ISCR Case No. 23-00555

___________ ___________ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 23-00555 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Adrienne Driskill, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 07/25/2024

TUIDER, Robert, Administrative Judge: Security concerns under Guideline B (foreign influence) related to his connections to Lebanon are not mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case On July 12, 2022, Applicant completed and signed an Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (SF-86) or security clearance application (SCA). On April 27, 2023, the Department of Defense (DOD) Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), Consolidated Adjudication Services (CAS), issued a statement of reasons (SOR) to Applicant under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry, February 20, 1960; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), January 2, 1992; and Security Executive Agent Directive 4, establishing in Appendix A the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (AGs), effective June 8, 2017. The SOR detailed reasons why the DCSA CAS did not find under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant and recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked. Specifically, the SOR set forth security concerns arising under Guideline B.

On May 21, 2023, Applicant provided a response to the SOR, and requested a hearing. On June 29, 2023, Department Counsel was ready to proceed. On July 6, 2023, the case was assigned to me. On July 17, 2023, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice scheduling the hearing for July 27, 2023. The hearing was held as scheduled. Department Counsel offered Government Exhibit (GE) 1 and 2, which I admitted without objection. (Tr. 10-11) Applicant testified and offered Applicant Exhibits (AE) 1 through 5, that he had pre-marked as such, which I admitted without objection. (Tr. 11- 12) On August 4, 2023, DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.). Legal Issue Department Counsel requested administrative notice concerning Lebanon. Hearing Exhibit (HE) I. Applicant did not object, and I granted Department Counsel’s motion. (Tr. 10-11) Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for administrative proceedings. See ISCR Case No. 16-02522 at 2-3 (App. Bd. July 12, 2017); ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n. 1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2007); ISCR Case No. 02- 24875 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No. 02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004) and McLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1986)). Usually, administrative notice at ISCR proceedings is accorded to facts that are either well known or from Government reports. See Stein, Administrative Law, Section 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006) (listing fifteen types of facts for administrative notice). The Department Counsel’s administrative notice request is quoted without attribution and quotation marks with minor changes in the Lebanon section, infra. Some details were excluded to protect Applicant’s right to privacy. Specific information is available in the cited exhibits and transcript.

In Applicant’s SOR response, he admitted SOR ¶¶ 1.a through 1.g with explanations and clarifications. He also provided mitigating information. Applicant is a 58-year-old network engineer, employed by a defense contractor since November 2021. He is a first-time applicant for a security clearance, which he seeks to enhance his upward mobility within his company. (Tr. 12-14; AE 5) Applicant was born in Lebanon in 1966, where he spent his formative years. He received his high school diploma in Lebanon in 1982. (Tr.14-15; GE 1, p. 5) Applicant first came to the United States on a “Visitor’s Visa” or “F-1” visa in 1983, “officially” entered the United States in 1994 when he received his “green card,” became a naturalized U.S. citizen in September 2000, and was issued his most recent U.S. passport in November 2020. He has an expired Lebanese passport. (Tr. 20-24; GE 1, p. 6) Applicant pursued his education after arriving in the United States as follows: (1) received a diploma in electronics/computer technology from a technical college 1986; (2)

took courses in English as a second language and general education from 1985 to 1988; (3) was awarded an associate in science degree in computer information systems in 1993; and (4) was awarded a bachelor of science degree in information technology in 2005. (Tr. 15-17; AE 4) Applicant was married from 2001 to 2005. That marriage ended by divorce. He remarried tin 2008. He and his second wife have one minor daughter. Applicant’s wife does not work outside the home. (Tr. 17-20; GE 1) Foreign Influence 1.a to 1.c – Family members in Lebanon – Applicant has one brother and one sister who are resident citizens of Lebanon. His father-in-law and mother-in-law are resident citizens of Lebanon. Lastly, he has three brothers-in-law and one sister-in-law who are resident citizens of Lebanon. One of these brothers-in-law serves as a senior officer in the Lebanese Internal Security Forces. 1.d – 1.g – Financial holdings in Lebanon – Since approximately 1982, Applicant has co-owned with his brothers and sisters a home in Lebanon with an approximate value of $200,000. Since approximately 1991, Applicant has owned a vacation property in Lebanon with an approximate value of $100,000. Since approximately 2014, Applicant has owned an apartment in Lebanon with an approximate value of $200,000 to $250,000. Since approximately October 2014, Applicant has maintained a bank account in Lebanon with a current value of $2,400.

Applicant admitted all of the allegations with explanations. He added that his one brother and one sister who are resident citizens of Lebanon “are the unfortunate ones that did not have the opportunity to migrate out of the country.” He and his siblings plan to sell the $200,000 property in Lebanon, but “unfortunately there are seven decision makers, and we never got a good offer for it.” The last time the family tried to sell this property was in 2014. Applicant also hopes to sell the $100,000 vacation property when the opportunity arises. He purchased an apartment in Lebanon for his family to stay in during a two-year period when they lived in Lebanon, and they now use it as a place to stay during their visits and vacations to Lebanon. Applicant maintained the bank account in Lebanon to pay for apartment-related expenses. However, with the current banking crisis, he is not allowed to “pull [his] money or use it to pay due bills.” (SOR Answer; Tr. 51-57) During his testimony, Applicant furnished the following information pertinent to the SOR allegations. He stated that he has an older brother living in Lebanon “in his 70s,” who is retired, and worked in the banking industry. (Tr. 25-26) Applicant sends his brother in Lebanon “[o]n an average like $5,000” a year to care for the maintenance of his properties located in Lebanon. (Tr. 43-45) Applicant’s sister living in Lebanon is “in her 60s,” is married, and does not work outside the home. Her husband works for a “U.S. organization that deliver(s) aid to needy people.” (Tr. 29-30) Applicant “occasionally” calls his brother and sister living in Lebanon. (Tr. 32-33)

Applicant’s wife was born in Lebanon and became a naturalized U.S. citizen three years after she married him. (Tr. 31-32) As noted, the majority of her family are resident citizens of Lebanon. Applicant’s father-in-law is a retired baker. His mother-in-law does not work outside of the home. (Tr. 32) The first brother-in-law is a senior officer in the Lebanese Internal Security Forces, which Applicant described as the “city police.” The second brother-in-law works for a bank. The third brother-in-law is a “financial auditor” and works for a “financial company.” (Tr. 35, 49-51) Applicant’s sister-in-law is a “math teacher” and “independently work(s) as a math teacher.” (Tr. 35) Applicant sends his sister-in-law in Lebanon approximately $5,000 a year to help with the living expenses of his mother-in-law and father-in-law in Lebanon. His sister-in-law is “staying at home with them” and “take(s) care of them.” (Tr. 46-47) Applicant’s wife is in frequent contact with her parents in Lebanon, “[p]robably every day, every other day, she communicate(s) with them over WhatsApp just to say hi, to see them.” (Tr. 47) Prior to the pandemic, Applicant visited Lebanon on average every other year. His first trip to Lebanon after the pandemic was Christmas 2022. Sometimes his wife and children visit Lebanon on their own. (Tr. 48-49, 57-58) Applicant has no plans to move back to Lebanon. (Tr. 59-60) Applicant’s testimony pertaining to his real estate holdings and assets in Lebanon confirmed the information he provided in his SOR answer. (Tr. 38- 41) He stated that if something happened to one of his properties in Lebanon, it would not be “important” to him adding that he has lost money just by having properties in Lebanon. (Tr. 60) Applicant’s has substantial assets in the United States. His combined real estate and financial holdings approximate $1.1 million dollars. (Tr. 41-42; AE 3) His annual salary is $190,000. (Tr. 42) He exercises his right to vote in the United States. (Tr. 42-43) Other than his immediate family members, Applicant does not have positive memories of growing up in Lebanon, a country wrought with war and violence. He stated that his loyalties are to the United States. (Tr. 61-62) Character Evidence Applicant called three character witnesses to testify on his behalf, his supervisor, his supervisor’s supervisor, and a co-worker. They all spoke highly of Applicant stating that he was trustworthy, was an excellent worker, and they did not have any concerns regarding his loyalty to the United States. (Tr. 63-76) He submitted a statement describing the challenges of growing up in Lebanon and of his loyalty and affinity for United States that he read into the record as his “closing argument.” He concluded that after completing his education in the United States, having lived in the United States for “close to four decades, and “dedicat(ing) his career to safeguarding his employer’s information, his commitment to the United States and its principles is unassailable.” (Tr. 79-85; AE 1) Lebanon Lebanon is a parliamentary republic based on the 1943 National Pact, which apportions governmental authority among a Maronite Christian president, a Shia speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (parliament), and a Sunni prime minister. Parliament elected

Michel Aoun to the presidency in 2016; his term expired on October 31, 2022. On May 15, 2022, the government conducted parliamentary elections that international observers considered free and fair. Following the election of the new parliament, the cabinet of Prime Minister Najib Mikati went into caretaker status. The U.S. Department of State has issued a Level 3, Reconsider Travel advisory for Lebanon due to crime, terrorism, armed conflict, civil unrest, kidnapping and the Embassy of Beirut’s limited capacity to provide support to U.S. citizens. Some areas have increased risk. The Department of State has issued notices not to travel for the following areas in Lebanon: to the border with Syria due to terrorism and armed conflict; to the border with Israel due to the potential for armed conflict; or to refugee settlements due to the potential for armed clashes. Local security authorities in Lebanon have noted a rise in violent crimes, including political violence. Multiple unsolved killings in Lebanon may have been politically motivated. Terrorist groups continue plotting possible attacks in Lebanon. Terrorists may conduct attacks with little or no warning targeting tourist locations, transportation hubs, markets/shopping malls, and local government facilities. Kidnapping, whether for ransom, political motives, or family disputes, has occurred in Lebanon. Suspects in kidnappings may have ties to terrorist or criminal organizations. There is potential for death or injury in Lebanon because of terrorist attacks. Violent extremist groups, including U.S. government-designated terrorist organizations, operate in Lebanon. ISIS and Al-Nusrah Front have claimed responsibility for suicide bombings in Lebanon. U.S. citizens have been the targets of terrorist attacks in Lebanon. The threat of anti-Western terrorist activity persists, as does the risk of death or injury to non-targeted bystanders. Clashes between Lebanese authorities and criminal elements continue to occur in areas of the Bekaa Valley and border regions. Hizballah maintains a strong presence in the Bekaa Valley, in addition to areas in southern Lebanon and south Beirut. Hizballah has been the target of attacks by other extremist groups for their support of the Assad regime in Syria. Terrorist groups operating in Lebanon include U.S. government-designated foreign terrorist organizations such as Hizballah and ISIS. Hizballah continued armed militia activities in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in collaboration with the Iranian regime. Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps remained largely outside the control of Lebanese security forces and posed a security threat because of the potential for militant recruitment and terrorist infiltration. Several individuals on the FBI’s most wanted list and the Department of State's Rewards for Justice list reportedly remained in Lebanon. Iran continues to provide Hizballah with most of its funding, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid. Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah - which has been estimated to be hundreds of millions of dollars annually-accounts for the overwhelming majority of the group’s annual budget. This support has made Hizballah a dangerous terrorist partner with Iran and the most- capable terrorist organization in Lebanon. The Assad regime in Syria has provided training, weapons, and diplomatic and political support to Hizballah. Hizballah also

receives funding in the form of private donations from some Lebanese Shia diaspora communities worldwide, including profits from legal and illegal businesses. These include smuggling contraband goods, passport falsification, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and credit card, immigration, and bank fraud. In its 2023 Annual Threat Assessment, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence assessed that Iran and Lebanese Hizballah remain committed to conducting terrorist attacks and could seek to do so on U.S. soil. While ISIS and al-Qa’ida suffered major leadership losses in 2022, degrading external operations and capabilities, both organizations’ offshoots continue to exploit local conflicts and broader political instability to make territorial and operational gains. Lebanese Hizballah will continue to develop its global terrorist capabilities as a complement to the group’s growing conventional military capabilities in the region. Hizballah seeks to reduce U.S. influence in Lebanon and the broader Middle East. Hizballah maintains the capability to target U.S. persons and interests in the region, worldwide, and, to a lesser extent, in the United States. Iran could benefit strategically if Hizballah were to conduct terrorist activity on U.S. soil. The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed sanctions against multiple people and entities connected to Hizballah. The U.S. Department of Justice has prosecuted individuals connected to Hizballah for espionage, terrorism, and export violations. Significant human rights violations continue to occur in Lebanon.

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the

possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest that it is based, in whole or in part, on any express or implied determination about applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President, Secretary of Defense, and Director of National Intelligence have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts or concerns they raise. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).

Foreign Influence AG ¶ 6 explains the security concern about “foreign contacts and interests” stating: Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

AG ¶ 7 lists conditions that could raise a foreign influence security concern and may be disqualifying in this case: (a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology; (e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and (f) substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country, or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could subject the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation or personal conflict of interest. The mere possession of close family ties with people living in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if an applicant, his or her spouse, or someone sharing living quarters with them, has such a relationship with even one person living in a foreign country, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 08-02864 at 4-5 (App. Bd. Dec. 29, 2009) (discussing problematic visits of that applicant’s father to Iran). In ISCR Case No. 17-01979 at 5 (App. Bd. July 31, 2019) the Appeal Board reversed the grant of a security clearance and noted, “Application of the guidelines is not a comment on an applicant’s patriotism but merely an acknowledgment that people may act in unpredictable ways when faced with choices that could be important to a loved- one, such as a family member.” Not every foreign contact or tie presents the heightened risk under AG ¶ 7(a). The “heightened risk” denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under a foreign government. The nature and strength of the ties and the country involved (i.e., the nature of its government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record) are relevant in assessing whether there is a likelihood of vulnerability to coercion. “[T]he nature of the foreign government involved, and the intelligence-gathering history of that government are among the important considerations that provide context for the other record evidence and must be brought to bear on the Judge’s ultimate conclusions in the case. The country’s human rights record is another

important consideration.” ISCR Case No. 16-02435 at 3 (App. Bd. May 15, 2018) (citing ISCR Case No. 15-00528 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 13, 2017)). Another important consideration is the nature of a nation’s government’s relationship with the United States. These factors are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members or friends living in that country are vulnerable to government coercion or inducement. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, the government ignores the rule of law including widely accepted civil liberties, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, the government is engaged in a counterinsurgency, terrorism causes a substantial amount of death or property damage, or the country is known to conduct intelligence collection operations against the United States. The relationship of Lebanon with the United States and the situations involving terrorists and insurgents in that country places a significant burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his relationships with anyone living in that country does not pose a security risk because of the risks due to terrorist activities in that country. Applicant should not be placed into a position where he might be forced to choose between the protection of classified information and concerns about assisting someone living in Lebanon. The issue under Guideline B is whether Applicant has ties or contacts with friends or associates in Lebanon, which raise security concerns because those ties and contacts create a potential vulnerability that criminals or terrorists could seek to exploit in an effort to get unauthorized access to U.S. classified information that he has by virtue of a security clearance. Applicant may be vulnerable to influence or pressure exerted on, or through, his family. International terrorist groups are known to conduct intelligence activities as effectively as capable state intelligence services, and Lebanon has a significant problem with terrorism and crime. Applicant’s family living in Lebanon “could be a means through which Applicant comes to the attention of those who seek U.S. information or technology and who would attempt to exert coercion upon him.” ADP Case No. 14-01655 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 9, 2015) (citing ISCR Case No. 14-02950 at 3 (App. Bd. May 14, 2015)). Applicant’s relationships with family living in Lebanon create a potential conflict of interest because terrorists could place pressure on them to attempt to cause Applicant to compromise classified information. Additionally, he has financial and property interests in Lebanon, although those interests are not as substantial when compared to his financial and property interests in the United States. Those relationships and interests create “a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion” under AG ¶ 7. AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), 7(e), and 7(f) apply, and further inquiry is necessary about potential application of any mitigating conditions. AG ¶ 8 lists conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns including: (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in

that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation; (d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or are approved by the agency head or designee; (e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and (f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. As indicated in the disqualifying conditions of the Foreign Influence section, supra, Applicant has relationships with family living in Lebanon. He also owns property in Lebanon. These issues increase the risk that family and financial interests in Lebanon could be targeted to put pressure on Applicant to provide classified information. The Appeal Board has concluded that contact every two months or three months constitutes “frequent contact” under AG ¶¶ 7 and 8. ISCR Case No. 14-05986 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Oct. 14, 2016). See also ISCR Case No. 04-09541 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Sept. 26, 2006) (finding contacts with applicant’s siblings once every four or five months not casual and infrequent and stating “The frequency with which Applicant speaks to his family members in Iran does not diminish the strength of his family ties.”). Frequency of contact is not the sole determinant of foreign interest security concerns. Applicant’s SOR does not allege that he visited Lebanon frequently, and that his spouse has frequent contacts with her parents who are citizens and residents of Lebanon. In ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006), the Appeal Board listed five circumstances in which conduct not alleged in an SOR may be considered, stating: (a) to assess an applicant’s credibility; (b) to evaluate an applicant’s evidence of extenuation, mitigation, or changed circumstances; (c) to consider whether an applicant has demonstrated successful rehabilitation;

(d) to decide whether a particular provision of the Adjudicative Guidelines is applicable; or (e) to provide evidence for whole person analysis under Directive Section 6.3. Id. (citing ISCR Case No. 02-07218 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 15, 2004); ISCR Case No. 00- 0633 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 24, 2003)). See also ISCR Case No. 12-09719 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 6, 2016) (citing ISCR Case No. 14-00151 at 3, n. 1 (App. Bd. Sept. 12, 2014); ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006)). The non-SOR information discussed above will not be considered except for the five purposes listed above. A key factor in the AG ¶ 8(b) analysis is Applicant’s “deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.” His relationship with the United States must be weighed against the potential conflict of interest created by his connections to Lebanon. Applicant was born in Lebanon, and first came to the United States on an F-1 Visa in 1983. He “officially” entered the United States when he received his “green card,” became a naturalized U.S. citizen in September 2000, and was issued his most recent U.S. passport in November 2020. After completing high school in Lebanon in 1982, he continued his higher education in the United States. His spouse became a U.S. citizen three years after marrying him in 2008. His daughter is a U.S. citizen. He has worked for his current Defense-contractor employer since November 2021. These factors are balanced against the security concerns outlined in the SOR. Applicant’s access to classified information would add risk to his family in Lebanon. There is no allegation that he would choose to help the terrorists against the interests of the United States. A Guideline B adjudication is not a judgment on an applicant’s character or loyalty to the United States. It is a determination as to whether an applicant’s circumstances foreseeably present a security risk. See ISCR Case No. 19-00831 at 5 (App. Bd. July 29, 2020). The concern here pertains to the risk to his family living in Lebanon and how that risk could be used to coerce Applicant. It does not relate to his loyalty or patriotism to the United States. Applicant has not rebutted the concern arising from his relationships with family or owning his properties in Lebanon. His travels to Lebanon, sending money to his in-laws in Lebanon, and sending money to his brother to maintain his property in Lebanon are also factors indicating his care and concern for citizens and residents of Lebanon and his affection for them as well as his desire to maintain his property in Lebanon. His connections to the United States, taken together, are insufficient to overcome the foreign influence security concerns under Guideline B.

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), “[t]he ultimate determination” of whether to grant a security clearance “must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines” and the whole-person concept. My comments under Guideline B are incorporated in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under that guideline but some warrant additional comment. Applicant has important connections to the United States as discussed under Guideline B. His U.S. citizenship, his spouse’s U.S. citizenship, and his child’s U.S. citizenship, and his contributions to DOD-related work by his employer are some of his most important connections to the United States. He made a credible and sincere statement about his strong commitment to the United States. The reasons for denying Applicant’s security clearance are more compelling. A Guideline B decision concerning Lebanon must take into consideration the geopolitical situation and dangers in that country. See ISCR Case No. 04-02630 at 3 (App. Bd. May 23, 2007) (remanding because of insufficient discussion of geopolitical situation and suggesting expansion of whole-person discussion); ISCR Case No. 02-26130 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 7, 2006) (reversing grant of security clearance because of terrorist activity in the West Bank). Lebanon is a dangerous place because of violence from terrorists and criminals and the risk of war with Israel. Terrorists continue to threaten the interests of the United States, and those who cooperate and assist the United States. Applicant has a history of visiting Lebanon. He has fairly frequent contacts with his brother and sister who are resident citizens of Lebanon. His spouse has frequent contacts with her parents there. Concern for and loyalty to family living in Lebanon is a positive character trait. However, Applicant did not show that he was unlikely to come to the attention of those interested in acquiring U.S. classified information, and willing to coerce or extort him to obtain it. “Application of the guidelines is not a comment on an applicant’s patriotism but merely an acknowledgment that people may act in unpredictable ways when faced with choices that could be important” to a family member. See Generally ISCR Case No. 17-01979 at 5 (App. Bd. July 31, 2019). It is not in the national interest to put Applicant in such a situation. It is well settled that once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against granting a security clearance. See Dorfmont, 913 F. 2d at 1401. I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Egan, Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, the AGs, and the Appeal Board’s jurisprudence to the

_________________________ facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person. Applicant failed to mitigate foreign influence security concerns.

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a - g:

Against Applicant

In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Robert Tuider Administrative Judge