A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.
ISCR Case No. 25-01323
DeniedDecided Oct 19, 2026 · Administrative Judge Mark W. Harvey · Hearing
Case headnote
Summary
The applicant, a 47-year-old security escort, faced security concerns under Guideline D (sexual behavior) and Guideline E (personal conduct) due to past incidents involving solicitation of sex and multiple violations of company policies leading to termination. The judge found that while the sexual behavior concerns were mitigated, the personal conduct concerns were not, resulting in a denial of security clearance.
Why the applicant was denied
- The applicant's personal conduct involved multiple violations of company policies, including being terminated for these violations.
- The applicant provided inconsistent statements regarding his employment history and conduct, undermining his credibility.
- The applicant's attempts to downplay or deny the severity of his actions did not sufficiently mitigate the concerns raised.
Conditions referenced
Disqualifying
- E2.a Personal Conductraised
- E2.b Personal Conductraised
- E2.c Personal Conductraised
- E2.d Personal Conductraised
- E2.e Personal Conductraised
Mitigating
- D2.a Sexual Behaviorapplied
Key rule quoted
“The security clearance decision is based on the whole person concept, which requires consideration of the applicant's conduct in the context of their overall character and reliability.”
Procedural posture
- SOR issued
- 03/23/2026
- Answer filed
- 01/19/2024
- Hearing held
- 09/29/2026 via Microsoft Teams
- Decision date
- 10/19/2026
Cite for
- Denial of Security Clearance Due to Personal Conduct Violations
- Credibility Issues Arising From Inconsistent Statements
- Mitigation of Sexual Behavior Concerns Under Guideline D
Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.
From the decision
Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.
- Applicant Age
- 47
- Bankruptcy
- none
Allegations under Guideline D
Reading the 1 per allegation row needs a free account.
1 row in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Allegations under Guideline E
Reading the 7 per allegation rows needs a free account.
7 rows in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.
Full decision
Open original PDFThe complete official text, footnotes and signatures included, is in the original PDF.
Decision text, by section
___________ ___________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: Applicant for Security Clearance ) ) ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 25-01323 Appearances For Government: Cassie L. Ford, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Samir Nakhleh, Esq. 10/19/2026 Decision HARVEY, Mark, Administrative Judge: Guideline D (sexual behavior) security concerns are mitigated; however, Guideline E (personal conduct) security concerns are not mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case On June 13, 2019, Applicant completed a security clearance application (SCA). (Government Exhibit (GE) 1) On March 23, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a statement of reasons (SOR) to Applicant under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960); Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive) (January 2, 1992), as amended; and Security Executive Agent Directive 4, establishing in Appendix A, the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (AGs), effective June 8, 2017. (Hearing Exhibit (HE) 1) The SOR detailed reasons why DCSA did not find under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant and stated his case would be submitted to an Administrative
Judge for a determination whether to grant, deny, or revoke his security clearance. Specifically, the SOR set forth security concerns arising under Guidelines D and E. (HE 1) On January 19, 2024, Applicant responded to the SOR. (HE 2) In July 2026, Applicant provided a personal statement. (HE 3) On August 3, 2026, Department Counsel was ready to proceed. On August 12, 2026, the case was assigned to me. On August 21, 2026, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice scheduling the hearing for September 29, 2026. (HE 4) The hearing was held as scheduled, using the Microsoft Teams video teleconference system. During the hearing, Department Counsel offered nine exhibits; Applicant offered seven exhibits; there were no objections; and all proffered exhibits were admitted into evidence. (Tr. 12-16; GE 1-GE 9; Applicant Exhibit (AE) A-AE G) Applicant’s list of exhibits is at .pdf 14 of the SOR materials. On October 14, 2026, DOHA received a copy of the transcript. The record was not held open after his hearing. Some details were excluded to protect Applicant’s right to privacy. Specific information is available in the cited exhibits and transcript. Findings of Fact The file contains a prehearing statement and a response to the SOR. (HE 2, HE 3) In the event of a conflict, I have accepted the prehearing statement as more accurately reflecting Applicant’s intentions. In his SOR response, SOR ¶¶ 2.c, 2.d, and 2.e are indicated as “admit,” and in his personal statement SOR ¶¶ 2.c, 2.d, and 2.e are indicated as “deny.” In his SOR response, SOR ¶ 2.f is indicated as “deny,” and in his personal statement, SOR ¶ 2.f is indicated as “admit.” In Applicant’s personal statement, he admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 2.f, and 2.g, and he denied the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 2.a through 2.e. (HE 2) For SOR ¶ 1.f in his personal statement, he admitted that he left the base; however, he denied that he provided false information to security officials. (HE 2) Overall, he denied that he intended to provide false information and deceive security officials. He also provided mitigating information. His admissions are accepted as findings of fact. Applicant is a 47-year-old security escort who previously worked as a linguist from 2013 to 2026. (Tr. 17, 19-20, 28; AE D) In 2011, he married, and his four children are aged 14, 16, 18, and 20. (Tr. 18) His employment as a security escort has been successful in that he received a pay raise and a good performance evaluation. (Tr. 20; AE G) He earned a general educational development (GED) and associate degree simultaneously. (AE B) In 2025, he was awarded a bachelor’s degree in business administration and finance. (AE B, AE E) Additional information about his rationale for working in combat zones and professional experience is in his personal statement and resume. (AE B, AE D) 2
Sexual Behavior and Personal Conduct SOR ¶ 1.a alleges under the sexual behavior guideline that between approximately 2013 and 2018, Applicant paid for sex on at least four occasions while working in a foreign country. SOR ¶ 2.g cross alleges under the personal conduct guideline the conduct in SOR ¶ 1.a. In 2019, Applicant volunteered his involvement with “beach girls” (women who engage in sex for money in a foreign country) to a background investigator. (Tr. 40-42) In 2018, Applicant was at a restaurant, and a woman came to his table, and offered to have sex with him. (Tr. 25-26) He walked with her to a nearby room, and he paid her about $20 for sex. (Tr. 25-26) He returned to his table in the restaurant after engaging in sexual activity and being with her for about 40 minutes. (Tr. 25-26) He did not provide any personal information about his employment to her. (Tr. 25-26) He said his sexual indiscretions occurred on four occasions either at a restaurant or otherwise during lunchtime, and he paid $20 to $30 on each occasion. (Tr. 36, 39-40, 45) He did not engage in sexual activity with prostitutes after 2018. (Tr. 47) At his hearing, Applicant initially said he disclosed his sexual infidelity to his spouse in 2019. (Tr. 27, 41) However, his 2021 summary of counterintelligence interview states: CANDIDATE stated HE could not be blackmailed for HIS solicitation of prostitutes (as further described in this report) because HE claimed HE was “very careful and was not out in the open with it.” CANDIDATE claimed HIS wife “knows [he is] a man” and she would get “pissed off” but would not “go crazy” if she found out. CANDIDATE would report any attempted blackmail to the U.S. government. (GE 7 at 12, .pdf 222) After Department Counsel pointed out his inconsistent statement during his 2021 counterintelligence interview, Applicant said he told his spouse about his involvement with prostitutes in 2021 after his counterintelligence interview. (Tr. 44) Personal Conduct In 2016, a new on-site manager became Applicant’s supervisor. Applicant said he had a personal or personality conflict with his new supervisor. (Tr. 28) On January 6, 2017, Applicant received an email from his deputy program manager, which stated: It’s come to my attention that a number of employees have been violating the company Off-Post Travel Policy on a regular basis. Each individual signs a copy of the attached during in-processing and your Site Management Team emailed a reminder of this policy on 9 March 2016. As stated in the policy, “Any breach of this policy will result in the termination of the Employee’s services and employment.” 3
For those of you who have not been violating this policy, consider this email refresher training. For those of you who have, consider this email your final warning/reminder of [Applicant’s employer’s] policy. (GE 5 at 13, .pdf 195) In Applicant’s June 13, 2019, and September 21, 2021 SCAs, Applicant disclosed his employment as a linguist from 2013 to 2019, and he said he left that employment for a “family reason.” (GE 7 at 35, .pdf 244) He also said he was fired in January 2019 for “violation of company policy.” (GE 7 at 36, .pdf 245) This SCA asked, “For this employment, in the last seven (7) years have you received a written warning, been officially reprimanded, suspended, or disciplined for misconduct in the workplace, such as a violation of security policy?” He responded, “No.” Id. The SOR does not allege that he provided false information in his September 21, 2021 SCA about not receiving a written warning in the workplace, and this information will not be considered for disqualification purposes. SOR ¶ 2.a alleges in about January 2019, Applicant was terminated from his employment in January 2019 for multiple violations of company policy. He is not eligible for rehire. In January 2019, Applicant’s employer issued a “Separation Form,” which stated, Applicant was involuntarily separated from “employment due to multiple violations of the Company and TF Off-Post travel policy. Not eligible for rehire” on the command’s contract. (GE 5 at 1, .pdf 183) In his prehearing personal statement, Applicant stated: The assertion of violating multiple company policies is categorically denied. I reject this claim as a false accusation, which is that the allegation is unfounded and fabricated. This testimony originates from a newly [hired] and inexperienced site manager [who supervised me], who singled me out, due to personality issues. Prior to his arrival, there were not many instances of conduct issues on my part. I worked for [my employer] from 2013 to 2019. This highlights the direct correlation between my conduct and the mistreatment I experienced under his supervision during that short period, from 2018 to beginning of 2019. On the other hand, during the same period I received an exemplary employee recognition certificate from [a Navy commander] (Please see EXHIBITS A and B). This award is a testament to my hard work, performance, dedication, and commitment to excellence in our missions and my work ethics. These are the people I work with closely and day to day operations. Additionally I am not endorsed for rehire by [my former employer]. This served as a catalyst for the unfolding events involving that specific site manager. In truth, after I complained about the new manager’s behavior towards me and other coworkers to higher ups by phone, [his employer] predominantly sided with their site manager. And the referenced warnings and write-ups are attributed to that same site manager. 4
I was upset with this new site manager, and I even signed a separation document without reading because I just wanted to go home. (HE 3) SOR ¶ 2.b alleges in about September 2018, Applicant’s overseas employer counseled him for abandoning his workstation. In his prehearing personal statement, Applicant stated: This accusation of abandoning a work station is inaccurate. This was due to one night that I was sick. I informed my coworkers and also called the site manager, he did not answer his phone, and left him a voice mail that night about my sickness. Since the site manager office was far away from my [location], I contacted a colleague to request that they inform the site manager on my behalf. (HE 3) In September 2018, Applicant received a performance counseling statement, which stated: [Applicant], Today you are being counseled in the form of a written warning for the following infraction: Violation: Class II (7) Being absent without approval On 9/5/2018 your site manager was notified by your team that you abandoned your work station at 2200 and did not return until 0300 with no excuse as to why. You are well aware that your work. schedule is 1800 - 0400 daily. As a result of this incident, your team had a meeting with you to discuss the importance of being available for your entire shift and to advise your team lead of your whereabouts if you decided to leave your work station for a short period of time. It was reported that you stated “you understood” after this meeting. On 9/6/2018 you ab
andoned your work station again at 2200 and did not return to complete your shift; sending your team in disarray due to no accountability of your whereabouts and your position b eing gapped for an extended period of time. It was discovered that you went back to your living quarters to lay down and decided not to return to work. [Applicant], this type of behavior is unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Leaving your position gapped not only hampers the mission, it also causes an increase in workload on your fellow co-workers. This type of behavior also impedes the accountability of personnel should an attack on t he base occur. 5
Additionally, on 11/27/2017 your site manager sent an email titled “Employee Illness - Sick Days”. In the email your site manager provided guidance to everyone regarding accountability. Everyone was instructed to contact their team and the site management team directly if they were feeling ill. Everyone was also instructed that they were not allowed to send this information through a co-worker. Lastly, it was also discovered that you have shown a pattern of this type of behavior and have been spoken to on several different occasions about remaining at work for the duration of your shift. (GE 5 at 9-11, .pdf 191-193) Applicant refused to sign this counseling form. (GE 5 at 11, .pdf 193) At his hearing, Applicant said the allegation that he was absent without approval from his workstation was “completely fabricated.” (Tr. 47-48) He denied that he was violating the company policy because he could leave the base with clients for work. (Tr. 52) However, he conceded that if he was late for work, he violated the company policy. (Tr. 52) SOR ¶ 2.c alleges in about October 2018, Applicant’s employer counseled him for attempting to leave base with a forged authorization form. In his prehearing personal statement, Applicant stated: This portrayal of attempting to leave the base with a forgery is inaccurate. There was no manipulation or falsification of any records. I did depart from the base but returned promptly. Given the nature of my work, which involves traveling off base for clients and [on a need] to know basis, I had legitimate reasons for leaving the base that day. I refute the claim of leaving without approval and dismiss any involvement with a fraudulent memorandum. (HE 3) In October 2018, Applicant acknowledged receipt of a written final warning, which stated: [Applicant], Today you are being counseled in the form of a final warning for the following infractions: Violation: Class I (4) Insubordination Violation: Class I (21) Falsification of official Company, Government or other client documentation Violation: Class II (23) Violating applicable US Government I Military policies, rules and/or orders. On 10/19/2018 at approx. 0800, you texted your On-site manager (OSM) to advise him that your CAC card was confiscated the previous night. This 6
required your OSM to go to the security office to retrieve it. That afternoon, your site manager went over to retrieve your CAC, and discovered that you, along with two additional co-workers, attempted to depart base with an outdated and falsified off base authorization form. This form was dated for 10/15/2018. The destination was to [a hotel], and the purpose of travel was religious. This form also had you listed under the incorrect unit. It was also discovered that, after being denied the authorization to depart base several times by the on-shift force protection officer, the MA (Master of Arms) was notified and ultimately confiscated your CAC card. [Applicant], this type of behavior is unacceptable and will not be tolerated. You have been notified on several different occasions that there is no liberty for personal off base movement. [In May 2018], you were notified via email that personal off base movement was unauthorized and if you needed to depart base for any official business, you had to be accompanied by one of your site managers. (GE 5 at 6-8, .pdf 188-190) Applicant signed the counseling form. (GE 5 at 8, .pdf 190) Applicant said, “But some of [the alleged absences], it’s possible that it did not happen at all.” (Tr. 68) He denied that he attempted to use an outdated and falsified authorization form for off-base activity. (Tr. 54) In February 2019, Applicant emailed his employer and said, “I apologize for getting off the base three weeks ago without authorization, which caused my employment . . . to end. I’m really sorry and I will guarantee this will never happen again.” (GE 5 at 12, .pdf 194) Applicant contended at his hearing that when he was absent from his base, he was with clients, which is part of his job. (Tr. 50) He said it was inappropriate for him to inform the site manager when he left his base with clients because his site manager might not be located at his base. (Tr. 51) He acknowledged his employer was unaware of his location because sometimes he did not use the sign out sheet or inform his employer when he left the base with a client. (Tr. 53) His employer might not even know in which country he was located at the time of his absence from base. (Tr. 53) SOR ¶ 2.d alleges Applicant falsified material facts on his June 13, 2019 SCA in response to the following questions: Section 13A - Employment Activities #2. Reason for Leaving Question For [the employment with the company where he worked as a linguist from 2016 to 2019]. Have any of the following happened to you in the last seven (7) years? ▪ Fired from a job? ▪ Quit after being told you would be fired? ▪ Have you left a job by mutual agreement following charges or allegations of 7
misconduct? ▪ Left a job by mutual agreement notice of unsatisfactory performance? and Received Discipline or Warning For this employment, in the last seven (7) years have you received a written warning, been officially reprimanded, suspended, or disciplined for misconduct in the workplace, such as a violation of security policy? The SOR alleges, “[h]e answered, “No” and listed “Family Reason” as his reason for leaving this employment, thus deliberately failing to disclose that information set forth in SOR ¶ 2.a., above. (GE 1 at 16, .pdf 20) This SCA also asked, “For this employment, in the last seven (7) years have you received a written warning, been officially reprimanded, suspended, or disciplined for misconduct in the workplace, such as a violation of security policy?” He responded, “No.” Id. In his pretrial personal statement, Applicant stated: I misinterpreted the questionnaire and genuinely forgot the subject information. This testimony of being fired and misconduct originates from the supervisor who singled me out, and the referenced warnings and write- ups are attributed to this former supervisor. Prior to his arrival, there were no instances of conduct issues on my part. This highlights the direct correlation between my conduct and the mistreatment I experienced under his supervision. Furthermore, during that period, I was dealing with family issues that ultimately led to my discharge. (HE 3) Applicant stated at his hearing: I reported incorrectly on the [SCA] for the separation of [from employment in 2019]. I was upset at the time and the termination was -- I mean, I don’t agree, but the termination was correct. They fired me. But I was -- I reported -- I later learned that it was a mistake that I reported on the [SCA] that I was -- I was not terminated. . . . And the reason was I had a -- I was frustrated with the site manager, I was frustrated with the [employer], and I had a family issue as well. So all that combined to report incorrectly, but I -- I reported incorrectly. I admit now. (Tr. 33-33, see also Tr. 62-63) In Applicant’s September 21, 2021 SCA, he disclosed his employment as a linguist from 2013 to 2019, and he said he left that employment for a “family reason.” (GE 7 at 35, .pdf 244) He also said he was fired in January 2019 for “violation of company policy.” (GE 7 at 36, .pdf 245) This SCA asked, “For this employment, in the last seven (7) years have you received a written warning, been officially reprimanded, suspended, or disciplined for misconduct in the workplace, such as a violation of security policy?” He responded, “No.” Id. The SOR does not allege any discrepancies in his September 21, 2021 SCA. He believed the termination of employment was “unethical” and “unfair.” (Tr. 63-65) 8
SOR ¶ 2.e alleges Applicant falsified material facts during his November 22, 2019, interview with an authorized government investigator when he stated he left his employment with [the employer in 2019] on his own accord and denied that he was fired, and that he further falsely denied any formal reprimands, misconduct, or security violations. In his pretrial personal statement, Applicant stated: I disapprove of the manner in which my separation from [employment] unfolded, ultimately leading to my termination. I believe this was a personality disagreement, and nothing raising to the level of a national security threat or misconduct. The being fired action stems from a single site manager, which I’m feeling targeted and unheard. I had never had any instances of performance or conduct issues before this individual assumed their role. Over a span of five years, I maintained exemplary behavior and conduct with the company. (HE 3) The November 22, 2019 Office of Personnel Management (OPM) summary of interview states: Subject said that he was not fired, but there was definitely negative separation from this employment. Subject said that prior to the Nov 2018 vacation, he w as verbally warned to return to work at his expected return date in J an 2019, but instead, he never returned for that work. Subject said that the main reason that he did not wish to return to [his] work in [a foreign country] was because in 2017 and 2018, [his employer] began instituting shared residence tents and temporary bunk facilities on base [in the foreign country], and subject did not like sharing his residence with other contractors [who worked for his employer] or other contracts while in [the foreign country]. While subject denied any incidents on base, he indicated that he voiced his concerns to [his employer’s] supervisors, including [his] listed supervisor, but [his employer’s] supervisors indicated that the shared bunking facilities on base would not change. Subject said that he had repeated discussions [with his] superiors about this issue, but they never changed their residence policy. Subject denied leaving [his assigned foreign country] or other base, on u nscheduled leave, at any time prior to late 2018, however. Subject denied ever leaving any contractor duties in [several countries] at any other time prior to Nov 2018. Subject denied any formal reprimands or misconduct, he denied any security regulations or information technology systems violations, he denied any firing, he denied any violence in the workplace, and he said that he got along with coworkers and supervisors[.] (GE 4 at 5-6, .pdf 168-169 (emphasis added)) 9
Applicant said that he provided incorrect information about not being fired to the investigator during his November 22, 2019 interview. (Tr. 34) He said he denied that he was fired because he had “a personal conflict with the site manager.” (Tr. 66) Department Counsel asked Applicant why he told the investigator that he did not have any reprimands. (Tr. 66-67)1 Applicant responded: So -- I mean, it was due -- like I said, it was due all to this new site manager. And this thing was happening all in 2018. So this was due on this new site -- I was frustrated with him and it was a personal conflict and I worked [for the same employer] since 2013, but this is the only time that this newly site manager, all the reporting, and incidents happened, most of it. So that’s what I was trying to explain to the investigator, that some of them, it was just personal from the single [new] site manager. (Tr. 67) SOR ¶ 2.f alleges Applicant falsified material facts during his November 9, 2021, Counterintelligence-Focused Security Interview with an authorized government investigator when he denied leaving base without authorization while employed by employer A and claimed, “the issue was just coming late.” In his pretrial personal statement, Applicant stated: I did depart from the base that day but returned late given the nature of our work, which involves traveling for clients. I had legitimate reasons to come back late that day. I refute the claim of leaving without approval and dismiss any involvement with a fraudulent memorandum. (HE 3) Applicant said he signed out to leave the base, and on the sign-out sheet he indicated when he would return. (Tr. 34) He returned about one hour later than scheduled on the sign-out sheet. (Tr. 35) Applicant’s counterintelligence summary of interview states: CANDIDATE claimed HE was “given a three or four hour window to go off of base” and HE was late. CANDIDATE denied leaving base when HE was not allowed to leave base, and HE claimed, “the issue was just coming late.” CANDIDATE claimed that [his employer’s policy] conflicted with the base policy for leaving base and because HE was assigned to work with military personnel who left base, HE also had to leave the base. (GE 7 at 7, .pdf 216) 1 Department Counsel considered the two written counseling statements to be reprimands. (Tr. 66-67) Applicant did not contend they were not reprimands. (Tr. 66-67) 10
At his hearing, Applicant said the incident where he was one hour late is the only time he was late in arriving on post. (Tr. 69) He reiterated his previous statements that when he was off post, he was with clients without his employer’s specific authorizations and that his absences were authorized by the requirement that he go with clients who wanted to go off base. (Tr. 69) He said he had authorization from the unit he was supporting to exit the base. (Tr. 70-71) He said he did not ask the unit to corroborate his statements about unit members asking Applicant to accompany them off the base. (Tr. 71) At his hearing, Applicant concluded his statement as follows: I just want to add that the reason I went to work as a linguist is to help the country on the mission on war on terror. And I even -- I had this clearance for about 13 years now, and I never had an issue except that year, 2018. And this was all to do with the personal conflict. It wasn’t anything, like -- it wasn’t anything on work performance or anything because I did not work directly with the site manager, I worked directly with the client, so -- and the clients are the people who can judge my performance and my work ethics. And all the exhibits that I have [show] positive evaluations during my work as a linguist. That’s all I [have] to say right now. (Tr. 74) Character Evidence Applicant received a certificate from a Navy commander for his exemplary work and being an invaluable asset, which emphasized his generation of intelligence reports and contributions to removing adversaries from the battle space. (AE A) Applicant provided eight statements from colleagues and coworkers. (AE C) The general sense of the statements is that he is diligent, responsible, trustworthy, and reliable. (AE C) He is an asset to his employers. (AE C) He has several certificates of training. (AE D) He provided a 2017 article which discussed the dangerous conditions in a country where Applicant was a linguist. (AE F) Policies The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information. Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicant eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended. 11
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, nothing in an unfavorable decision should be construed to suggest that it is based on any express or implied determination about an applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism. An unfavorable decision is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President, Secretary of Defense, and Director of National Intelligence have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his [or her] security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sept. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b). 12
Analysis Sexual Behavior AG ¶ 12 articulates the security concern for sexual behavior: Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense; reflects a lack of judgment or discretion; or may subject the individual to undue influence of coercion, exploitation, or duress. These issues, together or individually, may raise questions about an individual’s judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Sexual behavior includes conduct occurring in person or via audio, visual, electronic, or written transmission. No adverse inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the individual. AG ¶ 13 provides sexual behavior conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying in this case: (a) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted; (b) pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high-risk sexual behavior that the individual is unable to stop; (c) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (d) sexual behavior of a public nature or that reflects lack of discretion or judgment. The record establishes AG ¶¶ 13(c) and 13(d). AG ¶¶ 13(a) and 13(b) do not apply because the record does not establish that Applicant’s involvement with prostitutes violated the law of the country in which it occurred, and applicant was able to stop his activities with prostitutes after 2018. Discussion of the disqualifying conditions is in the mitigating section infra. AG ¶ 14 lists sexual behavior mitigating conditions which are potentially applicable: (a) the behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature; (b) the sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment; 13
(c) the behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress; (d) the sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual, and discreet; and (e) the individual has successfully completed an appropriate program of treatment, or is currently enrolled in one, has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment plan, and/or has received a favorable prognosis from a qualified mental health professional indicating the behavior is readily controllable with treatment. The Appeal Board in ISCR Case No. 10-04641 at 4 (App. Bd. Sept. 24, 2013) explained Applicant’s responsibility for proving the applicability of mitigating conditions as follows: Once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). After the Government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut or mitigate those concerns. See Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The standard applicable in security clearance decisions is that articulated in Egan, supra. “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” Directive, Encl. 2 ¶ 2(b). Applicant’s involvement with prostitutes is serious misconduct. It caused him to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, and duress, and this conduct reflects lack of discretion and judgment. His involvement with prostitutes violates policies prohibiting facilitation of trafficking in persons. Applicant has not engaged in sexual activity with prostitutes since 2018. AG ¶ 14(b) applies because “the sexual behavior happened so long ago”; “it is unlikely to recur[;] and does not cast doubt on [his] current reliability, trustworthiness, [and] judgment.” (emphasis added) Applicant told his spouse and security officials about his involvement with prostitutes in 2018. AG ¶ 14(c) applies because his “behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, [and] duress.” Sexual behavior security concerns are mitigated. Personal Conduct AG ¶ 15 explains why personal conduct is a security concern stating: 14
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. AG ¶ 16 provides personal conduct conditions that could raise security concerns in this case: (a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; (b) deliberately providing false or misleading information; or concealing or omitting information, concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical or mental health professional involved in making a recommendation relevant to a national security eligibility determination, or other official government representative; [and] (d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or government protected information; (2) any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and (4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer’s time or resources. AG ¶¶ 16(a), 16(b), and 16(d) are established. Discussion of the disqualifying conditions is in the mitigating section infra. AG ¶ 17 lists personal conduct mitigating conditions which are potentially applicable: 15
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; (b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with professional responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning security processes. Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully; (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; [and] (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur. SOR ¶ 2.a alleges Applicant was involuntarily separated from “employment due to multiple violations of the company and TF Off-Post travel policy. Not eligible for rehire” on the command’s contract. SOR ¶¶ 2.b and 2.c allege multiple violations of the company off-post travel policy. The conduct alleged in SOR ¶ 2.a is duplicated in SOR ¶¶ 2.b and 2.c, and SOR ¶ 2.a is mitigated as a duplication. The record establishes that Applicant was warned that he could not go off-post without permission. He repeatedly violated this rule in September and October 2018 as documented in the counseling statements his supervisor issued. SOR ¶ 2.g cross alleges the conduct in SOR ¶ 1.a, which was mitigated under the sexual behavior guideline, supra. SOR ¶ 2.g is also mitigated. SOR ¶ 2.d alleges Applicant provided false information in his June 13, 2019 SCA; SOR ¶ 2.e alleges he provided false information during his November 22, 2019 background interview; and SOR ¶ 2.f alleges he provided false information during his November 9, 2021, Counterintelligence-Focused Security Interview with an authorized government investigator. SOR ¶¶ 2.d and 2.e allege he denied that he was fired or that he involuntarily left his linguist employment in 2019. SOR 2.f alleges he denied leaving base without authorization and claimed, “the issue was just coming late.” Applicant admitted that he was fired from his employment in January 2019, and the counseling records document that he repeatedly left his base without proper authorization. He also left his shift several hours early on two occasions. He did not provide any records from his employer, indicating he was authorized to leave his base with clients without his supervisor’s knowledge or permission. He did not provide any written documentation from his clients in which he was asked to leave his base with them. 16
“To establish a falsification, it is not enough merely to d
emonstrate that an applicant’s answers were not true. To raise security concerns under Guideline E, the answers must be deliberately false. In analyzing an applicant’s intent, a Judge must consider the a pplicant’s answers in light of the record as a whole.” ISCR Case No. 14- 05005 at 5 n.3 (App. Bd. Sept. 15, 2017). “Applicant’s statements about his [or her] intent and state of mind when [he or she] executed [his or her] Security Clearance Application [are] relevant evidence, but they [are] not binding on the Administrative Judge.” ISCR Case No. 04-09488 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 29, 2006) (citation omitted). In ADP Case No. 17- 03932 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 14, 2019), the Appeal Board recognized the importance of circumstantial evidence of intent in falsification cases: When evaluating the deliberate nature of an alleged falsification, a Judge should consider the applicant’s mens rea in light of the entirety of the record evidence. See, e.g., ADP Case No. 15-07979 at 5 (App. Bd. May 30, 2017). As a practical matter, a finding regarding an applicant’s intent or state of mind may not always be based on an applicant’s statements, but rather may rely on circumstantial evidence. Id. Applicant intended to deceive the government about his termination from employment and his violations of his employer’s rule about leaving the base without permission and leaving his shift without permission. His provision of inaccurate information was deliberate and intentional. None of the mitigating conditions fully apply. At his hearing, Applicant continued to blame his termination from employment on a personality or personal conflict with his supervisor, and he refused to accept responsibility for his repeated rule violations in connection with his absences from his place of duty. His employer’s documentation is more reliable than Applicant’s denials. See ISCR Case No. 25-00238 at 3 (App. Bd. Sept. 23, 2026) (noting the deference afforded to a company’s findings and conclusions in its internal investigations). Applicant’s claim that he only stayed off base for about one hour without authorization is an attempt to minimize his conduct, which precludes mitigation through acceptance of responsibility under AG ¶ 17(d) or the passage of time under AG ¶ 17(c). In ISCR Case No. 25-00238 at 3 (App. Bd. Sept. 23, 2026), the Appeal Board stated: An applicant’s acceptance of responsibility for concerning conduct carries significant weight in national security eligibility determinations, and it is well settled that the failure to do so impacts upon the individual’s case in mitigation, such as through the passage of time without incident and other evidence of rehabilitation.2 Applicant’s minimization of the extent of his 2 See ISCR Case No. 96-0360, 1997 WL 1882602 at *3 (App. Bd. Sep. 25, 1997) (“Where an applicant is unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for his or her own actions, such a failure is evidence that detracts from a finding of reform and rehabilitation.”); ISCR Case No. 97-0625 at 3 (App. Bd. Aug. 17, 1998) 17
[inappropriate conduct] avoids full responsibility and undercuts his evidence of reform and rehabilitation under the Adjudicative Guidelines and the Whole-Person Concept. Personal conduct security concerns in SOR ¶¶ 2.b through 2.f are not mitigated. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), “[t]he ultimate determination” of whether to grant a security clearance “must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines” and the whole-person concept. My comments under Guidelines D and E are incorporated in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under those guidelines but some warrant additional comment. Applicant is a 47-year-old security escort who previously worked as a linguist from 2013 to 2026. His employment as a security escort has been successful in that he received a pay raise and a good performance evaluation. He earned his GED and associate degree simultaneously. In 2025, he was awarded a bachelor’s degree in business administration and finance. Additional information about his rationale for working in combat zones and professional experience is in his personal statement and resume. Applicant received a certificate from a Navy commander for his exemplary work and for being an invaluable asset, which emphasized his generation of intelligence reports and contributions to removing adversaries from the battle space. Applicant provided eight statements from colleagues and coworkers. The general sense of the statements is that he is diligent, responsible, trustworthy, and reliable. He is an asset to his employers. He has several certificates of training. He provided a 2017 article, which discussed the dangerous conditions in a country where Applicant was a linguist. (“Whatever mitigating value attaches to the passage of time since the [alleged misconduct], it is seriously diminished by Applicant’s failure to acknowledge his misconduct or accept responsibility for it.”). 18
________________ The evidence supporting revocation of Applicant’s security clearance is detailed in the personal conduct section, supra, and this evidence is more persuasive than the evidence supporting mitigation. Applicant’s failures to provide accurate information on his SCA and during two investigative interviews are discussed in the personal conduct section, supra. Intentional falsifications cut to the heart of the security clearance process. They are serious because a person should not receive access to classified information based on false information. A person who lies during the security-clearance process is not trustworthy. He or she cannot be relied upon to report a security infraction or violation. It is well settled that once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against granting a security clearance. See Dorfmont, 913 F.2d at 1401. “[A] favorable clearance decision means that the record discloses no basis for doubt about an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.” ISCR Case No. 18-02085 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan. 3, 2020). I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Egan, Dorfmont, Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, the AGs, and the Appeal Board’s jurisprudence to the facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person. Applicant mitigated the sexual behavior security concerns; however, he failed to mitigate the personal conduct security concerns. Formal Findings Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline D: Subparagraph 1.a:
FOR APPLICANT For Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline E: Subparagraphs 2.a and 2.g: Subparagraphs 2.b through 2.f: AGAINST APPLICANT For Applicant Against Applicant Conclusion I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security of the United States to grant or continue Applicant’s national security eligibility for access to classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Mark Harvey Administrative Judge 19