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ISCR 09-01701.h1: Guideline B security clearance hearing, denied (2012) · CASE

ISCR Case 09-01701.h1denied

Case headnote

ISCR Case No. 09-01701.h1

deniedJul 31, 2012· Hon. Nichole L. Noel· hearing

Summary

A 48-year-old federal contractor and translator, originally from Afghanistan, was denied a security clearance under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline I (Psychological Conditions). The denial stemmed from concerns regarding his mental health and foreign family ties.

The applicant had a history of mental health issues, including psychotic episodes requiring hospitalization, and was diagnosed with major depressive disorder with psychotic features and PTSD. He exhibited bizarre behavior following a hospitalization and failed to follow treatment advice, including refusing prescribed medications. These factors raised concerns about his judgment and reliability.

Additionally, the applicant maintained relationships with family members who are residents and citizens of Afghanistan and Pakistan. While his deep and long-standing ties to the United States were acknowledged, the judge determined that his psychological instability and non-compliance with treatment, combined with his foreign family connections, posed a significant risk to national security, leading to the denial of his clearance.

Why the applicant was denied

The applicant exhibited erratic behavior and was hospitalized for mental health issues, raising concerns about his judgment and reliability.
He failed to follow treatment advice related to his diagnosed psychological conditions, including refusing prescribed medications.
The applicant's close ties to family members in Afghanistan and Pakistan created a potential for foreign influence and compromise of classified information.

Conditions referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 28(a)appliedEmotional, Mental, or Personality Conditions
AG ¶ 28(b)appliedOpinion by a Qualified Mental Health Professional
AG ¶ 28(c)appliedFailure to Follow Treatment Advice
AG ¶ 7(a)appliedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)appliedConnections to Foreign Persons or Governments

Key rule quoted

“The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.”

Procedural posture

SOR issuedOct 19, 2011
Answer filed—
Hearing heldApr 3, 2012
Decision dateJul 31, 2012

Cite for

Denial of Clearance Due to Psychological Instability Under Guideline I
Foreign Influence Concerns Due to Family Ties Under Guideline B
Importance of Following Mental Health Treatment Recommendations in Security Clearance Cases.

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

From the decision

Facts this decision states, each with the exact sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.

Age at decision: 48: “Applicant is a 48-year-old employee of a federal c ontractor who works as a translator and linguist.”

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The judge found that the applicant's relationships with family members who are citizens of Afghanistan and Pakistan were mitigated by his deep ties to the United States. However, the applicant's mental health issues were a significant concern, leading to the denial of his security clearance.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline I (Psychological Conditions) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The judge found that the applicant's mental health issues, including a history of psychotic episodes and treatment non-compliance, raised significant concerns regarding his judgment and reliability. Despite some evidence of improvement, the applicant's lack of insight into his mental health and refusal to follow prescribed treatment led to a denial of his security clearance.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶28)	Mitigating applied (¶29)	Mitigation

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text, footnotes and signatures included, is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 09-01701 ) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Eric Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Alan V. Edmunds, Esq.

07/31/2012 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

NOEL, Nichole L., Administrative Judge:

Applicant’s relationships with family me mbers who are resident sand citizens of Afghanistan and Pakistan are mitigated by his deep and long-standing ties to the United States. However, his mental health issues remain a concern. Clearance is denied.

Statement of the Case

Acting under the relevant Exec utive Order and DoD Directive, 1 on October 19, 2011, the Defense O ffice of Hearings and Appeals ( DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) explaining that it was unable to find that it is clearly consist ent with the national interest to grant Applic ant access to classified information. The SOR, whic hdetailed the reasons for the action under the psychological conditions and foreign influence guidelines, recommended the case be submitted to an administrative judge for a determination to revoke or deny Applicant’s access to classified information.

Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a hearing. T he case was assigned to me on F ebruary 7, 2012. The hearing took plac e as scheduled on April 3, 2012. At hearing, Government’s Exhibits (GE) 1 through 10, as well as Hearing Exhibit (HE) 1, a demonstrative exhi bit detailing Applicant’s foreign family members, were admitted without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AE) A through J, which were also adm itted without objection. At A pplicant’s request, I left the record open until April 30, 2012 t o allow him to submit a medical evaluation. He timely submitted the evaluation, which was admitted as AE K, without objection. I received the transcript (Tr.) on April 10, 2012.

Request for Administrative Notice

Department Counsel submitted a written request that I take administrative notice of certain facts about Afghani stan and Pakistan. Without obj ection from A pplicant, I approved the request. The request and the a ttached documents have been included in the record as HE 2. The pertinent facts are set out in the Findings of Fact, below.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant is a 48-year-old employee of a federal contractor who works as a translator and linguist. Born in Afghanistan, Applicant immigrated to the United States as a refugee in 1993, joining his parents and four brothers – two of whom also work as translators for federal contractors. Marri ed in December 2000 to an Afghan citizen who is a permanent resident of the United States, he is the father of five children between the ages of 18 months and 10 years old. All are U.S. citizens by birth. Applicant’s parents-in-law are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. Ap plicant believes that his father-in-law, now retired, served in the Afghanistan Nati onal Assembly; however, he does not know the details of his father-in-law’s public service. Applicant speaks to his in- laws by telephone twice each year on holidays. Applicant ’s two sisters and their husbands are residents and citizens of Pakistan. He speaks to his sisters, one of whom is a teacher, the other a housewife, ever ytwo months by telephone. Neither of Applicant’s brothers-in-law works for the government.2

Between 1999 and 2008, Applic ant worked in the fast-food indus try, frequently changing jobs to earn more money to support his growing family. In 2008, he obtained a position as a translator supporting military operations overseas. While on assignment in February 2010, Applicant was hospitalized for five days after exhibiting erratic behavior. The details of the episode are unclear. In one acc ount Applicant claim she was hospitalized after being found as leep on the job; in another he claims that he suffered from stress issues and suic idal thoughts. After being re leased from the hospit al, Applicant voluntarily resigned his position and was esco rted home by his employer. During the multi-day trip, Applicant continued to display erratic behavior. During the first leg of the trip, Applic ant became unresponsive when he and his escort reached the security check point. His escort had to physi cally move him through the security check point. Applicant displayed a similar unrespo nsiveness during the second leg of the trip. He refused to comply with the security pr otocol at the airport. As Applicant became more uncooperative, airport police and air line security were called to res olve the problem. Eventually, law enforcement made the decision to take Applicant t o a medical center for diagnosis.3

Applicant continued to resist the security officers, refusing to sit in the wheelchair waiting to take him to the medic al center. Only after the threat of force did Applicant voluntarily sit in the wheelch air. During transport, Applicant sprang from the chair and began to walk quickly through the terminal causing security to chase and restrain him. After being medicated and cleared for travel by the treating physician, Applicant and his escort resumed their travel to the United States. The third leg of the trip began with Applicant’s continued refusal to cooperate with the air port security procedures, but he was overpowered by his escort and airport security. The escort struggled to ge t Applicant through the terminal and onto the pl ane because Applicant kept trying to sit down as they walked through the airport. Once on the plane, the escort seated Applicant in the section of the plan reserved for them. After the plane took off, Applicant went to sleep only waking to eat or use the restroom.4

Three hours before landing in the United States, Appl icant awoke and resumed his bizarre behavior. Every few minutes, A pplicant would leave his seat, run to a window, open the shade, look out, close the shade, run back to his seat, and lay down. He continued this pattern with quickening sp eed until the escort noti ced that the other passengers and the flight attendant were becoming alarmed. The escort managed to restrain Applicant for a few minutes; how ever, Applicant resumed the behavior at a more rapid rate. The escort explained to Applicant that his behavior could get him detained by federal authorities. Applicant remained seated throughout the remainder of the flight, but the escort struggled to keep Applicant in an upright position as the plane landed.5

Deplaned without incident, Applicant’s erratic behavior resumed once he cleared immigration. Applicant attempted to walk past the customs offi cer without completing the process. He was able to move on afte rthe esc ort intervened on his behalf. At baggage claim, Applicant tried to sit down on the baggage belt and then on the floor. When the escort went to inquire about their missing luggage, Applicant laid on the floor, drawing the attention of airport security. Again, the escort defused the situation and took Applicant to a location where they could wa it for his family to pick him up. As they waited in the terminal, Applicant again laid on the floor. When his brother-in-law came to retrieve him, Applicant became instantly alert and talkative. According to the escort, he walked out of the air port as if nothing had happened. Applicant does not recall any details of this trip.6

Upon returning home, Applicant entered in tensive outpatient treatment at a local hospital. He was diagnosed by his treating psychiatrist as having a psychotic disorder not otherwise specified (NOS), major de pressive order with psychotic features, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Appl icant received a similar diagnosis in 2006 after being hospitaliz ed for hearing voices and hav ing suicidal thoughts. Applicant reported being stressed about maintaining his family’s financial stability. Applicant was prescribed anti-psychotic medications, which he stopped taking shortly after his discharge. During his 2010 treatment, the treating psychiatrist prescribed an antidepressant, which was the only medicat ion Applicant agreed to take at the time. He was instructed to take one pill a day for six months. He stopped taking the anti- depressant in June 2010 and has refused to take any psychotropic medicines since.7

Around the time Applicant decided to st op taking his prescribed anti-depres sant, he interviewed for a position with his current employer. Initially, Applicant was told that he could not be hired for certain contracts if he was taking an ant i-depressant. He was hired by his current employer in August 2010.8

Before the issuance of the SOR, DO HA requested that Applic ant undergo a psychological evaluation. Although the evalua ting psychologist noted that at the time of the evaluation Applicant appeared to be symp tom free, he did not make a specific diagnosis. He concluded that Applicant’s lack of insight in to his behavior and den ial of his mental health iss ues may adversely a ffect Applicant’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. In response, Applic ant obtained a second opinion from another psychologist, which was completed in April 2012. While this evaluation is also bereft of a diagnosis, the evaluating psy chologist determined that Applic ant is not currently displaying any psychological dysfunction that could prevent him from resuming his work as a translator. However, given Applicant’ sapparent vulnerability to high levels o fstress, the psychologist observed that Applicant could return to his translator job under circumstances that allow for adequate sleep, rest, and relaxation.9

Applicant does not believ e that he has ever suffered from any mental health issues. He attributes his inc idents in 2006 and 2010 t o sleep deprivation. He testified that while working abroad he was nev er exposed to any event that could hav e negatively impacted his mental health. He only complained of long hours and lack of sleep.10 As the sole provider for his family, Applic ant is anxious to return to work. In the year and a half he has been home, he has work ed as a cashier at a fast food restaurant. In 2011, he earned $17,000, down from the $21 0,000 he earned as a translator working overseas. Applicant is no tcurrently receiving medical treatment for his mental health issues.11

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is located in southwestern Asia. Pakistan borders it on the ea st and the south. Iran borders it on the west and Russia on the nort h. Afghanistan is presently an Islamic Republic of 18 million people. The country has exper ienced a turbulent political history, including an invasion by the Russians in 1979 and fighting among the various ethnic, clan and religious militias after the Russians withdrew from the country in 1989. By the end of 1998, the Taliban rose to power and controlled 90% of the country, imposing aggressive and repressive policies. In October 2001, U.S. forces and coalition partners led military operations in the co untry, forcing the Taliban o ut of power b y November 2001. The new democ ratic government took power in 2004 after a popular election. Despite that election, terrorists and the Taliban continue to assert power within the country.12

The country’s human rights record remains poor. Problems include: extrajudicial killings; widespread official impunity; offici al corruption; and violence and societa ldiscrimination against women. Violence is rampant. According to recent reports from the U.S. Department o f State, insurgents continue to plan attacks and kidnappings of Americans and other Western nat ionals. Travel warnings are ongoing. No section of Afghanistan is safe or immune from violence.13

Pakistan

Pakistan is a parliamentary federal republic in Southwest Asia. It i s a low-income country, with a population that is 97 perc ent Muslim. After September 11, 2001, Pakistan was one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. However, Pakistan reassessed it srelations with the Taliban and pledged support to the United States and the inter national coalition in Operation Enduring Freedom, which aimed at remo ving the Taliban from power . Despite this support, members of the Taliban are kn own to be in the Federally Administered Tribal Area s (FATA) of Pakistan and in the Balochistan Prov ince, which borders Iran and Afghanistan. The leaders of the Taliban operate openly in Pakistan. Extremists led by the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Talib an “TTP”) commander and other Al-Qaida extremists have re-exerted their hold over areas in the FATA and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Taliban financing, wh ich crosses the border of Pakistan to Afghanistan, has a llowed the insurgency in Afghanistan to strengt hen its military an dtechnical capabilities.

The security situation in Afghanistan worsened in 2008, including an increase in Al-Qaida’s presence to levels unseen sinc e 2001-2002, driven in part by insurgent access to safe havens in western Pakistan through the porous Afghan-Pakistan border. Although Al-Qaida’s core organization in the tribal areas of Pakistan was under greater pressure in 2009 than in 2008, it remained the most dangerous component of the larger Al-Qaida network. In early 2009, the FATA in Pak istan continued to provide vital sanctuary to Al-Qaida and a number of foreign and Pakistan-based extremist groups. Al-Qaida exploits the permissive operat ing environment to support the Afghan insurgency, while also planning attacks against the United States and Western interests in Pakistan and wor ldwide. Together with the Afghan Tali ban and other extremist groups, Al-Qaida uses this sanctuary to train and recruit operatives, plan and prepare regional and transnational attacks, disseminate propaganda, and obtain equipment and supplies.

The Pakistani government has a poor human rights record. R eported human rights violations include extrajudicial killings, torture and rape by security forces, lack of judicial independence, arbitrary arrest, widespread corruption, disappearance and imprisonment of political oppo nents, and trafficking in wo men and children. As of February 2009, the government maintained domestic intelligence services that monitored political activists, suspected te rrorists, the media, and suspected foreign intelligence agents. The Department of State warns U.S. citizens of the risks of travel to Pakistan in light of threats of terrorist acti vity. Since 2007, American citizens have been kidnapped for ransom or other reasons. Credible reports i ndicated that authoritie sroutinely intercepted and opened mail without requisite court approval, and monitored mobile phones and electronic messages.14

POLICIES

When evaluating an applicant’s suitabi lity for a security clearance, the administrative judge must cons ider the adjudicative guidelines . In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluatin gan applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines ar e not inflexible ru les of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, adminis trative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2( c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider a ll available, reliable information about the person, past and pr esent, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national sec urity is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning pe rsonnel being cons idered for access to classified information will be re solved in favor of national secu rity.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are re asonable, logical, and based on the evidence.

Under Directive ¶ E3. 1.14, the Government must present evidence to es tablish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Direc tive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant i sresponsible for presenting “wit nesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applic ant or proven by Department Counsel.” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.

A person who seeks access to classifi ed information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predi cated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in indi viduals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applic ant may deliberat ely or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions ent ail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, ra ther than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3. 1(b) (listing multiple pr erequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

ANALYSIS

Psychological Conditions

The security concern relating to the guideline for Psychological Conditions is set out in AG ¶ 27:

Certain emotional, mental and personality conditions can impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness. A fo rmal diagnosis of a disorde ris not required for there to be a conc ern under this guideline. A duly qualified mental health professional (e.g. clin ical psychologist or ps ychiatrist) employed by or acceptable to and approved by the U.S. Government, should be consulted when evaluat ing potentially disqualifying and mitigating information under this guideline. No negative inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised on the basis of seeking mental health counseling. All of the disqualifying conditions available under AG ¶ 28 apply:

(a) the behavior that casts doubt on an individual’s judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness that is not covered under any other guideline, including but not limited to emotionally unstable, irresponsible, dysfunctional, violent, paranoid, or bizarre behavior;

(b) an opinion by a duly qualified ment al health pr ofessional that the individual has a condition not covered under any other guideline that may impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; and

(c) the individual has failed t o follow treatment advice relat ed to a diagnosed emotional, mental, or personality condition, e.g., failure to take prescribed medication.

Applicant experienced psychotic epi sodes in 2006 and 2010 that required hospitalization. During the latter event, wh ich occurred while Ap plicant was working overseas, his behavior was so bizarre and erra tic, that his employer removed him from the contract and sent him home. On bo th occasions, Applicant willingly entered treatment, but Applic ant has refused to ta ke the pre scribed psychotropic drugs after being discharged. The psychologist who evaluat ed Applicant in connection with this security clearance investigation concluded that Applic ant’s inability to acknowledge his mental health issues may compromise his security worthiness.

None of the mitigating conditions under the AG ¶ 29 apply. Applicant has displayed little ins ight into the source of his mental health is sues. Based on the available medical records, sleep deprivation, while a potentially aggravating factor, does not appear to be the root cause of his psychological dysfunction. As is astutely noted by the psychologist hired by Applic ant, he is ex tremely vulnerable to stress. However, Applicant has not pr ovided any evidence to show that he is able to manage th is significant trigger. While both evaluating psy chologists are in agree ment that Applicant is not currently showing sympt oms of the previously diagnosed psychotic order, neither provided any prognosis regarding Applicant’s mental or emot ional stability. Becaus e Applicant is not currently receiving medic al treatment, there is no indicat ion that his condition – while episodic – has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation.

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

Under this guideline, “foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be ma nipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.”15 AG ¶ 7 indicates two conditions that are disqualifying in this case:

(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professiona lassociate, friend, or ot her person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and

(b) connections to a foreign per son, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the indi vidual’s obligation to protect sensitive infor mation or tec hnology and the individ ual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.

Applicant’s parents-in-law are citizens of Afghanistan. He believes that his father- in-law, now retired, was a member of the national assembly. His two sisters and their husbands are citizens and residents of Pakistan. None of his relatives in Pakistan are employed by the gov ernment. The mere posse ssion of close ties with foreign family members is not, as a matter of law, dis qualifying under Guideline B. However, if an applicant has a close relationship with even one re lative living in a foreign country, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified information.

The nature of a nation’s gov ernment, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an Applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coer cion or inducement. T he risk of coercion , persuasion, or duress is signifi cantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government or the country is known to conduct intellige nce collection operations agains tthe United States. However, this inquiry is not limited to countri es hostile to the United States. Friendly nations can have profound dis agreements with the United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.

The relationship of Afghanistan and Paki stan with the United States places a significant, but not insurmountable burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his relationships with his relatives livin gin those countries do not pose a security risk. Applicant should not be placed in a position wher e he might be forced to choose between loyalty to the United States and a desire to assist his relatives living in Afghanistan and Pakistan who might be coerced by terrorists or other governmental entities in those countries. Wh ile there is no evi dence that intelligence o peratives or terrorists from Pakistan or Afghanistan seek or have sought classified or economic information from or through Applicant, or his rela tives, it is not possible to rule out such a possibility in the future. Given the perilous conditions in these countries caused by the operation of the Taliban, te rrorist groups, the wide-spread corruption within both governments, and the countries’ poor human rights records, a heightened risk exists. The following mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 are potentially applicable:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that count ry are suc hthat it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choos e between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the in terests of the U.S.;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, ei ther because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and

(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is li ttle likelihood that it coul dcreate a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.

Applicant has lived in the United States for 19 year sand has established deep roots. He owns his home, and his fiv e children are U.S. citizens. The majority of Applicant’s immediate family, his wife, children, parents, and four of his six siblings, reside in the United St ates and live in the same community as Applicant. Conversely, Applicant has two immediate family members, two brothers-in-law, and his parents-in- law living in Pakistan and Afghanistan, respectively. Applicant does not maintain regular contact with them. Wh ile his contacts with his fo reign relatives cannot b e considered casual, they are infrequent. Viewed in totality, Applicant’s connections to the United States outweigh those to his foreign relativ es. As such, I find that he is not vulnerable to foreign exploi tation, inducement, manipulatio n, pressure, or coercion because of his foreign relations. As such, these relationships do not create a potential conflict of interest.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this ca se. In doing so, I have also considered the whole-person concept and have doubts about Applicant’s ability to protect classified information. Applicant’s desire to return to his lucrative translator position is understandable; however, his untreated mental health i ssues pose an una cceptable security risk. Having Applicant perform hi stranslator duties in an environment that allows adequate sleep, rest, and relaxation does not mitigate the security risk. Applicant refuses to acknowledge his mental health issues; in doing so, he also has not learned to manage the conditions that tri gger his epis odic psychosis. Applicant’s suffers fro m a condition that, when exacerbat ed, impairs his judgment and reliab ility and has the potential to compromise the security of those around him. Clearance is denied.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline I: AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagr aphs 1.a -1.d: Against Applicant

Paragraph 2, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 2.a - 2.d.: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances present ed by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent wit hthe natio nal interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a securit yclearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

________________________ Nichole L. Noel Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

1 This case is adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry, signed by President Eisenhower on February 20, 1960, as amended, as well as DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program, dated January 2, 1992, as amended (Directive). In addition, the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (AG), effective within the Defense Department on September 1, 2006, apply to this case. The AG were published in the Federal Register and codified in 32 C.F.R. § 154, Appendix H (2006). The AG replace the guidelines in Enclosure 2 to the Directive. 2 Tr. 41, 45-49; GE 1, 9, 10. 3 Tr. 25, 35, 59-60; GE 1, 7, 9. 4 GE 7. 5 GE 7. 6 Tr. 60 - 61; GE 7. 7 Tr. 52-58; GE 6, 9. 8 Tr. 66-69; GE 1. 9 GE 8, AE K. 10 Tr. 34-35, 52-55, 59-60, 71-75. 11 Tr. 76-77; GE 9 – 10. 12 HE 2. 13 HE 2. 14 HE 2. 15 AG ¶ 6.