A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.
ISCR Case No. 26-00063
GrantedDecided Oct 15, 2026 · Administrative Judge LeRoy F. Foreman · Hearing
Case headnote
Summary
The applicant, a 59-year-old senior data scientist and U.S. citizen originally from India, faced security concerns under Guidelines B (Foreign Influence), E (Personal Conduct), and F (Financial Considerations) due to foreign contacts and a history of fraudulent conduct. The judge granted the security clearance, finding that the applicant's strong ties to the U.S. and his financial stability mitigated the concerns raised.
Why the applicant prevailed
- The applicant has strong ties to the U.S. through citizenship and family.
- He has been cleared for a public trust position since November 2019.
- The applicant's financial situation is stable, reducing vulnerability to pressure.
Conditions referenced
Disqualifying
- AG ¶ 7(a) Contact with foreign family membersnoted
- AG ¶ 7(b) Connections to foreign persons creating potential conflict of interestapplied
Mitigating
- AG ¶ 8(b) Minimal conflict of interest due to strong U.S. tiesapplied
- AG ¶ 8(f) Low value of foreign property interestsapplied
Key rule quoted
“Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines.”
Procedural posture
- SOR issued
- April 2, 2026
- Answer filed
- April 10, 2026
- Hearing held
- September 1, 2026 conducted by video teleconference
- Decision date
- October 15, 2026
Cite for
- Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Due to Strong U.S. Ties
- Consideration of Financial Stability in Security Clearance Decisions
- Impact of Personal Conduct History on Clearance Eligibility
Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.
From the decision
Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.
- Applicant Age
- 59
- Years in Industry
- 4
- Prior Clearance
- held
- Payment Plan
- yes
- Bankruptcy
- none
Allegations under Guideline B
Reading the 7 per allegation rows needs a free account.
7 rows in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Allegations under Guideline E
Reading the 1 per allegation row needs a free account.
1 row in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Allegations under Guideline F
Reading the 1 per allegation row needs a free account.
1 row in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.
Full decision
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Decision text, by section
Appearances
se No. 26-00063 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: William H. Miller, Esq., De
Decision
artment Counsel For Applicant: Daniel J. Wright, Esq. 10/15/2026 Decision FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline
Statement of Case
B (Foreign Influence), E (Personal Conduct), and F (Financial Considerations). Clearance is granted. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on June 20, 2025. On April 2, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guidelines B and E The DCSA acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016), which became effective on June 8, 2017. Applicant answered the SOR on April 10, 2026, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on June 8, 2026, and the case was assigned to me on June 17, 2026. On July 16, 2026, the Defense Office of 1
Findings of Fact
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the hearing was scheduled to be conducted by video teleconference on September 1, 2026. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 6 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) 1 through 21 in his answer to the SOR, and they were admitted without objection. Applicant testified but did not offer the testimony of any other witnesses. DOHA received the hearing transcript on September 21, 2026, and the record closed on that date. Findings of Fact In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, he admitted all the allegations. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. Applicant is a 59-year-old senior data scientist employed by a federal contractor since October 2022. He was born in India, came to the United States in January 1991, and became a U.S. citizen in July 2004. He married a citizen of India in March 1995, and his spouse is now a naturalized U.S. citizen. He has two daughters, ages 20 and 17, who were born in the United States and are native-born U.S. citizens. He received a bachelor’s degree from a university in India in January 1991, a master’s degree from a U.S. university in May 1993, and a doctorate from a U.S. university in May 2000. (Tr. 14-15) He was cleared for a public trust position by a federal agency in November 2019. (GX 2 at 65) Under Guideline B (SOR ¶ 1), the SOR alleges foreign contacts and financial interests in India. Under Guideline E, it alleges a course of fraudulent conduct and its consequences. Under Guideline F, it alleges a restitution debt to the United States. The evidence regarding each allegation in the SOR is summarized below. SOR ¶ 1.a. Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of India. Applicant has a video teleconference call with his mother once a week. He travels to India at least once a year. He testified, “if it’s more than 12 months, I start missing my mother a lot.” (Tr. 84) He was issued an “Overseas Citizen of India” card in 2024, which allows him to travel to India without a visa. (Tr. 86) SOR ¶ 1.b: Applicant’s cousin and nephew (Nephew #1) are citizens and residents of India. Applicant’s cousin is a citizen of India. She resides with Applicant’s mother and cares for her, and she is financially supported by her son. She submitted a letter, drafted by Applicant, stating that his cousins and her son are not financially dependent on Applicant. (AX 6) Applicant’s nephew submitted a similar letter. (AX 7) SOR ¶ 1.c: Applicant’s friends and business associates are citizens and residents of India. Applicant testified that several business associates in India have reached out to him for consultation and advice on highway design software. (Tr. 63-80) His SCA reflects that he has provided advice to several individuals, businesses, and educational institutions in India and was employed as a professor at an Indian institution on subjects including artificial intelligence, machine learning, transportation engineering, 2
computer science, quantum technology, and cybersecurity. He has also attended conferences and presented technical papers in India. He has declined offers for full-time employment at Indian institutions because of the relatively low pay and his desire to continue living in the United States. At the
Policies
hearing, he testified that, if he is granted security clearance, he will not disclose any information that has not been published in the public domain. (GX 2 at 44; Tr. 64-80) SOR ¶ 1.d: Applicant’s sister-in-law, niece, and Nephew #2 are citizens of India who were sponsored by Applicant for residence in the United States. Applicant admitted this allegation in his answer to the SOR and at the hearing. He testified that his sponsorship meant that he promised to financially support them so that they will not become a public charge eligible for food stamps or government-sponsored health insurance. (Tr. 81-83) SOR ¶ 1.e: Applicant provides financial support to his mother, cousin, and Nephew #1 in India. Applicant sends his mother about $500 twice a year. (Tr. 48-49) She submitted a letter, drafted by Applicant because his mother does not speak English, stating that his financial support is voluntary, that she does not depend on it, and that it does not create any obligation, dependency, or expectation of continued support. (AX 5) SOR ¶ 1.f: Applicant will inherit his mother’s home in India. Applicant testified that he is an only child and will inherit his 81-year-old mother’s home, valued at about $30,000 to $40,000 (USD). He testified that if he inherits the home, he will give it to his cousin, who is taking care of his mother. (Tr. 37) SOR ¶ 1.g: Applicant’s wife will co-own her father’s home in India as an inheritance. Applicant testified that his wife’s mother is deceased, and that when her father passes away, the property, worth about $20,000 (USD), will be divided among his five daughters. (Tr. 38, 50) SOR ¶ 2.a: Applicant’s Felony Conviction and Sentence. Applicant was hired as a professor at a U.S. university in the fall of 2000. (Tr. 18) In November 2012, he was arrested and charged with wire fraud, mail fraud, falsification of records, and federal program fraud. In September 2014, he was convicted in a federal district court of four counts of wire fraud, one count of mail fraud, and one count of theft from a program receiving federal funds. He was sentenced to incarceration for 36 months, followed by supervised release for three years, and ordered to pay restitution of $105,726, to be paid in monthly $100 payments. (GX 3; GX 4) In February 2018, the court directed that no interest be charged on the amount of restitution due. (AX 15). Applicant’s license as a professional engineer was suspended upon his conviction. It has since been reinstated. (AX 4; Tr. 42-43) The conviction and sentence were the result of a complicated fraudulent scheme to obtain funds from a national science foundation funded by the U.S. Government. Applicant formed a corpo
Analysis
ation in which he was the incorporator, president, and only 3
director, and he applied for research grants from the foundation. He falsely represented that he was a full-time employee of the corporation, when he was employed full-time as a university professor. He falsely claimed that the corporation had eight employees, when in fact there was only one employee in addition to himself. He identified another university that would participate as the collaborating research institution (CRI) and identified a professor from the CRI who would work for the corporation as a scientific advisor. (GX 3; GX 4) In January 2008, the corporation received two grants, one for $100,000 and one for $50,000. In January 2008, on the same day the corporation received the grants, Applicant used the grant funds to pay a personal $5,420 credit-card debt; used $20,000 of the funds to pay down the principal on his home mortgage; wrote a personal check for $6,000 to himself; and paid $11,000 to his wife for “salary” even though she performed no work. The CRI apparently received the remaining funds. In October 2011, the CRI returned about $12,000 in unused funds to Applicant’s corporation, and he used these funds to pay personal debts. (GX 3; GX 4) SOR ¶ 3.a: Restitution Debt. The SOR alleges the restitution imposed as part of Applicant’s sentence. Applicant’s payment records reflect that he began making regular and timely payments in February 2015. Since then, he has made timely payments except for one month in 2023 and another in 2024, when he missed payments but made them up. He also made more than the required monthly payment in October 2025 when he made a $300 payment, and one time in February 2026 when he made a $400 payment. (AX 13) In September 2017, the federal judge handling Applicant’s criminal case granted his request to not charge interest on the restitution balance. (AX 15) Student Kickbacks. During the investigation of the federal program fraud involving the national science foundation, as alleged in SOR ¶ 2.a, investigators discovered a second fraudulent scheme t hat occurred at about the same time. Applicant and several other professors received funding from DOD for a project in which they were authorized to pay stipends of $2,500 to students who worked on the project. When Applicant authorized a student to participate in the project, he asked for and received a $500 kickback. At the hearing, he testified that he c ollected between $10,000 to $20,000 in kickbacks. This scheme was not alleged in the SOR, but Applicant admitted it at the hearing. (Tr. 103-08)1 Administrative Notice. I have taken administrative notice that the Republic of India is a federal parliamentary republic. Its government consists of a president, prime minister, bicameral legislature, and a supreme court. Observers of recent elections 1 This conduct was not alleged in the SOR and may not be an independent basis for denying Applicant’s request for a security clearance. However, unalleged conduct may be considered to assess an applicant's credibility; to evaluate evidence of extenuation, mitigation, or changed circumstances; successful rehabilitation; or as
an element of the whole person analysis. See ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006). I have considered it only for these limited purposes. 4
considered them fair and free despite isolated instances of violence. India and the United States share interests in global security, stability, and economic prosperity. Indian governmental agencies, private companies, and individuals are frequently involved in the illegal transfer of sensitive data and dual-use equipment to India. Human-rights issues include widespread corruption; and lack of criminal investigations or accountability for rape, domestic violence, dowry-related deaths, and honor killings. A lack of accountability at all levels of government contributes to widespread impunity and discrimination based on religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, and caste or tribe. The U.S. State Department has issued a travel advisory of Level 2 (exercise increased caution) for most of India and a separate Level 4 (do not travel) for several areas. The record does not reflect whether the areas in which Applicant’s family members, friends, and business associates live or work are the areas for which increased caution is advised. Whole-Person Evidence. A university professor who has known Applicant as a student and as a colleague for several decades considers him “a very responsible and trustworthy professional” who is “cable of handling sensitive responsibilities and conducting himself with integrity. (AX 1) Applicant’s current supervisor since October 2022 considers Applicant to be “a trustworthy individual, capable of handling sensitive responsibilities.” He states that he has “no hesitation” in entrusting him with responsibility for handling sensitive information. (A 2)
Applicant is financially secure and not vulnerable to financial pressure. His annual salary is $170,000. (Tr. 34) He owns a home with an assessed value of $865,900. (AX 21) He has retirement accounts from his current and former employment with balances of $27,555 (AX 18); $20,733 (AX 19); and $17,126 (AX 20. Policies “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of War or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 5
The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions ent
Analysis
director, and he applied for research grants from the foundation. He falsely represented that he was a full-time employee of the corporation, when he was employed full-time as a university professor. He falsely claimed that the corporation had eight employees, when in fact there was only one employee in addition to himself. He identified another university that would participate as the collaborating research institution (CRI) and identified a professor from the CRI who would work for the corporation as a scientific advisor. (GX 3; GX 4) In January 2008, the corporation received two grants, one for $100,000 and one for $50,000. In January 2008, on the same day the corporation received the grants, Applicant used the grant funds to pay a personal $5,420 credit-card debt; used $20,000 of the funds to pay down the principal on his home mortgage; wrote a personal check for $6,000 to himself; and paid $11,000 to his wife for “salary” even though she performed no work. The CRI apparently received the remaining funds. In October 2011, the CRI returned about $12,000 in unused funds to Applicant’s corporation, and he used these funds to pay personal debts. (GX 3; GX 4) SOR ¶ 3.a: Restitution Debt. The SOR alleges the restitution imposed as part of Applicant’s sentence. Applicant’s payment records reflect that he began making regular and timely payments in February 2015. Since then, he has made timely payments except for one month in 2023 and another in 2024, when he missed payments but made them up. He also made more than the required monthly payment in October 2025 when he made a $300 payment, and one time in February 2026 when he made a $400 payment. (AX 13) In September 2017, the federal judge handling Applicant’s criminal case granted his request to not charge interest on the restitution balance. (AX 15) Student Kickbacks. During the investigation of the federal program fraud involving the national science foundation, as alleged in SOR ¶ 2.a, investigators discovered a second fraudulent scheme t hat occurred at about the same time. Applicant and several other professors received funding from DOD for a project in which they were authorized to pay stipends of $2,500 to students who worked on the project. When Applicant authorized a student to participate in the project, he asked for and received a $500 kickback. At the hearing, he testified that he c ollected between $10,000 to $20,000 in kickbacks. This scheme was not alleged in the SOR, but Applicant admitted it at the hearing. (Tr. 103-08)1 Administrative Notice. I have taken administrative notice that the Republic of India is a federal parliamentary republic. Its government consists of a president, prime minister, bicameral legislature, and a supreme court. Observers of recent
Analysis
elections 1 This conduct was not alleged in the SOR and may not be an independent basis for denying Applicant’s request for a security clearance. However, unalleged conduct may be considered to assess an applicant's credibility; to evaluate evidence of extenuation, mitigation, or changed circumstances; successful rehabilitation; or as
an element of the whole person analysis. See ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006). I have considered it only for these limited purposes. 4
considered them fair and free despite isolated instances of violence. India and the United States share interests in global security, stability, and economic prosperity. Indian governmental agencies, private companies, and individuals are frequently involved in the illegal transfer of sensitive data and dual-use equipment to India. Human-rights issues include widespread corruption; and lack of criminal investigations or accountability for rape, domestic violence, dowry-related deaths, and honor killings. A lack of accountability at all levels of government contributes to widespread impunity and discrimination based on religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, and caste or tribe. The U.S. State Department has issued a travel advisory of Level 2 (exercise increased caution) for most of India and a separate Level 4 (do not travel) for several areas. The record does not reflect whether the areas in which Applicant’s family members, friends, and business associates live or work are the areas for which increased caution is advised. Whole-Person Evidence. A university professor who has known Applicant as a student and as a colleague for several decades considers him “a very responsible and trustworthy professional” who is “cable of handling sensitive responsibilities and conducting himself with integrity. (AX 1) Applicant’s current supervisor since October 2022 considers Applicant to be “a trustworthy individual, capable of handling sensitive responsibilities.” He states that he has “no hesitation” in entrusting him with responsibility for handling sensitive information. (A 2)
Applicant is financially secure and not vulnerable to financial pressure. His annual
Analysis
salary is $170,000. (Tr. 34) He owns a home with an assessed value of $865,900. (AX 21) He has retirement accounts from his current and former employment with balances of $27,555 (AX 18); $20,733 (AX 19); and $17,126 (AX 20. Policies “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of War or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting t
Whole Person Analysis
e criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 5
The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions ent
Formal Findings
il a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of War have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan at 531. Substantial e
Conclusion
idence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.” See ISCR Case No. 17-04166 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 21,