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ISCR Case 16-02049.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-02049.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-02049.h1

grantedSep 20, 2017· Hon. Noreen A. Lynch· hearing

Summary

A 32-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen, working as a linguist for a defense contractor in Iraq, was granted a security clearance despite concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleged that the applicant had extensive family ties in Iraq, including his mother, father, two stepmothers, thirteen brothers, and ten sisters, all of whom are Iraqi citizens and residents. Additionally, the SOR noted that his father, three brothers, and one sister were employed by the Kurdistan Regional Government office in Iraq.

The judge considered these disqualifying conditions but ultimately applied mitigating factors. It was determined that the applicant's family members were not affiliated with the official Iraqi government, and the Kurdish region where they reside is considered pro-U.S. and offers a safer environment, thereby reducing the risk of coercion.

Furthermore, the applicant demonstrated strong ties to the U.S., including a girlfriend, and a commitment to bringing family members to the U.S. through the Diversity Lottery Program. These factors led the judge to conclude that the applicant's connections did not pose a significant risk of foreign influence, and the security clearance was granted.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

Applicant's family members are not affiliated with the official Iraqi government.
Applicant has strong ties to the U.S. and is committed to bringing family members to the U.S. through the Diversity Lottery Program.
The Kurdish region where his family resides is pro-U.S. and offers a safer environment, reducing the risk of coercion.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Government

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(a)appliedNature of Relationships with Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 8(b)appliedMinimal Conflict of Interest

Key Rule Quoted

“The mere possession of close ties with a family member in Iraq is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedAug 8, 2016
Answer filed—Applicant timely answered the SOR.
Hearing heldAug 24, 2017Hearing was conducted after a notice issued on 08/14/2017.
Decision dateSep 20, 2017

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Consideration of Family Ties in a pro-U.S. Region
Impact of Personal and Professional Ties to the U.S. on Security Clearance Decisions

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant's ties to family members in Iraq raised security concerns under Guideline B due to potential foreign influence. However, the applicant successfully mitigated these concerns by demonstrating that his family members were not affiliated with the Iraqi government and that they lived in a relatively safe region. Ultimately, the judge ruled in favor of the applicant, granting him eligibility for access to classified information.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · Intent to Remain in U.S.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	The SOR alleges that Applicant’s thirteen brothers, ten sisters, his mother, father and his father’s two wives are citizens and residents of Iraq.	For Applicant	Extended Family in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Iraq HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Other
1.b	The SOR also alleges that Applicant has extended family members who are citizens and residents of Iraq.	For Applicant	Extended Family in Foreign Country Extended Family	Iraq HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Other
1.c	The SOR alleges that Applicant’s father, three brothers and one sister are employed with the Kurdistan regional government office in Iraq.	For Applicant	In Law in Foreign Country Immediate Family GOVT-AFFILIATED	Iraq HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Other
1.d	specific text not stated in this decision	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Unknown	—	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ) ISCR Case No.16-02049 ) ` ) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Nicole Smith, Esq. Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

09/20/2017 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

LYNCH, Noreen, A., Administrative Judge:

On August 8, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant alleging security concerns arising under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) implemented in September 2006. Revised Adjudicative Guidelines were issued on December 10, 2016, and became effective on June 8, 2017.

Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on July 20, 2017. A notice of hearing was issued on August 14, 2017, 2017, scheduling the hearing for August 24, 2017. Government Exhibits (GX) 1-2 were admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant Exhibits (AX) A-D, which were admitted without objection. I kept the record open and Applicant submitted additional documents, which were marked and admitted into the record as (AX) E-L. The transcript was received on September 1, 2017. Based on a review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Procedural Issues

Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of relevant facts about Iraq. The request and supporting documentation are in the record as Hearing Exhibit I. Applicant did not object to the request. I took administrative notice as requested by Department Counsel. The facts administratively noticed are set out below.

FINDINGS OF FACT

In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations under Guideline B. He also provided explanations about the allegations. (Answer to SOR)

Applicant is a 32-year-old linguist working for a defense contractor for the United States military in Iraq. He was born in Iraq and came to the United States in 2008 via the green-card lottery. He is single and has no children. He became a naturalized citizen in 2014. Applicant obtained his undergraduate degree from an American university in 2013. He was a student in Iraq before coming to the United States and earned an associate’s degree. He has worked for his current employer since September 2016. Before his current position, he worked as a medical interpreter for a private company. (Tr. 21) Applicant completed his security clearance application on February 28, 2015. (GX 1)

Applicant lives on a military base and travels with a unit throughout Iraq so that he can interpret the language and assist with cultural matters. He provides the ability for the U.S. military to smoothly communicate with the Iraqi people and Iraqi authorities. He also helps with contacts with the Kurdish authorities so that they can complete their mission. (Tr. 23) He does not have contact with his family when working in Iraq on a mission.

Foreign Influence

The SOR alleges that Applicant’s thirteen brothers, ten sisters, his mother, father and his father’s two wives are citizens and residents of Iraq. The SOR also alleges that Applicant has extended family members who are citizens and residents of Iraq. Finally, the SOR alleges that Applicant’s father, three brothers and one sister are employed with the Kurdistan regional government office in Iraq. (SOR ¶¶1.a-1.d)

Applicant acknowledges his relatives in Iraq, but denies that they create a risk of foreign influence because none of his relatives are affiliated with the official Iraqi government. (GX 2) His relatives live in Northern Iraq, which is pro-U.S./western and is a safer area of Iraq. Applicant has many siblings, but some of them are half-siblings. He does not keep in touch with most of them. Some of his half-siblings are under the age of 18, and he does not know them well. When he would call his father, if one of them was around, he would say hello. (Tr. 31)

Applicant initially submitted documentation that he has applied for four brothers to be entered into the 2018 Diversity Lottery Program for entrance into the United States. (AX A-D) As post-hearing submissions, he submitted additional information that he has submitted others in his family. (AX E-L) Applicant explained that if one of his siblings win the lottery and receives a visa, then that person can write in the name of the others in the family for a chance with the lottery. (Tr. 32)

Applicant’s mother in Iraq is ill and is semi-paralyzed. He keeps in touch with her once every two to three months. (Tr. 26) Applicant sometimes sends her money for her physical therapy. (Tr. 29) He traveled to Iraq in 2014 to see his mother. He calls his father, who works for the Kurdistan ministry for religious affairs. (Tr. 26) When he calls his father, he asks about his father’s two wives, who are housewives. He explained that his father is a “simple employee” and does not have any contact with high level officials. (Tr. 27) Applicant’s father has visited him in the United States. Applicant believes it was in 2012.

Applicant has three brothers who work for the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. His one sister works for the Ministry of Education as a teacher. This is part of the Kurdistan Regional Government. (Tr. 34) Applicant has an uncle who is a citizen and resident of Iraq. He does not maintain direct contact with him, but if he talks to his father, he will ask about him. (Tr. 36)

When asked about his relatives in Iraq and possible Iraqi contacts, which might affect them, Applicant noted that his family is in the north and is Kurdish. He truly believes that this area, since it is pro-Western, is a much safer place for his family. (Tr. 44) His family does not know that he is under consideration for a security clearance.

Applicant has applied for each member of his immediate family who is eligible to enter the Lottery Program. The criteria is age (18) and in possession of an associate’s degree. Some of his half-siblings are still in lower school. (Tr. 45)

Applicant has a cousin who lives in the United States, who came to the United States through the Lottery Program. The cousin brought his wife and children with him. (Tr. 39) Applicant has a girlfriend who is a U.S. citizen. He has known her since 2011. (Tr. 41)

Applicant left Iraq because he sees no future for him in that country. He wants to stay in the United States, and he wants to bring as many of his family members to the United States as he can. His plan is to submit another family member for the lottery each year (Tr. 48 ) He sees no future in Iraq and the country is not stable. Applicant has no financial interest or property in Iraq. He has not provided financial support to any foreign national. He has had no foreign government contact. He also stated that he had no relatives associated with any political organization. (GX 2)

Applicant stated that he has provided money to his mother since 2016. He believes he has sent about $24,000. The economic situation is very bad and there is no salary from the government. (Tr.29) Applicant’s annual salary is now about $95,000. He also receives per diem when he is traveling with his unit. He has a bank and savings account in the United States.

Applicant submitted a letter of reference from a U.S. military officer, who is the unit team leader. The officer highly recommends Applicant because he is an incredible resource. He speaks both Arabic and Kurdish, which is necessary on missions in Arab controlled areas. His understanding of the culture allows the unit to navigate a complex and diverse sociological landscape. Applicant has served “on the road” for as many as 15 hours and has remained focused. He can provide important background information for each district. The unit team leader trusts Applicant and states that he has been the most valuable member of his team. Applicant has served on the front lines and has been threatened. (AX E)

Administrative Notice

DOHA administrative judges may accept for administrative notice uncontroverted, easily verifiable facts regarding a foreign country derived from official U.S. Government reports, the official position of appropriate federal agencies, or the pertinent statement(s) of key U.S. Government officials. The source document(s) or, at a minimum, the relevant portion(s) of the source document should be included in the record for potential appellate review regarding the accuracy and relevancy of the fact(s) administratively noticed. See generally, ISCR case No. 08-09480 (App. Bd. Mar. 17, 2010); ISCR Case No. 05-11292 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2007).

Iraq faces many challenges. Those challenges include overcoming three decades of war and government mismanagement that stunted Iraq’s economy; sectarian and ethnic tensions that have slowed progress toward national reconciliation; and ongoing criminal and terrorist violence. Since 2013, there has been a marked increase in insurgent attacks and civilian casualties. Conditions throughout the country remain dangerous.

In 2015, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) remained the greatest terrorist threat globally, maintaining a formidable force in Iraq and Syria, including a large number of foreign terrorist fighters. Although ISIL did not claim responsibility, it was likely responsible for several attacks involving chemical-filled munitions in Iraq. While ISIL’s capacity and territorial control in Iraq reached a high point in spring 2015, some erosion occurred over the second half of 2015. Despite Iraqi gains, there remained a security vacuum in parts of Iraq. The Kurdish region in Iraq is fairly autonomous. The region lies in the northeast of Iraq. They have their own government and school system. The Kurds are a strong ally in the region. Since 1991, the United States has played a role in protecting Iraq’s Kurdish autonomy ---- while insisting that Iraq’s territorial integrity not be compromised by an Iraqi Kurdish move toward independence. At times this region has been marked as the “other Iraq.” This is a relatively safe and economically sound slice of the country which welcomes westerners with open arms.

The U.S. Embassy warns that U.S. citizens are at high risk for kidnapping and violence and to avoid all but essential travel to Iraq. The U.S. government considers the potential threat to U.S. government personnel in Iraq to be serious enough to require them to live and work under strict security guidelines.

In 2015, observers reported many significant human-rights-related problems such as torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Terrorist suicide bombings are a continuing threat in Iraq, and U.S. citizens are advised to be cautious.

POLICIES

When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, they are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(d) national security eligibility requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.

The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The burden of proof is something less than a preponderance of evidence. The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.

A person seeking access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such information. The decision to deny an individual a security clearance does not necessarily reflect badly on an applicant’s character. It is merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense established for issuing a clearance.

ANALYSIS

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 6:

Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests, or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

Two disqualifying conditions under this guideline are relevant. A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion.” AG ¶ 7(a). In addition, AG ¶ 7(b) is relevant as it provides that “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology.”

Applicant’s immediate family are citizens and residents of Iraq in the Kurdish region. Some of them work for the Kurdish Regional Government. Applicant maintains contact with them. Iraq is ostensibly an ally and receives a great deal of military, economic, and political support from the United States. However, Iraq is increasingly unstable, violent, and beset by terrorist activity since the departure of most of the American presence from there. There is no doubt that ISIL falls within the security concerns associated with international terrorism. The presence of Applicant’s immediate family and uncle in Iraq establishes AG ¶ 7(a).

Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004).

Furthermore, “even friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.” ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002). Finally, friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. Nevertheless, the nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the United States. In considering the nature of the government, an administrative judge must also consider any terrorist activity in the country at issue. See generally ISCR Case No. 02-26130 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 7, 2006) (reversing decision to grant clearance where administrative judge did not consider terrorist activity in area where family members resided). The Government submitted country summaries of Iraq in its request for Administrative Notice. Record evidence places a burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his relationship with his family members living in Iraq does not pose a security risk. Applicant should not be placed in a position where he might be forced to choose between loyalty to the United States and a desire to assist his family living in Iraq.

I conclude that Applicant’s ties are sufficient to raise an issue of a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion. This relationship with his relatives in Iraq creates a concern about Applicant’s “obligation to protect sensitive information or technology” and his desire to help his relatives in Iraq.

Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.” AG ¶ 8 (a)

The mere possession of close ties with a family member in Iraq is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if an applicant has a close relationship with even one relative living in a foreign country, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could possibly result in the compromise of classified information. See generally ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case NO. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).

Security concerns under this guideline can also be mitigated by showing “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.” AG ¶ 8(b).

AG ¶¶ 8(a), and 8(b) are applicable. Applicant’s family lives in the Kurdish region of Iraq. They do not know that Applicant is applying for a security clearance. The circumstances of Applicant’s family are such that they are not likely to be targeted as a means of coercing Applicant. They are not aware that he might work in a classified environment. He has contact with his mother and father out of respect as a son. He has some contact with his siblings. Despite the heightened risk, the common defense of their home by the Kurdish military further lessens the vulnerability of Applicant’s family to coercion by terrorist entities. This supports mitigation under A G ¶ 8 (a).

The mitigating condition at AG ¶ 8(b) applies based on Applicant’s work as a linguist and cultural advisor for the U.S. military in Iraq. He presented a highly favorable letter of reference from a leader of the unit. He is highly recommended for his knowledge and language skills in Kurdish. He left Iraq without his family as he saw no future for him there. He has a girlfriend in the United States. He does not want to leave the United States. He is sending in the names of his relatives who are eligible for the Lottery Program each year. Applicant is a naturalized citizen. He worked hard and obtained an undergraduate degree in the United States before obtaining his present position. He has a cousin who lives in the United States. He is committed to his personal and professional life as a U.S. citizen.

Applicant expressed his loyalty to the United States. He is a naturalized citizen who has lived and worked in the U.S. since 2008. I have also considered the ongoing situation in Iraq with extensive terrorist activities, and human rights issues.

Applicant has strong ties to the United States. He left Iraq to pursue his academic career in the United States. He is a naturalized U.S. citizen and has been in the United States since 2008. He has no financial interests in Iraq. He has firm ties to the United States and considers it his home. He can be expected to resolve any potential conflict of interest in favor of the United States. He has established application of AG 8 (b). Applicant has mitigated the concerns under the foreign influence guideline.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d)

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. As noted above, the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant seeking a security clearance.

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors.

Applicant is 32 years old. He is an educated man who is a naturalized U.S. citizen. He left his country without his family so that he could continue his education in the United States and live in a country where he could utilize his language skills. He is trying to bring his family to the United States through the Lottery Program. He is working in Iraq with the U.S. military on the front lines. He has a letter of recommendation from his unit in Iraq. He has great language and cultural skills. Applicant can be relied on to act at all times in the best interests of the United States. He has a girlfriend in the United States and a cousin and family in the United States. He has no financial interests in Iraq.

Applicant’s relatives are Kurds. They do not know that Applicant is applying for a security clearance. Applicant does maintain contact with his mother and father and some siblings. However, his primary duty is to his own life in the United States. For all these reasons, Applicant has mitigated the security concerns under foreign influence.

After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B, and evaluating all the record evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security concerns under Guideline B (foreign influence). Accordingly, I conclude that he has carried his burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him eligibility for access to classified information.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a-1.d: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance. Clearance is granted.

NOREEN A. LYNCH Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

Applicant signed a waiver of notice. See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995). Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988). ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995). See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information), and EO 10865 § 7. ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995). Id.