicant testified that his relationship with his mother and sister is “a thousand percent” stronger than with his grandmother and cousins. Applicant’s grandmother is 91 years old and is a citizen and resident of Israel who is suffering from dementia. Applicant’s communication with his grandmother, which was once very frequent, has almost completely st

Policies

opped due to her condition. Applicant’s foreign travel is extensive and is certainly not limited to Israel. He has visited over 20 different foreign countries since April of 2013. Outside of his visits to Israel Applicant used his American passport to enter and exit each of the countries he visited. Applicant last visited Israel two months prior to his 2

hearing and spent less than a week there. While he was there, he spent time with his grandmother and saw two of the cousins that are alleged in the SOR. Applicant did not see the third one since he is now living in Thailand. Applicant has contact with his cousins about 3-4 times a year and never discusses his employment with them. He believes they may be or were reservists in the Israeli military. (Tr. at 17-19, 23-26, GE’s 1, 2, 4) SOR Paragraph 1 (Guideline H: Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) SOR ¶ 1.a. alleges Applicant used marijuana with varying frequency from about January 2013 until at least April 2024. Applicant admitted to this allegation stating that his marijuana use “occurred near the end of his senior year of high school and [in] college.” Applicant testified that his use was about three times a month, though between 2019 and 2022 he refrained from using marijuana. He also admitted that he had used marijuana on at least two occasions between January of 2022 and April of 2024, while he held a security clearance. (Tr. at 26-28, Answer) SOR ¶ 1.b. alleges Applicant used marijuana with varying frequency from about January 2022 to a least April 2024, while he held a security clearance. Applicant admitted that he had a “lapse of Judgement” and had used marijuana on at least two occasions during that time period, while he held a security clearance. In 2022 it was at a New Ye

Analysis

ar’s Eve party and in 2024 it was at a music festival (Tr. at 26-28, Answer) SOR ¶ 1.c. alleges from about April 2014 until at least April of 2024, Applicant used hallucinogenic mushrooms. Applicant admitted to this allegation stating he only used them three times: twice when he was in college and one time in April 2024. He further stated that he no longer associates with the people involved in his last use. (Tr. at 32, 33, Answer) SOR ¶ 1.d. alleges that in about April 2024, Applicant used hallucinogenic mushrooms while holding a security clearance. Applicant admitted that he had a “lapse of judgement,” has taken full responsibility, and has no intention of repeating that mistake. He has taken steps to ensure illegal substances are no longer part of his life. (Tr. at 32, 33, Answer) SOR ¶ 1.e. alleges that from about August 2013 until at least December 2017 he used cocaine with varying frequency. Applicant admitted he used cocaine on two occasions, and his last use was in December of 2017. Applicant stated his use was while he was in college and that he no longer associates with the individuals he used with, and that he has no intention to use cocaine in the future. (Tr. at 33, 34, Answer) I find that in a few short months nine years will have expired since Applicant’s last used cocaine. SOR Paragraph 1 (Guideline B: Foreign Influence) 3

SOR ¶ 2.a. alleges Applicant has three cousins who are citizens and residents of Israel. Applicant admitted to this allegation, however his contact with them is superficial at best and his relationship and feelings toward his immediate family – mother and sister, who live in the United States - are far deeper and stronger. I have no doubt he would choose them and the United States over his cousins and Israel. (Tr. at 23-26, Answer) SOR ¶ 2.b. alleges Applicant’s grandmother is a citizen and resident of Israel. Applicant admitted this allegation. Applicant’s grandmother is 91 years old and is suffering from dementia. Applicant’s communication with his grandmother, which was once very frequent, has almost completely stopped due to her condition. Applicant testified that his relationship is “a thousand percent” stronger with his mother and sister then his grandmother and cousins. I have no doubt he would choose them and the United States over his grandmother and Israel. (Tr. at 17-19, Answer) Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government 4

reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect, or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) makes it illegal under Federal law to manufacture, possess, or distribute certain drugs, including marijuana. (Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. See § 844.) All controlled substances are classified into five schedules, based on their accepted medical uses, their potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the body. §§ 811, 812. Marijuana is classified as a Schedule III controlled substance, § 812(c), based on its high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment. § 812(b)(1). See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Further, in October 2014, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued a memorandum entitled “Adherence to Federal Laws Prohibiting Marijuana Use,” (2014 DNI Memo) which makes clear that changes in the laws pertaining to marijuana by the various states, territories, and the District of Columbia do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines, and that Federal law supersedes state laws on this issue: [C]hanges to state laws and the laws of the District of Columbia pertaining to marijuana use do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines. . . . An individual’s disregard of federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations. As always, adjudicative authorities are expected to evaluate claimed or developed use of, or involvement with, marijuana using the current adjudicative criteria. The adjudicative authority must determine if the use of, or involvement with, marijuana raises questions about the individual’s judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and willingness to comply with law, rules, and regulations, including federal laws, when making eligibility decisions of persons proposed for, or occupying, sensitive national security positions. The DOHA Appeal Board has cited the 2014 DNI Memo in holding that “state laws allowing for the legal use of marijuana in some limited circumstances do not pre-empt 5

provisions of the Industrial Security Program, and the Department of Defense is not bound by the status of an applicant’s conduct under state law when adjudicating that individual’s eligibility for access to classified information.” ISCR Case No. 14-03734 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Feb. 18, 2016). The current National Security Adjudicative Guidelines went into effect on June 8, 2017, after the 2014 DNI memo was issued. Nevertheless, the principle continues to apply. Moreover, on December 21, 2021, then-DNI Avril D. Haynes issued a memorandum entitled, “Security Executive Agent Clarifying Guidance Concerning Marijuana for Agencies Conducting Adjudications of Persons Proposed for Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.” (2021 DNI Memo) The memo incorporates the AGs (at reference B) and the 2014 DNI Memo (at reference G) among various other relevant federal laws, executive orders, and memoranda. I take administrative notice of the 2021 DNI memo here, given its relevance to this case, its reliance on the AGs, and its recency. The 2021 DNI memo specifically notes that “under policy set forth in SEAD 4's adjudicative guidelines, the illegal use or misuse of controlled substances can raise security concerns about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness to access classified information or to hold a sensitive position, as well as their ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.” Thus, consistent with these references, the AGs indicate that “disregard of federal law pertaining to marijuana remains relevant, but not determinative, to adjudications of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.” (2021 DNI Memo) Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The security concerns relating to the guideline for drug involvement and substance misuse are set out in AG ¶ 24, which reads as follows: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. The facts of this case establish the following potentially disqualifying conditions set forth in AG ¶ 25: 6

(a) any substance misuse (see above definition); and (g) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position. Applicant admitted he used marijuana with varying frequency from about January 2013 until at least April 2024. This period encompasses his use on at least two separate occasions after submitting an e-QIP, having a security clearance interview, and receiving a security clearance. Applicant also admitted to using hallucinogenic mushrooms from about April 2014 until at least April of 2024. His use of hallucinogenic mushrooms occurred at least once after submitting an e-QIP, having a security clearance interview, and receiving a security clearance. Lastly, he admitted to using cocaine with varying frequency between August 2013 until at least December 2017. He used cocaine at least twice during that period of time and both uses occurred prior to Applicant receiving a security clearance in January 2019. Applicants’ use of marijuana, hallucinogenic mushrooms, and cocaine establish AG ¶25(a). His use of both marijuana and hallucinogenic mushrooms after receiving a security clearance clearly establishes AG ¶25(g). Therefore, the burden shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline H. The guideline includes the following two conditions in AG ¶ 26 that could mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s drug use: a. the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and b. the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome the problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. Applicant admitted using various illegal substances over almost a 12-year period to include using marijuana and hallucinogenic mushrooms after receiving a security clearance. Applicant is not new to the defense contractor realm having worked with 7

various ones since he graduated college. Applicant also testified he was familiar with the drug policies of his employers. He is far removed from being new to the security clearance arena and had to know the illegalities of his drug use while holding a security clearance. Even though Applicant has submitted a signed statement of intent to abstain from drug use in the future, (AE B) and he completed a drug course (AE D), his use of illegal drugs while holding a security clearance far outweighs this mitig

Analysis

are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government 4

reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect, or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) makes it illegal under Federal law to manufacture, possess, or distribute certain drugs, including marijuana. (Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. See § 844.) All controlled substances are classified into five schedules, based on their accepted medical uses, their potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the body. §§ 811, 812. Marijuana is classified as a Schedule III controlled substance, § 812(c), based on its high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment. § 812(b)(1). See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Further, in October 2014, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued a memorandum entitled “Adherence to Federal Laws Prohibiting Marijuana Use,” (2014 DNI Memo) which makes clear that changes in the laws pertaining to marijuana by the various states, territories, and the District of Columbia do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines, and that Federal law supersedes state laws on this issue: [C]hanges to state laws and the laws of the District of Columbia pertaining to marijuana use do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines. . . . An individual’s disregard of federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations. As always, adjudicative authorities are expected to evaluate claimed or developed use of, or involvement with, marijuana using the current adjudicative criteria. The adjudicative authority must determine if the use of, or involvement with, marijuana raises questions about the individual’s judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and willingness to comply with law, rules, and regulations, including federal laws, when making eligibility decisions of persons proposed for, or occupying, sensitive national security positions. The DOHA Appeal Board has cited the 2014 DNI Memo in holding that “state laws allowing for the legal use of marijuana in some limited circumstances do not pre-empt 5

provisions of the Industrial Security Program, and the Department of Defense is not bound by the status of an applicant’s conduct under state law when adjudicating that individual’s eligibility for access to classified information.” ISCR Case No. 14-03734 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Feb. 18, 2016). The current National Security Adj

Analysis

udicative Guidelines went into effect on June 8, 2017, after the 2014 DNI memo was issued. Nevertheless, the principle continues to apply. Moreover, on December 21, 2021, then-DNI Avril D. Haynes issued a memorandum entitled, “Security Executive Agent Clarifying Guidance Concerning Marijuana for Agencies Conducting Adjudications of Persons Proposed for Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.” (2021 DNI Memo) The memo incorporates the AGs (at reference B) and the 2014 DNI Memo (at reference G) among various other relevant federal laws, executive orders, and memoranda. I take administrative notice of the 2021 DNI memo here, given its relevance to this case, its reliance on the AGs, and its recency. The 2021 DNI memo specifically notes that “under policy set forth in SEAD 4's adjudicative guidelines, the illegal use or misuse of controlled substances can raise security concerns about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness to access classified information or to hold a sensitive position, as well as their ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.” Thus, consistent with these references, the AGs indicate that “disregard of federal law pertaining to marijuana remains relevant, but not determinative, to adjudications of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.” (2021 DNI Memo) Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The security concerns relating to the guideline for drug involvement and substance misuse are set out in AG ¶ 24, which reads as follows: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. The facts of this case establish the following potentially disqualifying conditions set forth in AG ¶ 25: 6

(a) any substance misuse (see above definition); and (g) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position. Applicant admitted he used marijuana with varying frequency from about January 2013 until at least April 2024. This period encompasses his use on at least two separate occasions after submitting an e-QIP, having a security clearance interview, and receiving a security clearance. Applicant also admitted to using hallucinogenic mushrooms from about April 2014 until at least April of 2024. His use of hallucinogenic mushrooms occurred at least once after submitting an e-QIP, having a security clearance interview, and receiving a security clearance. Lastly, he admitted to using cocaine with varying frequency between August 2013 until at least December 2017. He used cocaine at least twice during that period of time and both uses occurred prior to Applicant receiving a security clearance in January 2019. Applicants’ use of marijuana, hallucinogenic mushrooms, and cocaine establish AG ¶25(a). His use of both marijuana and hallucinogenic mushrooms after receiving a security clearance clearly establishes AG ¶25(g). Therefore, the burden shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline H. The guideline includes the following two conditions in AG ¶ 26 that could mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s drug use: a. the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and b. the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome the problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. Applicant admitted using various illegal substances over almost a 12-year period to include using marijuana and hallucinogenic mushrooms after receiving a security clearance. Applicant is not new to the defense contractor realm having worked with 7

various ones since he graduated college. Applicant also testified he was familiar with the drug policies of his employers. He is far removed from being new to the security clearance arena and had to know the illegalities of his drug use while holding a security clearance. Even though Applicant has submitted a signed statement of intent to abstain from drug use in the future, (AE B) and he completed a drug course (AE D), his use of illegal drugs while holding a security clearance far outweighs this mitig

Whole Person Concept

ating action. His use of both marijuana and hallucinogenic mushrooms after having submitted an e-QIP, having had a security clearance interview, and receiving a security clearance, coupled with his familiarity with the defense contractor realm is troubling to say the least. Applicant’s actions, statements, and testimony throughout this matter have established he lacks the judgement, reliability, maturity, and trustworthiness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. His use of cocaine almost 9 years ago, prior to him receiving a security clearance, is mitigated. Guideline B, Foreign Influence The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG ¶ 6: Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 7. The following are potentially applicable in this case: (a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology. 8

Applicant’s grandmother and cousins are citizens and residents of Israel so both AGs above are potentially applicable. Conditions that could mitigate fore

Formal Findings

ign influence security concerns are provided under AG ¶ 8. The following are potentially applicable: (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; and (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships

Conclusion

and l oyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. Applicant has extensive foreign travel which includes visiting family in Israel on a few occasions. He most recently visited Israel two months prior to his hearing and spent less than a week there. While he was there, he spent time with his grandmother who has dementia and saw two of the cousins. Applicant has ceased significant contact with his grandmother due to her dementia and contacts his cousins about 3-4 times a year. He never discusses his employment with them. Applicant has never voted in an Isr