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ISCR Case 01-02247.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 01-02247.h1denied

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 01-02247.h1

deniedMar 25, 2002· Hon. Darlene Lokey Anderson· hearing

Summary

A 60-year-old Senior Design Engineer, holding dual citizenship with Switzerland and the United States, was denied a security clearance. The denial was based on concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference).

The applicant's dual citizenship, specifically obtaining a Swiss passport after becoming a U.S. citizen, was cited as evidence of foreign preference. Additionally, the applicant maintained foreign contacts, including siblings who are Swiss citizens, which raised concerns about potential foreign influence and the compromise of classified information.

The judge determined that the applicant did not demonstrate an unequivocal preference for the United States and failed to mitigate the foreign influence concerns. The applicant also did not respond to the Government's File of Relevant Material, leaving no information on record to address the allegations.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

The applicant maintained dual citizenship with Switzerland, indicating a preference for a foreign country.
The applicant has foreign contacts, including siblings who are Swiss citizens, which could create potential for foreign influence.
The applicant did not respond to the Government's File of Relevant Material, leaving the record silent on mitigation.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

C1raisedDual Citizenship
C2raisedPossession And/or Use of a Foreign Passport
B1raisedForeign Contacts
B2raisedEmotional and Family Ties to Foreign Citizens

Key Rule Quoted

“The mere possession of a foreign passport raises legitimate questions as to whether the Applicant can be counted upon to place the interests of the United States paramount to that of another nation.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedOct 15, 2001
Answer filedNov 5, 2001Applicant elected to proceed without a hearing.
Hearing held—Written record only.
Decision dateMar 25, 2002

Cite For

Foreign Preference Due to Dual Citizenship Under Guideline C
Foreign Influence From Family Ties Under Guideline B
Failure to Mitigate Security Concerns Due to Lack of Response to Government Evidence

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The judge found against the applicant on all allegations related to foreign influence. The applicant's ties to family members in Switzerland raised concerns about potential foreign influence that could compromise classified information. The applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to mitigate these concerns, leading to the denial of the security clearance.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
2.a	The Government alleges in this paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he has foreign contacts that could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information.	Against Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Switzerland	Unknown	—	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline C (Foreign Preference) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The judge found that the applicant's dual citizenship and possession of a foreign passport indicated a preference for Switzerland over the United States. The applicant did not demonstrate an unequivocal preference for the United States, leading to a denial of the security clearance under Guideline C.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶10)	Mitigating applied (¶11)	Mitigation
1.a	The Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he has acted in such a way as to show a preference for another country over the United States.	Against Applicant	Foreign Citizenship Acquisition or Application	Admitted	(a) applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country	—	—
1.b	The Applicant has exercised dual citizenship by obtaining a Swiss passport after having become an American citizen.	Against Applicant	Foreign Passport Possession or Use	Admitted	(a) applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country	—	—
2.a	The Applicant has not demonstrated an unequivocal preference for the United States.	Against Applicant	Failure to Renounce or Surrender Foreign Status	Admitted	—	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline C). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DATE: March 25, 2002

In Re:

----------------------

SSN: ------------

Applicant for Security Clearance

ISCR Case No. 01-02247

DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

DARLENE LOKEY ANDERSON

STATEMENT OF CASE

On October 15, 2001, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), pursuant to Executive Order 10865 (as amended), and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to the Applicant, which detailed the reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the Applicant and recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine whether a clearance should be denied or revoked.

The Applicant responded to the SOR in writing on November 5, 2001, in which he elected to have the case determined on a written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government's File of Relevant Material (FORM) to the Applicant on January 22, 2002. The Applicant was instructed to submit information in rebuttal, extenuation or mitigation within 30 days of receipt. Applicant received the FORM on January 29, 2002, and he submitted no reply.

The case was assigned to the undersigned for resolution on March 20, 2002.

On August 16, 2000, a memorandum was issued by Mr. Arthur Money, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, clarifying "the application of Guideline C to cases involving an Applicant's possession or use of a foreign passport." The Applicant received a copy of this memorandum. (See, Government Exhibit 4).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following Findings of Fact are based on Applicant's Answer to the SOR, and the Government's documents. The Applicant is 60 years of age and single. He is a Senior Design Engineer for a defense contractor. He seeks a security clearance in connection with his employment in the defense industry. Paragraph 1 (Guideline C - Foreign Preference). The Government alleges in this paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he has acted in such a way as to show a preference for another country over the United States.

The Applicant was born and raised in Switzerland. He moved to the United States with his spouse in 1967. He obtained his United States citizenship in September 1973. The Applicant states that, "I have maintained dual citizenship throughout my career." He further states that, "My dual citizenship status is due to the fact that I was born in Switzerland and it is retained automatically unless I request renunciation which I do not wish to do at this point in my life." (See, Government Exhibit 3). The Applicant has held a security clearance since 1988.

The Applicant states that after becoming a United States citizen in 1973, he applied for and obtained a Swiss passport. (See, Government Exhibit 5). The reason he obtained a Swiss passport was to possibly return to Switzerland after his divorce. However, he did not exercise the option, and has not used his Swiss passport for any other reason. His Swiss passport expired in 1995, and he has not renewed it. (See, Government Exhibit 5).

The Applicant is entitled to a social security equivalent in Switzerland. When he retires in the United States, he will contact the Swiss Retirement Benefit Office to determine his entitlements. He does not expect much money because he only paid into the plan for seven years.

The Applicant has also met his Swiss military obligation by serving two thirds of one year as a soldier for the Swiss Army from 1961 to 1966, before he became a United States citizen. The Applicant has never been employed in any other capacity by the Swiss Government. (See, Government Exhibit 5).

The Applicant owns no Swiss property, and he does not foresee receiving any inheritance benefits. He does not vote in Swiss elections. He plans to continue to reside in the United States.

Paragraph 2 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence). The Government alleges in this paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he has foreign contacts that could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information.

The Applicant has a brother and sister who are citizens of Switzerland and reside there. His sister is a homemaker, and her husband is retired. His brother is working in a non-defense related field, and his wife is a homemaker. The Applicant states that he visits his siblings in Switzerland approximately every five years. Applicant's security clearance application dated August 15, 1989, reveals that he traveled to Switzerland in 1986 for two weeks. (See Government Exhibit 6).

POLICIES

Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum. Accordingly, the Department of Defense, in Enclosure 2 of the 1992 Directive sets forth policy factors and conditions that could raise or mitigate a security concern; which must be given binding consideration in making security clearance determinations. These factors should be followed in every case according to the pertinent criterion. However, the conditions are neither automatically determinative of the decision in any case, nor can they supersede the Administrative Judge's reliance on her own common sense. Because each security clearance case presents its own unique facts and circumstances, it cannot be assumed that these factors exhaust the realm of human experience, or apply equally in every case. Based on the Findings of Fact set forth above, the factors most applicable to the evaluation of this case are:

Foreign Preference

When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.

Conditions that could raise a security concern:

1. The exercise of dual citizenship; 2. Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns:

None.

Foreign Influence

A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants, and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are: (1) not citizens of the United States or (2) may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.

Conditions that could raise a security concern:

1. An immediate family member, or person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;

2. Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns:

None.

In addition, as set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive at pages 16-17, in evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the Administrative Judge should consider the following general factors:

a. The nature and seriousness of the conduct and surrounding circumstances

b. The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation

c. The frequency and recency of the conduct

d. The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct

e. The voluntariness of participation

f. The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavior changes

g. The motivation for the conduct

h. The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress

I. The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

The eligibility criteria established in the DoD Directive identify personal characteristics and conduct which are reasonably related to the ultimate question, posed in Section 2 of Executive Order 10865, of whether it is "clearly consistent with the national interest" to grant an Applicant's request for access to classified information.

The DoD Directive states, "The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicted upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable should be considered in reaching a determination. The Administrative Judge can draw only those inferences or conclusions that have reasonable and logical basis in the evidence of record. The Judge cannot draw inferences or conclusions based on evidence which is speculative or conjectural in nature. Finally, as emphasized by President Eisenhower in Executive Order 10865, "Any determination under this order . . . shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the Applicant concerned."

The Government must make out a case under Guideline C (foreign preference) and Guideline B (foreign influence) that establishes doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness. While a rational connection, or nexus, must be shown between Applicant's adverse conduct and his ability to effectively safeguard classified information, with respect to sufficiency of proof of a rational connection, objective or direct evidence is not required.

Then, the Applicant must remove that doubt with substantial evidence in refutation, explanation, mitigation or extenuation, which demonstrates that the past adverse conduct, is unlikely to be repeated, and that the Applicant presently qualifies for a security clearance.

An individual who demonstrates a foreign preference and has foreign connections may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States. The mere possession of a foreign passport raises legitimate questions as to whether the Applicant can be counted upon to place the interests of the United States paramount to that of another nation. The Government must be able to place a high degree of confidence in a security clearance holder to abide by all security rules and regulations, at all times and in all places.

CONCLUSION

Having considered the evidence of record in light of the appropriate legal standards and factors, and having assessed the Applicant's credibility based on the written record, this Administrative Judge concludes that the Government has established its case as to all allegations in the SOR, and that Applicant's foreign contacts have a direct and negative impact on his suitability for access to classified information.

The Applicant is a dual citizen of Switzerland and the United States. Since becoming a citizen of the United States, he has lived and worked in the United States, but has maintained his dual citizenship status. He has exercised dual citizenship by obtaining a Swiss passport after having become an American citizen. Although he has not used his Swiss passport, and presently it is expired, it can be renewed as long as he is a Swiss citizen. Furthermore, the Applicant has made it clear that, as to his Swiss citizenship, he does not want to renounce it. He has not demonstrated an unequivocal preference for the United States. Under the circumstances of this case, I find against the Applicant under Guideline C.

With respect to Guideline B, the Applicant has foreign contacts, as well as emotional and family ties, in Switzerland. His family members, in this case his brother and sister, are Swiss citizens of long standing. There remains the possibility of pressure being placed on them, and through them, on the Applicant. It is Applicant's burden to show that these ties are not of a nature that could create the potential for influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. He has not done so. Accordingly, I cannot say that he would not be vulnerable to foreign influence. The risk is considerable, and is of present security significance. Accordingly, the Applicant's request for a security clearance must be denied under Guideline B.

In addition, the Applicant has failed to respond to the File of Relevant Material, which leaves the record silent on the issue of mitigation. Thus, this Administrative Judge is restricted to the evidence presented by the Government.

Considering all the evidence, the Applicant has not met the mitigating conditions of Guideline C or Guideline B of the adjudicative guidelines set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive. Accordingly, he has not met his ultimate burden of persuasion under Guidelines C or B.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal Findings For or Against the Applicant on the allegations in the SOR, as required by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are: Paragraph 1: Against the Applicant.

Subparas. 1.a.: Against the Applicant

1.b.: Against the Applicant

Paragraph 2: Against the Applicant.

Subparas. 2.a.: Against the Applicant

DECISION

In light of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interests to grant or continue a security clearance for the Applicant.

Darlene Lokey Anderson

Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

01-02247.h1 FOR GOVERNMENT Melvin A. Howry, Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Pro Se file:///usr.osd.mil/...yComputer/Desktop/DOHA%20transfer/DOHA-Kane/dodogc/doha/industrial/Archived%20-%20HTML/01-02247.h1.html[7/2/2021 2:13:57 PM] 01-02247.h1