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ISCR Case 15-06526.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 15-06526.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 15-06526.h1

grantedJan 20, 2017· Hon. Jennifer I. Goldstein· hearing

Summary

A 50-year-old U.S. citizen and defense contractor, originally from Lebanon, was granted a security clearance despite concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The Statement of Reasons cited his deceased father’s former business partner, two uncles, and one cousin residing in Lebanon, along with the applicant's financial interest in an apartment there. These issues raised disqualifying conditions under Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) ¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(e).

However, the judge determined that the applicant successfully mitigated these concerns. He closed all bank accounts in Lebanon, transferring funds to U.S. accounts. His interactions with family in Lebanon were infrequent and casual, with no financial support provided. Furthermore, his share of the Lebanese property was deemed minimal relative to his overall financial worth.

Ultimately, the judge found that the applicant demonstrated limited foreign influence and strong ties to the U.S., applying mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8(a), 8(b), 8(c), and 8(f). Consequently, the security clearance was granted.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant closed all bank accounts in Lebanon and transferred funds to U.S. accounts.
His contacts with family in Lebanon are infrequent and casual, with no financial support sent.
The applicant's share of the property in Lebanon is minimal compared to his overall financial worth.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 7(e)raisedSubstantial Financial Interest in a Foreign Country

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(a)appliedNature of Relationships with Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 8(b)appliedNo Conflict of Interest Due to Minimal Loyalty to Foreign Contacts
AG ¶ 8(c)appliedCasual and Infrequent Contact with Foreign Citizens
AG ¶ 8(f)appliedValue of Foreign Property Interest Is Minimal

Key Rule Quoted

“The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedMay 19, 2016
Answer filedJun 4, 2016
Hearing heldSep 12, 2016
Decision dateJan 20, 2017

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Importance of Infrequent Foreign Contacts in Security Clearance Decisions
Consideration of Overall Financial Interests in Adjudicating Security Clearance Cases

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant mitigated the foreign influence concerns related to his ownership interest in an apartment in Lebanon and minimal contacts with family members there. The applicant's significant ties to the United States and the nature of his foreign interests led to a decision to grant his security clearance.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business · U.S. Financial Assets Predominant

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Your deceased father’s former business partner is a citizen and resident of Lebanon.	For Applicant	Business Associate in Foreign Country Business or Professional Associate	Lebanon HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Severed Foreign Contact
1.b	Your two uncles and one cousin are citizens and residents of Lebanon.	For Applicant	Extended Family in Foreign Country Extended Family	Lebanon HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Severed Foreign Contact
1.c	Your financial interest in an apartment in Lebanon.	For Applicant	Foreign Real Estate Financial or Property Interest	Lebanon HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Severed Foreign Contact

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 15-06526 ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Aubrey De Angelis, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

January 20, 2017 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge:

Based on a review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, I conclude that Applicant has mitigated the concerns related to foreign influence raised by his one-third ownership interest in an apartment in Lebanon. He no longer has any bank accounts in Lebanon. His contacts with people in Lebanon, including his deceased father’s former business partners, his uncles, and his cousin, are minimal. His request for a security clearance is granted.

Statement of the Case

On May 19, 2016, in accordance with DoD Directive 5220.6, as amended (Directive), the Department of Defense issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts that raise security concerns under Guideline B. The SOR further informed Applicant that based on information available to the government, DoD adjudicators could not make the preliminary affirmative finding it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance. Applicant answered the SOR on June 4, 2016, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. (Answer.) The case was assigned to me on July 25, 2016. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on August 16, 2016, scheduling the hearing for September 12, 2016. The hearing was convened as scheduled. The Government offered Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3, which were admitted after Applicant offered clarifications on those documents (Tr. 36-38.), and Hearing Exhibit (HE) I for Administrative Notice. Applicant testified on his own behalf and called one witness. The record was left open until October 12, 2016, for receipt of additional documentation. Applicant presented three documents, which I marked Applicant’s Exhibits (AE) A through C. Department Counsel objected to AE B, in part, as part of that document was in a foreign language. Applicant was given time to obtain a court-certified translation of his documents, but he elected not to exercise that option. Instead, he provided a narrative explaining AE B, which I identified and admitted as AE C. Only the English sections of AE B were considered as evidence. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on September 21, 2016.

PROCEDURAL RULINGS

At the hearing, the Government requested I take administrative notice of certain facts relating to Lebanon. Department Counsel provided an 8-page summary of the facts, supported by 12 Government documents pertaining to Lebanon, identified as HE I. The documents provide elaboration and context for the summary. I take administrative notice of the facts included in the U.S. Government reports. They are limited to matters of general knowledge, not subject to reasonable dispute. They are set out in the

FINDINGS OF FACT

Findings of Fact.

Further, SOR ¶ 1.cwas amended at hearing to conform to the evidence. Applicant and Department Counsel indicated they had no objection to the amendment and the amendment was made. (Tr. 81.) SOR ¶ 1.c, as amended, reads:

1.c. Your two uncles and one cousin are citizens and residents of Lebanon.

Applicant admitted to SOR allegations ¶¶ 1.a, and 1.b. He denied SOR allegation ¶ 1.c. After a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following findings of fact.

Applicant is a 50-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He has been employed with the defense contractor since 1996. He has had a security clearance since 2005. He has a master’s degree. He is married to a U.S. citizen, and has one child, age 11. (GE 1; Tr. 40-44.)

Applicant was born in Beirut, Lebanon. He is a Christian and was subject to an armed robbery that targeted Christian individuals while he was living in Lebanon in 1983. He immigrated to the United States in 1986 to attend college and was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 1995. (GE 1; GE 2; Tr. 40, 63-64.) Applicant’s parents are deceased. In 2012, when his mother passed away, Applicant inherited a one-fourth interest in the apartment his parents owned in Lebanon, shared jointly with his three brothers. However, one of his brothers passed away in 2014, which left Applicant with a one-third share in the apartment. The unit is valued at approximately $100,000, and Applicant’s share is approximately $33,000. Applicant estimated this share is “less than 2% of [his] current financial worth.” (AE A.) It has been uninhabited since his parent’s deaths and fell into disrepair. Applicant and his brothers intend to sell the property once it is repaired. It is 90% rehabilitated. (GE 2; AE A; Tr. 45.)

Applicant had two bank accounts in Lebanon, which were inherited from his parents. They were opened in 2012, to transfer his inheritance from his parent’s estate. One account was solely in Applicant’s name and had $190,000 in it. The other account was jointly held with one of Applicant’s brothers and had $6,000 in it. Applicant intended to keep the accounts open until the apartment was sold because he paid the electricity bill for the apartment from them. However, he presented documentation that shows he closed both of them, and all of the funds from those accounts have been transferred into accounts located in the United States. (GE 2; GE 3; AE A; AE B; AE C; Tr. 47-55, 70.)

In 2007 Applicant’s father, who was the chairman of a company in Lebanon, resigned and sold his shares in that company to one of his former business partners (P1). P1 is a citizen and resident in Lebanon. Applicant last saw him in 2012 when Applicant returned to Lebanon to manage his father’s estate. Applicant has had minimal communications with P1 since 2012, limited to two phone calls to express condolences after the deaths of relatives. He indicated in his post-hearing exhibits that “this contact will cease.” Applicant’s father’s second business partner (P2), is a resident and citizen of the United States. Applicant communicates with him every two-to-three months on a social basis. “He has no influence over [Applicant] or anything like that.” (Tr. 57.) Neither P1 or P2 is affiliated with the Lebanese military or government. (GE 2; Tr. 55-58, 71.)

Applicant has two uncles and one cousin who are citizens and residents of Lebanon. Both of his uncles were his mother’s brothers and both worked as accountants at banks. They are elderly and in frail health. Applicant last spoke to them two years ago when he called them at Christmas. His eldest uncle has a son, Applicant’s cousin. His cousin helped Applicant get contractors to repair his parent’s apartment, but Applicant has not spoken to him for “a couple years.” His uncles and cousin are not affiliated with the Lebanese military or government. Applicant has no other family members in Lebanon with whom he communicates. Applicant does not send anyone in Lebanon financial support. (GE 2; Tr. 58-61, 71.)

Applicant’s surviving brothers are both U.S. citizens and live in the same U.S. state as Applicant. He has extended family in Canada. (GE 2.) Applicant owns his home, a condominium, which is fully paid for and is valued at approximately $500,000. He testified he has approximately $120,000 in savings in U.S. banks, and other U.S. based assets valued at more than $650,000. He does not intend to travel to Lebanon in the future. (GE 2; Tr. 67-68.) Applicant’s supervisor testified on Applicant’s behalf. He indicated that Appellant is an honest, conscientious worker, with a high degree of integrity. He called Applicant a “true patriot” and spoke of Applicant’s dedication to the United States and his employer’s mission. Applicant preforms well at work and has received awards for his performance. The witness reported Applicant complies with all security requirements. (Tr. 83-92.)

Notice

Lebanon experienced civil war from 1975 through 1990. Since 1990 it has experienced years of social and political instability. Lebanon boarders both Syria and Israel. The U.S. Department of State has issued a travel warning that urges U.S. citizens to avoid all travel to Lebanon because of ongoing safety concerns. (HE I.)

Numerous terrorist organizations are active within Lebanon. The Asad regime in Syria provides political support to a variety of terrorist groups that affect the stability in the region. The Lebanese Hizballah, a foreign terrorist organization operating in Lebanon, “is closely allied with Iran and the two often work together and is providing assistance to Syrian regime forces.” Terrorist groups including Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, Asbat-al-Ansar, Fatah al-Islam, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and several other groups, operate within the borders of Lebanon. (HE I.)

Human right abuses occur in Lebanon. The most significant human rights abuse include torture and abuse by security forces, harsh prison and detention center conditions, and limitations on movement of refugees. Other human rights abuses include arbitrary arrests and detention; lengthy pretrial detention; violations of rights to privacy; restrictions of freedom of speech and press; and official corruption. (HE I.)

POLICIES

When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record.

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

ANALYSIS

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in AG ¶ 6:

Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 7. Three are potentially applicable in this case:

(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and

(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.

Applicant has contacts and connections in Lebanon including his deceased father’s former business partners, his uncles, and his cousin that could potentially create a conflict of interest between Applicant’s duties to protect classified information and those relationships. He also has a financial interest in an apartment in Lebanon, and formerly had two bank accounts there. To be fully applicable, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(e) require substantial evidence of a heightened risk. The heightened risk required to raise one of these disqualifying conditions is a relatively low standard. Heightened risk denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under a foreign government or substantial assets in a foreign nation. In this instance, a heightened risk is present because of the terrorist forces at work in Lebanon and the human rights abuses present in Lebanon. The evidence is sufficient to raise this disqualifying condition.

AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including:

(a) the nature of the relationship with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interests in favor of the U.S. interests; (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation; and

(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interest is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.

Applicant’s contacts with P1, P2, his uncles, and his cousin are infrequent and casual. He has not talked to his uncles or his cousin in more than two years. His conversations with P1 have been limited to expressing condolences after deaths of relatives. Further, Applicant has expressed his intent to discontinue further communications with P1. P2 is a U.S. citizen and resides in the same state as Applicant. It is highly unlikely Applicant will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of these foreign individuals and the interests of the U.S. Further, Applicant has established deep and longstanding relationships in the United States. He has established strong ties to his workplace and community. He has substantial investments located in the United States. His immediate family members are all U.S. citizens, with few ties to Lebanon. Applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States. AG ¶¶ 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c) apply.

Applicant’s share of the property he inherited in Lebanon is estimated to be only 2% of his net worth. The apartment will be sold as soon as the rehabilitation of the property is completed. He no longer has any bank accounts in Lebanon. Given Applicant’s significant assets in the United States, it is unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure Applicant. AG ¶ 8(f) is mitigating.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under that guideline, but some warrant additional comment.

Applicant has a distinguished history of working in the defense industry and is respected by his witness. He performs well at his job. While he was born Lebanon, he is an American by choice. He has been residing in the United States for the past 31 years. His closest familial ties are with his wife, son, and brothers, all of whom are American citizens. His remaining contacts in Lebanon are infrequent. He will dispose of the property he inherited as soon as it is ready for sale, and it only represents a small amount of his net worth. He can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States due to his longstanding ties here.

Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant mitigated the Foreign Influence security concerns.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant

Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant

Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

________________________ Jennifer I. Goldstein Administrative Judge