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ISCR Case 07-14830.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 07-14830.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 07-14830.h1

grantedJul 3, 2008· Hon. Edward W. Loughran· hearing

Summary

A 52-year-old U.S. citizen, born in Iran, was granted a security clearance despite concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference). The Statement of Reasons cited his possession and use of an Iranian passport, including its renewal, as well as the fact that his in-laws are citizens and residents of Iran, a country hostile to the U.S. These foreign ties were alleged to create a risk of exploitation or coercion.

However, the applicant successfully mitigated these concerns. He surrendered his Iranian passport to his facility security officer and stated he has no intention of renewing it or returning to Iran, thereby addressing foreign preference issues. Furthermore, his strong family ties within the U.S. and the absence of any connections between his family members and the Iranian government reduced the risk of foreign influence.

The judge ultimately granted the security clearance, concluding that the applicant demonstrated established loyalty to the U.S. and that there was no coercive risk posed by his foreign family members.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant surrendered his Iranian passport to his facility security officer, mitigating foreign preference concerns.
He has no intention of renewing his Iranian passport or returning to Iran, demonstrating a commitment to U.S. interests.
The applicant's family ties in the U.S. and the lack of connections to the Iranian government reduce the risk of foreign influence.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 10(a)raisedPossession of a Current Foreign Passport
AG ¶ 10(b)raisedAction to Acquire or Obtain Recognition of a Foreign Citizenship
AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with a Foreign Family Member
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to a Foreign Person or Government
AG ¶ 7(d)raisedSharing Living Quarters with a Foreign National

Mitigating

AG ¶ 11(a)appliedDual Citizenship Based Solely on Parents’ Citizenship
AG ¶ 11(b)appliedWillingness to Renounce Dual Citizenship
AG ¶ 11(e)appliedPassport Has Been Surrendered or Invalidated
AG ¶ 8(b)appliedNo Conflict of Interest Due to Strong U.S. Ties

Key Rule Quoted

“The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedMar 19, 2008
Answer filedApr 1, 2008
Hearing heldJun 5, 2008
Decision dateJul 3, 2008

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Preference Concerns Through Surrender of Foreign Passport
Demonstrating Strong U.S. Ties to Mitigate Foreign Influence Risks
Willingness to Renounce Dual Citizenship as a Mitigating Factor

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant mitigated the foreign influence concerns related to his in-laws residing in Iran. The applicant's ties to the U.S. and his willingness to renounce any foreign citizenship were significant factors in the decision to grant security clearance.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
2.a	Applicant’s in-laws are citizens and residents of Iran, a country that is clearly hostile to the United States.	For Applicant	In Law in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Iran HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Other
2.b	His family members’ presence in Iran creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion, both through him and through his wife.	For Applicant	In Law in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Iran HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Other

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline C (Foreign Preference) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant mitigated the Foreign Preference security concerns. The applicant had previously possessed and used an Iranian passport but surrendered it and expressed a willingness to renounce any foreign citizenship. The judge ruled in favor of the applicant on all allegations under Guideline C.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶10)	Mitigating applied (¶11)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant possessed and used an Iranian passport while a U.S. citizen.	For Applicant	Foreign Passport Possession or Use	Admitted	(a) applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country	(b) dual citizenship is based solely on parental citizenship or birth in a foreign country, and there is no evidence of foreign preference (e) the exercise of the entitlements or benefits of foreign citizenship do not present a national security concern	Claimed Other
1.b	The renewal of his Iranian passport while a U.S. citizen could raise concerns under AG ¶ 10(b), as an action to obtain recognition of his Iranian citizenship.	For Applicant	Foreign Citizenship Acquisition or Application	Unknown	(b) failure to report, or fully disclose when required, possession of a passport or identity card issued by any country other than the U.S.	(b) dual citizenship is based solely on parental citizenship or birth in a foreign country, and there is no evidence of foreign preference (e) the exercise of the entitlements or benefits of foreign citizenship do not present a national security concern	Claimed Other
1.c–1.e	3 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant).	For Applicant			—	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline C). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 07-14830 ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Ray T. Blank, Jr., Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro Se

July 3, 2008 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

LOUGHRAN, Edward W., Administrative Judge:

Applicant has mitigated the Foreign Preference and Foreign Influence security concerns. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

On March 19, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing the security concerns under Guideline C, Foreign Preference and Guideline B, Foreign Influence. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.

Applicant answered the SOR in writing on April 1, 2008, and requested a hearing before an Administrative Judge. The case was assigned to me on May 5, 2008. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on May 20, 2008, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on June 5, 2008. The Government offered Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3, which were received without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf and submitted Exhibits (AE) A through N, which were received without objection. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on June 16, 2008.

Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings

Notice

I advised Applicant of his right under ¶ E3.1.8 of the Directive to 15 days notice before the hearing. Applicant affirmatively waived his right to 15 days notice.

Request for Administrative Notice

Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice of certain facts relating to Iran. Applicant did not object and the request was approved. The request and the attached documents were not admitted into evidence but were included in the record as HE I through XII. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant is a 52-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He was born in Iran. He came to the United States in the late 1970sto attend college. He graduated with a bachelor’s degree from an American university. He remained in the United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1986. Applicant married a native-born U.S. citizen in 1982. They divorced in 1997. They have two children, ages 17 and 14. His first wife is of a different religion than the official religion of Iran. His two children have been raised in that religion.1 Applicant married again in 2002. His wife was born in Iran. She was introduced to Applicant through relatives in the United States. She became a U.S. citizen in 2006. As discussed below, U.S. citizens who were born in Iran are considered Iranian citizens by Iranian authorities. She maintained an Iranian passport in order to visit her relatives in Iran. They have a three-year-old child.2

Applicant’s parents are deceased. He has three siblings who are all citizens and residents of the United States. They live in the same geographic region as Applicant. They have children who were born in the U.S. His mother-in-law and father-in-law are citizens and residents of Iran. They are retired professionals with no association with the Iranian government. They have both applied for immigrant visas to become U.S. permanent residents. Their applications are pending. His wife speaks with her parents about once a month. She has a sibling who is a citizen and resident of Iran. He is a student. Applicant and his wife would like to bring him to the United States after her parents have arrived. She has another sibling who is a citizen and resident of a country that is an ally of the U.S.3

Applicant visited Iran on six occasions between about 2002 and 2006. The purpose of his trips in 2002 was to meet and marry his wife. In 2003, he returned to Iran to bring his wife to the United States. He visited Iran on two other occasions so that he and his wife could visit his in-laws and so that his in-laws could see their grandchild. He traveled to Iran using an Iranian passport. When he realized that possession of a foreign passport posed a security concern, he “surrendered” it to his facility security officer (FSO). The FSO certified the receipt of the passport and that the company would maintain the passport until Applicant “no longer requires a security clearance or no longer works for this company, which ever is sooner.” The FSO further stated “in the event [Applicant] requests his passport, we will immediately notify DOHA of his request.” The passport is now expired and Applicant has no intention to renew it or obtain another Iranian passport. Applicant is willing to renounce his dual citizenship, but he has not formally renounced his Iranian citizenship, as that would be ill-advised. He does not intend to return to Iran.4

Applicant does not own any foreign assets. He has considerable assets in the U.S. In addition to his current job with the defense contractor, he has other interests. He has a real estate license. He is a very experienced, highly trained instructor in a discipline that combines athleticism, self-defense, endurance, self-discipline, and respect for others. Character letters on his behalf describe him as trustworthy, organized, efficient, respectful, and a man of great integrity. He is recommended for any endeavor that involves trustworthiness.5

Iran

Iran is a constitutional Islamic republic with a theocratic system of government in which Shi’a Muslim clergy dominate the key power structures, and ultimate political authority is vested in a learned religious scholar. The U.S. has not had diplomatic relations with Iran since 1980. The President’s National Security Strategy has stated that the United States “may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran.” The U.S. Government has defined the areas of objectionable Iranian behavior as:

• Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD); • Its support for and involvement in international terrorism; • Its support for violent opposition to the Middle East peace process; and • Its dismal human rights record. Iran’s intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq is also a concern.

The U.S. has designated and characterized Iran as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. Iran provides critical support to non-state terrorist groups.

The government of Iran has committed numerous, serious human rights abuses against the Iranian people. Abuses include political killings and incarceration; summary executions, including of minors; disappearances; religious persecution; torture; arbitrary arrest and detention, including prolonged solitary confinement; denial of due process; severe restrictions on civil liberties - speech, press, assembly, association, movement and privacy; severe restrictions on freedom of religion; official corruption; violence and legal and societal discrimination against women, ethnic and religious minorities, and homosexuals; trafficking in persons; and child labor.

The State Department continues to warn U.S. citizens to consider carefully the risks of travel to Iran. U.S. citizens who were born in Iran and the children of Iranian citizens, even those without Iranian passports who do not consider themselves Iranian, are considered Iranian citizens by Iranian authorities, since Iran does not recognize dual citizenship. Therefore, despite the fact that these individuals hold U.S. citizenship, under Iranian law, they must enter and exit Iran on an Iranian passport, unless the Iranian government has recognized a formal renunciation or loss of Iranian citizenship. U.S.- Iranian dual nationals have been denied permission to enter/depart Iran using their U.S. passport; they even had their U.S. passports confiscated upon arrival or departure. U.S.-Iranian dual citizens have been detained and harassed by the Iranian government. Iranian security personnel may place foreign visitors under surveillance. Hotel rooms, telephones and fax machines may be monitored, and personal possessions in hotel rooms may be searched.

POLICIES

When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the Administrative Judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, Administrative Judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The Administrative Judge’s over-arching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.” The Administrative Judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security decision.

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

ANALYSIS

Guideline C, Foreign Preference

The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Preference is set out in AG ¶ 9:

When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 10. Two are potentially applicable in this case:

(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport;

(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an American citizen.

Applicant possessed and used an Iranian passport while a U.S. citizen. AG ¶ 10(a) is applicable. The renewal of his Iranian passport while a U.S. citizen could raise concerns under AG ¶ 10(b), as an action to obtain recognition of his Iranian citizenship.

Conditions that could mitigate Foreign Preference security concerns are provided under AG ¶ 11. Three are potentially applicable:

(a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country;

(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship; and

(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated.

Iran continued to consider Applicant an Iranian citizen after he was naturalized as a U.S. citizen. As such, he was required to use an Iranian passport to enter Iran. When he became aware that the passport was a security concern, he surrendered it to his company’s security officer. The passport is now expired and Applicant does not intend to renew it or obtain another one. To the extent that Iran considers him an Iranian citizen, he is very willing to renounce that citizenship. AG ¶ 11(a) is partially applicable. AG ¶¶ 11(b) and (e) are applicable.

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in AG ¶ 7:

Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 7. Three are potentially applicable in this case: (a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and

(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.

Applicant’s in-laws are citizens and residents of Iran, a country that is clearly hostile to the United States.6 He traveled to Iran on six occasions between about 2002 and 2006. Iran is considered the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, and the government of Iran has committed numerous, serious human rights abuses against its people. His family members’ presence in Iran creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion, both through him and through his wife. It also creates a potential conflict of interest. AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b), and (d) have been raised by the evidence.

Conditions that could mitigate Foreign Influence security concerns are provided under AG ¶ 8:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;

(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;

(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or are approved by the cognizant security authority; (e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and

(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.

Applicant has been in this country for about 30 years and has been a U.S. citizen for more than 20 years. He came to the U.S. as a young man to pursue his education. He married a native-born U.S. citizen in 1982, and they have two children who were born in the U.S. Other than his in-laws, Applicant has no family left in Iran. His parents are deceased and his three siblings and their families are all American citizens. His current wife is an American citizen and their child was born in the United States. His life, career, assets, interests, and allegiance all lie in the United States. His in-laws in Iran have no connection to the Iranian government and no incentive to bring Applicant to the attention of the Iranian government. It is therefore, unlikely Applicant will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of the Iranian government, a terrorist organization, or his family members in Iran and the interests of the United States. I further find there is no conflict of interest, because Applicant has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in America, that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States. AG ¶ 8(a) is partially applicable. AG ¶ 8 (b) is applicable. No other mitigating condition is applicable.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The Administrative Judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant was born in Iran. He came to the U.S. about 30 years ago to attend college. He remained and become a U.S. citizen in 1986. He met a U.S. citizen and married her. They have two children who were born in the U.S. This marriage ended in divorce. He met an Iranian woman through relatives and traveled there on an Iranian passport to meet and marry her. The use of his Iranian passport was not because Applicant maintained a sense of loyalty or allegiance to Iran; it was the only viable option for Applicant to travel to Iran, and was consistent with the information provided by the State Department, as stated in the Hearing Exhibits. He has surrendered the passport to his security officer and it is also expired. To the extent that Iran considers him one of its citizens, he is very willing to renounce that citizenship. He has no intention on returning to Iran for any purpose. His wife is now an American citizen and their three-year-old child was born in the United States. He has been very successful and is highly regarded personally and professionally.

I considered the totality of Applicant’s family ties to Iran, a country that is clearly hostile to the United States, and the heavy burden an applicant carries when he or she has family members in a hostile country. The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S., and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the United States, or the foreign country is associated with a risk of terrorism. Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism and has a dismal human rights record. Applicant has been a U.S. citizen for more than 20 years. All his blood relatives are in the United States and are U.S. citizens. His in-laws remain in Iran. His parents-in-law’s immigrant visas are pending. Once they are in the U.S., the focus will be on bringing his wife’s sibling to the U.S. His in-laws have no connection to the Iranian government and have no reason to raise Applicant’s profile with the Iranian government. These facts minimize any potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress. Applicant was sincere, open, and honest at the hearing. In the unlikely event that his in-laws were subjected to coercion or duress from the Iranian government or terrorist groups, I find that because of his deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., including his uncompromising commitment to his country and his children, that Applicant would resolve any attempt to exert pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress in favor of the United States.

Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the Foreign Preference and Foreign Influence security concerns.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a-1.e: For Applicant

Paragraph 2, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a-1.b: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

________________________ Edward W. Loughran Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

1 A person’s choice of religion, or to have no religion, is very personal and is protected by the Constitution. It is not a basis for the granting or denial of a security clearance. It is addressed here only as evidence of Applicant’s open-mindedness and tolerance of differences and diversity. 2 Tr. at 19, 48-49, 58-63, 83-84; GE 1-3. 3 Tr. at 52-54, 60, 72-82; Applicant’s response to SOR; GE 1-3; AE B-E. 4 Tr. at 54-58, 63-72, 85-87, 92; Applicant’s response to SOR; GE 1-3; AE A. 5 Tr. at 82; AE F-M. 6 ISCR Case No. 05-03250 at 5 (App. Bd. Apr. 6, 2007).