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ISCR Case 02-29577.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 02-29577.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 02-29577.h1

grantedOct 14, 2004· Hon. Joseph Testan· hearing

Summary

A 51-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen and engineer, originally from South Korea, was granted a security clearance despite concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The Statement of Reasons cited his mother and three siblings residing in South Korea, all South Korean citizens, and his relationship with a South Korean government official.

However, the applicant successfully rebutted these concerns. It was established that his immediate family members are not agents of South Korea and do not pose a significant security risk. Furthermore, his relationship with the South Korean government official was found to be distant and infrequent.

Mitigating factors included the applicant's considerable assets in the United States and no assets in South Korea, along with his stated intention not to return to South Korea to live. The judge concluded that the applicant's long-term residence and commitment to the U.S., combined with the low risk posed by his family and the nature of his official contact, warranted the granting of his security clearance.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

Applicant demonstrated that his immediate family members in South Korea do not pose a significant security risk.
The relationship with the South Korean government official was deemed distant and infrequent.
Applicant's long-term residence and commitment to the U.S. were considered mitigating factors.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

E2.A2.1.2.1raisedImmediate Family Member Is a Citizen or Resident of a Foreign Country.
E2.A2.1.2.3raisedAssociates Connected with a Foreign Government.

Mitigating

E2.A2.1.3.1appliedImmediate Family Members Are Not Agents of a Foreign Power.
E2.A2.1.3.3appliedContact with Foreign Citizens Is Casual and Infrequent.

Key Rule Quoted

“It is highly unlikely that South Korea, a democratic ally which is heavily dependent upon the United States for its security, would risk its relationship with the United States by forcing a United States citizen to betray his country.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedFeb 12, 2004
Answer filedMar 3, 2004
Hearing heldAug 4, 2004
Decision dateOct 14, 2004

Cite For

Rebuttal of Prima Facie Case Under Guideline B
Mitigating Factors Related to Family Ties and Foreign Relationships
Evaluation of Casual and Infrequent Contact with Foreign Officials

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant's immediate family members in South Korea do not present a significant security risk, and that his relationship with a South Korean government official is distant and infrequent. Therefore, the applicant successfully rebutted the government's case for denial of security clearance, leading to a decision to grant the clearance.

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business · U.S. Financial Assets Predominant · Intent to Remain in U.S.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant's mother and three siblings are citizens of, and reside in, South Korea.	For Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	South Korea	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely	Claimed Other
1.b	Applicant has a relationship with an official of the South Korean government.	For Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend GOVT-AFFILIATED	South Korea	Denied	(c) failure to report or disclose association with a foreign person/group/government	(c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk	Claimed Other
1.c	Applicant's immediate family members are not agents of South Korea.	For Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	South Korea	Denied	—	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely	Claimed Other
1.d	Applicant's relationship with the South Korean government official is distant and infrequent.	For Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend GOVT-AFFILIATED	South Korea	Denied	—	(c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk	Claimed Other
1.e	Applicant has considerable assets in the United States and no assets in South Korea.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Denied	—	—	Claimed Other
1.f	Applicant has no intention of returning to South Korea to live.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Denied	—	—	Claimed Other

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DATE: October 14, 2004

In Re:

-------------

SSN: -----------

Applicant for Security Clearance

ISCR Case No. 02-29577

DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

JOSEPH TESTAN

SYNOPSIS

The Government established a prima facie case under Guideline B based on the fact applicant's mother and three siblings are citizens of, and reside in, South Korea, and the fact applicant has a relationship with an official of the South Korean government. The applicant has, however, presented convincing evidence that his immediate family members in South Korea do not present a significant security risk, and that his relationship with the South Korean government official is distant. I therefore conclude that applicant has rebutted the Government's prima facie case. Clearance is granted.

STATEMENT OF CASE

On February 12, 2004, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), pursuant to Executive Order 10865 and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to applicant which detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for applicant and recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine whether clearance should be denied or revoked.

Applicant responded to the SOR in writing on March 3, 2004. The case was assigned to the undersigned on June 22, 2004. A Notice of Hearing was issued on July 8, 2004, and the hearing was held on August 4, 2004. The transcript was received on August 25, 2004.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant is a 51 year old engineer. He has been employed by the same defense contractor for six and one-half years, and has held a DoD security clearance for four years.

Applicant was born in South Korea. In 1979, he moved to the United States to attend college. By 1985 he had earned a Ph.D. He became a naturalized United States citizen in 1995. His wife, to whom he has been married since 1983, is a naturalized United States citizen. They have two teenage children.

Applicant's 82 year old mother, brother, and two sisters are citizens and residents of South Korea. He has visited these family members in South Korea once during each of the last three years. He speaks by telephone with his mother monthly and with his siblings a few times a year. He considers his relationships with his mother and siblings to be "close" (TR at 19). None of these family members is connected to the South Korean government.

Applicant's 74 year old mother-in-law is a citizen and resident of South Korea. Applicant speaks to her once or twice a year. She does not raise a security concern.

Applicant maintains friendships with a few South Korean citizens. Only one of these friendships raises a security concern. (1) Applicant attended high school and college with an individual who works for the South Korean Foreign Ministry. This high-ranking official first contacted applicant in the United States in the early 1980s. They did not meet at that time. He next contacted applicant about six years ago (in the late 1990s) when he was assigned to the same area where applicant lives. Applicant and the official visited each others home four or five times during a one year period. These face-to-face encounters were the first since applicant left South Korea in 1979. The next and last time they met was two to three years ago when the friend and his wife were passing through applicant's town and they and their spouses had dinner together. Their last communication was a few months after the dinner when the official called applicant and invited applicant and his family to visit and stay at his house in a different state. Applicant did not accept the invitation, and that was the last communication they had. Applicant does not know where the official is assigned at the present time (TR at 37).

A letter from applicant's manager at his place of employment was admitted into evidence (Exhibit A). The manager expresses his "full support for [applicant] and his appeal regarding his security clearance application."

Applicant has no assets in South Korea. He has considerable assets in the United States, including $300,000.00 in equity in a house and approximately $65,000.00 in a 401K account. He is no longer a South Korean citizen, and has no intention of returning to South Korea to live. His two children, who were born here, plan on remaining in the United States.

CONCLUSION

Although applicant, his wife and two children are United States citizens living in the United States, applicant's elderly mother and three siblings are citizens and residents of South Korea. This fact requires application of Disqualifying Condition E2.A2.1.2.1 (An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident of or present in, a foreign country).

Based on the evidence presented, I conclude that these immediate family members are not agents of South Korea. I further conclude that they are not in a position to be exploited by South Korea in a way that could force applicant to choose between loyalty to them and loyalty to the United States. Although it would be naive to think South Korea does not conduct economic espionage against the United States, it is highly unlikely that South Korea, a democratic ally which is heavily dependent upon the United States for its security, would risk its relationship with the United States by forcing a United States citizen to betray his country. Furthermore, although applicant considers himself "close" to his immediate family members in Korea, based on the evidence presented, including the facts that applicant renounced his South Korean citizenship, has lived in this country for approximately 25 years, married and raised a family here, and intends on retiring and living here permanently, I conclude he would not compromise classified information in the unlikely event pressure was applied on him to do so. Based on the foregoing, Mitigating Condition E2.A2.1.3.1 (a determination that the immediate family member(s) . . . in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States) is applicable to this case.

Applicant's friendship with the high-ranking South Korean government official raises security concerns, and requires application of Disqualifying Condition E2.A2.1.2.3 (relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government). However, since applicant's contact with this individual has been casual and infrequent, Mitigating Condition E2.A2.1.3.3 (contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent) is also applicable. The fact that applicant has not communicated with this person in years, and doesn't even

know where he is currently living and working, leads me to conclude that this casual and infrequent relationship should not preclude applicant from having access to classified information.

Based on the foregoing, I conclude that applicant's evidence was sufficient to overcome the Government's prima facie case under Guideline B.

FORMAL FINDINGS

GUIDELINE B: FOR THE APPLICANT

Subparagraph 1a: for the applicant

Subparagraph 1b: for the applicant

Subparagraph 1c: for the applicant

Subparagraph 1d: for the applicant

Subparagraph 1e: for the applicant

Subparagraph 1f: for the applicant

DECISION

In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for applicant.

____________________________

Joseph Testan

Administrative Judge

1. The individual identified in SOR Allegation 1fis a college professor with no ties to the South Korean government.

FOOTNOTES

02-29577.h1 FOR GOVERNMENT Jennifer I. Campbell, Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Pro Se file:///usr.osd.mil/...omputer/Desktop/DOHA%20transfer/DOHA-Kane/dodogc/doha/industrial/Archived%20-%20HTML/02-29577.h1.html[6/24/2021 11:15:07 AM] 02-29577.h1