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ISCR Case 16-00138.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-00138.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-00138.h1

grantedApr 27, 2017· Hon. Robert J. Tuidar· hearing

Summary

A 39-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen, originally from Taiwan, was granted a security clearance despite concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The Statement of Reasons cited her father, brother, and a cousin, all resident citizens of Taiwan. Her father is a semi-retired business owner, her brother completed mandatory military service and is in the inactive reserves, and her cousin works for a private manufacturing company. The applicant communicates with her father every two to three months and her cousin annually. Additionally, she maintains a casual friendship with an assistant research fellow at a government-affiliated institution in Taiwan, whom she met through previous employment.

Disqualifying conditions related to foreign influence were raised, specifically concerning her family and personal connections in Taiwan. However, the applicant successfully applied mitigating conditions by demonstrating strong ties to the U.S. She is married to a U.S. citizen, and her children are U.S. citizens. Her assets in the U.S. significantly outweigh her minimal assets in Taiwan.

The judge determined that the applicant's family members in Taiwan were not affiliated with the government and posed no significant risk of foreign influence. Based on her strong U.S. ties and the nature of her foreign connections, the security clearance was granted.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant demonstrated strong ties to the U.S. through her marriage and children, all U.S. citizens.
The applicant's assets in the U.S. significantly outweighed her minimal assets in Taiwan.
The applicant's family members in Taiwan were not affiliated with the government and posed no significant risk.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Member
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(b)appliedNo Conflict of Interest Due to Strong U.S. Ties
AG ¶ 8(f)appliedMinimal Foreign Financial Interests

Key Rule Quoted

“The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedJun 9, 2016
Answer filedJun 27, 2016
Hearing heldSep 13, 2016
Decision dateApr 27, 2017

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Importance of U.S. Ties in Security Clearance Decisions
Evaluation of Foreign Family Connections in Security Clearance Cases

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant mitigated security concerns related to foreign influence under Guideline B. The applicant's ties to family members in Taiwan were acknowledged, but the judge determined that these relationships did not pose a significant risk of foreign exploitation or coercion, leading to the granting of the security clearance.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business · U.S. Financial Assets Predominant · Community or Civic Involvement · Intent to Remain in U.S. · Renounced or Surrendered Foreign Citizenship or Passport

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant's father is a resident citizen of Taiwan. He is a semi-retired owner of a private company that imports and sells ceramic materials. He is a cancer survivor currently in remission. Applicant communicates with her father "every two to three months" by telephone.	For Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
1.b	Applicant has a younger brother, who is a resident citizen of Taiwan, and a younger sister, who is a resident of Singapore and citizen of Taiwan. Her brother served 18 months of mandatory military service in Taiwan and remains in the inactive reserves.	For Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
1.c	Applicant has a cousin in her "50s" who is a resident citizen of Taiwan. Her cousin and her husband work for a private company that manufactures screws and nails. Applicant communicates with her cousin typically once a year "around the Chinese New Year."	For Applicant	Extended Family in Foreign Country Extended Family	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
1.d	Applicant maintains a casual friendship with an assistant research fellow employed at a government-affiliated research institution in Taiwan. She met him during her previous employment.	For Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend GOVT-AFFILIATED	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
1.e–1.h	4 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant). (low confidence)	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—		—	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-00138 ) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Carroll Connelley, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

04/27/2017 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

TUIDER, Robert J., Administrative Judge:

Applicant mitigated security concerns pertaining to (Guideline B) foreign influence. Clearance is granted.

History of Case

On February 4, 2015, Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF-86). On June 9, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, pursuant to Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, dated February 20, 1960, as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended; and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), which became effective on September 1, 2006.

The SOR alleged security concerns under Guideline B. The SOR detailed reasons why the DOD CAF was unable to find that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant a security clearance for Applicant, and it recommended that her case be submitted to an administrative judge for a determination whether her clearance should be granted or denied. On June 27, 2016, Applicant responded to the SOR. On August 8, 2016, Department Counsel was ready to proceed. On August 12, 2016, DOHA assigned Applicant’s case to me. On August 15, 2016, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a hearing notice, setting the hearing for September 13, 2016. Applicant’s hearing was held as scheduled.

At the hearing, Department Counsel offered Government Exhibit (GE) 1, which was received into evidence without objection. Applicant testified, called her husband as a witness, and offered Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through E, which were received into evidence without objection. On September 21, 2016, DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.).

PROCEDURAL RULINGS

Request for Administrative Notice

Department Counsel requested administrative notice of facts concerning Taiwan. Department Counsel provided supporting documents to show detail and context for those facts. Applicant did not object, and I granted Department Counsel’s request. (Tr. 11, Exhibit I (1-13).)

Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for administrative proceedings. See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n.1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No. 02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004)); McLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986)). The most common basis for administrative notice at ISCR proceedings, is to notice facts that are either well known or from government reports. See Stein, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Section 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006) (listing fifteen types of facts for administrative notice). Various facts pertaining to Taiwan were derived from Department Counsel’s country summary and accompanying documents as indicated under subheading “Taiwan” of this Decision.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant admitted with explanations all of the SOR allegations except for SOR ¶ 1.e, which she denied. After a thorough review of the evidence, I make the following findings of fact.

Background Information

Applicant is a 39-year-old logistician who seeks employment with a defense contractor. She is a first-time applicant for a security clearance. Successfully vetting for a secret security clearance is a condition of her employment. (Tr. 13-16, 56-57; GE 1)

Applicant was born, raised, and educated in Taiwan. She was awarded an associate’s degree in business in Taiwan in June 1999. Applicant initially came to the United States under a student visa in August 1999 and received a certificate to teach English in June 2002. She returned to Taiwan in January or February 2003. Applicant returned to the United States in March 2005, again under a student visa. She received a business management certificate with an emphasis in marketing in December 2005. Applicant applied for and received her “green card” in the summer of 2007, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in June 2011. She was issued her U.S. passport in July 2011. She surrendered her Taiwanese passport to her facility security officer in January 2015. (Tr. 16-24, 44, 49-50, 57-58; GE 1; AE A)

Applicant married her U.S.-born husband, who is of Taiwanese descent, in the United States in September 2006. She has two U.S.-born daughters, ages ten and five. Her husband holds a PhD and is employed by the U.S. military as a civilian employee. (Tr. 19-20, 24-25, 60-64; GE 1)

Foreign Influence

Applicant’s father is a resident citizen of Taiwan. He is a semi-retired owner of a private company that imports and sells ceramic materials. He is a cancer survivor currently in remission. Applicant’s father spends the majority of his time volunteering at a local city government and prosecutor’s information desk as well as volunteering at a nursing home. Applicant’s mother passed away when she was 17 years old. Applicant communicates with her father “every two to three months” by telephone. (Tr. 25-29, 30, 32-33, 50; GE 1) Applicant and her husband plan to bring her father to the United States to care for him. (Tr. 65-66)

Applicant is the oldest of three children. She has a younger brother, who is a resident citizen of Taiwan, and a younger sister, who is a resident of Singapore and citizen of Taiwan. Her brother served 18 months of mandatory military service in Taiwan and remains in the inactive reserves. Applicant’s brother was previously employed as an electrical engineer and is currently employed as a salesperson for a private company. She communicates with her brother on an “infrequent” basis typically by telephone. (Tr. 29-31, 33; GE 1) Applicant’s sister is employed as an insurance agent for a private insurance company. She communicates with her sister with the same frequency as she does with her father by telephone. (Tr. 31-32, 50-51; GE 1)

Applicant has a cousin in her “50s” who is a resident citizen of Taiwan. Her cousin and her husband work for a private company that manufactures screws and nails. Applicant communicates with her cousin typically once a year “around the Chinese New Year.” (GE 1; Tr. 35-36) Applicant maintains a casual friendship with an assistant research fellow employed at a government-affiliated research institution in Taiwan. She met him during her previous employment. (Tr. 39-40)

One of the SOR allegations alleged that Applicant was a partial owner in her family’s business. She denied that allegation stating that she divested herself of her ownership in 2011. (Tr. 33-34; GE 1) She maintains a bank account in Taiwan with an approximate balance of $100. (Tr. 34-35, 51-53; GE 1) In contrast to Applicant’s limited assets in Taiwan, she and her husband have a home valued at $499,900, a 401kretirement worth $13,000, a savings account with a $3,000 balance, and a checking account with a $2,000 balance. Additionally, Applicant and her husband own two automobiles and numerous personal possessions. She estimates the total value of her U.S. assets to be “about a half a million dollars.” (Tr. 40- 44) Applicant is registered to vote in the United States. (Tr. 44) Applicant provided a copy of her HUD settlement statement documenting the value of her home when purchased in 2015 as well as her current property tax bill. (Tr. 46; AE C)

Character Evidence

Applicant submitted several character or reference letters and a farewell card from her former supervisors and colleagues. The collective sense of these exhibits reflect that Applicant is conscientious, loyal, hardworking, and trustworthy. (Tr. 44-46; AE B) Applicant has a history of involvement in her church and local community. (Tr. 46- 48; AE D-E) She testified that she likes living in the United States very much. After Applicant returned to Taiwan the first time in 2003, she had to convince her father to support her return to the United States to resume her studies. (Tr. 58) She would very much like to continue her career and stated she had no control over where she was born. (Tr. 59) Her in-laws live in the United States and she occasionally sees them. (Tr. 59-60)

Taiwan

Taiwan is a multi-party democracy. The United States does not support Taiwan’s independence, in keeping with the “one China” policy; however, “maintaining strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan is also a major U.S. goal, in line with [the U.S.] desire to further peace and stability in Asia.” The United States supports Taiwan’s membership in appropriate international organizations where statehood is not a requirement for membership and encourages its meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the Asian Development Bank. Maintaining diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been recognized to be in the long-term interest of the United States by six consecutive administrations.

There are significant economic ties between Taiwan and the PRC, which are attributable to their physical proximity and history. Because of its location, Taiwan has a particular interest in information from the United States that could aid it in its own defense. Taiwan’s primary defense goal is to deter invasion from the PRC. The PRC maintains intelligence operations in Taiwan through a bureau utilizing PRC nationals with Taiwanese connections. Unlike the PRC, however, the constitutional basis of the Taiwanese government suggests that resort to coercive measures against its citizens to collect economic intelligence is unlikely.

Taiwan’s commercial ties with the United States have expanded since 1979. Export-Import Bank financing, Overseas Private Investment Corporation guarantees, normal trade relations (NTR) status, and ready access to U.S. markets have enhanced the Taiwan economy. “In recent years, AIT[1] commercial dealings with Taiwan have focused on expanding market access for American goods and services. AIT has been engaged in a series of trade discussions that have focused on protection of intellectual property rights and market access for U.S. goods and services.”

The record references various cases involving the illegal export or attempted illegal export of U.S. restricted, dual-use technology to and/or through Taiwan. One report to the U.S. Congress concerns foreign economic collection and industrial espionage. That report notes that Taiwan was then known to be an active collector of U.S. economic intelligence. The report ranked Taiwan after China, Japan, Israel, France, and Korea as an active collector of such information. Although some of the record information about Taiwan’s intelligence activities targeting U.S. classified or sensitive information is more than 10 years old, several exhibits address more recent espionage by Taiwan’s National Intelligence Bureau (NSB). There is some evidence that Taiwan has specifically targeted U.S. citizens in the last five to seven years to obtain protected and classified information.

The United States is committed to assisting Taiwan with maintenance of Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. “The United States has continued the sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, which provides for such sales and which declares that peace and stability in the area are in U.S. interests. Sales of defensive military equipment are also consistent with the 1982 U.S.-P.R.C. Joint Communique.”

Taiwan is a modern democracy with vibrant public participation during which demonstrations may become confrontational. The U.S. State Department urges caution within the vicinity of any political demonstrations. Overall crime is noted as low.

POLICIES

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.

The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. See also Executive Order 12968 (Aug. 2, 1995), § 3.1. Thus, nothing in this Decision should be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express or implied determination about applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).

Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue her security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).

ANALYSIS

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

AG ¶ 6 explains the Government’s concern about “foreign contacts and interests” stating: [I]fthe individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, [he or she] may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

AG ¶ 7 indicates three conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying in this case, including:

(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and

(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.

The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in a foreign country and an applicant has contacts with that relative, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). Applicant has frequent contact with her elderly father in Taiwan and relatively infrequent contact with her younger brother, cousin, and friend living in Taiwan as well as her younger sister living in Singapore. These relationships create a potential risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion meriting a close examination of all circumstances. The Government also identified minor concerns associated with Applicant’s limited assets in Taiwan.

The Government produced substantial evidence of disqualifying conditions AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b) as a result of Applicant’s admissions and evidence presented. The burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence and prove a mitigating condition. The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. Three Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions under Guideline ¶ 8 are potentially applicable to these disqualifying conditions:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and

(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.

Applying common sense and life experience, there is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, and or obligation to his or her immediate family. ISCR Case No. 04-07766 at 4 (App. Bd. Sept. 26, 2006); ISCR Case No. 01-03120 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002). Applicant has demonstrated the indicia of ties of affection for and or obligation to her father and to a lesser extent with her siblings, cousin, and friend.

Applicant’s family are not associated with or affiliated with the Taiwanese government. Her father is semi-retired, is in cancer remission, and spends most of his discretionary free time doing volunteer work. Her brother is a salesperson and her sister is an insurance agent. Both siblings are employed by private companies. The record does not identify what influence, if any, the Taiwanese government could exert on Applicant’s siblings as a result of their being resident citizens of Taiwan. However, their presence in Taiwan creates concerns under this Guideline. As such, the burden shifted to Applicant to show her relatives in Taiwan do not create security risks.

“[T]he nature of the foreign government involved in the case, and the intelligence- gathering history of that government are important evidence that provides context for all the other evidence of the record . . .” See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 04-0776 at 3 (App. Bd. Sept. 26, 2006); see also ISCR Case No. 02-07772 at 7 (App. Bd. Aug. 28, 2003). As noted supra under the subheading “Taiwan,” Taiwan actively engages in intelligence gathering against the U.S.

Applicant denies having “divided loyalties” between the U.S. and any foreign country. It should be noted Applicant’s allegiance to the U.S. was not challenged in this proceeding. The issue is rather a positional one. The evidence supports application of AG ¶¶ 8(b) and 8(f). Applicant is fully vested in the United States. She is married to a U.S.-born citizen and her children are U.S.-born citizens. Applicant has integrated into the U.S. way of life not only through her family, but also through her church and community involvement. Her assets in Taiwan are minimal when compared to her assets in the United States.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment.

The Appeal Board requires the whole-person analysis address “evidence of an applicant’s personal loyalties; the nature and extent of an applicant’s family’s ties to the U.S. relative to his [or her] ties to a foreign country; his or her social ties within the U.S.; and many others raised by the facts of a given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan. 5, 2007).

I have carefully considered Applicant’s family connections and personal connections to Taiwan. Several circumstances weigh against Applicant in the whole- person analysis. First, and most importantly for security purposes, Taiwan actively seeks classified and industrial/economic information. Taiwan may attempt to use Applicant’s family members who live in Taiwan to obtain such information. In addition, Applicant spent her formative years in Taiwan. Applicant also maintains frequent contact with her father and to a lesser her two siblings, cousin, and friend. These contacts are manifestations of strong affection and regard Applicant has for family members in Taiwan.

The mitigating evidence weighs towards grant of Applicant’s security clearance. Applicant initially came to the United States in 1999, returned to Taiwan in 2003, and came back to the United States again in 2005. Since returning to the United States in 2005, she married her U.S.-born husband in 2006, received her “green card in 2007,” became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2011, and received her U.S. passport that same year. She is the mother of two young U.S.-born children and embarked on a successful career. Applicant is a homeowner, is active in her community, and is a productive member of society. Her assets in the U.S. are far more substantial when contrasted to her minimal assets in Taiwan. Applicant’s ties to the United States are stronger than her ties to her family members in Taiwan. She has vested her life and future in the U.S. There is no evidence Applicant has ever taken any action that could cause potential harm to the United States. She takes her loyalty to the United States very seriously, and hopes to begin work for a contractor. The evidence contains no derogatory record evidence about the Applicant.

I considered the totality of Applicant’s family ties to Taiwan. Taiwan is a multi- party democracy. There is no evidence that Taiwan uses coercion to obtain intelligence from U.S. residents. In the unlikely event that Applicant’s family in Taiwan was subjected to coercion or duress from the Taiwanese government in an attempt to obtain sensitive information, I find that because of her deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that Applicant would resolve any attempt to exert pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress in favor of the United States. Noteworthy is the affirmative and overt steps Applicant recently took to surrender her Taiwanese passport to her facility security officer.

I have carefully assessed Applicant’s demeanor and sincerity at her hearing, and I find her statements to be credible. I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, and the AGs, to the facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person. I conclude Applicant has carried her burden and foreign influence concerns are mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.h: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue eligibility for a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is granted.

____________________________ ROBERT J. TUIDER Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

1 The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is a private nonprofit corporation with its headquarters in the Washington, DC area and offices in Taipei and Kaohsiung. It is authorized to issue visas, accept passport applications, and provide assistance to U.S. citizens in Taiwan. (HE 5 at 7)