CASE · Clearance Adjudication Search EngineCASE

Loading case…

ISCR Case 16-00594.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-00594.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-00594.h1

grantedSep 20, 2017· Hon. Gina L. Marine· hearing

Summary

A 53-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen, originally from Israel, was granted a security clearance despite concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailed several allegations, including the applicant's co-ownership of an Israeli apartment valued at approximately $175,000, where his father resides. The SOR also noted his wife's dual citizenship, and that his father, sister, and wife's parents are all citizens and residents of Israel. His father-in-law had past associations with banks that may have been governmental entities.

Further allegations included the applicant and his wife maintaining separate Israeli retirement accounts with a combined worth of approximately $300,000, and a joint bank account with his sister for his father's expenses, holding no more than $4,000. The applicant also maintained casual contact with three Israeli friends.

The clearance was granted because the applicant demonstrated strong ties to the U.S., including long-term residency and employment in the defense industry. Crucially, the applicant and his family expressed a willingness to renounce their Israeli citizenship if required. Additionally, all of the applicant's immediate family members are U.S. citizens, which mitigated concerns about divided allegiance.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant demonstrated significant ties to the United States, including long-term residency and employment in the defense industry.
The applicant and his family expressed willingness to renounce their Israeli citizenship if required for the security clearance.
The applicant's immediate family members are all U.S. citizens, reducing the risk of divided allegiance.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons Creating Potential Conflict of Interest
AG ¶ 7(e)raisedShared Living Quarters with Foreign Persons

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(b)appliedMinimal Conflict of Interest Due to Strong U.S. Ties
AG ¶ 8(f)appliedRoutine Nature of Foreign Interests Unlikely to Result in Conflict

Key Rule Quoted

“Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the AG.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedAug 20, 2016
Answer filedSep 7, 2016
Hearing heldJun 22, 2017
Decision dateSep 20, 2017

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Importance of U.S. Ties in Security Clearance Determinations
Applicants' Willingness to Renounce Foreign Citizenship as a Mitigating Factor

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant's foreign ties, including family members in Israel, did not pose a significant risk of foreign influence. The applicant's willingness to renounce dual citizenship and his strong ties to the United States were key factors in the decision. Ultimately, the applicant was granted eligibility for access to classified information under Guideline B.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business · U.S. Financial Assets Predominant · Intent to Remain in U.S.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
2.a	Applicant and his sister share equally the ownership of the apartment where their father resides. His share is approximately $175,000 (SOR ¶ 2.a).	For Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Israel HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
2.b	The SOR alleges the dual citizenship of his wife (SOR ¶ 2.b), but not his children.	For Applicant	Spouse Dual or Foreign Citizen Immediate Family	Israel HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
2.c	Applicant’s father is also a citizen and resident of Israel, as are his wife’s parents (SOR ¶¶ 2.c, 2.e, and 2.f).	For Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Israel HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
2.d	Applicant has one sibling. She is a citizen and resident of Israel (SOR ¶ 2.d).	For Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Israel HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
2.e	His wife’s parents are both retired. (SOR ¶¶ 2.c, 2.e, and 2.f).	For Applicant	In Law in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Israel HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
2.f	None of these family members had careers affiliated with the Israeli military or government except for his father-in-law, who was associated with certain banks that may have been governmental entities. (SOR ¶¶ 2.c, 2.e, and 2.f).	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	Israel HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
2.g	Applicant maintains “casual” contact with three friends who are citizens and residents of Israel (SOR ¶ 2.g).	For Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend	Israel HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
2.h	Applicant and his wife each maintain separate retirement accounts in Israel, with a combined worth of approximately $300,000 (SOR ¶ 2.h).	For Applicant	Foreign Bank Account or Investment Financial or Property Interest	Israel HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(f) substantial foreign business, financial, or property interests	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
2.i	Applicant maintains a bank account with his sister to pay for his father’s day-to-day expenses (SOR ¶ 2.i). The account carries a balance of no more than approximately $4,000 at any given time.	For Applicant	Financial Support to Foreign Relative Financial or Property Interest	Israel HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(f) substantial foreign business, financial, or property interests	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) [REDACTED] ) ISCR Case No. 16-00594 ) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Alison O’Connell, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 09/20/2017 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

MARINE, Gina L., Administrative Judge:

This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Statement of the Case

Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on April 13, 2015. On August 20, 2016, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD CAF) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline B and Guideline C (Foreign Preference). The DOD CAF acted under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by DOD on September 1, 2006.

Applicant answered the SOR on September 7, 2016, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on October 17, 2016. The case was assigned to me on May 3, 2017. On June 1, 2017, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the hearing was scheduled for June 22, 2017. I convened the hearing as scheduled. At the hearing, I admitted Government Exhibits (GE) 1 and 2 into evidence without objection. I appended to the record a letter the Government sent to Applicant as Hearing Exhibit (HE) I, and the Government’s exhibit list as HE II. Applicant testified and did not submit any exhibits. At Applicant’s request, I left the record open until July 6, 2017. Applicant timely provided additional documents, which I admitted as Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through F, without objection. I appended post-hearing emails as HE III. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on July 5, 2017.

On June 8, 2017, the DOD implemented new AG.1 Accordingly, I have applied the June 2017 AG.2 However, I have also considered the September 2006 AG because they were in effect on the date the SOR was issued. I conclude that my decision would have been the same under either version.

SOR Amendment

At the hearing, I granted Department Counsel’s motion, without objection, to amend the SOR to withdraw the sole Guideline C allegation, paragraph 1.a of the SOR.3

Findings of Fact4

Applicant is 53 years old and has been married for 26 years. He and his wife have three children, ages 24, 19, and 11. Applicant received his associate’s degree in 1984 from a technical college in Israel, bachelor’s degree in 1994 from a university in Israel, and master’s degree in 2000 from a U.K.-affiliated university based in Israel. Since then, Applicant has worked as an engineer in the telecommunications field.5

In approximately 1988, Applicant became employed by a private Israeli high-tech company (Company A) in its Israel office and then transitioned to its U.S. branch office in 2000, where he remained until he was laid off in 2013. In 2002, he began working in support of the U.S. defense industry. 6

In 2014, Applicant began his own consulting company. His jobs included representing the interests of two different private Israeli telecommunications companies in the sale of their products to U.S. companies. Company B was an Israeli company and Company C was a company that was registered in the U.S. but developed its product in Israel. He received a commission-based salary from Company B in an amount not specified in the record, and a monthly salary of $1,500 from Company C. He worked with Company C for approximately two years beginning in 2014, and with Company B for a period not specified in the record in 2015. He is no longer affiliated with either entity and has no present ties with any other Israeli companies.7

In 2015, Applicant contracted as a consultant through his company with the defense contractor sponsoring his first application for a security clearance. In 2016, he began working full time for his current employer as a salaried employed. Since then, his consulting company has remained dormant, as he is not able to accept any work from his sponsor until he receives his security clearance, and has not taken on any other clients.8

Applicant immigrated to the United States in 2000, as a citizen of Israel. In 2008, he became a naturalized U.S. citizen, retaining dual citizenship. His wife and three children have similar dual citizenship. His two older children were born in Israel, and his youngest in the United States. The SOR alleges the dual citizenship of his wife (SOR ¶ 2.b), but not his children. Applicant and his wife are both willing to renounce their Israeli citizenship if it is required for him to maintain a security clearance.9

Applicant has one sibling. She is a citizen and resident of Israel (SOR ¶ 2.d). Applicant’s father is also a citizen and resident of Israel, as are his wife’s parents (SOR ¶¶ 2.c, 2.e, and 2.f). His father, age 86, retired over 20 years ago from the textile industry. Applicant’s sister, age 56, is employed by a private health company. Her husband is retired from the retail industry. His wife’s parents are both retired. His mother-in-law, age 72, was an elementary school teacher, and his father-in-law, age 71, was a programmer in the banking industry. None of these family members had careers affiliated with the Israeli military or government except for his father-in-law, who was associated with certain banks that may have been governmental entities. His mother-in- law receives a government-sponsored pension in an amount not specified in the record. Applicant did not know whether his father-in-law’s pension is similarly sponsored. His father receives social security and a holocaust-survivor pension from the Israeli government in amounts not specified in the record, which serve as his primary means of support. Applicant is in contact with his father daily by phone, and with his sister and his wife’s parents weekly by phone or electronic means. He sees them in person during his visits to Israel.10

Applicant maintains “casual” contact with three friends who are citizens and residents of Israel (SOR ¶ 2.g). All three friends are his former Company A coworkers. Friend 1 is now employed by another private telecommunications company. Friends 2 and 3 remain employed by Company A. Historically, Applicant was in contact, by phone or electronic means, weekly with Friend 1, monthly with Friend 2, and quarterly with Friend 3. In the last two years, that contact has not been “very often.” He sees them in person during his visits to Israel.11

Applicant visits Israel at least once each year, sometimes more. He intends to continue those visits, especially since his father is aging. When he was consulting, he sometimes travelled there for work. Otherwise, his visits are to spend time with family and friends. During the last two years, he has stayed with his sister during his visits. On prior occasions, he has stayed in a hotel. In 2016, he brought his two daughters with him. He plans to bring his youngest daughter with him in 2017.12

Applicant and his wife each maintain separate retirement accounts in Israel, with a combined worth of approximately $300,000 (SOR ¶ 2.h). Applicant and his sister share equally the ownership of the apartment where their father resides. His share is approximately $175,000 (SOR ¶ 2.a). Applicant maintains a bank account with his sister to pay for his father’s day-to-day expenses (SOR ¶ 2.i). The account carries a balance of no more than approximately $4,000 at any given time. Applicant and his wife either sold or transferred to the United States any asset they previously owned in Israel before immigrating to the United States.13

Applicant and his wife maintain assets in the United States, including their primary residence with equity valued at approximately $350,000, a rental property with equity valued at approximately $150,000, two undeveloped plots of land valued at an amount not specified in the record, and separate retirement accounts with a combined worth of approximately $420,000.14 Applicant’s two eldest children were ages seven and three when they immigrated to the United States. Since then, they have been educated in U.S. schools. His eldest child is currently a graduate student, his second is a college student, and the third is in middle school. Applicant and his family have built a life here in the United States and have no plans to live elsewhere.15

Applicant served in the Israeli Air Force from 1983 through 1987, of which three years were mandatory. Applicant has not voted in an Israel election since he moved to the United States.16 Applicant served in a two-day jury trial in May 2017.17 A friend and former colleague praised Applicant’s character and work performance. He described Applicant’s work on an important defense project as making a “huge difference in the war effort.”18

Administrative Notice (Israel)

I have taken administrative notice of the U.S. Government’s pronouncements concerning Israel, as outlined in GE 2 and the documents appended thereto, including the following:

 Although the United States has provided regular military support to Israel, there is a significant documented history of classified information and controlled technologies being illegally imported by private Israeli entities. Illegal technology transfers, even to private Israeli entities, are a significant concern because foreign government entities – including intelligence organizations and security services – have learned to capitalize on private-sector technology acquisitions.

 In the past 30 years, there have been at least three cases in which U.S. Government employees were convicted of disclosing classified information to Israel or of conspiracy to act as an Israeli agent. Reports indicate that concerns regarding possible Israeli espionage persist among U.S. officials.

 The U.S. Department of State warns all persons seeking to enter or depart Israel, the West Bank, or Gaza are subject to security screening, including prolonged questioning and physical searches, and may be denied entry or exit. Israeli security officials have also on occasion requested access to travelers’ personal e-mail accounts or other social media accounts as a condition of entry. In such circumstances, travelers should have no expectation of privacy for any data stored on such devices or in their accounts.

POLICIES

“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”19 As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.”20 The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”21

Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.

The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”22 Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR.23 “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”24 The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.25 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.26 An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government.27

An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”28 “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”29

ANALYSIS

Guideline B (Foreign Influence)

The security concern under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) is set out in AG ¶ 6, as follows:

Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

The following disqualifying conditions under this guideline are potentially relevant:

AG ¶ 7(a): contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; AG ¶ 7(b): connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology;

AG ¶ 7(e): shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and

AG ¶ 7(f) substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country, or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could subject the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation or personal conflict of interest.

Applicant’s ties to his father, sister, and in-laws who are citizens and residents of Israel establish AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b), and his indirect ties to his in-laws through his wife establish AG ¶ 7(e). While casual in nature, Applicant’s contact with close friends who work in the telecommunications industry establishes AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b). AG ¶ 7(f) is not established as to Applicant’s interest the apartment where his father’s resides, his retirement account, and the bank account used for his father’s benefit given that the nature and value of those assets is not substantial as compared to the nature and value of his U.S. assets. A “heightened risk” is associated with Israel given its infringements on privacy rights, history of illegally imported classified information and controlled technologies, and the concerns regarding possible Israeli espionage against the United States. Applicant’s wife’s dual citizenship does not establish any disqualifying condition under Guideline B.

The following mitigating conditions under this guideline are established:

AG ¶ 8(b): there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and

AG ¶ 8(f): the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.

Applicant chose to immigrate to the United States over 17 years ago with his wife and two children. His third child was born in the United States. Applicant has accumulated significant U.S. assets, been gainfully employed in the U.S. for over 17 years, and began working with the defense industry 15 years ago. Neither Applicant nor any of his Israel-based family or friends have any security-significant connection to the Israeli military or government. His immediate family are all citizens and residents of the United States. While Applicant has close ties to family and friends who are citizens and residents of Israel, his stronger ties are in the United States. Therefore, I conclude that Applicant would resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.

In the event that Applicant’s interest the apartment where his father’s resides, his retirement account, and the bank account used for his father’s benefit are deemed sufficient to establish AG ¶ 7(f), I find the nature and value of those assets is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure Applicant.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of national security eligibility is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the following guidelines, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis, and I have considered the factors in AG ¶ 2(d). Applicant was candid, sincere, and credible at the hearing. He is highly regarded for his work performance and character. He has made important contributions to the U.S. war effort through his work in support of the defense industry. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person and the “heightened risk” associated with Israel, I conclude that Applicant has mitigated the concerns raised by his ties to citizens and residents of Israel, and by his assets in Israel. Accordingly, I conclude that he has carried his burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him eligibility for access to classified information.

FORMAL FINDINGS

I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR:

Paragraph 2, Guideline B (Foreign Influence): FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 2.a – 2.i: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is granted.

Gina L. Marine Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

1 On December 10, 2016, the Security Executive Agent issued Directive 4 (SEAD-4), establishing a “single, common adjudicative criteria for all covered individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.” (SEAD-4 ¶ B, Purpose). The SEAD-4 became effective on June 8, 2017 (SEAD-4 ¶ F, Effective Date). The National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG), which are found at Appendix A to SEAD-4, apply to determine eligibility for initial or continued access to classified national security information. (SEAD-4 ¶ C, Applicability). 2 ISCR Case No. 02-00305 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 12, 2003) (security clearance decisions must be based on current DOD policy and standards). 3 Tr. at 9. 4 Unless otherwise indicated by citation to another part of the record, I extracted these facts from Applicant’s SOR answer and his SCA (GE 1). 5 See also Tr. at 6-8, 29-31. 6 See also Tr. at 6-8, 22-25, 29-32, 44-46, and 51-52. During his tenure with Company A, the name of the company changed at times to reflect various divisions and acquisitions. Any reference to Company A includes those various names. 7 See also Tr. at 6-8, 22-25, 29-32, and 44-46. 8 See also Tr. at 6-8, 22-25, 29-32, and 44-46. 9 See also Tr. at 26. 10 See also Tr. at 26-27, 33-37, and 54. I considered that Applicant’s brother-in-law completed his mandatory military service, and may have served “a little bit longer.” While Applicant was not certain, he estimated his father’s service to have been less than five years. 11 See also Tr. at 27, 37-39. 12 See also Tr. at 53-54. 13 See also Tr. at 25-28, 39-41. 14 Tr. at 42-45, 49-50; AE A through E. 15 Tr. at 22-29, and 59-61. 16 See also Tr. at 22, 24, 29, and 53-54. 17 Tr. at 56. 18 AE F. 19 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). 20 Egan at 527. 21 EO 10865 § 2. 22 EO 10865 § 7. 23 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 24 See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). 25 See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993). 26 Directive ¶ E3.1.15. 27 See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 28 ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). 29 Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; See also AG ¶ 2(b).