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ISCR Case 18-02706 — CASE

ISCR Case 18-02706denied

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 18-02706

deniedJul 9, 2019· Hon. Richard A. Cefola· hearing

Summary

A 34-year-old married applicant with one child was denied a security clearance under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) due to significant familial ties and financial interests in Israel. The administrative judge found these factors raised concerns about divided allegiance and potential foreign influence.

Specifically, the applicant's mother is a dual U.S. and Israeli citizen residing in Israel, and the father is an Israeli citizen and resident. Additionally, the applicant's three siblings—a sister and two brothers—are dual U.S. and Israeli citizens who also reside in Israel.

The applicant admitted to possessing an Israeli bank account valued at approximately $600 and two Israeli pension accounts totaling about $43,000 upon retirement. The applicant also confirmed making monthly payments to the Government of Israel for social security and medical insurance. Although the applicant denied a second Israeli bank account valued at about $1,800, the immediate family connections and admitted financial interests were sufficient to warrant denial, as no mitigating conditions were found to apply.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

The applicant has immediate family members who are citizens and residents of Israel, raising concerns of divided allegiance.
The applicant has financial interests in Israel, including a bank account and pension accounts, which could lead to foreign influence.
The applicant failed to demonstrate that mitigating conditions applied to alleviate the security concerns.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to a Foreign Government
AG ¶ 7(f)raisedSubstantial Financial Interests in a Foreign Country

Key Rule Quoted

“Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedJan 9, 2019
Answer filedFeb 8, 2019
Hearing held—Applicant requested decision on the written record without a hearing.
Decision dateJul 9, 2019

Cite For

Impact of Familial Ties on Security Clearance Under Guideline B
Evaluation of Financial Interests in Foreign Countries
Consideration of Divided Allegiance in Security Clearance Decisions

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The judge found multiple foreign influence concerns regarding the applicant's family ties and financial interests in Israel. The applicant's mother, father, and siblings are all dual citizens residing in Israel, and the applicant has bank accounts and pension accounts in Israel. The decision ultimately denied the applicant's request for national security eligibility due to these concerns.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant’s mother is a dual citizen of the United States and Israel, and resides in Israel.	Against Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Israel	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
1.b	Applicant’s father is a citizen and resident of Israel.	Against Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Israel	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
1.c	Applicant’s three siblings, a sister and two brothers, are dual citizens of the United States and Israel, and reside in Israel.	Against Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Israel	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
1.f	Applicant admits that he has a bank account in Israel, valued at about $600.	Against Applicant	Foreign Bank Account or Investment Financial or Property Interest	Israel	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
1.g	Applicant denies that he has a second bank account in Israel, valued at about $1,800.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	Israel	Denied	—	—	—
1.h	Applicant admits that he has two Israeli pension accounts valued at about $43,000 on his retirement.	Against Applicant	Foreign Bank Account or Investment Financial or Property Interest	Israel	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
1.i	Applicant admits that he is making monthly payments to the Government of Israel for Israeli social security and medical insurance.	Against Applicant	Foreign Employment or Pension Financial or Property Interest	Israel	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: )

)

) ISCR Case: 18-02706

) Applicant for Security Clearance )

Appearances For Government: Andrew H. Henderson, Esquire, Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

July 9, 2019 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________ CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge: Statement of Case

On March 27, 2016, Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF- 86). On Jenuary 9, 2019, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR), detailing security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. (Item 1.) The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, dated June 8, 2017.

Applicant answered the SOR on February 8, 2019. He admitted all the SOR allegations except for subparagraph 1.g. regarding a second bank account. He requested that his case be decided by an administrative judge on the written record without a hearing. (Item 1.) On February 28, 2019, Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case. A complete copy of the File of Relevant Material (FORM),

containing three Items, was mailed to Applicant on February 28, 2019, and received by him on March 29, 2019. The FORM notified Applicant that he had an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation within 30 days of his receipt of the FORM. Applicant failed to respond to the FORM.

PROCEDURAL RULINGS

In the FORM, the Government requested I take administrative notice of certain facts relating to Israel. Department Counsel provided a five-page summary of the facts, supported by eight Government documents pertaining to Israel, identified as Additional Information. The documents provide elaboration and context for the summary. I take administrative notice of the facts included in the U.S. Government reports. They are limited to matters of general knowledge, not subject to reasonable dispute. They are set out after the Findings of Fact.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant is 34 years old. He is married, with one minor child. (Item 2 at pages 5, 25, and 37.).)

Guideline B – Foreign Influence

1.a. Applicant’s mother is a dual citizen of the United States and Israel, and resides in Israel.

1.b. Applicant’s father is a citizen and resident of Israel.

1.c.~1.e. Applicant’s three siblings, a sister and two brothers, are dual citizens of the United States and Israel, and reside in Israel.

1.f. Applicant admits that he has a bank account in Israel, valued at about $600.

1.g. Applicant denies that he has a second bank account in Israel, valued at about $1,800. As the Government only refers to “a bank account” in the FORM, this allegation is found for Applicant.

1.h. Applicant admits that he has two Israeli pension accounts valued at about $43,000 on his retirement.

1.i. Applicant admits that he is making monthly payments to the Government of Israel for Israeli social security and medical insurance.

Notice

Although The United States has provided regular military support to Israel, there is a significant documented history of classified information and export-controlled technologies being illegally imported by Israel.

POLICIES

When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.

Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence that establishes controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally

permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

ANALYSIS

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in AG ¶ 6:

Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 7. Three are potentially applicable in this case:

(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology; and

(f) substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country, or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could subject the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation or personal conflict of interest.

Applicant’s parents and siblings are Israeli citizens living in Israel. He also has a bank account, pension accounts, and makes monthly payment to the Israeli government. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.

AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;

(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;

(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or are approved by the agency head or designee;

(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and

(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.

Applicant has submitted no evidence demonstrating that that any of these mitigating conditions apply. Foreign Influence is found against Applicant.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the applicable guidelines and the whole-person concept.

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility, and suitability for a security clearance. He has not met his burden to mitigate the security concerns arising under the guideline for Foreign Influence.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B:

AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a. through 1.f.: Against Applicant

Subparagraph 1.g.

For Applicant

Subparagraphs 1.h. and 1.i.:

Against Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant national security eligibility and a security clearance. National security eligibility is denied.

Richard A. Cefola Administrative Judge