Summary
A 57-year-old dual citizen of the U.S. and Israel was denied a security clearance under Guidelines B (Foreign Influence), C (Foreign Preference), and M (Use of Information Technology). The applicant admitted to having family ties in Israel and possessing a valid Israeli passport, which he renewed after becoming a U.S. citizen. These factors raised concerns regarding foreign influence and preference.
Additionally, in December 2004, an investigation into inappropriate email use by another employee led to a search of the applicant's work computer. This search revealed a high quantity of inappropriate chain emails, videos displaying female nudity, political humor, and jokes. The investigation concluded that the applicant violated several company policies concerning the use of company assets, email, and internet/intranet usage, resulting in a 30-day suspension without pay on January 15, 2005.
Despite expressing a willingness to renounce his Israeli citizenship, the applicant failed to provide evidence of initiating this process or surrendering his Israeli passport after the hearing. The retention of a valid Israeli passport indicated a preference for foreign citizenship, and his family ties in Israel created a potential conflict of interest regarding the protection of sensitive information. Consequently, the security clearance was denied.
Why the Applicant Was Denied
- The applicant retained a valid Israeli passport, indicating a preference for foreign citizenship.
- The applicant did not provide evidence of initiating the renunciation of his Israeli citizenship or surrendering his Israeli passport after the hearing.
- The applicant's family ties in Israel created a potential conflict of interest regarding his obligation to protect sensitive information.
Conditions Referenced
- FI DC ¶ 7(c)raisedContact with a Family Member, Business or Professional Associate, Friend, or Other Person Who Is a Citizen of or Resident in a Foreign Country If That Contact Creates a Heightened Risk of Foreign Exploitation, Inducement, Manipulation, Pressure, or Coercion
- FI DC ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to a Foreign Person, Group, Government, or Country That Create a Potential Conflict of Interest Between the Individual’s Obligation to Protect Sensitive Information or Technology and the Individual’s Desire to Help a Foreign Person, Group or Country by Providing That Information
- FP DC ¶ 10(a)raisedExercise of Any Right, Privilege or Obligation of Foreign Citizenship After Becoming a U.S. Citizen or Through Foreign Citizenship of a Family Member
- FP DC ¶ 10(b)raisedAction to Acquire or Obtain Recognition of a Foreign Citizenship by an American Citizen
- M DC ¶ 40(e)raisedUnauthorized Use of a Government or Other Information Technology System
- M DC ¶ 40(f)raisedIntroduction, Removal, or Duplication of Hardware, Firmware, Software, or Media to or From Any Information Technology System Without Authorization, When Prohibited by Rules, Procedures, Guidelines or Regulations
- FI MC ¶ 8(b)appliedThere Is No Conflict of Interest, Either Because the Individual’s Sense of Loyalty or Obligation to the Foreign Person, Group, or Government, or Country Is so Minimal, or the Individual Has Such Deep and Longstanding Relationships and Loyalties in the U.S., That the Individual Can Be Expected to Resolve Any Conflict of Interest in Favor of the U.S. Interest
- FP MC ¶ 11(b)appliedThe Individual Has Expressed a Willingness to Renounce Dual Citizenship
Key Rule Quoted
“Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.”
Procedural Posture
- SOR issuedNov 14, 2008
- Answer filedDec 3, 2008
- Hearing heldFeb 24, 2009
- Decision dateMar 24, 2009
Cite For
- Foreign Influence Concerns Due to Family Ties in Israel
- Foreign Preference Due to Possession of a Valid Foreign Passport
- Trustworthiness Issues Related to Unauthorized Use of Information Technology Systems