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ISCR Case 16-00268.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-00268.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-00268.h1

grantedSep 5, 2017· Hon. Gina L. Marine· hearing

Summary

This case involved a 35-year-old systems engineer, holding a security clearance since 2009, whose eligibility was reviewed under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The Statement of Reasons cited that his wife and two stepdaughters are citizens of Kyrgyzstan, as are his mother-in-law, father-in-law, and two sisters-in-law, who also reside there. These facts raised disqualifying conditions related to foreign ties.

However, the judge found that these family relationships did not pose an undue security risk. Key mitigating factors included the absence of any connections between the applicant's in-laws and the Kyrgyz government or military. Furthermore, the applicant demonstrated strong ties and obligations to the United States, and he consistently complied with all reporting requirements concerning his foreign contacts.

Based on these considerations, the judge determined that the security concerns under Guideline B were sufficiently mitigated. Consequently, the applicant's security clearance was granted.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant's in-laws have no connections to the Kyrgyz government or military.
The applicant has strong ties and obligations to the United States, mitigating potential foreign influence.
The applicant complied with reporting requirements regarding foreign contacts.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons Creating Potential Conflict of Interest
AG ¶ 7(e)raisedShared Living Quarters with Foreign Persons

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(a)appliedNature of Relationships with Foreign Persons Unlikely to Create Conflict
AG ¶ 8(b)appliedMinimal Conflict of Interest Due to Strong U.S. Ties
AG ¶ 8(e)appliedPrompt Compliance with Reporting Requirements

Key Rule Quoted

“Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the AG.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedJun 3, 2016
Answer filedJun 25, 2016
Hearing heldMay 18, 2017
Decision dateSep 5, 2017

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Impact of Family Ties on Security Clearance Eligibility
Criteria for Evaluating Foreign Contacts and Interests

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge granted the applicant's security clearance, finding that the foreign influence concerns related to the applicant's family ties to Kyrgyzstan were mitigated. The applicant's wife and stepdaughters are citizens of Kyrgyzstan, but the judge concluded that these ties did not create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation or conflict of interest, given the applicant's established life and responsibilities in the United States.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: U.S. Home or Property · Intent to Remain in U.S.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant’s wife and two stepdaughters are citizens of Kyrgyzstan (SOR ¶ 1.a).	For Applicant	Spouse Dual or Foreign Citizen Immediate Family	Kyrgyzstan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely	Claimed Deep U.S. Ties
1.b	Applicant’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, and two sisters-in-law are citizens and residents of Kyrgyzstan (SOR ¶ 1.b).	For Applicant	Extended Family in Foreign Country Extended Family	Kyrgyzstan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely	Claimed Deep U.S. Ties

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) [REDACTED] ) ISCR Case No. 16-00268 ) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Benjamin Dorsey, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro Se

09/05/2017 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

MARINE, Gina L., Administrative Judge:

This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Statement of the Case

Applicant submitted a security clearance application (e-QIP) on November 14, 2012. On June 3, 2016, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD CAF) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline B. The DOD CAF acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by DOD on September 1, 2006.

Applicant answered the SOR on June 25, 2016, and requested a decision on the record without a hearing. After timely requesting that the case be converted to a hearing,1 Department Counsel was ready to proceed on October 20, 2016. The case was assigned to me on March 1, 2017. On April 28, 2017, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the hearing was scheduled for May 18, 2017. I convened the hearing as scheduled.

I admitted Government Exhibits (GE) 1 and 2 into evidence without objection. I appended Government’s exhibit list to the record as Hearing Exhibit (HE) 1, and its request for administrative notice of relevant facts about the Kyrgyz Republic as HE 2, without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A through D, which I admitted without objection. At Applicant’s request, I left the record open to June 1, 2017. Applicant timely provided additional documents which I admitted as AX E through L, without objection. I appended to the record two post-hearing emails as HE 3. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on May 30, 2017.

On June 8, 2017, the DOD implemented new AG.2 Accordingly, I have applied the June 2017 AG.3 However, because the September 2006 AG were in effect on the date the FORM was completed, I have also considered the September 2006 AG. I conclude that my decision would have been the same under either version.

Findings of Fact4

Applicant, age 35, married his wife in 2014. He has two stepdaughters, ages 8 and 7. He received his bachelor’s degree in 2009. He served honorably in the U.S. Army on active duty from 2000 through 2002, and in the U.S. Army National Guard on active reserve duty from 2002 through 2012. He has been employed as a systems engineer by a defense contractor since 2011. He has maintained a security clearance since 2009.5

Applicant’s wife and two stepdaughters are citizens of Kyrgyzstan (SOR ¶ 1.a). They have lawfully resided with the Applicant in the United States since November 2014.6 Applicant’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, and two sisters-in-law are citizens and residents of Kyrgyzstan (SOR ¶ 1.b). Before moving to the United States, Applicant’s wife had been employed by the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan for approximately six years. Since moving to the United States, Applicant’s wife has been employed as a freelance translator and as a fitness instructor. Recently, she began working for a grocery store. She has never been employed by the Kyrgyzstan government or military.7

Applicant’s father-in-law is 68 years old and his mother-in-law is 66 years old. They reside in the capital city, Bishkek. His father-in-law owns a small engine repair shop. While his father-in-law has never been employed by the Kyrgyzstan government as alleged in SOR ¶ 1.b, he did work for the Soviet government as the head of roadway construction. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, he lost that job and became an entrepreneur. His mother-in-law is a retired entrepreneur who worked in the textile industry. Neither in-law has ever been employed by the Kyrgyzstan government or military. Applicant’s in-laws receive “minimal” retirement income from the Kyrgyzstan government, which is analogous to the U.S. social security program and not tied to any government employment. His in-laws own two apartments and a summer home in Kyrgyzstan, which Applicant’s wife and sisters will eventually inherit. Applicant was not certain of the values for these properties, but estimated that at one point the two apartments were worth approximately $80,000 each.8

Since Applicant’s parents-in-law speak limited English, his wife and stepdaughters translate his conversations with them. His wife talks to her parents approximately once a week or once every other week, primarily via Face Time. During those conversations, Applicant usually exchanges pleasantries with them.9

Applicant’s wife has two sisters, one of whom is her identical twin (Sister A) and the other who is the eldest of the three (Sister B). They both also reside in the capital city, Bishkek. After working for the U.S. Embassy as a U.S. government employee in Kyrgyzstan for 15 years, Sister A became employed by the United Nations. For both entities, she worked in human resources. Sister B has been employed by a non- governmental organization as a cleaning person. Sister A is divorced and Sister B is widowed. Neither Sister A nor Sister B have ever been employed by the Kyrgyzstan government or military. Sister B’s 26-year-old son has worked for the U.S Embassy in Kyrgyzstan for approximately four years.10

Applicant’s wife communicates with Sister A daily by either text, phone, or Face Time; and with Sister B approximately once every two weeks. He often exchanges pleasantries with Sister A while his wife is talking to her; but rarely with Sister B. Sister A has visited the United States twice, once in 2015 for Christmas and once in 2016 during a work trip. Sister A stayed at Applicant and his wife’s home on both occasions. Applicant’s wife was in Kyrgyzstan during her 2016 visit. Sister A’s 12-year-old daughter stayed with Applicant and his wife in the United States for six months between 2016 and 2017 while Sister A was on work travel.11

Applicant travelled to Kyrgyzstan twice in 2013, twice in 2014, once in 2015, and once in 2016. All of these trips were personal in nature. Except for his wife’s solo trip to Kyrgyzstan in early 2017, Applicant was with his wife and stepdaughters either visiting his wife’s family or sightseeing. On each occasion, they stayed in an apartment owned by his parents-in-law, who reside elsewhere. Since 2014, Sister A has resided in that apartment. This is the same apartment where Applicant’s wife previously resided. In 2015 and 2016, Applicant’s wife and stepdaughters visited for a more extended period than Applicant, as it was their summer vacation.12

During her divorce proceedings, Applicant’s wife’s learned that her ex-husband had changed his name after the collapse of the Soviet Union because he was wanted for a murder committed in Russia. As Applicant, his wife, and stepdaughters were planning their move to the United States in 2014, her ex-husband threatened to prevent them from doing so. A court finally resolved the issue in his wife’s favor by granting her sole custody and terminating the ex-husbands parental rights.13

During that same time period, police officers came to his wife’s apartment on more than one occasion; once asking about the whereabouts of her ex-husband, once checking for guns registered to her ex-husband, and at least twice asking questions of their neighbors about who resided in the apartment. Applicant was present only during the gun check. While there, the police asked him to present his passport. Applicant does not know whether these police interactions were solely related to the ex-husband’s murder charge, his wife’s custody battle with her ex-husband, or with him being an American. He reported these police interactions to U.S. Embassy personnel. Since his wife and stepdaughters moved to the United States in 2014, Applicant and his wife have not had any interactions with the police during their visits to Kyrgyzstan, nor have their former neighbors or Sister A had any police encounters about them.14

Applicant’s wife and two stepdaughters, who are currently green-card holders, plan to apply for U.S. citizenship at the earliest opportunity.15 His stepdaughters have attended public school since they arrived in the United States.16 In February 2016, Applicant and his wife purchased a home for $525,000.17 Neither own any foreign assets nor earn foreign income.18 Applicant maintains a 401K with a current balance of approximately $115,000. His wife recently opened a 401K through her fitness-instructor employer. Applicant adhered to all of his reporting requirements regarding his relationship with his wife and stepdaughters, and travel to Kyrgyzstan.19

Applicant did a 15-month tour of duty in a combat zone from 2006 through 2007.20 He has served in several other combat zones as a contractor. While serving in one of those zones, his duty station was attacked by truck bomb.21 Applicant is highly regarded for both his character and work performance.22

Administrative Notice (Kyrgyz Republic)

In response to the Government’s request, to which Applicant did not object, I have taken administrative notice of the following relevant facts about the Kyrgyz Republic:

 The Kyrgyz Republic has a parliamentary form of government intended to limit presidential power and enhance the role of parliament and the prime minister.

 Since the crisis began in Ukraine in 2014, Moscow has redoubled its efforts to reinforce its influence in Eurasia. Events in Ukraine raised Moscow’s perceived stakes for increasing its presence in the region to prevent future regime change in the former Soviet republics and for accelerating a shift to a mulitpolar world in which Russia is the uncontested regional hegemon in Eurasia. Moscow will therefore continue to push for greater regional integration, raising pressure on neighboring states to follow the example of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan and join the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union.

 The Kyrgyz Republic remains vulnerable to transnational threats, especially in southern areas. The recession in Russia increased unemployment among Kyrgyz migrant laborers and had significant ripple effects on the Kyrgyz economy, potentially leaving the population more vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. The Kyrgyz Republic’s counterterrorism efforts focuses on countering violent extremism (CVE), rooting out extremists, monitoring the flow of Kyrgyz national foreign terrorist fighters, and preventing those returning from conflicts abroad from engaging in terrorist activities. The State Committee for National Security (GKNB) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) conducts several operations targeting individuals suspected of affiliation with banned religious groups or extremist recruitment activities. Impediments to more effective counterterrorism law enforcement activity included interagency rivalries, a lack of coordination between the GKNB and MVD, and budgetary constraints.

 The most important human rights problems include routine violations of fundamental procedural protections in all stages of the judicial process; law enforcement officers’ use of arbitrary arrest and torture; and attacks, threats, and systematic, police-driven extortion of sexual and ethnic minority groups. Additional human rights problems included pervasive corruption. Underscoring the country’s human rights problems was an atmosphere of impunity for officials in the security services and elsewhere in government who committed abuses and engaged in corrupt practices. This situation reflected the central government’s inability and unwillingness to hold human rights violators accountable, allowing security forces to act arbitrarily, and emboldening law enforcement officers to prey on vulnerable citizens.

POLICIES

“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”23 As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.”24 The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”25

Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.

The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”26 Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR.27 “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”28 The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.29 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.30 An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government.31

An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”32 “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”33

ANALYSIS

Guideline B (Foreign Influence)

The security concern under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) is set out in AG ¶ 6, as follows:

Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

The following disqualifying conditions under this guideline are potentially relevant:

AG ¶ 7(a): contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

AG ¶ 7(b): connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology; and

AG ¶ 7(e): shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.

Applicant and his wife’s close family ties to citizens and residents of Kyrgyzstan establish AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(e). A “heightened risk” is associated with the Kyrgyz Republic given Russia’s influence there, the impediments to its counterterrorism efforts, and significant human rights problems, including pervasive government corruption. Applicant’s ties to his wife and stepdaughters, who are citizens of Kyrgyzstan and lawful U.S. residents, do not establish AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), or 7(e).

Application of the guidelines is not a comment on an applicant’s patriotism but merely an acknowledgment that people may act in unpredictable ways when faced with choices that could be important to a loved one, such as a family member.34 Family relationships can involve matters of influence or obligation.35 As a matter of common sense and human experience, there is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, the immediate family members of the person’s spouse.36 Moreover, Applicant’s marital relationship provides a conduit for susceptibility to foreign influence because of the vulnerabilities associated with the relationship with his in-laws, directly and indirectly through his wife.37 Therefore, these family ties raise concerns for which he has the burden of persuasion to mitigate.38

The following mitigating conditions under this guideline are potentially relevant:

AG ¶ 8(a): the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States;

AG ¶ 8(b): there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and

AG ¶ 8(e): the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country.

None of his in-laws have any connection to the Kyrgyzstan government or military beyond the minimal income that his parents-in-law receive in the form of social- security-like benefits. His father-in-law is a small business owner, and his mother-in-law is retired. They own three properties. Sister A worked in human resources for the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan for 15 years, and now for the United Nations. Sister B is a cleaning person and her son works for the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan. They all live in the capital city, which is in the northern part of the country. It is unlikely Applicant will be placed in a position of having to choose the interests of his in-laws over the interests of the United States. AG ¶ 8(a) is established.

Applicant’s wife and stepdaughters have resided with him in the United States since 2014, where they have made their home. His stepdaughters are being educated in public school. Applicant promptly reported his relationship with his wife and stepdaughters, the police interactions, and his foreign travel. Since 2014, Applicant and his wife have not had any police interactions while visiting Kyrgyzstan, nor have there been any police interactions with former neighbors or Sister A about them. His wife and stepdaughters plan to apply for U.S. citizenship at the earliest opportunity. Applicant and his wife own a home and maintain all other assets in the United States. While Applicant and his wife have close family ties in Kyrgyzstan, their financial interests, future plans, and loyalties are in the United States. Therefore, I conclude that Applicant would resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. AG ¶ 8(b) and 8(e) are established.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of national security eligibility is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the following guidelines, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis, and I have considered the factors in AG ¶ 2(d). Applicant was candid, sincere, and credible at the hearing. He is highly regarded for his work performance and character. He honorably served in the U.S. Army, including a 15-month tour of duty in a combat zone, and has served in several other combat zones as a contractor. While serving in one of those zones, his duty station was attacked by truck bomb. Under these circumstances, I do not doubt his allegiance to the United States. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person and the “heightened risk” associated with Kyrgyzstan, I conclude that Applicant has mitigated the security concerns raised by his family ties in Kyrgyzstan. Accordingly, I conclude that he has carried his burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him eligibility for access to classified information.

FORMAL FINDINGS

I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B (Foreign Influence): FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.b: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is granted.

Gina L. Marine Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

1 Transcript (Tr.) at 5-6. 2 On December 10, 2016, the Security Executive Agent issued Directive 4 (SEAD-4), establishing a “single, common adjudicative criteria for all covered individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.” (SEAD-4 ¶ B, Purpose). The SEAD-4 became effective on June 8, 2017 (SEAD-4 ¶ F, Effective Date). The National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG), which are found at Appendix A to SEAD-4, apply to determine eligibility for initial or continued access to classified national security information. (SEAD-4 ¶ C, Applicability). 3 ISCR Case No. 02-00305 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 12, 2003) (security clearance decisions must be based on current DOD policy and standards). 4 Unless otherwise indicated by citation to another part of the record, I extracted these facts from Applicant’s SOR answer, e-QIP (GE 1), and the summary of his background investigation interview (GE 2). 5 See also Tr. at 8-10; 27, 38-42. 6 Tr. at 27, 38, 79, AX K, AX L. 7 Tr. at 44-45, 52. 8 Tr. at 56-57, 68-69; AX B. 9 Tr. at 20-21, 54-57. 10 Tr. at 37-38, 52-54, 57-60, 67-68, 70-74, 78, 90-91; AX B. 11 Tr. at 37-38, 52-54, 57-60, 67-68, 70-74, 78, 90-91. 12 Tr. at 46, 48-51, 76-81. 13 Tr. at 61-66, 81-89. 14 Tr. at 61-66, 81-89; AE E. 15 Tr. at 39; AX J. 16 Tr. at 45. 17 Tr. at 43-44. 18 Tr. at 45-47. 19 Tr. at 47-48, AX C, AE E. 20 Tr. at 42-43. 21 Tr. at 26-27, 42. 22 AXD, AX E. 23 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). 24 Egan at 527. 25 EO 10865 § 2. 26 EO 10865 § 7. 27 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 28 See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). 29 See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993). 30 Directive ¶ E3.1.15. 31 See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 32 ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). 33 Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; See also AG ¶ 2(b). 34 ISCR Case No. 08-10025 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov. 3, 2009). 35 ISCR Case No. 02-04786 (App. Bd. Jun. 27, 2003). 36 ISCR Case No. 01-03120 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002). 37 ISCR Case No. 03-24144 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Dec. 6, 2005)(The Appeal Board let stand the Administrative Judge’s conclusion that the potential existed for pressure to be placed on the applicant’s in-laws that could then be extended to the applicant through the applicant’s spouse.). 38 ISCR Case No. 99-0532 at 7 (App. Bd. Dec. 15, 2000) (When an applicant’s ties in a foreign country raise a prima facie security concern, the applicant is required to present evidence of rebuttal, extenuation, or mitigation sufficient to carry his burden of persuasion that it is “clearly consistent with the national interest” to grant or continue a security clearance on his behalf).