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ISCR Case 16-03238.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-03238.h1denied

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-03238.h1

deniedSep 29, 2017· Hon. Elizabeth M. Matchinski· hearing

Summary

A 38-year-old dual citizen of Turkey and the United States was denied a security clearance under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) due to unmitigated concerns regarding his close ties to family members residing in Turkey.

The Statement of Reasons cited several allegations, including that the applicant's mother, father, sister, and parents-in-law are all resident citizens of Turkey. Additionally, his sister-in-law is a Turkish citizen residing in Canada, and he maintains close friendships with resident citizens of Turkey. These conditions raised disqualifying concerns under Adjudicative Guidelines Paragraphs 7(a) and 7(b).

While mitigating conditions under Paragraphs 8(a) and 8(b) were considered, the judge determined they were insufficient. The applicant's dual citizenship, combined with frequent communication with his family in Turkey, led to the conclusion that his assertion of loyalty to the U.S. did not fully mitigate the foreign influence concerns, resulting in the denial of his security clearance.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

The applicant has close family ties to Turkey, including parents, a sister, and parents-in-law who are resident citizens.
The applicant's dual citizenship and frequent communication with family in Turkey raised concerns about foreign influence.
The applicant's assertion of loyalty to the U.S. was not sufficient to mitigate the foreign influence concerns.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedForeign Influence
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedForeign Influence

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(a)rejectedLoyalty to the United StatesThe applicant's claims of loyalty were not sufficient to mitigate the concerns.
AG ¶ 8(b)rejectedForeign ContactsThe applicant's contacts with family in Turkey were deemed significant enough to raise concerns.

Key Rule Quoted

“"The presence of a foreign influence may be a disqualifying condition if it creates a potential conflict of interest."”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedDec 16, 2016
Answer filedJan 18, 2017
Hearing heldMay 22, 2017
Decision dateSep 29, 2017

Cite For

Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Impact of Dual Citizenship on Security Clearance Eligibility
The Significance of Family Ties in Security Clearance Determinations

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The judge found against the applicant on the foreign influence concerns due to his close ties to family members who are citizens of Turkey. The applicant's relationships with his parents, sister, and in-laws in Turkey were deemed to present a heightened risk of foreign influence, leading to the denial of his security clearance.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business · Intent to Remain in U.S.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
2.a	Applicant’s mother is a resident citizen of Turkey.	Against Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Turkey	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	—	—
2.b	Applicant’s father is a resident citizen of Turkey.	Against Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Turkey	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	—	—
2.c	Applicant’s sister is a resident citizen of Turkey.	Against Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Turkey	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	—	—
2.d	Applicant’s parents-in-law are resident citizens of Turkey.	Against Applicant	In Law in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Turkey	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	—	—
2.e	Applicant’s sister-in-law is a Turkish citizen residing in Canada.	For Applicant	Extended Family in Foreign Country Extended Family	Canada	Admitted	—	—	—
2.f	Applicant has close friends who are resident citizens of Turkey.	For Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend	Turkey	Admitted	—	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) (Redacted) ) ISCR Case No. 16-03238 ) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Rhett C. Petcher, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

09/29/2017 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge:

Applicant is a dual citizen of Turkey and the United States since his U.S. naturalization in July 2014. Applicant’s parents and sister and his spouse’s parents are resident citizens of Turkey. The foreign influence security concerns raised by his close bonds to, and contacts with family members in Turkey are not fully mitigated. Clearance is denied.

Statement of the Case

On December 16, 2016, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing a security concern under Guideline C, foreign preference, and Guideline B, foreign influence, and explaining why it was unable to grant or continue security clearance eligibility to him. The DOD CAF acted under Executive Order 10865 (EO), Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for access to Classified Information (AG) effective within the DOD on September 1, 2006. Applicant responded to the SOR allegations on January 18, 2017, and he requested a hearing before an administrative judge from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). On April 10, 2017, the case was assigned to me to conduct a hearing to determine whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. On April 19, 2017, I scheduled a hearing for May 22, 2017.

While this case was pending a hearing, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued Security Executive Agent Directive 4 establishing new National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) applicable to all covered individuals who require national security eligibility or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. On May 18, 2017, I provided Applicant with a copy of the updated Directive incorporating the new AG which supersede the adjudicative guidelines implemented in September 2006 and are effective for any adjudication made on or after June 8, 2017. I advised him that I would be adjudicating his security clearance eligibility under the new AG,1 and that I would consider a request to leave the record open after his hearing for additional information if necessary in light of this change in the AG.

I convened the hearing on May 22, 2017, as scheduled. Before the introduction of any evidence, Department Counsel withdrew the Guideline C allegation. Two Government exhibits (GEs 1-2) and eight Applicant exhibits (AEs A-H) were admitted into evidence without objection. A February 24, 2017 letter forwarding discovery of the Government’s exhibits to Applicant was marked as a hearing exhibit (HE 1) for the record but was not admitted as an evidentiary exhibit. At the Government’s request and without objection from Applicant, I agreed to take administrative notice of several facts pertinent to the Republic of Turkey. Applicant testified, as reflected in a hearing transcript (Tr.) received on June 1, 2017.

I held the record open for three weeks after the hearing for Applicant to respond to the Government’s Administrative Notice request, to propose facts for administrative notice, and to submit additional documentary evidence. On June 12, 2017, Applicant submitted a written statement (AE I) and three character references (AEs J-L), which were admitted in evidence without objection. No further submissions were received from Applicant by the June 13, 2017 deadline so the record closed on that date.

Administrative Notice

At the hearing, the Government requested administrative notice of several facts pertinent to Turkey, as set forth in an Administrative Notice request dated February 24, 2017. The Government’s request was based on publications from the U.S. State Department and on White House press releases. I was provided extracts of the documents and given the URLs where I could obtain the full documents.2 Pursuant to my obligation to take administrative notice of the most current political conditions in evaluating Guideline B concerns, see ISCR Case No. 05-11292 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2007), I informed the parties of my intention to take administrative notice, subject to the reliability of the source documentation and the relevance and materiality of the facts proposed. Applicant confirmed his receipt of the Government’s Administrative Notice request with extracts of the source documents. Applicant filed no objections to the facts set forth in the Government’s Administrative Notice request. He accepted an opportunity to propose additional facts for administrative notice, and made some comments in a June 12, 2017 statement. (AE I.)

Concerning the relevance of the information, some of the information relied on by the Government in its Administrative Notice request was not current. The State Department had issued a new Fact Sheet U.S. Relations with Turkey on December 23, 2016. Before the date of Applicant’s hearing, the State Department released its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016—Turkey, and on March 28, 2017, issued a new Turkey Travel Warning. In accord with Appeal Board precedent to consider the most current political conditions, I reviewed the full texts of the updated publications, which may be accessed from the State Department’s website www.state.gov. With that caveat, the facts administratively noticed are set forth below.

FINDINGS OF FACT

With the withdrawal of the Guideline C allegation, the SOR alleges under Guideline B that Applicant’s mother (SOR ¶ 1.a), father (SOR ¶ 1.b), sister (SOR ¶ 1.c), and parents- in-law (SOR ¶ 1.d) are resident citizens of Turkey; that Applicant’s sister-in-law is a Turkish citizen residing in Canada (SOR ¶ 1.e); and that Applicant has close friends who are resident citizens of Turkey (SOR ¶ 1.f). In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant denied Guideline B but in a detailed explanation admitted that the alleged family members and friends lived in Turkey with the exception of his sister-in-law in Canada, who had recently become a Canadian citizen. He denied any inference of divided loyalties, and stated that consistent with his oath of naturalization, he would “uphold [his] U.S. citizenship above all, as [he] declared that [he] renounce any allegiance to any foreign state that [he has] been a citizen, and that [he] will support and defend the constitution and laws of the United States of America.”

After considering the pleadings, exhibits, and transcript, I make the following findings of fact. Applicant is a 38-year-old aerospace engineer, who has been working for his defense contractor employer since October 2009. He was awarded his doctorate degree in December 2009 and is considered an “in-house expert” in his field. (GE 1; Tr. 40-41.) He seeks his first DOD security clearance. (Tr. 15, 41.)

Applicant and his sister were born in Germany to Turkish citizens and acquired Turkish citizenship through their parents. Their father was educated as a mechanical engineer. The family returned to their hometown in Turkey when Applicant was about to start primary school. After graduating from high school, Applicant studied mechanical engineering at a technical university in Turkey. He earned his bachelor’s degree in June 2001 and his master’s degree in July 2003 in mechanical engineering. While working as an undergraduate student research assistant, he was considered to be an employee of the Turkish government. (GEs 1-2; AE F; Tr. 57-58.)

In the fall of 2003, he started a doctoral program in Turkey. During his first year, he realized that he would not be able to acquire expertise in Turkey in his academic field of interest. On his own application, he was accepted into one of the top graduate programs in the United States in aerospace engineering. Applicant came to the United States in July 2004, and for the next five years, he pursued his doctorate degree and worked as a graduate research assistant in the United States. (GE 1; Tr. 39-40.) Applicant was very productive and published three refereed journal papers during that time. (AEs F, L; Tr. 40.)

In December 2006, Applicant and his spouse were married in the United States. He had a passing acquaintance with his spouse, a native of Turkey, when they were graduate students in Turkey. Two years ahead of him in her studies, she came to the United States to pursue a doctorate degree at a different university, and they became reacquainted when she came to visit a friend working in the same university lab as Applicant in the fall of 2004. (GEs 1-2; Tr. 54-56.)

In approximately 2007, Applicant obtained U.S. permanent residency status. (Tr. 54.) In September 2008, Applicant served three weeks of basic training in the Turkish military. On payment of approximately 5,000 Euros, and because he was living legally in the United States, he was required to serve only three weeks rather than the usual 15 months of compulsory military service in Turkey. (GE 1; Tr. 51-53.) Applicant stayed in Turkey for one month and spent some time with his parents during that trip. (Tr. 53.)

After he finished his doctoral studies in aerospace engineering, Applicant worked as a post-doctoral research fellow in the United States from August 2009 to October 2009. During that time, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration gave Applicant permission to create a secure account so that he could run computer simulations. (AE H; Tr. 36.)

In October 2009, Applicant left his research position for his current job, where he could apply his academic knowledge in a practical environment. (GE 1.) His spouse, who also holds a doctorate degree, accepted an offer of employment with the defense contractor as well. Applicant and his spouse have been professional colleagues in the same work group since they started with the company in October 2009. (AEs I, K; Tr. 47.)

In June 2010, Applicant and his spouse purchased their home in the United States for $365,000. They owed about $150,000 on their mortgage loan as of May 2017. (GE 1; Tr. 46, 81-83.) In May 2014, they had a daughter, who holds dual citizenship with the United States and Turkey. (GEs 1-2; Tr. 46, 85.) They applied for Turkish citizenship for her but not for a Turkish passport. (Tr. 85.) In July 2014, Applicant and his spouse acquired dual citizenship with Turkey and the United States on their naturalization in the United States. (GEs 1-2; AE I; Tr. 56.) Applicant understands that he is compelled to uphold his U.S. citizenship above all; that he declared freely that he will renounce any allegiance to a foreign state of which he has been a citizen; and that he will support and defend the U.S. Constitution and laws. (AE I.) In September 2014, Applicant acquired his U.S. passport. He also holds a valid passport with Turkey that he last renewed in December 2011. (GE 1.) He used his Turkish and U.S. passports to enter and exit Turkey during recent trips. (Tr. 51.) Applicant has given no thought to renouncing his citizenship with Turkey. He receives no monetary benefit from his foreign citizenship, but he sees no compelling reason to renounce it. He has not voted in a Turkish election since becoming a dual citizen. (Tr. 56-57.)

As of January 2016, Applicant and his spouse had their own bank accounts in Turkey that they opened as research assistants in Turkey for deposit of their pay. The accounts had nothing on deposit. Applicant’s spouse holds a second bank account in Turkey that she opened in approximately August 2007 so that she would have funds available to her during trips to visit family. The account had $3,000 on deposit. (GEs 1-2; Tr. 84.) Neither Applicant nor his spouse own any foreign real estate. He and his spouse have substantial 401(k) assets in the United States. (Tr. 83-84.)

Applicant has received 12 awards at work for his contributions, nine of them between March 2010 and December 2012. (AE B; Tr. 40.) In May 2013, Applicant was promoted at work to his current position of staff engineer in his group. (AE A.) He serves as a technical team lead, and because of his expertise, he was selected to represent his employer at meetings of a professional society. (AE C; Tr. 40-41.) Applicant was told that he is in line for succession to become a technical fellow at the company. (Tr. 41.) Applicant plans to remain in the United States when he retires. (Tr. 89-90.)

Applicant was requested by his employer to obtain a DOD security clearance so that his skills can be used on developing a product for military applications. (AE K.) On September 22, 2015, Applicant completed and certified to the accuracy of a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF 86). He disclosed his dual citizenship with the U.S. and Turkey and added, “My parents and other relatives still live in Turkey. I do not want my ties to be severed by renouncing Turkish citizenship.” (GE 1.) When asked to elaborate at his hearing, Applicant acknowledged that he could travel to Turkey without Turkish citizenship on his U.S. passport, his family could visit him in the United States, and he could still communicate with his parents. He speculated that he might not be able to inherit from his parents if he renounced his Turkish citizenship, but he was not certain. (Tr. 87-88.)

Applicant disclosed on his SF 86 that he possessed valid passports for Turkey and the United States; that he was educated through his master’s degree in Turkey; that he served three weeks of basic military training in Turkey in September 2008; that he voted in Turkish elections in November 2002 and March 2004 while he was a resident citizen of Turkey; and that he traveled abroad in that last seven years, including to Turkey to visit family and friends in September 2008, October 2009, September 2010, April 2012, and June 2013. He listed multiple trips of shorter duration to Canada to visit his spouse’s sister. Applicant disclosed the Turkish residency and citizenship of his parents, sister, parents-in-law, and some friends, and the then Turkish citizenship and Canadian residency of his spouse’s sister. (GE 1.)

On September 22, 2015, Applicant notified his security officer at work that he had released his SF 86 for processing, and he asked whether he was allowed to travel outside of the contrary while his request for security clearance eligibility was being processed. He was advised that he could travel abroad but would need to notify his security officer each time. On May 5, 2016, Applicant advised his security officer that he would be traveling to Turkey on vacation from July 2, 2016, to July 24, 2016. On May 31, 2016, Applicant informed her that he could be traveling to Asia for a professional conference in June 2016. (AE G.)

Applicant and his spouse took their daughter to Turkey in July 2016 to see family members. Applicant saw his sister and then spent five or six days with his parents in their home before going on to the seaside where his in-laws have a summer home. After some time with his in-laws, Applicant and his spouse went with his parents to another beach resort for four to six days. (Tr. 76-77.) A friend gave Applicant a ride from the airport to his in-laws’ summer home, but Applicant did not see his other friends. (Tr. 78.) There was an attempted coup when they were in Turkey, but they experienced no problems because they were at his in-laws’ summer home. (Tr. 80-81.)

Applicant’s father and mother continue to be resident citizens of their native Turkey. Applicant’s father spent his entire career in the private sector in Turkey. He initially worked as a mechanical engineer in the wood industry servicing machines before progressing through management levels to a director position. (GEs 1-2; Tr. 42, 62-64.) As of September 2015, Applicant’s father was retired, although by January 2016, he was consulting part time for a company involved in the wood industry. (GEs 1-2.) By May 2017, he had again retired. Applicant’s mother owned a small gift shop in Turkey that she closed in 2017. Applicant’s sister in Turkey was expecting twins in late June 2017, and Applicant’s mother planned to help care for them after they are born. (Tr. 47, 69.) Applicant’s parents have tourist visas that allow them to stay in the United States for up to six months. (Tr. 47-48.) Applicant has weekly contact by telephone or video conference (Skype) with his parents. For the last three years, his conversations with his parents have focused on his daughter. (Tr. 49-50.) He had in-person contact with his parents during his trips to Turkey. (GE 1.) His parents have visited him in the United States. In the last three years, his parents have come every six to eight months for about a month each time. They stay with Applicant and his spouse. Their most recent visit was in December 2016. Applicant does not expect his mother to visit in the next two years because of his sister’s situation. (Tr. 61-62.) He doubts that his father would come on his own, given his father does not speak any English. (Tr. 65.) Applicant’s parents know that he works as an engineer for his employer and that the company manufactures jet engines, but they do not know the details of his work or that he has applied for a DOD security clearance. (Tr. 60-61, 64-66.) Applicant does not provide any financial support for his parents. He speculated that his father receives a pension from the Turkish government, but he then described the asset as a self-funded account from which one may withdraw funds in retirement. (Tr. 66-67.) His father has never worked directly for the Turkish government. (Tr. 67.)

Applicant’s sister is a resident citizen of Turkey. She earned a systems engineering degree from a university in Turkey and had been employed as a quality engineer for a company that produced plastic pipes. (GE 1; Tr. 68.) Due to her pregnancy, she was not working as of May 2017. (Tr. 68.) On his September 2015 SF 86, Applicant reported that he has monthly contact by telephone and electronic media with his sister and in-person contact during trips to Turkey. (GE 1.) He testified at his hearing that he had contact with her weekly or every two weeks until seven months ago. Since then, they have been in contact every two or three days. (Tr. 69-70.) According to Applicant, his sister is not happy living in Turkey. (Tr. 70) He would be willing to sponsor her for U.S. immigration. (Tr. 48.) Applicant’s sister knows nothing more than his parents about his work. She likewise is unaware the he is seeking a security clearance. (Tr. 71.) Her spouse co-owns a business that sells camera equipment to the film industry in Turkey. (Tr. 68-69.)

Applicant’s parents-in-law are also resident citizens of Turkey. His mother-in-law worked as a primary school teacher in Turkey before retiring at a young age some 20 years ago. She receives a retirement pension from the Turkish government. Applicant’s father-in-law is a vice president for a “FedEx like” company in Turkey. His primary responsibility is to create corporate guidelines to increase employee efficiency and to audit compliance with those guidelines. Applicant does not believe that his father-in-law has any direct involvement with the Turkish government. Applicant’s spouse has weekly telephone or Skype contact with her parents, who call every week. They are curious about their granddaughter. Her parents have come to the United States every 12 to 18 months and stay in Applicant’s home. Their knowledge of Applicant’s work is similar to that of his parents. Applicant does not provide any financial support for his parents-in-law. (GE 1; Tr. 71-74, 86.) Applicant and his spouse would like to sponsor their respective parents for U.S. immigration. (AE G.)

Applicant’s spouse’s sister is a resident of Canada who recently acquired dual citizenship with Turkey and Canada on her naturalization in Canada. She has a doctorate degree in statistics and is employed as a research associate at a university in Canada. (Tr. 74.) Applicant has annual in-person contact with his sister-in-law and once or twice monthly email contact. (GEs 1-2.) Applicant has three friends who are resident citizens of Turkey. One works as a professor at the government-owned university in Turkey where Applicant earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees. They met in April 2001 and worked in the same research laboratories in Turkey and in the United States. Applicant indicated on his SF 86 that he had quarterly contact with this friend. Applicant has a “very close friend,” whom he has known since September 1991. They were classmates through high school and studied together in the mechanical engineering department at the Turkish university. They roomed together for one year during that time. Applicant indicated on his SF 86 that he had quarterly contact with this friend. Applicant had monthly telephone contact with another friend from college in Turkey who pursued graduate studies with Applicant in the United States. (GE 1.) In May 2017, Applicant testified about his contact with these friends that he might not speak to them for six or seven months and sometimes they just exchange a series of emails. Since his friends are also interested in physics, they discuss black holes, Einstein’s relativity theory, and similar issues. (Tr. 75-76.) In a statement of June 12, 2017, Applicant described his communications with his friends as “very casual, and sporadic,” and indicated that it does not involve his work activities. (AE I.)

A co-worker who has known Applicant since October 2009 has not observed anything about Applicant that presents a conflict of interest to the United States. He is aware that Applicant has become a U.S. citizen. Applicant came to their company “a highly sought-after expert in his field . . . and has been a tremendous contributor to [their employer].” (AE J.) Likewise, the manager who offered both Applicant and his spouse positions with the company supports security clearance eligibility for Applicant. This manager has worked directly with Applicant on the design of various combustors for commercial applications. Applicant has exhibited exceptional capabilities. Should he be granted security clearance eligibility, he would be able to use his skills to benefit the U.S. military. (AE K.)

Administrative Notice

Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty system and a president with limited powers. With its political, economic, and security ties primarily oriented to the West, Turkey is a member of the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECF), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international and regional organizations. The country is a candidate for European Union membership. Turkey is an important U.S. security partner. A leader in the NATO’s support mission in Afghanistan, Turkey serves as the organization’s vital Eastern anchor, controlling the straits leading from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey is a vital member of the coalition to counter the Islamic Group of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, aka ISIS). Turkey opened its military bases to the United States and Coalition partners in July 2015, which has been critical in the effort to degrade ISIL in neighboring Syria and Iraq. The present Turkish and U.S. administrations are seeking to reinvigorate the two countries’ trade and commercial ties and to expand relations in the energy and defense sectors. On May 16, 2017, U.S. President Trump and Turkish President Erdogan met to discuss how to further strengthen the deep and diverse relationship between the two countries. The United States reiterated its commitment to the security of Turkey and cooperation in counterterrorism.

Domestic and transnational terrorist groups have targeted Turkish citizens and foreigners in Turkey for more than 40 years. Prominent terrorist groups in Turkey include the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK); the Revolutionary People’s Party/Front (DHKP/C), a Marxist-Leninist group with anti-U.S. and anti-NATO views that seeks the violent overthrow of the Turkish state; the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons/Hawks (TAK); and the Turkish (Kurdish) Hizballah. A March 2013 ceasefire brokered between the PKK and Turkish government ended in July 2015. On October 10, 2015, 102 people were killed and more than 400 were injured in two suicide bombings outside Ankara’s central railway station. That attack, which was attributed to ISIL, intensified efforts to interdict travel of suspected foreign terrorist fighters through Turkey to and from Syria and Iraq.

Hundreds of deaths occurred in 2016 from terrorist attacks involving shootings, suicide bombings, and vehicle-borne bombings in tourist areas, public spaces, private celebrations, sporting events, and government, police, and military facilities throughout Turkey. There were simultaneous suicide bombings near a soccer stadium in Istanbul on December 10, 2016, and a mass shooting at an Istanbul nightclub on January 1, 2017. Violent clashes between the PKK and security forces in southeast Turkey resulted in the death of more than 600 security forces, at least 200 civilians, and an unknown number of PKK terrorists, and displaced an estimated 300,000 persons. Foreign and U.S. tourists and expatriates have been explicitly targeted by terrorist organizations in Turkey for kidnapping and assassination. On October 26, 2016, family members of employees posted to the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul were directed to depart Turkey temporarily. That directive was terminated on March 27, 2017, but U.S. government personnel and their family members residing in or visiting Istanbul are restricted from congregating or traveling in large groups and are required to obtain prior approval from the U.S. Consulate to visit large, crowded areas in Istanbul such as shopping malls, houses of worship frequented by expatriates, entertainment complexes, nightclubs, public sporting/cultural venues, crowded pedestrian thoroughfares, and tourist destinations. Due to increased threats from terrorist groups in Turkey, the U.S. State Department as of March 28, 2017, advised U.S. citizens to carefully consider the need to travel to Turkey and to avoid travel to southeast Turkey.

On July 15, 2016, elements of Turkey’s military staged an unsuccessful coup attempt ascribed by the Turkish government to the cleric Fethullah Gullen and his supporters (“the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization”). During the attempted coup, more than 240 citizens were killed and more than 2,100 were injured. The United States condemns the coup attempt, but has some concerns about human rights abuses committed in response to the coup attempt. On July 20, 2016, the Turkish government declared a three-month state of emergency, which was renewed in October 2016 and again in January 2017, which grants security forces expanded powers and has restricted Internet access and media content. U.S. citizens have been deported and/or detained and held without access to lawyers or family members under the state of emergency. Delays or denial of consular access to U.S. citizens detained by security forces, some of whom also possess Turkish citizenship, have become more common. U.S. citizen employees of some nongovernmental organizations in Turkey have experienced increased scrutiny and denials related to residence permit applications.

Turkish courts imprisoned tens of thousands of persons accused of supporting the coup or terrorist groups with little clarity on the charges or evidence against them. Suspects had restricted access to legal assistance. Tens of thousands of civil servants were dismissed with little legal recourse or appeal and thousands of businesses, school, and associations were closed. More than 3,000 members of the judiciary were fired, creating an atmosphere of fear that limited judicial independence and complicated or delayed court proceedings. Turkish authorities intensified pressure on the media after the coup, raised media companies, and confiscated publications with allegedly objectionable material. Self-censorship was widespread amid fear of reprisals for criticism of the Turkish government. At least 140 journalists were arrested in 2016. Other human rights problems included the inadequate protection of civilians by security forces fighting the PKK and impunity as the government took limited steps to investigate, prosecute, and punish members of the security forces and other officials accused of human rights abuses. Authorities failed to adequately protect women, children, and religious, ethnic, and gender minorities.

POLICIES

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion the Executive Branch has in regulating access to information pertaining to national security, emphasizing that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are required to be considered in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overall adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

ANALYSIS

Guideline B: Foreign Influence

The security concern about foreign influence is articulated in AG ¶ 6:

Foreign contacts and interests, including but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

Applicant and his spouse have close family members who are resident citizens of Turkey. Applicant’s father worked as a mechanical engineer and then in management in the wood industry in Turkey before he retired. Applicant’s mother owned her own gift shop until recently when she closed it to care for her twin grandchildren expected in June 2017. Before her pregnancy, Applicant’s sister worked as a quality engineer for a company that produces plastic pipes. Applicant’s mother-in-law is a retired primary school teacher, who receives a pension from the Turkish government. Applicant’s father-in-law is vice president for a “FedEx like” company in Turkey, although there is no evidence that he has any direct involvement with the Turkish government. Applicant’s spouse’s sister is a dual citizen of Turkey and Canada, who works as a researcher at a Canadian university. Applicant also has three friends, who possess Turkish citizenship and live and work in Turkey. One of the friends is a professor at a government-owned university in Turkey. Review of Applicant’s contacts and connections to these foreign citizens is warranted to determine whether they present a heightened risk under AG ¶ 7(a) or AG ¶ 7(e) or create a potential conflict of interest under AG ¶ 7(b). AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(e) provide:

(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology; and

(e) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.

Not every foreign contact or tie presents the heightened risk under AG ¶ 7(a). The “heightened risk” denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under a foreign government. The nature and strength of the family ties or other foreign interests and the country involved (i.e., the nature of its government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record) are relevant in assessing whether there is a likelihood of vulnerability to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government; a family member is associated with, or dependent on, the foreign government; or the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the United States. In considering the nature of the foreign government, the administrative judge must take into account any terrorist activity in the country at issue. See generally ISCR Case No. 02-26130 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 7, 2006).

Applicant and his spouse understandably have close ties to their parents. They have weekly contact with both sets of parents. While Applicant has more contact with his parents and his spouse with her parents, there is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, the immediate family members of his or her spouse. See e.g., ISCR Case No. 11-12659 (App. Bd. May 30, 2013). Applicant’s conversations with his parents and parents-in-law may have been focused on his daughter and her activities in the last three years. However, the family ties are security significant and the contact is regular and ongoing. Applicant has indicated that he and his spouse would like to sponsor their respective parents for U.S. immigration.

Applicant had contact weekly to once every two weeks with his sister until her pregnancy. Concerned about her well-being, Applicant has spoken to his sister more frequently in the last seven months. As of May 2017, he was calling her every two to three days. Moreover, Applicant has indicated that he would be willing to sponsor his sister for U.S. immigration.

In addition to taking several trips to Turkey to visit their family members, including in July 2016, Applicant and his spouse had in-person contact with his parents in the United States every six to eight months over the last three years. He hosted his parents for about a month each time. Applicant’s parents-in-law have come to the United States less frequently, approximately every 1.5 years, but they stay with Applicant and his spouse when they are here. As a vice president of a shipping company, Applicant’s father-in-law is in a position that might cause some attention to his activities. Little otherwise about Applicant’s or his spouse’s parents’ past or present occupations in Turkey heightens the risk. The only direct tie to the Turkish government is a government pension received by his mother-in-law, a former teacher in a public primary school. There is no evidence that terrorists, criminals, the Turkish government, or persons engaged in espionage have targeted Applicant’s and his spouse’s family members in Turkey, or Applicant or his spouse when they were in Turkey, to gain classified or sensitive information from Applicant. Turkey has a very positive relationship with the United States. Even so, Turkey’s human rights violations, and the real and present danger from terrorists and those who seek to damage U.S. interests, heighten the risk. It cannot be ruled out that terrorists would attempt to coerce Applicant through his or his spouse’s relatives in Turkey if the terrorists determined it was advantageous to do so. While the family members in Turkey are unaware of the details of Applicant’s work or that he has applied for security clearance eligibility, they know of the company that employs him as a staff engineer. AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(d) apply primarily because of Applicant’s and his spouse’s close personal bonds to family members in Turkey, where there is a significant risk of terrorist activity. Applicant and his spouse also face a risk of being personally targeted or coerced when in Turkey to visit their family members.

Applicant and his spouse have an ongoing personal relationship with her sister in Canada. They have visited her sister in Canada several times, including in July 2015, but it is difficult to see where her Turkish citizenship heightens Applicant’s risk beyond that which he faces because of his own citizenship with Turkey. Canada is a close ally of the United States and has a much lower terrorism risk than Turkey, which shares borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

Concerning his friends in Turkey, Applicant disclosed that he had quarterly to monthly contact with them, depending on the friend. Applicant reported employment information for these friends on his SF 86. During his subject interview, he elaborated that the university employing one of his friends as a professor is owned and operated by the Turkish government. However, Applicant’s communication with his friends is casual and sporadic, and largely involves theoretical discussions over black holes and other issues of physics. To the extent that these friendships raise concerns of foreign influence, AG ¶ 8(c), “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation,” is applicable. Concerning the family members in Turkey, the parental and sibling relationships, the risk of terrorism in Turkey, and the Turkish government’s inconsistent human rights record makes it difficult to mitigate the foreign influence concerns under AG ¶ 8(a), which provides:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States.

Applicant has some significant ties to the United States that could trigger the second component of AG ¶ 8(b), which states:

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.

Applicant came to the United States in July 2004 to pursue his doctorate degree. In December 2006, he married his spouse, who also obtained her doctorate degree in the United States. Since October 2009, Applicant and his spouse have used their expertise in support of the national defense as colleagues in the same work group with a defense contractor. They bought their home in the United States in June 2010. In May 2014, they had their daughter. In July 2014, they both became naturalized U.S. citizens. Applicant understands his obligation and all that ensues, for he indicated in response to the SOR the following:

Furthermore, the naturalization oath of allegiance to the United States of America compels me to uphold my U.S. citizenship above all, as I declared freely that I will renounce any allegiance to any foreign state that I have been a citizen, and that I will support and defend the constitution and laws of the United States of America.

Applicant obtained his U.S. passport in September 2014. Applicant has no financial assets abroad. His spouse has a bank account with approximately $3,000 on deposit. She opened the account when she was in Turkey in 2007 visiting family so that she would have some funds available when in Turkey. That foreign asset is minimal compared to Applicant’s and his spouse’s employment incomes, equity in their home, and 401(k) assets in the United States. By all accounts, Applicant has been a law-abiding citizen of the United States. He intends to reside permanently in the United States and hopes to sponsor his parents for U.S. immigration. He has not voted in a Turkish election coming to the United States. These are factors that weigh in his favor in granting security clearance eligibility for Applicant. At the same time, Applicant continues to maintain his citizenship with Turkey. He holds a Turkish passport that is valid until December 2021. He was not yet a dual citizen when he renewed that passport in 2011, and retention of foreign citizenship is not per se disqualifying. See Guideline C, AG ¶ 9, which states in part, “By itself, the fact that a U.S. citizen is also a citizen of another country is not disqualifying without an objective showing of such conflict or attempt at concealment.” Given Turkey is a NATO ally, his foreign citizenship is not in conflict with U.S. national security interests. The Government withdrew its concern about foreign preference. However, Applicant’s motivation for retaining his citizenship with Turkey is relevant in determining whether he possesses such “deep and longstanding relationships” in the United States that he can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of the United States should he be placed in the untenable position of having to choose between the interests of his family members in Turkey and the interests of the United States. On his SF 86, Applicant stated with respect to retaining his citizenship with Turkey, “My parents and other relatives still live in Turkey. I do not want my ties to be severed by renouncing Turkish citizenship.” While Applicant speculated at his hearing that he might not be able to inherit from his parents if not a citizen of Turkey, it does not appear that he is keeping his Turkish citizenship for any particular benefit it affords him in Turkey. Applicant sees his Turkish citizenship in light of his family bonds, which are considerable in this case. Applicant has shown himself to be law-abiding when it comes to Turkey, as evidenced by his fulfillment of his military service obligation for Turkey as a U.S. permanent resident. His Turkish citizenship could impose an obligation on him inconsistent with U.S. citizenship or subject him to different treatment when in Turkey. His ties to the United States are substantial but recent in comparison to Turkey.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his conduct and all relevant circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d).3 Furthermore, in weighing these whole-person factors in a foreign influence case, the Appeal Board has held that:

Evidence of good character and personal integrity is relevant and material under the whole person concept. However, a finding that an applicant possesses good character and integrity does not preclude the government from considering whether the applicant's facts and circumstances still pose

recurrence. a security risk. Stated otherwise, the government need not prove that an applicant is a bad person before it can deny or revoke access to classified information. Even good people can pose a security risk because of facts and circumstances not under their control. See ISCR Case No. 01-26893 (App. Bd. Oct. 16, 2002).

Applicant understandably has close bonds of affection and obligation to his parents and sister in Turkey, and through his spouse, to her parents in Turkey. There is nothing untoward about his relationship and contacts with these family members. He has been a law-abiding citizen of the United States. He has earned the respect of his colleagues, who have asked that Applicant’s considerable expertise be used to benefit the U.S. military. Yet, people act in unpredictable ways when faced with choices that could be important to a family member.4 Present geopolitical realities over which Applicant has no control create an unacceptable security risk because of his close bonds to, and ongoing contacts with family members in Turkey. For the reasons noted above, I am unable to find that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant continue security clearance eligibility at this time.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline C: WITHDRAWN

Subparagraph 1.a: Withdrawn

Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 2.a-2.d: Against Applicant Subparagraphs 2.e-2.f: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to continue Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

________________________ Elizabeth M. Matchinski Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

1 Application of the AGs that were in effect as of the issuance of the SOR would not change my decision in this case.

2 The Government’s request for administrative notice was based on the following publications of the U.S. State Department: a Fact Sheet titled U.S. Relations with Turkey, dated February 24, 2015; Turkey; Quick Facts, dated November 7, 2016; Turkey Travel Warning, dated October 29, 2016; Country Reports on Terrorism, dated June 2, 2016; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015—Turkey, updated April 18, 2016, and June 14, 2016; and Turkey 2015 Religious Freedom Report. The White House press releases reported the context of a telephone contact between then President Obama and Turkish President Erdogan of July 19, 2016 and September 4, 2016 remarks of the two leaders after a bilateral meeting at the G20 Summit. 3 The factors under AG ¶ 2(a) are as follows:

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or 4 As stated by the DOHA Appeal Board in ISCR Case No. 08-10025 (App. Bd. Nov. 3, 2009), “Application of the guidelines is not a comment on an applicant’s patriotism but merely an acknowledgment that people may act in unpredictable ways when faced with choices that could be important to a loved-one, such as a family member.”