CASE · Clearance Adjudication Search EngineCASE

Loading case…

ISCR Case 16-02285.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-02285.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-02285.h1

grantedSep 22, 2017· Hon. Gregg A. Cervi· hearing

Summary

This case involved a 43-year-old government contractor with a military background, whose security clearance was reviewed under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Concerns arose from his marriage to a Russian citizen, her parents' residency in Russia, and the applicant's nine-month stay in Russia for the birth of his child. Additionally, the applicant maintained contact with a Russian citizen he lived with while abroad, who now resides in the U.S. The spouse's father is a retired neurologist who worked for a British company in Russia, and her mother is a homemaker.

Disqualifying conditions under Guideline B were raised, specifically concerning foreign preference, foreign financial interests, and foreign citizenship of immediate family members. However, the applicant successfully demonstrated mitigating conditions.

The judge determined that the applicant's strong ties to the U.S., including his military service and family connections, mitigated the foreign influence concerns. His spouse is a U.S. permanent resident with limited ties to Russia, and the applicant consistently complied with all reporting requirements for foreign contacts. Based on these factors, eligibility for access to classified information was granted.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant demonstrated strong ties to the U.S. through military service and family connections.
The applicant's spouse is a U.S. permanent resident with limited ties to Russia.
The applicant maintained compliance with reporting requirements regarding foreign contacts.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Member
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to a Foreign Person
AG ¶ 7(e)raisedShared Living Quarters with a Foreign National

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(a)appliedNature of Relationships with Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 8(b)appliedNo Conflict of Interest Due to Strong U.S. Ties
AG ¶ 8(e)appliedPrompt Compliance with Reporting Requirements

Key Rule Quoted

“Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedAug 4, 2016
Answer filedAug 23, 2016
Hearing heldFeb 1, 2017
Decision dateSep 22, 2017

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Importance of Strong U.S. Ties in Security Clearance Decisions
Impact of Limited Foreign Contacts on Security Eligibility

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant mitigated the foreign influence security concerns related to his ties to Russia. The applicant's relationships with his spouse and her family were deemed manageable, leading to a decision granting eligibility for access to classified information.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business · Intent to Remain in U.S.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant's spouse is a citizen of Russia, residing in the U.S.; her parents are citizens and residents of Russia.	For Applicant	Spouse Dual or Foreign Citizen Immediate Family	Russia HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Deep U.S. Ties
1.b	Applicant resided in Russia for approximately 9 months for the birth of his child.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	Russia HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Deep U.S. Ties
1.c	Applicant maintains contact with a Russian citizen with whom he lived while in Russia, who now resides in the United States.	For Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend	Russia HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Deep U.S. Ties
1.d	Applicant's spouse's father is a retired neurologist who worked for a British company in Russia.	For Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Russia HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Deep U.S. Ties
1.e	Applicant's spouse's mother is a homemaker.	For Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Russia HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Deep U.S. Ties

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-02285 ) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Charles C. Hale, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

09/22/2017 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

CERVI, Gregg A., Administrative Judge:

Applicant mitigated the foreign influence security concerns. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Statement of the Case

On August 4, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline B (foreign influence). The action was taken under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on September 1, 2006.

Applicant responded to the SOR on August 23, 2016, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on October 26, 2016. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on December 13, 2016, scheduling the hearing for February 1, 2017. I convened the hearing as scheduled. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on February 13, 2017. Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings

Evidence

Government Exhibits (GE) 1 and 2 were admitted in evidence without objection. The Government’s exhibit list was appended to the record as Hearing Exhibit (HE) II. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AE) A through H, which were admitted in evidence without objection. After the hearing, the record was held open at Applicant’s request to submit additional documentation. He submitted AE I, which was admitted without objection.

Request for Administrative Notice

Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts about Russia. The request was not admitted in evidence but was appended to the record as Hearing Exhibit (HE) I. The facts administratively noticed are summarized in the Findings of Fact, below.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant is a 43-year-old employee of a government contractor, employed since April 2014. He has held a DOD security clearance since 2002. He is a high school graduate, and has been working toward a bachelor’s degree. He enlisted in the United States Army in 2002 and was honorably discharged in 2010. He twice served in Iraq and was awarded an army commendation medal and three army achievement medals during his enlistment. He worked for other government contractors from 2010 to 2014, including in Afghanistan. His family has a long history of military service in combat for the United States.

The SOR alleges that Applicant’s spouse is a citizen of Russia, residing in the U.S.; her parents are citizens and residents of Russia; that Applicant resided in Russia for approximately 9 months for the birth of his child; and that he maintains contact with a Russian citizen with whom he lived while in Russia, who now resides in the United States. Applicant admitted the SOR allegations, but provided explanations and clarifications in his answer.

Applicant met his spouse, a Russian citizen, during a leisure trip to Russia in 2011. They met in a metro station, and she spoke English. They dated, corresponded by e-mail, and met in various U.S. and overseas locations between 2011 and 2014. He was introduced to her parents in 2013. Applicant resided in Moscow for five months from late May to October 2014, after he completed a civilian assignment to Afghanistan, while his fiancé was pregnant. They lived at her friend’s apartment (SOR ¶¶ 1.band 1.e) until his fiancé gave birth to their child in September 2014. She did so in Russia because she wanted her parent’s support while she was pregnant. The child is a dual U.S. and Russian citizen. They returned to the U.S. on a K-1 “fiancé” visa, and married in November 2014. Applicant’s spouse now has substantial ties to the United States, and no longer has significant ties to Russia, except for her elderly parents. Applicant’s spouse is a medical doctor. She previously worked in a clinic in Russia. While in the U.S., she passed the medical licensing exam, which permits her to practice in the United States. She was issued a green card and then U.S. permanent residency in June 2015. She expects to be granted U.S. citizenship before the card expires. She is currently employed as a research physician at a university. Her father is a 70-year-old retired neurologist, who worked for a British company in Russia. (SOR ¶ 1.d) Her mother is a homemaker. (SOR ¶ 1.c) They do not speak English and Applicant does not speak Russian, so they have very limited communications. Applicant’s spouse corresponds with them via skype about two times per month, but she has not returned to Moscow since leaving in 2014. Her mother has visited the U.S. in 2015 and 2016 to see her grandchild.

The friend that Applicant and his fiancé lived with in Moscow is a Russian citizen, now residing in the U.S. as a U.S. resident, is employed as a financial analyst for a U.S. company, and is engaged to marry a U.S. citizen. She will presumably be seeking U.S. citizenship after her marriage. Applicant’s spouse maintains irregular contact with her.

Applicant has a Russian bank account, opened in 2013, with a balance of approximately $2,000. The account was to assist his fiancé while she was pregnant and is available for use in case they visit Russia. He tried to close the account, but must do so in person. Applicant owns four residential properties in the U.S. that generate about $3,400 per month in income. He has paid-off the mortgage on two of the properties. He has about $130,000 in cash and investments. His estimated net worth is approximately $500,000. Applicant complied with reporting requirements during all of his overseas trips and filed contact reports each time he visited his spouse. He maintained strict compliance with security regulations and kept his management and security office informed. He testified that he takes security very seriously and has been entrusted before with sensitive and classified equipment and assignments while on active duty and while employed as a civilian.

Russia

Russia continues to be one of the leading state intelligence threats to U.S. interests. Russian intelligence services continue to target U.S. and allied personnel with access to sensitive computer network information. Russia remains one of the top two most aggressive and capable collectors of sensitive U.S. economic information and technologies, particularly in cyberspace. Non-cyberspace collection methods include targeting of U.S. visitors overseas, especially if the visitors are assessed as having access to sensitive information. One of the two trends that may increase Russia’s threat over the next several years is that many Russian immigrants with advanced technical skills, who work for leading U.S. companies, may be increasingly targeted for recruitment by Russian intelligence services.

Russia’s extensive and sophisticated intelligence operations are motivated by Russia’s high dependence on natural resources, the need to diversity its economy, and the belief that the global economic system is tilted toward the United States at Russia’s expense. As a result, Russia’s highly capable intelligence services are using HUMINT, cyber, and other operations to collect economic information and technology to support Russia’s economic development and security. In June 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the arrests of ten alleged secret agents for carrying out long-term, “deep-cover” assignments on behalf of Russia. Within weeks, all ten defendants pled guilty in federal court, and were immediately expelled from the United States.

Russia continues to take information warfare to a new level, working to fan anti- U.S. and anti-Western sentiment both within Russia and globally. Moscow will continue to publish false and misleading information in an effort to discredit the West, construe or distort events that threaten Russia’s image, undercut consensus on Russia, and defend Russia’s role as a responsible and indispensable global power.

The most significant human rights problems of 2015 in Russia involved the following: restrictions on the ability to choose one’s government and freedoms of expression, assembly, association, and the media, as well as internet freedoms; political prosecutions and administration of justice; and government discrimination against racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities. Other problems include allegations of torture and excessive force by law enforcement officials that sometimes led to deaths, executive branch pressure on the judiciary, electoral irregularities, and extensive official corruption. The government failed to take adequate steps to prosecute or punish most officials who committed abuses, resulting in a climate of impunity.

Although Russian law prohibits officials from entering a private residence, except in cases prescribed by federal law or when authorized by a judicial decision, government officials entered residences and premises without warrants. In addition, while Russian law prohibits government monitoring of correspondence, telephone conversations, and other means of communication without a warrant, government officials engaged in electronic surveillance without appropriate authorization.

The U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to a united, sovereign Ukraine, and is deeply concerned by the situation in Russian-occupied Crimea, where occupation “authorities” suppress dissent and where ethnic and religious minorities, especially Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians, face serious and ongoing repression. The U.S. does not accept the redrawing of borders by force and sanctions related to Crimea will remain in place as long as the occupation continues.

Russia is considered to be at a high risk of local, regional, and international terrorism threats and concerns. In September 2015, Russia initiated military operations in Syria. In response, the Islamic Group of Iraq and the Levant and affiliated terrorist organizations have issued threats vowing retaliatory terrorist attacks in Russia. The Russian Federal Security Service reported no terrorist attacks in the Russian Federation in 2015, however in October 2015, a Russian charter plane exploded in mid-air over Egypt due to an improvised explosive device on board. All 224 people on board, including 219 Russian nationals, were killed. Russian authorities, in addition to the United States and the United Kingdom, determined the incident was an act of terrorism. Law and Policies

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) in a Security Executive Agent Directive, effective on June 8, 2017. My ultimate decision would be the same under either set of adjudicative guidelines.

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.

Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.

The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. See also Executive Order 12968 (Aug. 2, 1995), § 3.1.

Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).

Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).

ANALYSIS

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

AG ¶ 6 explains the security concern about “foreign contacts and interests” stating:

Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

AG ¶ 7 has four conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying in this case:

(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology;

(e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and

(f) substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country, or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could subject the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation or personal conflict of interest.

Applicant is married to a Russian citizen who has parents living in Russia. He also has a modest bank account in Russia, and his spouse maintains periodic contact with her parents and a friend who is a Russian citizen, living and working in the U.S.

The mere possession of close family ties with one or more family members living in Russia is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B; however, if an applicant has a close relationship with even one relative living in a foreign country, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See Generally ISCR Case No. 03- 02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). There is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, their immediate family members. See generally ISCR Case No. 01-03120, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 94 at *8 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002).

The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human-rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion or inducement. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, the government ignores the rule of law including widely accepted civil liberties, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, the government is engaged in a counterinsurgency, terrorists cause a substantial amount of death or property damage, or the country is known to conduct intelligence collection operations against the United States. The relationship of Russia with the United States, places a significant, but not insurmountable burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his relationships with his family members living in Russia do not pose a security risk. Applicant should not be placed into a position where he might be forced to choose between loyalty to the United States and a desire to assist a family member living in Russia.

Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. See ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).

Applicant’s relationship with his spouse, relatives and a friend who are foreign citizens or living in Russia create a potential conflict of interest because the Russian government could place pressure on his family living in Russia in an effort to cause Applicant to compromise classified information. These relationships create “a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion” under AG ¶ 7. Department Counsel produced substantial evidence of Applicant’s contacts with family and a friend who are citizens of Russia and has raised the issue of potential foreign pressure or attempted exploitation. AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(e) apply, and further inquiry is necessary about potential application of any mitigating conditions. I find AG ¶ 7(f) does not apply as Applicant’s bank account in Russia is not substantial, and he intends to close it but requires physical access to do so.

AG ¶ 8 lists conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns, including:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;

(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;

(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or are approved by the agency head or designee;

(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and

(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.

AG ¶¶ 8 (a), (b), (e), and (f) apply. Applicant has infrequent contact with his in- laws, but his spouse has contact about twice a month. Applicant has “deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,” including honorable service in the U.S. military and contract work for the U.S. government. His patriotism is unquestioned. His spouse is a U.S. permanent resident striving to gain her U.S. citizenship, and is a working doctor. They have a young child that is a U.S. citizen, living in the U.S. Applicant’s spouse’s ties to Russia are limited to her parents, and tangentially to her friend, who is a Russian citizen despite her residence in the U.S. Her father is a 70 year old retired doctor from a UK corporation. Her mother is a homemaker. I believe there is little likelihood that contact with his spouse’s parents or friend creates a reasonable risk for foreign influence or exploitation, despite the heightened risk associated with Russia. Her father and mother do not have known ties to the Russian government and there is a language barrier between Applicant and his in-laws. Her friend, a Russian citizen, is also a resident of the U.S., working in the U.S., and engaged to a U.S. citizen. Presumably, she will be seeking U.S. citizenship once married. Applicant and his spouse’s contact with her are infrequent.

Applicant and his spouse own substantial assets in the U.S., and their Russian bank account is minimal in comparison. He intends to close the account, but must do so in-person. Applicant reported all of his trips and contacts with his spouse while traveling overseas. He kept his management and security officials aware of his travels. He has faithfully served the United States in conflict areas while on active duty and as a government contractor. Overall, the Applicant and his spouse’s ties to the U.S. far outweigh their ties to Russia, and I would expect that he would resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.

In sum, Applicant’s connections to Russia are less significant than his connections to the United States. His connections to the U.S. and limited contact with his in-laws in Russia and Russian friend in the U.S., taken together are sufficient to fully overcome the foreign influence security concerns under Guideline B. Foreign influence concerns under Guideline B are mitigated.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns raised in the SOR. Accordingly, I conclude he has carried his burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him eligibility for access to classified information.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B: For Applicant

Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.e: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to continue Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

________________________ Gregg A. Cervi Administrative Judge