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A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ISCR Case No. 26-00421

Appeal Board

Decided Oct 22, 2026 · Administrative Judge Richard A. Cefola · Appeal

Appeal at a glance

The appeal concerned the denial of a security clearance based on security violations under Guideline K and personal conduct under Guideline E. The applicant challenged the Judge's findings and analysis, but the Board found no merit in the arguments and affirmed the denial.

Descriptive structured reading of this decided, public Appeal Board decision: what the case says, not a prediction or advice.

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Appearances

FOR GOVERNMENT Andrea M. Corrales, Esq., Deputy Chief Department Counsel

Appearances

Samir Nakhleh, Esq. The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On May 20, 2026, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline K (Handling Protected Information) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On September 24, 2026, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Richard A. Cefola denied Applicant national security eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. The SOR alleged three Guideline K security concerns and four related Guideline E concerns. Applicant admitted all allegations without comment or explanation and elected a decision on the written record. The Government submitted its written case in a File of Relevant Material (FORM), provided a copy to Applicant, and afforded him an opportunity to file objections and to submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the alleged concerns. By reply email, Applicant elected not to submit any materials and requested that the case be forwarded for adjudication. The Judge found adversely to Applicant on the Guideline K allegations and on three Guideline E allegations. He found favorably on one Guideline E falsification allegation.

Background Applicant is 60 years old and earned a bachelor’s degree in the early 1990s. He first obtained a security clearance in about 2020 and re-applied for eligibility for his current job, which he has held since April 2025. The allegations arise from Applicant’s employment with two prior defense contractor employers, Company A and Company B. In September 2021, Applicant received a formal written warning from Company A after an investigation concluded that he failed four internal email phishing exercises. The warning advised him that his behavior of “repeatedly clicking on the phishing attempts has put our company at risk and is a violation of Company policies,” citing inter alia to its policy regarding use of the company’s IT systems. Government Exhibit (GE) 8 at 1. This incident was alleged under Guideline K (SOR ¶ 1.c). During the adjudicative process, DOHA sent Applicant interrogatories that asked, among other questions, “Have you EVER violated company policy, for any of your past employers?,” to which Applicant answered “No.” GE 5 at 10. His failure to disclose this written warning is alleged as a Guideline E falsification (SOR ¶ 2.d). In November 2021, Applicant was hired by Company B. In July 2024, another employee reported that Applicant had uploaded a presentation containing classified information to an unclassified SharePoint site (SOR ¶ 1.a). An inquiry revealed that Applicant, while working in a classified area, had copied the classified information by hand onto a document that he removed from the secured space and kept at his desk in an unclassified area (SOR ¶ 1.b). The company’s investigation determined that Applicant’s actions “were deliberate and intentional in nature.” GE 6 at 1. The two incidents — copying the classified information to an unclassified document and uploading a presentation containing classified information to an unclassified SharePoint site — were separately alleged under Guideline K. Following the investigation, Applicant was terminated from Company B on the grounds that his actions were “deliberate in nature” and that they “represented gross negligence,” as he had been trained on the protection of classified information on at least three specified occasions within the prior 18 months. GE 7 at 1. The termination is alleged under Guideline E (SOR ¶ 2.a). Finally, the SOR alleged that Applicant falsified his security clearance application (SCA) in May 2025 in that he failed to disclose that he was fired from Company B (SOR ¶ 2.b). Judge’s Analysis For the three Guideline K allegations detailed above, the Judge found that the evidence established four disqualifying conditions, including AG ¶¶ 34(b): collecting or storing protected information in any unauthorized location; 34(c): loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or otherwise handling protected information, including images, on any unauthorized equipment or medium; 34(g): any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or sensitive information; and 34(h): negligence or lax security practices that persist despite counseling by management. In his Guideline K mitigation analysis, the Judge highlighted Appeal Board precedent for two well-established principles — that “[s]ecurity violations are one of the strongest possible reasons for denying or revoking access to classified information” and that “an employer’s 2

determinations and characterizations regarding security violations are entitled to considerable deference.” Decision at 6 (citations omitted). He noted that two mitigating conditions were potentially applicable: AG ¶¶ 35(a): so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and 35(b): the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of security responsibilities. In concluding that neither mitigating condition applied, the Judge noted that Applicant was terminated by Company B for security violations that were determined to be deliberate and grossly negligent, that Applicant admitted to the allegations and offered no evidence in explanation or mitigation, and that, although the incidents at Company B were over two years ago, Applicant offered “no evidence of counseling or remedial security training that would suggest a positive attitude toward safeguarding classified information – or that such conduct is unlikely to recur.” Id. Turning to the Guideline E allegations, the Judge noted that the mitigating condition found at AG ¶ 17(c) was potentially applicable: the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individuals’ reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment. In concluding that the security concerns were not mitigated, the Judge highlighted that Applicant’s “untrustworthy and unreliable behavior” that resulted in his termination “show[ed] an unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations” and that Applicant had “offered no evidence of counseling, remedial security training, or any mitigation during the ensuing two years that would suggest this behavior is unlikely to recur.” Id. at 8. Discussion Although pro se earlier in the adjudicative process, Applicant is now represented on appeal and raises a number of distinct challenges to the Judge’s decision, to include: that the Judge “materially misstated the record by finding that Applicant ‘intentionally copied classified information in his unclassified, handwritten notes,’” arguing that the conduct was instead inadvertent; that the Judge “treated the September 2021 phishing exercises as part of the Guideline K security-violation pattern without adequately establishing that the conduct involved protected information or violated a rule specifically governing the protection of classified or sensitive information”; that the Judge conflated AG ¶¶ 35(a) and (b) and erroneously treated the absence of post-incident counseling or remedial training as a reason to reject AG ¶ 35(a); that the Judge conducted an inadequate mitigation analysis for the falsification allegations; and, finally, that the Judge’s “whole-person analysis is largely conclusory” and does not adequately weigh favorable facts in the record. Appeal Brief at 1–2. We are unpersuaded by any of these arguments, as detailed below. First, regarding the issue of whether Applicant intentionally or inadvertently copied classified information onto an unclassified document, we reiterate what the Judge highlighted — that he is required to give considerable deference to the investigative findings of the employer. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 10-07070 at 8 (App. Bd. Apr. 19, 2012) (“[B]ecause of the unique position of employers as actual administrators of classified programs and the degree of knowledge possessed by them in any particular case, their determinations and characterizations regarding security violations are entitled to considerable deference, and should not be discounted or 3

contradicted without a cogent explanation.”). In this case, Company B’s investigation made explicit findings that: 1) Applicant admitted that he copied classified information to his unclassified notes; and 2) the handwritten notes were verbatim and included portion markings to the classified document. The Judge committed no error in adopting the investigative report’s findings and its conclusion that Applicant’s actions in copying the classified notes were “deliberate and intentional.” GE 6. Second, Applicant challenges the Judge’s adverse finding under Guideline K regarding the incident at Company A in which he was given a formal warning after failing four internal email phishing exercises (SOR ¶ 1.c). Although he admitted the conduct and the warning, Applicant challenges whether it falls squarely within Guideline K, as the Judge did not establish “that the conduct involved protected information or violated a rule specifically governing the protection of classified or sensitive information.” Appeal Brief at 2. Said differently, Applicant argues that the alleged conduct — failing internal tests to discern whether he was susceptible to phishing — does not fall within any of the enumerated disqualifying conditions found at AG ¶ 34. We are not persuaded. The Directive presumes a nexus between proven circumstances under any of its Guidelines and an applicant’s security eligibility. In analyzing cases, judges must be guided by common sense, with a view toward making a reasoned determination that is consistent with the interests of national security. Here, Company A clearly articulated in its written warning that Applicant’s repeated failures to recognize phishing “put our company at risk.” It is only logical to infer that Company A is referring to a risk to its proprietary information or to the classified and sensitive government information maintained on its systems. Contrary to Applicant’s arguments, the disqualifying condition found at AG ¶ 34(g) is applicable, as it encompasses “any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or sensitive information.” Applicant’s repeated failures to recognize phishing attempts bear a rational relation to the protection of classified, sensitive, and proprietary information within the meaning of Guideline K.1 Moreover, even if the evidence did not establish a violation of one of the enumerated provisions found at AG ¶ 34, the Judge did not err by concluding that Applicant’s repeated failures to detect phishing nevertheless established a security concern under Guideline K. The Board has consistently held that the disqualifying conditions listed under each Guideline are illustrative only, and not exhaustive or exclusive. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 07-00852 at 4 (App. Bd. May 27, 2008). See also ISCR Case No. 14-04441 at 3–4 (App. Bd. Apr. 8, 2016) (Applicant’s failure to report an affair with a foreign national was determined to raise concerns under Guideline K even though it did not directly involve the handling of protected information or satisfy the explicit criteria of Guideline K). The remainder of Applicant’s brief takes issue with the Judge’s mitigation analysis and Whole-Person Concept analysis. We note, as the Judge did, that Applicant failed to submit any matters in mitigation. Applicant’s bare admissions in his Answer to the SOR provided no 1 AG ¶ 33: “Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for handling protected information– which includes classified and other sensitive government information, and proprietary information–raises doubt about an individual’s trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such information, and is a serious security concern.” 4

explanations or context for his actions, and he declined to provide any response to the FORM. Having submitted no matters in mitigation, Applicant is ill-positioned to argue now that the Judge’s mitigation analysis is flawed, and our review establishes that Applicant’s arguments in this regard are without merit. For example, his argument that the Judge somehow conflated AG ¶¶ 34(a) and (b) is unfounded. The Judge acknowledged that two years had passed since the latest security incidents alleged but highlighted that Applicant had “offered no evidence of counseling or remedial training that would suggest a positive attitude toward safeguarding classified information – or that such conduct is unlikely to recur.” Decision at 6. Contrary to Applicant’s argument, the Judge explicitly addressed why Applicant failed to mitigate under either AG ¶¶ 34(a) or (b). Moreover, the Judge in his Whole-Person Concept analysis expressly cited his consideration of Applicant’s statements in his SCA and in his response to the interrogatories, there being no other evidence offered in mitigation. As the Appeal Board has previously discussed, most frequently applicants are denied a clearance because they have an indicator of a risk factor—such as drug use, alcohol abuse, or financial delinquencies—that raises a concern they might not comply with rules and regulations surrounding the protection of classified or sensitive information. See ISCR Case No. 03-26888 at 1 (App. Bd. Oct. 5, 2006). Here, the Judge found that Applicant did not comply with established requirements, and the record supports those findings. Our precedent establishes that an applicant in such cases has “a very heavy burden” of demonstrating that he should again be entrusted with classified information. ISCR Case No. 00-0030 at 6 (App. Bd. Sep. 20, 2001). The Judge concluded that Applicant did not carry that burden, and we concur. Conclusion Applicant has not established that the Judge’s conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Rather, the Judge examined and weighed the disqualifying and mitigating evidence and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, and the record is sufficient to sustain the Judge’s findings and conclusions. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). 5

Order The decision in ISCR Case No. 26-00421 is AFFIRMED. Signed: Moira Modzelewski Moira Modzelewski Administrative Judge Chair, Appeal Board Signed: Allison Marie Allison Marie Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: Eric H. Borgstrom Eric H. Borgstrom Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board 6