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ISCR Case 16-01918.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-01918.h1denied

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-01918.h1

deniedSep 13, 2017· Hon. Robert J. Tuider· hearing

Summary

A 68-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen, originally from China and working as a chief communications system engineer, was denied a security clearance under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The denial stemmed from significant family ties and financial interests remaining in China.

The applicant's wife is a Chinese citizen and permanent U.S. resident, while his stepdaughter, sister, mother-in-law, and father-in-law are all Chinese citizens and residents. The applicant maintains frequent contact with these family members. Financially, the applicant owns property in China valued at $120,000, and his wife owns property there valued at $300,000. Additionally, his wife holds two bank accounts in China totaling $330,000 and receives a monthly pension from a former Chinese university employer.

The judge determined that these extensive family connections and financial holdings in China presented unmitigated risks of foreign influence, leading to the denial of the applicant's security clearance.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

The applicant has significant family ties to China, including a wife, stepdaughter, and in-laws who are Chinese citizens.
The applicant owns property in China valued at approximately $120,000 and his wife has property valued at $300,000, creating a potential conflict of interest.
The applicant's wife receives a pension from a Chinese university, which adds to the financial ties to China.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons Creating Potential Conflict of Interest
AG ¶ 7(e)raisedShared Living Quarters with a Foreign National
AG ¶ 7(f)raisedSubstantial Financial Interests in a Foreign Country

Key Rule Quoted

“The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.”
— ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004)

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedSep 3, 2016
Answer filedSep 27, 2016Requested decision without a hearing.
Hearing held—No hearing was conducted.
Decision dateSep 13, 2017

Cite For

Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Impact of Family Ties to Foreign Nationals on Security Clearance Eligibility
Financial Interests in Foreign Countries as a Disqualifying Factor for Security Clearance

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The judge denied the applicant's security clearance due to significant foreign influence concerns stemming from familial ties and financial interests in China. The applicant's connections to family members who are citizens and residents of China, along with substantial property and financial interests in that country, were deemed to create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation and conflict of interest.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant has a wife who is a citizen of China and a permanent U.S. resident.	Against Applicant	Spouse Dual or Foreign Citizen Immediate Family	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk (f) substantial foreign business, financial, or property interests	—	—
1.b	Applicant has a stepdaughter who is a citizen of China.	Against Applicant	Extended Family in Foreign Country Immediate Family	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk (f) substantial foreign business, financial, or property interests	—	—
1.c	Applicant has a sister who is a citizen and resident of China.	Against Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk (f) substantial foreign business, financial, or property interests	—	—
1.d	Applicant has a mother-in-law and father-in-law who are citizens and residents of China.	Against Applicant	In Law in Foreign Country Immediate Family	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk (f) substantial foreign business, financial, or property interests	—	—
1.e	Applicant owns property in China valued at $120,000.	Against Applicant	Foreign Real Estate Financial or Property Interest	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk (f) substantial foreign business, financial, or property interests	—	—
1.f	Applicant's wife owns property in China valued at $300,000.	Against Applicant	Foreign Real Estate Financial or Property Interest	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk (f) substantial foreign business, financial, or property interests	—	—
1.g	Applicant's wife has two bank accounts in China valued at $330,000.	Against Applicant	Foreign Bank Account or Investment Financial or Property Interest	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk (f) substantial foreign business, financial, or property interests	—	—
1.h	Applicant's wife receives a monthly pension from her former university employer in China.	Against Applicant	Foreign Employment or Pension Financial or Property Interest	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk (f) substantial foreign business, financial, or property interests	—	—
1.i	Applicant maintains frequent and regular contact with his immediate family members and his in-laws.	Against Applicant	Failure to Disclose Foreign Association Immediate Family	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk (f) substantial foreign business, financial, or property interests	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-01918 ) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Julie R. Mendez, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

09/13/2017 ___________

STATEMENT OF CASE

___________

TUIDER, Robert, Administrative Judge:

Applicant failed to mitigate security concerns pertaining to Guideline B (foreign influence). Clearance is denied.

Statement of the Case

On February 6, 2015, Applicant completed and signed a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF-86). On September 3, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry, February 20, 1960; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), January 2, 1992; and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, which became effective on September 1, 2006 (Sept. 1, 2006 AGs).

The SOR detailed reasons why the DOD CAF did not find under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant, and recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked. Specifically, the SOR set forth security concerns arising under the foreign influence guideline. On September 27, 2016, Applicant provided a response to the SOR, and he requested a decision without a hearing. On October 19, 2016, Department Counsel completed the File of Relevant Material (FORM). On October 26, 2016, Applicant received the FORM. He did not submit any information within the 30 days after receiving the FORM. On August 10, 2017, the case was assigned to me. The case file consists of four exhibits, all of which are admitted. (Items 1-4)

While this case was pending a decision, the Director of National Intelligence issued Security Executive Agent Directive 4, establishing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (AGs), which he made applicable to all covered individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. The new AGs supersede the Sept. 1, 2006 AGs and are effective “for all covered individuals” on or after June 8, 2017. Accordingly, I have evaluated Applicant’s security clearance eligibility under the new AGs.1

Request for Administrative Notice

As part of the FORM, Department Counsel submitted a written request that I take administrative notice of certain facts about China. The request is included with the FORM as Item 4. Applicant did not object, and I have taken administrative notice of the facts contained in the request that are supported by source documents from official U.S. Government publications. The facts are summarized in the Findings of Fact, below.

Findings of Fact2

Applicant submitted a mixed response to the nine allegations contained in his SOR. He admitted SOR ¶¶ 1.a through 1.e, and partially admitted SOR ¶¶ 1.fthrough 1.i that included updates or clarifications. Those admitted allegations or allegations as partially admitted and updated or clarified are accepted as findings of fact. Additional findings of fact follow.

Applicant is a 68-year-old chief communications system engineer employed by a defense contractor since 2007.3 He was born, raised, and educated in China through his bachelor’s degree awarded in 1982. In 1983, Applicant immigrated to the United States to attend graduate school, where he earned a master’s degree in 1985 and a doctorate degree in 1991. In 1999, he became a naturalized U.S. citizen, and was issued a U.S. passport in 2008 that expires in 2018. Applicant did have a Chinese passport that was issued in 1992 and expired in 1999. Applicant taught at a prestigious Chinese university as an adjunct professor from 2004 to 2007 and it was during this timeframe that he met his current wife and stepdaughter, both Chinese-born citizens. His wife was also employed at the same university where Applicant was teaching. He married his current wife in 2010 at a ceremony in the United States. In 2016, Applicant’s wife retired from the Chinese university where she was employed, and is receiving a monthly pension of about $1,240.

In addition to his stepdaughter, Applicant has three biological children from two previous marriages -- a Chinese-born adult son, who is a naturalized U.S. citizen and resides in China; and two U.S.-born adult sons, who reside in the United States. Applicant’s stepdaughter, a Chinese citizen, resides in the United States.

Applicant’s SOR lists nine allegations under this concern that include having a wife, a sister, and stepdaughter, who are citizens of China; a sister, mother-in-law and father- in-law, who are resident citizens of China; owning property in China valued at $120,000; property owned by his wife in China valued at $300,000, two bank accounts in China owned by his wife valued at $330,000, and his wife receives a $900 monthly pension from her former university employer in China. (SOR ¶¶ 1.a – 1.i)

Applicant has a younger sister living in the United States as a permanent resident alien and is employed by a private Chinese company. His other younger sister lives in China and is employed by a private Chinese company. Not alleged, Applicant has a younger brother who is a resident citizen of Germany and is employed by a private Swaziland company. Applicant’s in-laws are both employed by a private university in China. Applicant communicates with his siblings in person, by telephone, and by e-mail, and communicates with his in-laws in person and by telephone. Applicant visited China at least two times in 2008, one time in 2009, one time in 2010, three times in 2011, one time in 2013, and one time in 2014.4

As noted, Applicant updated or clarified several allegations, particularly as they pertain to real estate values of properties in China or cash value of assets. With regard to his and his wife’s real estate properties in China, he emphasized that it is “extreme[ly] difficult” to assess the value of Chinese real estate. That being the case, he could not know the true value of the properties at the time he completed his SF-86 nor could he know their true value at the present. (Item 2) Applicant also stated in his SOR answer that since he completed his SF-86, the value of his wife’s Chinese bank accounts had decreased from $330,000 to approximately $52,000. Additionally, the amount alleged in the SOR of $900 as his wife’s monthly pension from her former Chinese university employer alleged is incorrect. The correct amount is approximately $1,240 a month. (Item 2) China

China has an authoritarian government, dominated by the Chinese Communist Party. It has a poor human rights record, suppresses political dissent and engages in arbitrary arrests and detentions, forced confessions, torture, and mistreatment of prisoners.

China is the world’s most active and persistent perpetrator of economic espionage. It is among the most aggressive countries in seeking sensitive and protected U.S. technology, as well as military and economic intelligence. China targets the United States with active intelligence-gathering programs, both legal and illegal. Its focus is on obtaining U.S. information and technologies beneficial to China’s military modernization and economic development. China’s intelligence services, as well as private companies and other entities, frequently seek to exploit Chinese citizens or persons with family ties to China who can use their insider access to corporate networks to steal trade secrets using removable media devices or e-mail. There are several recent cases involving actual or attempted espionage, as well as the illegal export of sensitive military technology to China.

In China, authorities routinely monitor telephone conversations, facsimile transmissions, e-mail, text messaging, and internet communications. Authorities open and censor mail. Its security services have entered personal residences and offices to gain access to computers, telephones and fax machines. Hotel guest rooms are sometimes bugged and searched for sensitive or proprietary materials.

POLICIES

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.

Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest that it is based, in whole or in part, on any express or implied determination about applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).

Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).

ANALYSIS

Foreign Influence

AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:

Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. I have considered all of them and the following are potentially applicable:

(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology;

(e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and

(f) substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country, or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could subject the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation or personal conflict of interest.

AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(e) and 7(f) require evidence of a “heightened risk.” The “heightened risk” required to raise this disqualifying condition is a relatively low standard. “Heightened risk” denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under a foreign government or owning property in a foreign country. The totality of Applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well as each individual family tie must be considered.

Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.”5

China has a significant history of conducting espionage against the United States to gain access to both industrial and military information. China’s tactics include seeking to exploit Chinese citizens or persons with family ties to China who can use their insider access to corporate networks to gain useful information. China has a poor human rights record. This creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, and coercion. It also creates a potential conflict of interest.

Applicant’s sister and his wife’s parents are citizens and residents of China. He also has a sister and stepdaughter living in the United States that are Chinese citizens. Applicant has property in China valued at approximately $120,000; his wife has property in China valued at approximately $300,000 and bank accounts valued at approximately $52,000; and receives a monthly pension from her former Chinese university employer of $1,240. Applicant maintains frequent and regular contact with his immediate family members and his in-laws. Applicant’s wife is a citizen of China and a permanent U.S. resident and lives with Applicant. AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), 7(e) and 7(f) have been raised by the evidence.

I have analyzed the facts and considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 and conclude the following are potentially applicable:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;

(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;

(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or are approved by the agency head or designee;

(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and

(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.

Applicant has regular contact with his family members and his in-laws, and has visited his family in China numerous times. He has daily contact with his wife, a Chinese citizen. Applicant’s contact with foreign relatives is not infrequent or casual. Therefore, I cannot conclude that it is unlikely that his familial relationships could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. AG ¶ 8(c) does not apply.

Applicant’s wife maintains two bank accounts in China valued at approximately $52,000. Applicant and his wife have property interests in China valued at $430,000. His wife receives a monthly pension of $1,240 from her former Chinese university employer. These financial interests are not insignificant. I cannot conclude that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate or pressure the applicant. AG ¶ 8(f) does not apply.

The foreign influence concerns are increased because China aggressively and actively engages in espionage against the United States. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that the Applicant’s familial connections in China would make it unlikely that Applicant would be placed in a position of having to choose between his family interests and the interests of the United States. AG ¶ 8(a) does not apply.

Applicant has significant ties to his family members and his wife’s parents. There is insufficient evidence to conclude there is no conflict of interest, either because Applicant’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or Applicant has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interests in favor of the U.S. interests. AG ¶ 8(b) does not apply.

The nature of a nation’s government and its relationship with the United States is relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if a family member is associated with or dependent upon the foreign government or the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the United States. There is insufficient evidence to make a determination regarding Applicant’s family’s association with the Chinese government or their vulnerability to government coercion. However, receiving a Chinese-based pension and owning real property and a bank account in China very likely involves government regulation of those interests. Although it is possible that Applicant’s parents, in-laws and his wife do not pose a security risk, I cannot make that determination without additional evidence. The record is void of sufficient information about Applicant or his family that would allow me to find that any of the mitigating conditions are applicable.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under that guideline, but some warrant additional comment.

Applicant was born, raised and educated in China. He has a sister and in-laws who remain in China. Applicant has regular contact with them. Applicant and his wife maintain significant financial interests in China. His wife, sister, and stepdaughter remain Chinese citizens. He failed to provide sufficient information to meet his burden of persuasion to mitigate the foreign influence security concerns. The record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns arising under Guideline B, foreign influence.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a-1.i: Against Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

_____________________________ Robert Tuider Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

1 The new AGs are available at http://ogc.osd.mil/doha/SEAD4 20170608.pdf.

2 Some details were excluded to protect Applicant’s right to privacy. Specific information is available in the cited exhibits.

3 The source of the information in this subsection is Applicant’s February 6, 2015 Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF-86) and Applicant’s SOR answer. (Items 3, 4) 4 Applicant reported these visits to China on his October 19, 2016 SF-86. Any visits after this date would not be included in this decision. 5 ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004).