A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.
ISCR Case No. 26-00296
DeniedDecided Oct 5, 2026 · Administrative Judge Richard A. Cefola · Hearing
Case headnote
Summary
The applicant, a 26-year-old Venezuelan national and software engineer, sought a top secret security clearance but was denied due to unresolved issues under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) and Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse). Despite mitigating concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), the applicant's ongoing marijuana use and dishonesty in security questionnaires raised significant doubts about his reliability and trustworthiness.
Why the applicant was denied
- The applicant admitted to ongoing marijuana use, including while holding a sensitive position.
- The applicant falsified information on two security questionnaires regarding his drug use.
- The applicant's claims of addiction and intent to abstain were not supported by sufficient evidence or professional evaluation.
Conditions referenced
Disqualifying
- H.1.a Any substance misuseraised
- H.1.c Illegal possession of a controlled substanceraised
- H.1.f Illegal drug use while granted access to classified informationraised
- H.1.g Expressed intent to continue drug involvementraised
- E.2.a Deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant factsraised
Mitigating
- H.2.a Behavior happened so long ago or infrequentrejected
- H.2.b Acknowledges drug involvement and provides evidence of actions taken to overcome the problemrejected
- E.2.a Prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omissionrejected
- E.2.c Offense is minor or unlikely to recurrejected
Key rule quoted
“Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.”
Procedural posture
- SOR issued
- 04/02/2026
- Answer filed
- 04/10/2026 Requested decision on written record.
- Hearing held
- No hearing; decided on written record.
- Decision date
- 10/05/2026
Cite for
- Issues of Personal Conduct and Dishonesty in Security Clearance Applications
- Impact of Ongoing Substance Misuse on Security Clearance Eligibility
- Considerations Regarding Foreign Influence in Security Clearance Decisions
Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.
From the decision
Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.
- Applicant Age
- 26
- Years in Industry
- 3
- Clearance Level
- top_secret
- Prior Clearance
- held
- Bankruptcy
- none
Allegations under Guideline B
Reading the 1 per allegation row needs a free account.
1 row in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Allegations under Guideline E
Reading the 2 per allegation rows needs a free account.
2 rows in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Allegations under Guideline H
Reading the 3 per allegation rows needs a free account.
3 rows in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.
Full decision
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Decision text, by section
Appearances
___ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS ____________________________________
Decision
In the matter of: )
)
) ISCR Case No. 26-00296
)
) Applicant for Security Clearance ) _____________________________________ ) Appearances For G
Statement of Case
vernment: Rhett E. Petcher, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 10/05/2026 Decision CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge: Applicant mitigated the security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) and Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions on July 24, 2023 (2023 Questionnaire) and another on October 12, 2024 (2024 Questionnaire). On April 2, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), Guideline E (Personal Conduct), and Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse).
The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within DoD after June 8, 2017. On April 10, 2026, Applicant responded to the SOR in writing (Answer) and requested that this case be decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. In his Answer, Applicant admitted to all of the SOR allegations. On June 30, 2026, Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case in a File of Relevant Material (FORM). A complete copy of the FORM, consisting of Government Exhibits (GE) 1 to 7, and the Government’s arguments in support of the SOR, was received by the Applicant on July 16, 2026. After being afforded 30 days to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns, Applicant timely submitted a five-page response to the FORM (Response) as well as one-page letter dated April 14, 2026, from a licensed professional counsellor (LPC), which was marked as Applicant Exhibit (AE) A. The case was assigned to me on September 23, 2026. Department Counsel lodged an objection to AE A premised on relevancy and foundation. The objection is overruled. The Directive at ¶ E3.1.19 dictates that the guiding Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) are relaxed
Findings of Fact
n these proceedings. To that end, the bar to establish foundation is quite low. Here, the LPC indicated in her letter that she has worked with Applicant since 2024, during which time he “demonstrated consistent attendance, appropriate engagement, and responsible participation treatment.” Under FRE 602, the personal knowledge component of foundation is established. As for the requisite FRE 901 review of authentication, the signed, dated letter on business letterhead satisfies this requirement. Finally, relevancy of course always remains germane and it is established here under the low threshold of FRE 401 in that the LPC report does have a tendency to make one or more facts more or less probable, particularly as it pertains to the required whole person evaluation. All of the evidence proffered by the parties is admitted. In the FORM, Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts about the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela and provided a summary, supported by Government documents pertaining to the country. Without objection, I have taken administrative notice of the facts contained in the request. The facts are summarized in the written request and will not be repeated verbatim here. However, I take particular note of the Attorney General’s determination that Venezuela has engaged in a long-term pattern and in serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of U.S. persons. These instances of conduct pose a significant risk of exploiting government-related data or bulk U.S. sensitive personal data to the detriment of the national security of the United States or the security and safety of U.S. persons. I also note the President’s proclamation to partially restrict and limit the entry of nationals of Venezuela in the United States given his evaluation of the specific risk factors involved. (GE 7) 2
Findings of Fact Applicant is 26 years old, has never married, and has no children. He was born in Venezuela, moved the United States when he was about 11 years old, and was naturalized in 2018. He attended college from 2020 to 2023 and earned a bachelor’s degree. Applicant has been employed by a defense contractor since October 2023 as a software engineer and received a secret clearance after completing his 2023 Questionnaire. He is now seeking a top secret clearance with the same defense contractor. (GE 3 at 5-7, 12-13, 22-23; GE 5; GE 6) SOR Paragraph 1 (Guideline H: Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) The Government alleged that Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance due to his purchase and use of marijuana, including after receiving a secret clearance. The following facts pertain: 1.a. Use of marijuana from 2019 until at least April 2025: On October 25, 2024, Applicant self-reported to his employer’s facility security officer (FSO) that he used marijuana daily from November 2023 through September 3, 2024. He averred to being “clean” since that date and indicated he pledged to never consume marijuana ever again. During an interview by a defense investigator on April 15, 2025, Applicant acknowledged that his initial use of marijuana was actually in 2019, and that after a break from August to November 2024, he resumed daily use through March 2025. He averred once again to having no intent to use the drug in the future. However, in his response to interrogatories executed on March 16, 2026, Applicant clarified that in truth he h ad us
ed marijuana, off and on, on a daily basis from the summer
Whole Person Concept
of 2019 through April 2025. He once again indicated he had no intention of using the drug again in the future. (GE 4 at 9, 20; GE 5 at 3) 1.b. Purchase of marijuana from 2019 until at least April 2025: From the Summer of 2019 through April 2025, Applicant purchased marijuana on a monthly basis from acquaintances during college and then from dispensaries. He spent approximately $20 per purchase. (GE 4 at 9, 20) 1.c. Purchase and use of marijuana while holding a sensitive position from October 2023 to at least April 2025: See SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b above. SOR Paragraph 2 (Guideline E: Personal Conduct) The Government alleged that Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance because he had engaged in conduct that involved questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. The following facts pertain: 2.a. False Statement in 2023 Questionnaire: On July 24, 2023, Applicant submitted his 2023 Questionnaire wherein i n Section 23 – Illegal Drugs, he answered, “No,” to a question asking if, in the last seven (7) years he had illegally used any controlled substances. He acknowledged the falsity of this statement to a defense investigator on 3
April 14, 2025, explaining he had not listed his drug use because he was “worried that listing it would prevent him from obtaining a security clearance.” He had known marijuana had been federally illegal since high school. (GE 4 at 9, 21) 2.b. False Statement in 2024 Questionnaire: On October 12, 2024, Applicant submitted his 2024 Questionnaire wherein i n Section 23 – Illegal Drugs, he answered, “No,” to a question asking if, in the last seven (7) years he had illegally used any controlled substances. He likewise answered, “No,” to a question asking if he had EVER illegally used any controlled substances while possessing a security clearance. He acknowledged the falsity of both statements to a def
ense i nvestigator on April 14, 2025, explaining h e had not listed his drug use because he was “worried that listing it would prevent him from obtaining a security clearance.” He had known marijuana had been federally illegal since high school. (GE 4 at 9, 21) SOR Paragraph 3 (Guideline B: Foreign Influence) The Government alleged that Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance due to foreign influence given his contacts with citizens of Venezuela. The following facts pertain: 3.a. Applicant has extended family who are citizens of Venezuela: Applicant acknowledged that his grandmother AM, aunt MP, aunt MF, cousin DP, and cousin AP are Venezuelan citizens residing in the United States. None have any
ties to a foreign military or government. There is no evidence in the record as to their immigration status. He maintains
Policies
monthly contact with Aunt AP and annual contact with the other extended family members. (GE 4 at 8, 23) Whole Person and Mitigating Evidence Applicant submitted extensive commentary in both his Answer and his Response. Regarding the Guideline B allegations, he asserted that his family members who are not U.S. citizens were “in the legal process to obtain U.S. citizenship.” He then noted how he is careful to never talk about his job outside of work and simply references his position as “a software engineer.” He further explained that he holds the matter of protecting classified information to be one of professional integrity and noted he has never had a security incident at work. Regarding the Guideline H allegations, he described his marijuana use as an addiction brought on by depression, which in turn was brought on by “multiple life changing events, unhealthy relationships, and loss of purpose.” He alluded to “self-harm” in approximately 2019, followed by therapy with a psychologist until June 2020. He described fairly consistent marijuana use from June 2019 to at least April 2025, with intermittent periods of abstinence ranging from one to several months. Applicant described relapses as times when he would get urges “that moved [his] body without any of [his] consent.” He offered an expansive exploration of drug addiction, asserting it to be “a chronic, relapsing disorder characterized by compulsive drug seeking and use despite adverse consequences.” He also averred to having been diagnosed in January 2025 with Major 4
Depressive Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, ADHD, as well as Autism (Level 1), but he did not mention receiving a Substance Use Disorder diagnosis. He did mention having been prescribed the antidepressant Qelbree (aka viloxazine). Applicant did not provide evidence of these diagnoses and the LPC letter (AE A) does not mention these issues. The letter likewise does not mention marijuana, addiction, drug abuse, or depression; but it opined nonetheless he is psychologically stable and has appropriate judgment. The LPC further suggested Applicant’s risk behavior was not inconsistent “with the standards typically required for positions involving access to sensitive or classified information.” It is unclear, however, what the basis might be for her knowledge or experience with said standards. Lastly, regarding the Guideline E allegations, he described the Questionnaire omissions as “my mishandling in communicating my substan
Analysis
e abuse struggles.” He offered to submit to drug tests in the future and suggested the LPC letter supported his veracity. (Answer; Response; AE A) Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of national security is of paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14 requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national 5
security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis SOR Paragraph 1 (Guideline H: Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) The security concerns relating to the guideline for drug involvement and substance misuse are set out in AG ¶ 24, which reads as follows: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. The facts of this case establish the following potentially disqualifying conditions set forth in AG ¶ 25: (a) any substance misuse (see above definition); (c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; (f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position; and (g) expressed intent to continue drug involvement and substance misuse, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue such misuse. Applicant admitted to using marijuana, including while holding a sensitive position. He has also pledged to stop on more than one occasion after which he resumed use. Consequently AG ¶¶ 25(a), (c), (f), and (g) apply. The burden then shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline H. 6
The guideline includes the following conditions in AG ¶ 26 that can mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s drug use: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome the problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. The Appeal Board has specifically noted that drug use after being placed on notice is incompatible with security clearance eligibility standards and raises substantial questions about an applicant’s judgment, reliability, and willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. ISCR 20-02974 at 6 (App. Bd. Feb. 1, 2022). And conduct falling under AG ¶ 25(f) reflects a heightened security concern inasmuch as individuals who have already been granted access to classified information or who hold sensitive positions are held to a higher standard than individuals not similarly situated because of the existing potential to adversely impact national security. ISCR Case No. 23-01884 at 3 (App. Bd. Nov. 6, 2024). In this case, Applicant’s college marijuana use, on its own, could potentially be mitigated by the application of time. But he continued to use the drug after filling out two separate Questionnaires, after starting a position with a defense contractor, after speaking with his FSO about using marijuana, and most egregiously, after receiving a secret security clearance. Applicant averred to being addicted to marijuana and characterized such addiction as a relapsing disorder that at times overcame his will. He did not, however, provide evidence of a substance abuse disorder diagnosis. Indeed, it was unclear from the evidence he provided if his LPC was even aware of his ongoing seven-year involvement with marijuana. Assuming, arguendo, Applicant does have the drug addiction issue with a relapsing disorder that he suggests, he provided no evidence of a professional evaluation relating a present prognosis that would mitigate future risks. Applicant’s marijuana use was both recent and frequent – and continued both after making assurances to both his FSO and the defense investigator that he had no intention of using the drug again in the future. None of the referenced AG ¶ 26 mitigating conditions, together or individually, are applicable as his current reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment are highly questionable. Paragraph 1 is found against Applicant. 7
SOR Paragraph 2 (Guideline E: Personal Conduct) The security concerns relating to the guideline for personal conduct are set out in AG ¶ 15, which states: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. The facts of this case establish the following potentially disqualifying condition set forth in AG ¶ 16: (a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities. Applicant acknowledged intentionally omitting information from two separate Questionnaires. The burden therefore shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline E. The guideline includes the following conditions in AG ¶ 17 that can mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s personal conduct: (a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; and (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment. As the Appeal Board has noted, “a person holding a security clearance has a duty to fully disclose conduct of security concern.” ISCR 24-00278 a t 3 ( App. Bd. Jan. 14, 2026). Moreover, a falsification of a security questionnaire constitutes misconduct that casts serious doubt on an applicant’s judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness. ISCR 22- 00657 at 4 (App. Bd. Apr. 18, 2023). In this case, Applicant admitted to twice omitting information ab
out his marijuana use – including after receiving a security clearance – solely for the purpose of furthering his own personal interests, i.e., obtaining and keeping a security clearance. The fact that he self-reported his marijuana use to his FSO two weeks after filling out the 2024 Questionnaire is an insufficient matter in mitigation as it pertains to SOR ¶ 2.b. AG ¶ 17(a) provides no definition of “prompt efforts” to correct an omission, but in this case Applicant had experience with the security application process, having previously submitted the 2023 Questionnaire. He knew he had been dishonest on July 24, 2023, and he knew it again on October 12, 2024. 8
Moreover, Applicant was untruthful to the FSO about when he started using marijuana, claiming he had been using it since November 2023 as opposed to the summer of 2019. Then, after professing to his FSO that he was “clean,” he continued daily use of marijuana for at least another six months – all while receiving care from his LPC, who may or may not have been aware of his actions. As a result, his report to the FSO does not present as a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the record. Therefore, having examined the omissions in light of the record as a whole, none of the mitigating conditions, individually or collectively, are sufficiently applicable to overcome the issues surrounding Applicant’s personal conduct. Paragraph 2 is found against Applicant. SOR Paragraph 3 (Guideline B: Foreign Influence) The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG ¶ 6: Foreign contacts and interests, includi
Whole Person Concept
g, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. The facts of this case establish the following potentially disqualifying conditions set forth in AG ¶ 7 to all of the allegations under Guideline B: (a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology. The burden therefore shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline B. The guideline includes the following conditions in AG ¶ 8 that can mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s foreign contacts: (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 9
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and l oyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. Applicant’s loyalty to th
Formal Findings
United States is not the subject of analysis; but the protection of national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” Additionally, it is well-established that the mere existence of family members in foreign countries is a possible basis for a security clearance denial. ISCR 23-01463 at 6 (App. Bd. April 10, 2025). In this case, however, the extended family members in question live in the United States – not Venezuela. And the administrative notice provided by the Government does not suggest that Venezuela has a history of acting extra-territorially to press its citizens living abroad for information. Given the country in which these persons are located, and the nature of the relationships with these family members (annual contact with extended family), it i
Conclusion
highly unlikely Applicant will be placed in a position of having to choose between foreign interests and the interests of the United States. Likewise, Applicant has been a U.S. citizen his entire adult life and most of his childhood There is no evidence of matters that could create a conflict of interest. AG ¶¶ 8(a) and (b) apply – Paragraph 3 is found for Applicant. Whole-Person