A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.
ISCR Case No. 26-00298
DeniedDecided Oct 21, 2026 · Administrative Judge Jeff A. Nagel · Hearing
Case headnote
Summary
The applicant, a 46-year-old Financial Analyst with a security clearance since December 2023, faced security concerns under Guideline H due to extensive marijuana use from 1998 to March 2026, including daily use while holding a clearance. Despite disavowing future use, the judge found that the applicant's long history of illegal drug use undermined his reliability and trustworthiness, leading to a denial of his security clearance.
Why the applicant was denied
- Applicant admitted to using and purchasing marijuana from 1998 to at least March 2026, including daily use while holding a security clearance.
- Applicant's long history of drug use raised significant concerns about his judgment and reliability.
- The applicant's actions demonstrated a lack of maturity and trustworthiness necessary for national security eligibility.
Conditions referenced
Disqualifying
- AG ¶ 25(a) Any substance misuseapplied
- AG ¶ 25(f) Any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive positionapplied
- AG ¶ 25(g) Expressed intent to continue drug involvement and substance misuse, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue such misuseapplied
Mitigating
- AG ¶ 26(b) The individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome the problem, and has established a pattern of abstinencerejected
Key rule quoted
“Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.”
Procedural posture
- SOR issued
- April 8, 2026
- Answer filed
- May 5, 2026
- Hearing held
- September 8, 2026
- Decision date
- October 21, 2026
Cite for
- Denial of Security Clearance Due to Extensive Drug Involvement Under Guideline H
- Importance of Compliance with Federal Drug Laws in Security Clearance Determinations
- Evaluation of Applicant's Reliability and Trustworthiness in Light of Drug Use History
Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.
From the decision
Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.
- Applicant Age
- 46
- Clearance Level
- top_secret
- Prior Clearance
- held
- Bankruptcy
- none
Allegations under Guideline H
Reading the 3 per allegation rows needs a free account.
3 rows in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.
Full decision
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Decision text, by section
Appearances
_____________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVIC
Decision
S AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS _____________________________________
In the matter of: )
)
)
) ISCR Case
Statement of Case
o. 26-00298
)
Applicant for Security Clearance ) _____________________________________ ) Appearances For Government: William Miller, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro Se 10/21/2026 Decision NAGEL, JEFF A., Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case On October 25, 2024, Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Questionnaire). On April 8, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within DoD after June 8, 2017.
Findings of Fact
On or about May 5, 2026, Applicant responded to the SOR in writing (Answer) and requested a hearing before an Administrative Judge. The Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on June 29, 2026. The case was assigned to me on July 6, 2026. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing on July 20, 2026. I convened the hearing as scheduled on September 8, 2026. The Government called no witnesses and submitted Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 4, which I admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf, called no other witnesses, and submitted no documentary exhibits. The record was left open for Applicant to submit additional documentation until September 16, 2026. Applicant submitted numerous letters of support as well as his Year End (YE) 2025 Manager’s Review, all of which I admitted into evidence as Appellant Exhibit (AE) A, without objection. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (TR) on September 20, 2026. Findings of Fact Applicant is 46 years old, is married, and has one child. He earned a bachelor’s degree in finance and works as a Financial Analyst for a defense contractor. Applicant first received a security clearance in December of 2023. Applicant admitted he was familiar with the drug policy of his employer and that it was impermissible for people with a security clearance to use illegal drugs. Applicant admitted he has known marijuana was illegal to use on the federal level since he was young. His father held a top-secret clearance and talked about it being illegal. He testified that he understood that his poor decisions have led to his hearing. He further testified that he knew he had made mistakes in the past and perceived a gray area that was not there. Applicant testified that he used and purchased marijuana from 1998 to at least March 2026. He had a hard time placing a number on how many times he used during this period. However, he did admit to using marijuana daily between March 2025 and March 2026. In response to questions from Department Counsel, Applicant admitted he smoked marijuana out of a water pipe and at times had two or three bowls in a night. Applicant testified he stopped all marijuana use on March 31, 2026, and has no intent to use marijuana in the future. (Tr. at 15-18, 20, 22, 23, 25-27, GE 1, 2, 4, Answer) SOR Paragraph 1 (Guideline H: Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse)
Policies
OR ¶ 1.a. alleges Applicant used and purchased marijuana with varying frequency from about May 1998 to at least March 2026. Applicant admitted this allegation. (Tr. at 26, Answer) SOR ¶ 1.b. alleges Applicant used and purchased marijuana with varying frequency from about December 2023 to at least March 2026, while holding a sensitive position, i.e., one in which he held a security clearance. Applicant admitted this allegation, and that he used marijuana daily between March 2025 and March 2026, while he held a clearance (Tr. at 26-28, Answer) 2
SOR ¶ 1.c. alleges Applicant intends to continue to use marijuana in the future. Applicant denied this allegation and stated in both his Answer and during his testimony that his last use was on March 31, 2026, and that he has no intention to use marijuana in the future. (Tr. at 22, 23, Answer) I find that Applicant credibly disavowed his previous intent to continue to use marijuana in the future in his Answer and during his testimony. Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny
Analysis
f applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect, or safeguard classified information. 3
Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) makes it illegal under Federal law to manufacture, possess, or distribute certain drugs, including marijuana. (Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. See § 844.) All controlled substances are classified into five schedules, based on their accepted medical uses, their potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the body. §§ 811, 812. Marijuana is classified as a Schedule III controlled substance, § 812(c), based on its high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment. § 812(b)(1). See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Further, in October 2014, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued a memorandum entitled “Adherence to Federal Laws Prohibiting Marijuana Use,” (2014 DNI Memo) which makes clear that changes in the laws pertaining to marijuana by the various states, territories, and the District of Columbia do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines, and that Federal law supersedes state laws on this issue: [C]hanges to state laws and the laws of the District of Columbia pertaining to marijuana use do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines. . . . An individual’s disregard of federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations. As always, adjudicative authorities are expected to evaluate claimed or developed use of, or involvement with, marijuana using the current adjudicative criteria. The adjudicative authority must determine if the use of, or involvement with, marijuana raises questions about the individual’s judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and willingness to comply with law, rules, and regulations, including federal laws, when making eligibility decisions of persons proposed for, or occupying, sensitive national security positions. The DOHA Appeal Board has cited the 2014 DNI Memo in holding that “state laws allowing for the legal use of marijuana in some limited circumstances do not pre-empt provisions of the Industrial Security Program, and the Department of Defense is not bound by the status of an applicant’s conduct under state law when adjudicating that individual’s eligibility for access to classified information.” ISCR Case No. 14-03734 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Feb. 18, 2016). 4
The current National Security Adjudicative Guidelines went into effect on June 8, 2017, after the 2014 DNI memo was issued. Nevertheless, the principle continues to apply. Moreover, on December 21, 2021, then-DNI Avril D. Haynes issued a memorandum entitled, “Security Executive Agent Clarifying Guidance Concerning Marijuana for Agencies Conducting Adjudications of Persons Proposed for Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.” (2021 DNI Memo) The memo incorporates the AGs (at reference B) and the 2014 DNI Memo (at reference G) among various
Analysis
into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect, or safeguard classified information. 3
Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) makes it illegal under Federal law to manufacture, possess, or distribute certain drugs, including marijuana. (Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. See § 844.) All controlled substances are classified into five schedules, based on their accepted medical uses, their potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the body. §§ 811, 812. Marijuana is classified as a Schedule III controlled substance, § 812(c), based on its high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment. § 812(b)(1). See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Further, in October 2014, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued a memorandum entitled “Adherence to Federal Laws Prohibiting Marijuana Use,” (2014 DNI Memo) which makes clear that changes in the laws pertaining to marijuana by the various states, territories, and the District of Columbia do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines, and that Federal law supersedes state laws on this issue: [C]hanges to state laws and the laws of the District of Columbia pertaining to marijuana use do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines. . . . An individual’s disregard of federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations. As always, adjudicative authorities are expected to evaluate claimed or developed use of, or involvement with, marijuana using the current adjudicative criteria. The adjudicative authority must determine if the use of, or involvement with, marijuana raises questions about the individual’s judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and willingness to comply with law, rules, and regulations, including federal laws, when making eligibility decisions of persons proposed for, or occupying, sensitive national security positions. The DOHA Appeal Board has cited the 2014 DNI Memo in holding that “state laws allowing for the legal use of marijuana in some limited circumstances do not pre-empt provisions of the Industrial Security Program, and the Department of Defense is not bound by the status of an applicant’s conduct under state law when adjudicating that individual’s eligibility for access to classified information.” ISCR Case No. 14-03734 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Feb. 18, 2016). 4
The current National Security Adjudicative Guidelines went into effect on June 8, 2017, after the 2014 DNI memo was issued. Nevertheless, the principle continues to apply. Moreover, on December 21, 2021, then-DNI Avril D. Haynes issued a memorandum entitled, “Security Executive Agent Clarifying Guidance Concerning Marijuana for Agencies Conducting Adjudications of Persons Proposed for Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.” (2021 DNI Memo) The memo incorporates the AGs (at reference B) and the 2014 DNI Memo (at reference G) among various
Whole Person Concept
other relevant federal laws, executive orders, and memoranda. I take administrative notice of the 2021 DNI memo here, given its relevance to this case, its reliance on the AGs, and its recency. The 2021 DNI memo specifically notes that “under policy set forth in SEAD 4's adjudicative guidelines, the illegal use or misuse of controlled substances can raise security concerns about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness to access classified information or to hold a sensitive position, as well as their ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.” Thus, consistent with these references, the AGs indicate that “disregard of federal law pertaining to marijuana remains relevant, but not determinative, to adjudications of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.” (2021 DNI Memo) Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The security concerns relating to the guideline for drug involvement and substance misuse are set out in AG ¶ 24, which reads as follows: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. The facts of this case establish the following potentially disqualifying conditions set forth in AG ¶ 25: (a) any substance misuse (see above definition); (f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position; and 5
(g) expressed intent to continue drug involvement and substance
Formal Findings
misuse, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue such misuse. Applicant admitted he used and purchased marijuana with varying frequency from about May 1998 to at least March 2026. This period encompasses his use on numerous occasions after submitting an e-QIP, having a security clearance interview, and receiving a security clearance in December 2023. Applicant initially indicated he would continue to use marijuana in the future. AG’s ¶25(a), (f), and (g) are clearly established. Therefore, the burden shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline H. The guideline includes the following tw
Conclusion
conditions in AG ¶ 26 that could mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s drug use: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides ev