A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.
ISCR Case No. 25-01498
DeniedDecided Oct 22, 2026 · Administrative Judge LeRoy F. Foreman · Hearing
Case headnote
Summary
The applicant, a 40-year-old configuration management specialist, faced security clearance denial under Guidelines H (Drug Involvement) and E (Personal Conduct) due to her history of marijuana use and falsification of information on security clearance applications. Despite her claims of abstaining from marijuana and receiving mental health treatment, the judge found her conduct raised significant security concerns.
Why the applicant was denied
- The applicant admitted to using and purchasing marijuana while holding a security clearance.
- The applicant falsified material facts in her security clearance applications and self-reports to her employer.
- The applicant's explanations for her conduct were deemed not credible.
Conditions referenced
Disqualifying
- AG ¶ 25(a) Substance misuseapplied
- AG ¶ 25(c) Illegal possession of a controlled substanceapplied
- AG ¶ 25(f) Illegal drug use while granted access to classified informationapplied
- AG ¶ 16(a) Deliberate omission or falsification of relevant factsapplied
- AG ¶ 16(b) Deliberately providing false or misleading informationapplied
Key rule quoted
“An applicant has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”
Procedural posture
- SOR issued
- 05/14/2026
- Answer filed
- 06/18/2026
- Hearing held
- 09/25/2026 conducted by video teleconference
- Decision date
- 10/22/2026
Cite for
- Denial of Security Clearance Due to Drug Involvement Under Guideline H
- Falsification of Information in Security Clearance Applications Under Guideline E
- Credibility Issues Impacting Security Clearance Determinations.
Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.
From the decision
Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.
- Applicant Age
- 40
- Years in Industry
- 6
- Prior Clearance
- held
- Bankruptcy
- none
Allegations under Guideline E
Reading the 3 per allegation rows needs a free account.
3 rows in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Allegations under Guideline H
Reading the 2 per allegation rows needs a free account.
2 rows in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.
Full decision
Open original PDFThe complete official text, footnotes and signatures included, is in the original PDF.
Decision text, by section
______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 25-01498 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Cassie Ford, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 10/22/2026 Decision FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines H (Drug Involvement) and E (Personal Conduct). Clearance is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on October 26, 2022. She submitted another SCA on September 18, 2025. On May 14, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) sent her a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guidelines H and E. The DCSA acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016), which became effective on June 8, 2017. Applicant answered the SOR on June 18, 2026, denied all the allegations, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on August 10, 2026, and the case was assigned to me on August 11, 2026. On 1
August 13, 2026, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the hearing was scheduled to be conducted by video teleconference on September 25, 2026. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 6 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A through C, which were admitted in evidence without objection. The record closed upon adjournment of the hearing. DOHA received the transcript on October 6, 2026. Findings of Fact Applicant is a 40-year-old configuration management specialist employed by a federal contractor since March 2020. She has never married and has no children. She received a bachelor’s degree in December 2009. She received a security clearance in August 2020. Although Applicant denied all the allegations in the SOR, she admitted some of the adjudicative facts. The evidence related to each of the allegations is summarized below. SOR ¶ 1.a alleges that Applicant used and purchased marijuana with varying frequency from about 2020 to January 2025. Applicant denied this allegation in her answer to the SOR, admitting that she used marijuana but denying that she purchased it, explaining that she obtained marijuana from friends during the dates alleged. When she was interviewed by a security investigator in March 2023, she stated that she first used marijuana in college between 2006 and 2009 and stopped using it after graduating from college. She started using it again in 2020 while dating a man who had a marijuana card. (GX 4 at 8) At the hearing, she testified that she obtained marijuana from her boyfriend and used it once or twice a week from 2020 to 2023 to help her sleep. (Tr. 18) When she and her boyfriend broke up in 2023, she started having anxiety problems and difficulty sleeping and used marijuana to help her sleep. She admitted that she purchased marijuana from state dispensaries after recreational use became legal in 2023. (Tr. 17) She received mental health treatment and medication for her anxiety until about February 2026. (Tr. 27) She continued to use marijuana until 2025, when one of her mental health providers recommended that she stop using it. (Tr. 29) This allegation is established. SOR ¶ 1.b alleges that Applicant purchased and used marijuana with varying frequency from about 2020 to about January 2025, while employed in a sensitive position, i.e., one requiring a security clearance. In her response to DCSA interrogatories in November 2025, she stated that she used marijuana until January 2025. (GX 3 at 2) In her answer to the SOR, she admitted that when she was hired in March 2020, her position required a security clearance. This allegation is established. SOR ¶ 2.a alleges that Applicant falsified material facts in her September 2025 SCA in response to the question in Section 23, asking if, in the last seven years, she had illegally used or purchased any drugs or controlled substances, by answering “Yes” to the question and admitting her use and purchase of marijuana from about May 2022 to about 2
June 2022, but not admitting her purchase and use from 2020 to January 2025, as alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b. In her answer to the SOR, she denied this allegation, explaining that her answer was an unintentional error caused by failing to update her previous 2023 SCA. Applicant has a history of attempting to conceal her marijuana use. Her explanation is not credible. This allegation is established. SOR ¶ 2.b alleges that Applicant falsified material facts in her October 2022 SCA in response to the same question about illegal use of drugs or controlled substances by answering “Yes” but not fully disclosing the conduct alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b and by claiming that she purchased and used marijuana in May and June 2022 on the advice and discretion of her primary physician. In her answer to the SOR, she explained that she used but did not purchase marijuana, and that even though her physician had suggested that she use marijuana to help with sleep and anxiety, he did not give her a prescription for marijuana. When she was interviewed by a security investigator in March 2023, she told the investigator that she stated in her “case papers” that she had used marijuana at the advice and discretion of her doctor because she did not want to lose her security clearance. (GX 4 at 8) Based on her admission to the security investigator, I find that this allegation is established. SOR ¶ 2.c alleges that Applicant falsified material facts in a self-report to her employer in September 2022 by stating that she used “medical marijuana” at the recommendation of her doctor in about April 2022, that it was “an infrequent use,” and that she had abstained from further use of marijuana and did not intend to use it again. In her answer to the SOR, Applicant denied this allegation and stated that at the time of her self-report, she was abstaining from marijuana and did not intend to use it again. At the hearing, she testified that she submitted the self-report pursuant to the advice and direction of her security manager, after an ex-boyfriend and co-worker had reported her marijuana use. (Tr. 41) She admitted that she used marijuana again after her self-report, which she attributed to a lapse in judgment, and she stated that as of the date of her SOR response, she was not using marijuana. I am satisfied that when Applicant submitted her self-report, she intended to terminate her marijuana use, and this part of her self-report was truthful. However, her claim that she used marijuana at the recommendation of her doctor was false. This allegation is established in part by her false claim about her doctor’s recommendation. At the hearing, Applicant testified that she has continued to abstain from marijuana. She is receiving mental health treatment, and her medications for anxiety are being well managed. (Tr. 26, 43) She submitted a drug screening report dated August 12, 2026, which reflected negative results for marijuana as well as multiple other controlled substances. (AX C) Her year-end performance reviews for 2024 and 2025 reflected that she met or exceeded all performance goals. (AX A; AX B) 3
Policies “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy” to have access to such information. Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan at 531. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.” See ISCR Case No. 17-04166 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 21, 2019). It is “less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or 4
rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan at 531. Analysis Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 24: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. On October 25, 2014, the Director of National Intelligence (the Security Executive Agent (SecEA)) issued DNI Memorandum ES 2014-00674, “Adherence to Federal Laws Prohibiting Marijuana Use,” which states: [C]hanges to state laws and the laws of the District of Columbia pertaining to marijuana use do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines . . . . An individual’s disregard of federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations. As always, adjudicative authorities are expected to evaluate claimed or developed use of, or involvement with, marijuana using the current adjudicative criteria. The adjudicative authority must determine if the use of, or involvement with, marijuana raises questions about the individual’s judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and willingness to comply with law, rules, and regulations, including federal 5
laws, when making eligibility decisions of persons proposed for, or occupying, sensitive national security positions. On December 21, 2021, a subsequent SecEA promulgated clarifying guidance concerning marijuana-related issues in security clearance adjudications. It states in pertinent part: [Federal] agencies are instructed that prior recreational marijuana use by an individual may be relevant to adjudications but not determinative. The SecEA has provided direction in [the adjudicative guidelines] to agencies that requires them to use a “whole-person concept.” This requires adjudicators to carefully weigh a number of variables in an individual’s life to determine whether that individual’s behavior raises a security concern, if at all, and whether that concern has been mitigated such that the individual may now receive a favorable adjudicative determination. Relevant mitigations include, but are not limited to, frequency of use and whether the individual can demonstrate that future use is unlikely to recur, including by signing an attestation or other such appropriate mitigation. . . . The following disqualifying conditions under this guideline are established by Applicant’s admissions and the evidence submitted at the hearing: AG ¶ 25(a): any substance misuse (see above definition); AG ¶ 25(c): illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; and AG ¶ 25(f): any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position. The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 26(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; AG ¶ 26(b): the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a p attern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; 6
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. The first prong of AG ¶ 26(a) (happened so long ago) focuses on whether the drug involvement was recent. There are no bright-line rules for determining when conduct is recent. The determination must be based on a careful evaluation of the evidence. If the evidence shows a significant period of time has passed without any evidence of misconduct, then an administrative judge must determine whether that period of time demonstrates changed circumstances or conduct sufficient to warrant a finding of reform or rehabilitation. ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2004). Applicant has a long history of marijuana involvement. She used it in college from 2006 to 2009, stopped using it after graduating from college, and resumed her use in 2020, when she began dating a marijuana user. She declared her intent to stop using marijuana in her self-report to her security manager in September 2022, but she did not stop using marijuana until January 2025, well after she submitted an SCA in October 2022. She has used marijuana to cope with anxiety, and she continues to deal with anxiety through mental health treatment and medication. Based on all the evidence, I am not convinced that her use of marijuana is mitigated by the passage of time. It was frequent and did not occur under circumstances making recurrence unlikely. AG ¶ 26(a) is not established. AG ¶ 26(b) is not established. Except for the breakup with a former boyfriend, she provided no evidence of disassociation from marijuana users or a change of environment. She has not provided the signed statement of intent described in AG ¶ 26(b)(3). Guideline E, Personal Conduct The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. . . . The following disqualifying conditions under this guideline are established by Applicant’s admissions and the evidence submitted at the hearing: AG ¶16(a): deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, 7
or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; and AG ¶ 16(b): deliberately providing false or misleading information; or concealing or omitting information, concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical or mental health professional involved in making a recommendation relevant to a national security eligibility determination, or other official representative. The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 17(a): the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; and AG ¶ 17(c): the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment. AG ¶ 17(a) is not established. In each instance, Applicant did not attempt to correct her falsifications until confronted with the evidence. AG ¶ 17(c) is not established. Falsifications during the adjudication of a security clearance application is not minor, because they undermine the integrity of the adjudication process. Applicant’s falsifications were recent, frequent, and did not occur under unique circumstances. I am not persuaded that recurrence is unlikely. Whole-Person Analysis Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. An administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 8
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines H and E in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under those guidelines and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by her drug involvement and personal conduct. Formal Findings I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: Paragraph 1, Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse):
AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline E (Personal Conduct): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant Subparagraph 2.b: Against Applicant Subparagraph 2.c: Against Applicant, except “no intent to use again” Conclusion I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. LeRoy F. Foreman Administrative Judge 9