ISCR Case 11-00481.h1

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 11-00481.h1

grantedJul 1, 2011· Hon. Rita C. O'Brien· hearing

Summary

A 51-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen, originally from Taiwan, was granted a security clearance despite concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference). The Statement of Reasons raised issues regarding his dual citizenship and foreign contacts. Specifically, allegations included contact with foreign individuals creating a risk of exploitation or coercion, connections to foreign entities creating potential conflicts of interest, and sharing living quarters in a manner that could heighten foreign inducement.

Additionally, the applicant was alleged to have possessed and used a foreign passport while a U.S. citizen, primarily for convenience during travel to Taiwan between 2004 and 2009. Disqualifying conditions cited included AG ¶ 10(a)(1), AG ¶ 7(a), AG ¶ 7(b), and AG ¶ 7(d).

The judge found that the applicant successfully mitigated these concerns. He surrendered his Taiwanese passport upon understanding its security implications, maintained minimal contact with foreign relatives, and held no financial interests in Taiwan. The decision emphasized his strong ties to the U.S. and a demonstrated lack of foreign influence, leading to the application of mitigating conditions AG ¶ 11(e), AG ¶ 8(a), AG ¶ 8(b), and AG ¶ 8(f), and ultimately, the granting of his security clearance.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant surrendered his Taiwanese passport upon understanding its security implications.
He has minimal contact with foreign relatives and no financial interests in Taiwan.
His strong ties to the U.S. and lack of foreign influence were emphasized.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 10(a)(1)raisedPossession of a Current Foreign Passport
AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to a Foreign Person That Create a Potential Conflict of Interest
AG ¶ 7(d)raisedSharing Living Quarters with a Foreign National

Mitigating

AG ¶ 11(e)appliedPassport Has Been Surrendered
AG ¶ 8(a)appliedNature of Relationships with Foreign Persons Unlikely to Create Conflict
AG ¶ 8(b)appliedMinimal Loyalty or Obligation to Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 8(f)appliedValue of Foreign Interests Unlikely to Result in Conflict

Key Rule Quoted

“A security clearance decision is intended only to resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest for an applicant to either receive or continue to have access to classified information.”
— Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988)

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedJul 12, 2011
Answer filedAug 5, 2011
Hearing heldNov 2, 2011
Decision dateDec 12, 2011

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Preference Under Guideline C
Evaluation of Foreign Influence Under Guideline B
Consideration of the Whole-person Concept in Security Clearance Decisions

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
2.a	Contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.	For Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
2.b	Connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.	For Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
2.c	Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.	For Applicant	Cohabitation with Foreign National Cohabitant	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
2.d–2.g	4 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant).	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—		—	—	—

Allegation

Finding

Relationship

Country

Response

Disqualifying (¶7)

Mitigating applied (¶8)

Mitigation

2.a

Contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.

For Applicant

Sibling in Foreign Country

Immediate Family

Taiwan

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

Credited

Deep U.S. Ties

2.b

Connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.

For Applicant

Sibling in Foreign Country

Immediate Family

Taiwan

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

Credited

Deep U.S. Ties

2.c

Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.

For Applicant

Cohabitation with Foreign National

Cohabitant

Taiwan

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

Credited

Deep U.S. Ties

2.d–2.g

4 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant).

For Applicant

Unspecified Foreign Relationship

Other

—

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶10)	Mitigating applied (¶11)	Mitigation
1.a(1)	Applicant possessed and used a foreign passport while he was a U.S. citizen. He used it primarily to avoid long lines at airports during his travels to Taiwan from 2004 to 2009. He used only his U.S. passport for other foreign travel. AG ¶ 10(a)(1) applied during that period.	For Applicant	Foreign Passport Possession or Use	Admitted	(a) applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country	(e) the exercise of the entitlements or benefits of foreign citizenship do not present a national security concern	—
1.a(2)–1.a(3)	2 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant).	For Applicant			—	—	—

Allegation

Finding

Type

Response

Disqualifying (¶10)

Mitigating applied (¶11)

Mitigation

1.a(1)

Applicant possessed and used a foreign passport while he was a U.S. citizen. He used it primarily to avoid long lines at airports during his travels to Taiwan from 2004 to 2009. He used only his U.S. passport for other foreign travel. AG ¶ 10(a)(1) applied during that period.

For Applicant

Foreign Passport Possession or Use

Admitted

(a) applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country

(e) the exercise of the entitlements or benefits of foreign citizenship do not present a national security concern

—

1.a(2)–1.a(3)

2 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant).

For Applicant

—

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Case Profile

Summary

Why the Applicant Prevailed

Conditions Referenced

Key Rule Quoted

Procedural Posture

Cite For

Full decision

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

STATEMENT OF CASE

PROCEDURAL RULINGS

FINDINGS OF FACT

POLICIES

ANALYSIS

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

FORMAL FINDINGS

CONCLUSION

FOOTNOTES