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A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ISCR Case No. 26-00024

Denied

Decided Oct 1, 2026 · Administrative Judge Gatha LaFaye · Hearing

Case headnote

Summary

The applicant, a 26-year-old defense contractor employee, faced security clearance denial under Guidelines H (drug involvement and substance misuse) and J (criminal conduct) due to admitted marijuana use and purchases, including while employed in a sensitive position. The judge found insufficient evidence of rehabilitation or intent to abstain from illegal drug use, leading to a conclusion that the applicant did not mitigate security concerns.

Why the applicant was denied

  • Applicant admitted to using and purchasing marijuana, including during employment in a sensitive position.
  • Insufficient evidence was presented to demonstrate a pattern of abstinence or rehabilitation from drug use.
  • Inconsistencies in the applicant's statements raised doubts about his credibility and reliability.

Conditions referenced

Disqualifying

  • H.25(a) Substance misuseraised
  • H.25(c) Illegal possession of a controlled substanceraised
  • H.25(f) Illegal drug use while holding a sensitive positionraised
  • J.31(a) Pattern of minor offensesraised
  • J.31(b) Evidence of criminal conductraised

Mitigating

  • H.26(a) Behavior unlikely to recurrejected
  • H.26(b) Acknowledgment of drug involvementrejected
  • J.32(a) Time elapsed since criminal behaviorrejected
  • J.32(d) Evidence of successful rehabilitationrejected

Key rule quoted

Procedural posture

SOR issued
04/01/2026
Answer filed
04/13/2026
Hearing held
Case decided on the written record.
Decision date
10/01/2026

Cite for

  • Insufficient Evidence of Rehabilitation Under Guideline H
  • Inconsistencies in Applicant's Statements Affecting Credibility
  • Denial of Security Clearance Due to Recent Drug Use While Employed in a Sensitive Position.

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

From the decision

Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.

Years in Industry
2
Clearance Level
top_secret
Prior Clearance
held
Bankruptcy
none

Allegations under Guideline H

Reading the 3 per allegation rows needs a free account.

3 rows in this decision.

It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.

Allegations under Guideline J

Reading the 1 per allegation row needs a free account.

1 row in this decision.

It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.

Full decision

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The complete official text, footnotes and signatures included, is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

Appearances

L SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: Applica

Decision

nt for Security Clearance ) ) ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 26-00024 Appearances For Government: Cynthia Ruckno, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant:

Statement of Case

Pro se 10/01/2026 Decision LAFAYE, Gatha, Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate security concerns related to drug involvement and substance misuse and criminal conduct. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on March 19, 2025. On April 1, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guidelines H (drug involvement and substance misuse) and J (criminal conduct). Applicant answered the SOR (Answer) on April 13, 2026, and e

lected to have his case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. The Government’s written case was submitted on June 4, 2026. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was provided to Applicant, who was given an opportunity to file objections and to s

Findings of Fact

ubmit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns. Applicant received the FORM on June 12, 2026, and submitted a response. The case was assigned to me on August 11, 2026. Evidence Government Exhibit (GE) 1 and GE 2 include the SOR and Applicant’s Answer, which are the pleadings in the case. GE 3 through GE 8 are admitted in evidence without objection. No documentary evidence was submitted with Applicant’s Answer, but he submitted a letter of rebuttal in response to the FORM, which was already part of the record. For ease of reference, Applicant’s rebuttal letter is referenced as Applicant Exhibit (AE) A in the decision. Findings of Fact The SOR alleges under Guideline H that Applicant, from July 2016 to about June 2025, used (SOR ¶ 1.a) and purchased (SOR ¶ 1.b) marijuana; and he used and purchased marijuana from August 2024 to June 2025, while employed in a sensitive position (SOR ¶ 1.c); and cross-alleges the conduct in SOR ¶¶ 1.a–1.c, under Guideline J (SOR ¶ 2.a). He admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 2.a and denied the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.b–1.c. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact, and after careful review of the evidence, I make the following additional findings of fact. Applicant, age 26, has worked as a full-time employee of a defense contractor since August 2024. He previously worked as an intern for the same defense contractor from June 2023 to August 2023. Applicant received a high school diploma in June 2018; he enrolled in college in September 2019 and earned dual bachelor’s degrees in May 2024. He is unmarried and does not have children. (GE 3–5) He resided with his girlfriend, with whom he used drugs, from August 2024 until February 2026, when he said they broke up and she moved out. (GE 5 at 9) In his FORM response, he said they broke up and she moved out in November 2025, vice February 2026. (GE 5 at 9; AE A) Applicant completed his first SCA in October 2024, and in Section 23 (illegal use of drugs, drug activity), he disclosed he used marijuana from July 2016 to April 2023, and he commented on the nature and frequency of his use, stating: “[I] used to smoke marijuana occasionally with my friends in high school and college. When I received an offer to intern at [federal contractor] I quit.” (GE 4 at 30) He denied ever purchasing marijuana in the last seven years and said he had no intent to use marijuana in the future. He stated: I do not have an interest in using [marijuana] anymore, and my job is far too valuable to me. That is why I quit when I received an internship offer for [federal contractor], before I was even brought on full time. (GE 4 at 30) Applicant signed a classified information nondisclosure agreement (standard form (SF) 312) with his employer on November 21, 2024. (GE 6) He was granted national security eligibility at the secret level on March 13, 2025. (GE 7) A few days later, on March 19, 2025, he completed a second SCA, to apply for national security eligibility at the top- secret level. A few weeks later, on April 10, 2025, he was granted interim national security eligibility at the top-secret level. (GE 3, 8) In Section 23 of his March 2026 SCA, Applicant disclosed the same marijuana use he previously disclosed in his October 2024 SCA, with the same comments. No additional marijuana use was disclosed, and he again denied he ever purchased marijuana. (GE 3) 2 During his July 2025 background interview with a federal investigator, Applicant disclosed he used marijuana from September 2023 to about June 2025 and said he did not list his additional marijuana use due to oversight. (GE 5 at 6) He started using marijuana in high school in 2016 and continued using marijuana in college. He increased his marijuana use, from monthly in high school, to weekly in college. He used marijuana at social gatherings and at night to relax and sleep. He denied ever experiencing adverse effects from his marijuana use. He said he stopped using marijuana before and during his internship, but resumed in September 2023, after his internship ended, and he continued using marijuana until his last use in June 2025. He said he used marijuana about 10 times between September 2023 and June 2025 and that he has “always been aware” that using marijuana is fede

Policies

rally illegal. (GE 5 at 12) In his FORM response, he claimed he did not use marijuana from August 2024 to May 2025 but admitted he “used marijuana three to four times in June 2025.” (AE A) Applicant said he purchased marijuana from friends in high school and college but purchased marijuana from a dispensary in June 2025. (GE 5 at 6) In his FORM response, he claimed his ex-girlfriend purchased marijuana at the dispensary in June 2025, though he told the investigator he did. (AE A) He estimated his marijuana purchases from 2016 to 2023 totaled between $1,000 to $2,000. He denied ever cultivating or selling marijuana and said he was not drug dependent. He has never received counseling or treatment for marijuana use, nor has he ever failed a drug test, and he said his marijuana use is common knowledge among his friends, family, and his ex-girlfriend. In response to DOHA interrogatories, he disclosed additional illegal drug use during college, including mushrooms, (lysergic acid diethylamide) LSD, and cocaine, which were not alleged in the SOR. (GE 5 at 11) He did not disclose the additional illegal drug use in his 2024 and 2025 SCAs. He disclosed a one-time use of mushrooms with his ex-girlfriend during his background interview with a federal investigator. (GE 3–4) In ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006), the Appeal Board provides five circumstances in which conduct not alleged in the SOR (unalleged conduct) may be considered, as set forth below. (

Analysis

a) to assess an applicant’s credibility; (b) to evaluate an applicant’s evidence of extenuation, mitigation, or changed circumstances; (c) to consider whether an applicant has demonstrated successful rehabilitation; (d) to decide whether a particular provision of the Adjudicative Guidelines is applicable; or (e) to provide evidence for whole-person analysis under Directive Section 6.3. (Id). I have considered the unalleged conduct as part of my whole-person analysis as set forth in (e), above. Applicant denied having an intent to use marijuana or other illegal drugs in the future, and said if he ever encounters illegal drugs in an environment in the future, he would: 3 Stay away from people that are using [marijuana/marijuana/another illegal drug] and typically if you don’t talk to them or ask to use with them, they will not offer [marijuana/another illegal drug] to you or try to persuade you. If they did, I would leave the area. (GE 5 at 12) In his FORM response, Applicant expressed a desire to sign a statement of intent to abstain from all illegal drug involvement or misuse and to acknowledge that any future misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. He expressed regret for his decision to use marijuana in June 2025 and said: “I was unaware of the impact that [marijuana use] would have on my security clearance process.” He said he has not been briefed on classified information, and he does not have access to classified areas or systems. He is successful in his current position and said he is eligible for a promotion. (AE A) Policies This case is adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), which became effective on June 8, 2017. When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision. 4 A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information). Analysis Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The security concern for drug involvement and substance misuse is described in AG ¶ 24: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any "controlled substance" as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. AG ¶ 25 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. Those applicable to this case are: (a) any substance misuse (see above definition); (c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; and (f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position. Applicant admitted he used and purchased marijuana, and his admissions are supported by evidence in the record. Some of his marijuana use occurred after he was 5

granted national security eligibility at the secret and top-secret security levels, and while working in position that requires a security clearance. AG ¶¶ 25(a), 25(c), and 25 (f) apply. AG ¶ 26 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. The following are potentially applicable: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. AG ¶ 26(a) and 26(b) are not established. Applicant’s behavior raises substantial questions about his trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, and willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. See ISCR Case No. 20-02974 (App. Bd. Feb. 1, 2022). He used and purchased marijuana in June 2025, after he was granted national security eligibility at the secret and top-secret levels, and while working in a position that requires national security eligibility, a sensitive position. In doing so, his marijuana use weighs heavily against the continuation of national security eligibility. See ISCR Case No. 222- 01661 (App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2023

Analysis

a) to assess an applicant’s credibility; (b) to evaluate an applicant’s evidence of extenuation, mitigation, or changed circumstances; (c) to consider whether an applicant has demonstrated successful rehabilitation; (d) to decide whether a particular provision of the Adjudicative Guidelines is applicable; or (e) to provide evidence for whole-person analysis under Directive Section 6.3. (Id). I have considered the unalleged conduct as part of my whole-person analysis as set forth in (e), above. Applicant denied having an intent to use marijuana or other illegal drugs in the future, and said if he ever encounters illegal drugs in an environment in the future, he would: 3 Stay away from people that are using [marijuana/marijuana/another illegal drug] and typically if you don’t talk to them or ask to use with them, they will not offer [marijuana/another illegal drug] to you or try to persuade you. If they did, I would leave the area. (GE 5 at 12) In his FORM response, Applicant expressed a desire to sign a statement of intent to abstain from all illegal drug involvement or misuse and to acknowledge that any future misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. He expressed regret for his decision to use marijuana in June 2025 and said: “I was unaware of the impact that [marijuana use] would have on my security clearance process.” He said he has not been briefed on classified information, and he does not have access to classified areas or systems. He is successful in his current position and said he is eligible for a promotion. (AE A) Policies This case is adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), which became effective on June 8, 2017. When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision. 4 A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endure

Analysis

s throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information). Analysis Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The security concern for drug involvement and substance misuse is described in AG ¶ 24: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any "controlled substance" as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. AG ¶ 25 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. Those applicable to this case are: (a) any substance misuse (see above definition); (c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, s

Whole Person Concept

ale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; and (f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position. Applicant admitted he used and purchased marijuana, and his admissions are supported by evidence in the record. Some of his marijuana use occurred after he was 5

granted national security eligibility at the secret and top-secret security levels, and while working in position that requires a security clearance. AG ¶¶ 25(a), 25(c), and 25 (f) apply. AG ¶ 26 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. The following are potentially applicable: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. AG ¶ 26(a) and 26(b) are not established. Applicant’s behavior raises substantial questions about his trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, and willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. See ISCR Case No. 20-02974 (App. Bd. Feb. 1, 2022). He used and purchased marijuana in June 2025, after he was granted national security eligibility at the secret and top-secret levels, and while working in a position that requires national security eligibility, a sensitive position. In doing so, his marijuana use weighs heavily against the continuation of national security eligibility. See ISCR Case No. 222- 01661 (App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2023

Formal Findings

). His willingness to sign a statement of intent not to use illegal drugs in the future does not mitigate the scope of the security concerns raised by his conduct. He failed to establish any of the AG ¶ 26 condition that could mitigate the security concerns raised by SOR ¶¶ 1.a–1.c. His evidence is insufficient to overcome concerns and doubts about his judgment, reliability, and willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Drug involvement and substance misuse security concerns are unmitigated. Guideline J, Criminal Conduct The security concern for criminal conduct is described in AG ¶ 30: Criminal activity creates doubt about an Appellant’s judgment, reliability, and t

Conclusion

rustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations. Applicant’s admissions and the evidence in this case establish the following disqualifying con