A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.
ISCR Case No. 26-00266
DeniedDecided Oct 20, 2026 · Administrative Judge LeRoy F. Foreman · Hearing
Case headnote
Summary
The applicant, a 68-year-old chief operating officer for a federal contractor, faced security concerns under Guidelines D (Sexual Behavior) and E (Personal Conduct) due to his admissions of engaging in sexual activities for compensation while traveling abroad. Despite expressing remorse and having support from colleagues, the judge found that the applicant's conduct raised significant questions about his reliability and trustworthiness, leading to a denial of his security clearance.
Why the applicant was denied
- The applicant's sexual conduct was recent and frequent, raising concerns about his reliability and trustworthiness.
- The applicant did not demonstrate that his behavior would not recur when the pressure of retaining his security clearance was removed.
- The applicant failed to seek counseling or take steps to alleviate the circumstances that led to his inappropriate behavior.
Conditions referenced
Disqualifying
- AG ¶ 13(c) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duressapplied
- AG ¶ 13(d) Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that reflects lack of discretion or judgmentapplied
- AG ¶ 16(e) Personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duressapplied
Key rule quoted
“Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines.”
Procedural posture
- SOR issued
- April 22, 2026
- Answer filed
- May 3, 2026
- Hearing held
- September 21, 2026 conducted by video teleconference
- Decision date
- October 20, 2026
Cite for
- Denial Based on Recent and Frequent Sexual Conduct Raising Reliability Concerns
- Failure to Demonstrate Mitigation of Personal Conduct Issues
- Lack of Counseling or Corrective Measures for Inappropriate Behavior
Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.
From the decision
Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.
- Applicant Age
- 68
- Clearance Level
- sci
- Prior Clearance
- held
- Bankruptcy
- none
Allegations under Guideline D
Reading the 1 per allegation row needs a free account.
1 row in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Allegations under Guideline E
Reading the 1 per allegation row needs a free account.
1 row in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.
Full decision
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Decision text, by section
______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: )
)
)
ISCR Case No. 26-00266
) Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances For Government: Andrea Corrales, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 10/20/2026 Decision FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines D (Sexual Behavior) and E (Personal Conduct). Clearance is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on December 3, 2025. On April 22, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guidelines D and E. The DCSA acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016), which became effective on June 8, 2017. Applicant answered the SOR on May 3, 2026, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on August 12, 2026, and the case was assigned to me on August 14, 2026. On August 27, 2026, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the hearing was scheduled 1
to be conducted by video teleconference on September 21, 2026. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 3 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant Exhibit (AX) A, which was admitted in evidence without objection. I kept the record open until September 30, 2026, to enable Applicant to submit additional documentary evidence. He timely submitted AX B, C, D, and E, which were admitted without objection. DOHA received the hearing transcript on October 6, 2026. Findings of Fact In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, he admitted all the allegations, with explanations. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. Applicant is a 68-year-old chief operating officer for a federal contractor. He served in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) from May 1976 to June 1996 and retired as a chief warrant officer. He earned an associate degree in August 1983 while on active duty. (Tr. 16-17) He worked as a program manager for a federal contractor from May 1996 to April 2004 and as a staff officer for another federal contractor from April 2004 to July 2008. He was employed as a geospatial intelligence officer from July 2008 to September 2024, when he was hired by his current employer. He has held a security clearance since 1982. He testified that a security clearance is not a requirement for his job, but that the lack of a clearance would limit his ability to perform his current duties. Applicant married in January 1978. He and his wife have two adult children. Since 2023, Applicant’s wife has been incapacitated and suffers from dementia. Applicant cares for her, administers her medication, and takes her to medical appointments. (GX 3 at 9) Applicant was previously cleared for access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI). In September 2024, he underwent a polygraph examination, which was required to retain his SCI clearance. During the polygraph, he di sclosed that he had paid for sexual activities while traveling abroad. When he was questioned by a security investigator in January 2026, he disclosed that from 1977 through 1985, while on active duty and deployed to South Korea on four separate deployments, he paid f or a sexual hand massage on about seven occasions, each occurring at massage parlors maintained on military facilities. (GX 3 at 8) At the hearing, he testified that he knew his conduct was inappropriate, but it was widespread and condoned by military commanders until the mid- 1980s. (Tr. 33-34) In 2002, while Applicant was a federal contractor working in Mexico, he paid to have sexual intercourse with a woman he met at a bar. (Tr. 36) Between 2008 and 2013, his duties required travel to Korea about six times a year, and he had no sexual encounters during these trips. Between 2019 and 2022, he traveled to Korea at least four times a year, and he had no sexual encounters during these trips. In 2023, he traveled to Korea and used a massage parlor in his hotel for sexual massages. On a subsequent 2
trip, the massage parlor had moved to a downtown location, and he used it three times for sexual hand massages. On two subsequent trips, the masseuse came to his hotel at her suggestion, and they had sexual intercourse. (GX 3 at 8; Tr. 39-47) In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, he submitted a statement expressing remorse for his conduct. He stated that he has “made peace” with the changes in his marriage, and he promised that his unacceptable conduct will not be repeated. (AX A) The president of the company that employs Applicant personally discussed the security concerns with him and observed that he was “not someone attempting to dismiss, rationalize, or shift responsibility for past decisions.” The president states that he saw “genuine remorse and a recognition that his actions were inconsistent with the standards expected of him.” He believes that Applicant understands that decisions have consequences, even when those decisions occurred years ago. (AX E) The owner and former chief operating officer for Applicant’s employer has known him and his family for more than 44 years. He believes that Applicant has been open and sincere about the sexual misconduct that triggered an inquiry into his suitability for a clearance. He states that he continues to have confidence in his integrity, judgment, and trustworthiness. (AX B) A former supervisor has known Applicant since December 2022 and worked with him daily during a deployment to Iraq. He was impressed by his creativity, initiative, dedication, and professional skills. (AX C) A former co-worker who has known Applicant since 2014 is aware of the security concerns raised by his conduct. Nevertheless, he believes that his character, integrity, and reliability are outstanding. He believes that Applicant has expressed genuine remorse, has learned from his mistakes, and will not repeat them. (AX D) Policies “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy” to have access to such information. Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense 3
decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan at 531. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.” See ISCR Case No. 17-04166 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 21, 2019). It is “less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan at 531.
4
Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).
Analysis Guideline D, Sexual Behavior The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 12: Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, reflects lack of judgment or discretion, or which may subject the individual to undue influence or coercion, exploitation, or duress can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. . . . The following disqualifying conditions under this guideline are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 13(a): sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted; AG ¶ 13(c): sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress; and AG ¶ 13(d): sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that reflects lack of discretion or judgment. AG ¶ 13(a) is not established. There is no evidence in the record establishing that Applicant’s conduct violated the law of the country where it occurred. Thus, the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.a that he engaged in “illegal” prostitution solicitation is not established. However, the remainder of SOR ¶ 1.a, alleging that he engaged in prostitution solicitation is established. AG ¶ 13(c) and 13(d) are established. Applicant’s sexual conduct while assigned to Korea as a junior enlisted soldier apparently was common and tolerated by military commanders. However, his more recent sexual conduct in foreign countries as a civilian employee with access to highly sensitive information made him vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress and reflects lack of discretion or judgment. The following mitigating conditions under this guideline are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 14(b): the sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; AG ¶ 14(c): the behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress; and 5
AG ¶ 14(d): the sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual, and discreet. AG ¶ 14(b) is not established. Applicant’s sexual conduct was recent and frequent. It is not clear why he refrained from extra-marital sexual affairs in Korea from 2008 to 2013 and 2019 to 2022. However, his conduct resumed in 2023 and did not stop until he was confronted with a polygraph examination. He is remorseful because he was caught; not because he believes it was intrinsically wrong. I am not convinced that it will not recur when the pressure of retaining his security clearance is removed. AG ¶ 14(c) is not established. Applicant continues to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress by threats to disclose his conduct to his children, co-workers, or future employers. AG ¶ 14(d) is not established. Applicant’s conduct was private and consensual, but it was not discreet. Guideline E, Personal Conduct The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15: “Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. . . .” Applicant’s admissions and the evidence submitted at the hearing establish the following disqualifying condition under this guideline: AG ¶ 16(e): personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress by a foreign intelligence entity or other individual or group. Such conduct includes . . . engaging in activities which, if known, could affect the person’s personal, professional, or community standing. The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 17(c): the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and AG ¶ 17(d): the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the be
havior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur. 6
AG ¶ 17(c) is not established. Applicant’s conduct was not “minor.” While on official duty and holding access to highly sensitive information, he engaged in a course of conduct with a prostitute in a foreign country and made himself vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. His conduct was recent, frequent, did not occur under unique circumstances, and it casts doubt on his reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. AG ¶ 17(d) is not established. Applicant has acknowledged his behavior, but he has not sought or obtained counseling or taken any steps to alleviate the circumstances that led to his inappropriate behavior. I am not satisfied that it will not recur when the pressure of qualifying for a security clearance is removed. Whole-Person Analysis Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. An administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines D and E in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). Applicant was candid and sincere at the hearing, but I am not convinced that he is remorseful for his bad judgment and the intrinsic wrongfulness of his conduct. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under those guidelines and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by his sexual behavior and personal conduct. Formal Findings I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: Paragraph 1, Guideline D (Sexual Conduct): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant, except for the word “illegal” 7
Paragraph 2, Guideline E (Personal Conduct): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant Conclusion I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to continue Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. LeRoy F. Foreman Administrative Judge 8