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ISCR Case 14-03574.a1 — CASE

ISCR Case 14-03574.a1denied

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 14-03574.a1

Sep 2, 2015· Hon. Jeffrey D. Billett· appeal

Summary

A defense contractor, divorced with two children, was denied a security clearance under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) due to multiple delinquent debts. The judge cited Disqualifying Conditions AG ¶ 20(a) and AG ¶ 20(c).

The applicant had several outstanding debts, notably three large credit card bills incurred following her divorce. The judge determined that the applicant provided insufficient detail regarding her efforts to resolve these debts and did not adequately explain her overall financial situation.

Furthermore, the judge found the applicant's assertions about her debt consolidation efforts to be implausible. Given the lack of credible evidence regarding debt resolution and the importance of financial responsibility, the security clearance application was denied.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 20(a)raisedFinancial Considerations
AG ¶ 20(c)raisedFinancial Considerations

Key Rule Quoted

“The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”
— Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988)

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedAug 5, 2015
Answer filed—
Hearing heldJun 23, 2015
Decision dateSep 2, 2015

Cite For

Insufficient Evidence to Support Claims of Debt Resolution Under Guideline F
Importance of Financial Responsibility in Security Clearance Evaluations
Interpretation of Applicant's Statements Regarding Debt Consolidation Efforts

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Appeal at a glance· Full written decision

Affirmed

The appeal was brought by the Applicant after the Department of Defense denied her security clearance based on financial considerations under Guideline F. The Applicant argued that the Judge's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The Board affirmed the Judge's decision, finding that the adverse decision was supported by substantial evidence and that any potential error was harmless.

Appealed bythe applicant

Applicant representationPro se (self-represented)

Judge belowErin C. Hogan — denied the clearance

Decided onthe written record

Guidelines belowGuideline F

What the Board reviewed

Decision arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law — raised by the applicantRejected
Applicant argued that the Judge's adverse decision was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

Error found, but harmless. The Board agreed the judge made a mistake but affirmed anyway, because it did not change the outcome.

Why the Board ruled this way

The Board found that the Judge's material findings of security concern were supported by substantial record evidence. Even if the Judge erred in interpreting the Applicant's statements, it was unlikely to have changed the outcome of the decision.

Standard of review applied

Harmful-error gatekeeperSubstantial-evidence reviewArbitrary-and-capricious reviewNo de-novo re-decisionNo new evidence on appeal

Appeal Board panel

Michael Ra’anan — Chair
Jeffrey D. Billett
James E. Moody

Descriptive structured reading of this decided, public Appeal Board decision — what the case says, not a prediction or advice.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

APPEAL

SYNOPSIS

KEYWORD: Guideline F DIGEST: Even if Applicant’s evidence had been received by the Judge, it is unlikely to resulted in a different decision. Adverse decision affirmed. CASENO: 14-03574.a1 DATE: 09/02/2015 DATE: September 2, 2015 In Re: ---------

Applicant for Security Clearance ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 14-03574

APPEAL BOARD DECISION

APPEARANCES

FOR GOVERNMENT James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Pro se The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On August 5, 2015, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). Applicant requested a decision on the written record. On June 23, 2015, after considering the record, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge Erin C. Hogan denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse decision was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Consistent with the following, we affirm. The Judge’s Findings of Fact Applicant works for a Defense contractor. Divorced with two children, she has worked for her employer since late 1998. Her SOR lists 11 delinquent debts. The three largest ones were the result of divorce, although Applicant supplied little detail on this. These three debts were for credit cards. Applicant claims that she was working with a credit consolidation firm that chose to write the debts off rather than arrange for their payment. Applicant did not indicate whether she attempted to contact the creditor. Applicant’s other debts include credit cards and two medical accounts in the amounts of $52.00 and $38.00. The larger of the two was listed as having been paid on her most recent credit report. Applicant provided no information about her overall financial situation (monthly income, expenses, debt payments, etc.). Neither did she provide information about the status of her debts or the quality of her duty performance. Applicant’s most recent credit report lists two additional delinquent debts. The Judge’s Analysis The Judge resolved several of the allegations in Applicant’s favor. However, for the three large credit card bills resulting from her divorce and for the remaining medical debt, she entered adverse findings. The Judge stated that Applicant’s contention that her debt consolidation company wrote off the debts was not plausible. She also stated that Applicant provided no explanation for her failure to have resolved the three credit card debts, nor did she supply information about her finances, etc. The Judge noted that Applicant had two additional delinquent debts. In the whole- person analysis, the Judge reiterated that Applicant had not provided evidence sufficient to explain her financial situation.

DISCUSSION

Applicant argues that the Judge misinterpreted her SOR reply, which states the following: “I was working with a debt consolidation company on repaying these debts. In the process, this company chose to write these amounts off instead of working with me.” She contends that she did not mean that her debt consolidation company wrote off the debts. Rather, the company to which she was referring was the creditor. Given the wording that Applicant used, the Judge’s interpretation was not unreasonable. However, even if the Judge had interpreted this comment in the way Applicant urges on appeal, it is not likely that she would have granted Applicant a clearance. Her adverse decision was based, for the most part, on the amounts of Applicants debts and a lack of evidence concerning such things as the circumstances underlying the debts, explanations for her failure to have addressed them, Applicant’s overall financial picture, etc. Therefore, even if the Judge erred, it was harmless. The Judge’s material findings of security concern are supported by substantial record evidence. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 14-01607 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 9, 2015). Applicant states that her response to the Judge “must not have been received.” Appeal Brief at 1. Normally, we cannot consider new evidence on appeal. Directive ¶ E3.1.29. However, we have done so from time to time in order to resolve issues of due process. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 11-07169 at 1 (App. Bd. Nov. 18, 2013). In this case, Applicant includes certain documents that she states she had submitted to the Judge for inclusion in the record. She has provided no corroboration for this assertion, such as postal receipts, USPS tracking documents, etc. In any event, even if the material in question had been submitted to the Judge it is unlikely that the decision would have been different. Applicant cites to her SOR reply in arguing that the Judge erred in her overall conclusion. Applicant’s arguments are not enough to rebut the presumption that the Judge considered all of the evidence. Neither is it sufficient to show that she weighed the record evidence in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 14-00597 at 3 (App. Bd. Jul. 16, 2015). The Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision. The decision is sustainable on this record. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). See also Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b): “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.”

ORDER

The Decision is AFFIRMED. Signed: Michael Ra’anan Michael Ra’anan Administrative Judge Chairperson, Appeal Board Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett Jeffrey D. Billett Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: James E. Moody James E. Moody Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board