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A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ISCR Case No. 25-01353

Granted

Decided Oct 15, 2026 · Administrative Judge John Bayard Glendon · Hearing

Case headnote

Summary

The applicant, a 28-year-old former Army National Guard sergeant, faced security concerns under Guideline H due to two instances of psilocybin mushroom use in 2023 and 2024. The judge found that the applicant's drug use was infrequent, experimental, and occurred during stressful life changes, and he demonstrated significant rehabilitation and a commitment to abstain from future drug use. The applicant was granted national security eligibility for access to classified information.

Why the applicant prevailed

  • The applicant's drug use was infrequent and occurred over two years ago.
  • He demonstrated a clear understanding of the responsibilities associated with holding a security clearance.
  • The applicant provided credible evidence of rehabilitation and a commitment to abstain from illegal drug use.

Conditions referenced

Disqualifying

  • AG ¶ 25(a) Any substance misuseraised
  • AG ¶ 25(c) Illegal possession of a controlled substanceraised
  • AG ¶ 25(f) Illegal drug use while granted access to classified informationraised

Mitigating

  • AG ¶ 26(a) Behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recurapplied
  • AG ¶ 26(b) Acknowledgment of drug involvement and evidence of actions taken to overcome the problemapplied
  • AG ¶ 26(b)(1) Disassociation from drug-using associates and contactsapplied
  • AG ¶ 26(b)(2) Changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were usedapplied
  • AG ¶ 26(b)(3) Providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvementapplied

Key rule quoted

Procedural posture

SOR issued
04/06/2026
Answer filed
06/26/2026
Hearing held
09/18/2026 via Microsoft Teams
Decision date
10/15/2026

Cite for

  • Mitigation of Drug Involvement Under Guideline H
  • Importance of Demonstrating Rehabilitation and Commitment to Abstinence
  • Consideration of the Whole-person Concept in Security Clearance Decisions

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

From the decision

Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.

Applicant Age
28
Clearance Level
secret
Prior Clearance
held
Bankruptcy
none

Allegations under Guideline H

Reading the 2 per allegation rows needs a free account.

2 rows in this decision.

It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.

Full decision

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The complete official text, footnotes and signatures included, is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

Appearances

_____________ ______________ DEFEN

Decision

E LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 25-01353 ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: John B. Renehan, Esq.

Statement of Case

Department Counsel For Applicant: Ryan C. Nerney, Esq 10/15/2026 Decision GLENDON, John Bayard, Administrative Judge: Applicant mitigated the security concerns raised under the adjudicative guideline for drug involvement and substance misuse. National security eligibility for access to classified information is granted. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions on February 4, 2025 (the Questionnaire). On April 6, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline H. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within DoD after June 8, 2017. Applicant responded through counsel to the SOR allegations on June 26, 2026, (Answer) and requested a hearing before an administrative judge from the Defense Office

of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on August 7, 2026. The case was assigned to me on August 11, 2026. DOHA sent Applicant’s attorney a Notice of Hearing on August 18, 2026, scheduling the case to be heard via Microsoft Teams video teleconference on September 18, 2026. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Department Counsel offered three documents marked as Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3. Applicant’s counsel offered the 15 exhibits attached to the Answer, which were marked as

Findings of Fact

Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through O. He also offered three additional exhibits, which he marked as AE P through R. All exhibits were admitted into the record without objection. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on September 25, 2026. (Tr. at 9-11.) DCSA alleged in the SOR that Applicant had used an illegal drug during the period August 2023 through June 2024. The Government also alleged that he used this drug in June 2024 while in a sensitive position, i.e., one that required a security clearance. In the Answer, Applicant admitted both of the allegations in part, and denied them in part. Findings of Fact

Applicant is 28 years old and married. Beginning in August 2016, he attended college classes. He enlisted in the Army National Guard (ANG) in January 2017 at the age of 18. In March 2017, he applied for a security clearance in connection with his ANG enlistment and was granted a secret clearance. Applicant earned a bachelor’s degree in May 2021. He served for six years in the ANG and received an honorable discharge in January 2023. During his service with the ANG, he deployed for 16 months to three countries in the Middle East. At the time of his discharge, he held the rank of sergeant (E- 5). (Tr. at 28-29, 33; GE 1 at 5, 12-13, 22-23, 25-26, 37-38; GE 3 at 1-2, 5.) Based upon testimony presented and the documentation in the record, I make the following findings of fact: As a civilian, Applicant worked for a defense contractor from August 2023 until January 2026 (Employer 1). On August 14, 2023, he executed a Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA) in connection with his employment at Employer 1. In January 2025, Applicant was asked to apply for an upgraded security clearance. He submitted the Questionnaire in February 2025. In February 2026, he was hired to work for a second defense contractor (Employer 2). He was looking for a more challenging job. In that current employment, Applicant is deployed at times to forward base locations in the Middle East supporting Operation Epic Fury as an engineer. He testified at the hearing while on deployment for his current employer. (Tr. at 29-31, 75; GE 1 at 13-14; GE 3 at 5.) Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse 2

SOR ¶ 1.a. Used Psilocybin Mushrooms during the Period August 2023 through June 2024. Applicant used psilocybin mushrooms (Mushrooms) on two occasions, in August 2023 and again in June 2024. He consumed a Mushroom the first time seven months after his discharge from the ANG. This occurred with a friend at the friend’s apartment. The friend provided the drug. Applicant used the drug experimentally to see what it was like. He was experiencing a lot of stress at that time because he was

Analysis

leaving a job he liked, moving across the country with his then-fiancée, and starting a new job with Employer 1. He was leaving his family behind and was planning a wedding with his girlfriend, while somewhat uncertain that relocating with her as a step towards marriage was the right thing for him. By taking the Mushroom, he hoped that the experience would provide him with some clarity in his feelings about the changes. He had a bad experience with the drug. (Tr. at 33-35; GE 3 at 6.) In June 2024, Applicant consumed a Mushroom a second time while on a camping trip with his then-fiancée and friends. A friend of his friend offered him the drug, and he accepted it. He was again feeling stressed with a scheduled August 2024 wedding approaching. He was also stressed because his grandfather was dying at that time. He was close to his grandfather. His drug experience was “nerve wracking.” That strong negative experience confirmed in his mind that drug use was not anything he wanted in his life. Applicant had never used any other drugs before or after these two times with Mushrooms. He considers both uses of the drug to be experimental during times he was experiencing stress. (Tr. at 33-37; GE 3 at 6-7.) SOR ¶ 1.b. Used Psilocybin Mushrooms in June 2024 While in a Sensitive Position, i.e., One Requiring a Security Clearance. At the time Applicant enlisted in the ANG in 2017, his recruiter asked him to fill out a security clearance application even though Applicant was seeking to serve as an infantryman. He was granted a clearance, though he was never advised by the ANG that his application was granted. When he first consumed a Mushroom, Applicant was working in an uncleared position for a company that was not a U.S. Government cont

Policies

actor, so his clearance was inactive. (Tr. at 35-36, 52.) In August 2023, Applicant relocated and began working for Employer 1, a major government contractor. In the course of his hiring process, he was advised that he had an active security clearance, and he was required to sign a Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA). In June 2024, when he consumed a Mushroom for the second time, he was working for Employer 1. In that position, he had not been exposed to any classified information since his hiring in August 2023. The same was true with respect to his six-year experience in the ANG serving as an infantryman. When he began at Employer 1, Applicant understood that at some point he would need to apply for higher clearance eligibility. In February 2025, at his employer’s request, he submitted the Questionnaire. At the time he resigned from Employer 1 and transitioned to Employer 2 in January/February 2026, he had one experience working with classified information. That first time occurred shortly before he resigned, and it took place in a 3

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). Since he began his employment with Employer 2, he frequently works with classified information. His access to classified information is “crucial to the job.” (Tr. at 34-35, 40-44, 49-52.) Applicant testified that at the time he used a Mushroom in June 2024, he failed to understand the obligations of persons granted national security eligibility when they are not at work. He blamed that misunderstanding on his never having used his clearance (i.e., never having had exposure to classified information). He mistakenly gave his clearance little thought when he consumed the Mushroom. In his current position, he has gained an appreciation of the importance of the responsible behavior required of individuals holding clearances. He recognizes that his job is no longer about just himself, it is about the people who count on him. He takes full respo

Analysis

sibility for his mistake. (Tr. at 40-44, 48-49, 54.) Mitigation Two of Applicant’s supervisors testified as character witnesses. Witness 1, a manager at Employer 2, described Applicant as a top performer on his team. He does not believe that Applicant’s past drug use reflects badly on his character today or is a detriment to him performing his job well. Witness 2 supervises Applicant when he is deployed to a war zone location. He described Applicant as a valuable, hard-working employee, who can be trusted to perform his job independently with little guidance. (Tr. at 12-19, 20-27.) Applicant testified that today he handles stress in his life in healthier ways. He exercises and has the support of his wife. He also writes in a journal and practices breathing techniques. He experiences high stress situations when he is deployed in a war zone for his current job and claims he is coping with the stress well. (Tr. at 37-38.) As part of his extensive mitigation documentation, Applicant signed a Statement of Intent in which he asserted that he has no intent to use illegal drugs in the future. His Statement of Intent includes an acknowledgement that any violations of his commitment would be grounds for the automatic revocation of his clearance. He testified that he refuses to be around drug-users and avoids places where he might encounter illegal drugs. His testimony was highly credible. He showed his integrity by volunteering to a government investigator information about his past drug use during his security background interview. Applicant’s other mitigation exhibits, including his personal written statement, 12 character-reference letters, and strong performance evaluation records, were reviewed in their entirety and found to be very supportive of Applicant’s character and integrity. (Tr. at 72-73; GE 3 at 6; AE B through AE R.) Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 4

introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See a

Whole Person Analysis

so Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) 5

The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 24: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription an

d non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any "controlled substance" as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. The following potentially disqualifying conditions set forth in AG ¶ 25 apply to the facts of this case: (a) any substance misuse (see above definition); (c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; and (f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position. Applicant’s possession and consumption of Mushrooms on two occasions satisfy the conditions set forth in AG ¶¶ 25(a) and (c). AG ¶ 25(f) also apples because a position requiring a security clearance is a “sensitive position” for the purposes of establishing a security concern under this condition. Applicant signed the NDA at the beginning of his work at Employer 1 in 2023. He was told that he had a secret clearance and would need to apply for a top secret clearance at some point. There is substantial evidence establishing that Applicant’s June 2024 drug use occurred while he held a sensitive position at Employer 1 that required a security clearance. See ISCR Case No. 22-01661 at 4 (App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2023). The burden, therefore, shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline H. The guideline includes the following two conditions in AG ¶ 26 that can mitigate security concerns arising from an applicant’s drug involvement and substance misuse: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happ

Formal Findings

ned under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 6

(b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this pro

Conclusion

lem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of nation