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ISCR Case 03-12349.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 03-12349.h1denied

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 03-12349.h1

deniedJun 14, 2004· Hon. Wilford H. Ross· hearing

Summary

A 46-year-old American citizen employed by a defense contractor was denied a security clearance due to concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference). The denial stemmed from her extensive foreign contacts with her husband's family in Iran and her prior use of an Iranian passport.

Specifically, the Statement of Reasons alleged that the Applicant had multiple family members or persons to whom she was bound by affection or obligation who were not American citizens or who could be subject to duress. Additionally, it was alleged that she had acted in a way that indicated a preference for another country over the United States. This included acquiring an Iranian passport in 1993 or 1994, renewing it in 1998, and using it for three trips to Iran between 1994 and 2000. The expired passport had also not been surrendered.

The judge found that the Applicant's extensive family connections in Iran raised security concerns under Guideline B, and her possession and use of an Iranian passport raised concerns under Guideline C. The Applicant failed to provide persuasive evidence to mitigate these concerns, leading to the denial of her security clearance.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

The Applicant has extensive family connections in Iran, raising security concerns under Guideline B.
The Applicant possessed and used an Iranian passport, which raised security concerns under Guideline C.
The Applicant failed to provide persuasive evidence to mitigate the Government's case against her.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 1appliedForeign Influence
AG ¶ 2appliedForeign Preference

Key Rule Quoted

“The Applicant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him or her a security clearance.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedNov 24, 2003
Answer filedDec 16, 2003
Hearing held—Decision made without a hearing at Applicant's request.
Decision dateJun 14, 2004

Cite For

Foreign Influence Due to Extensive Family Ties in Iran
Foreign Preference Indicated by Possession of an Iranian Passport
Insufficient Mitigation of Security Concerns Related to Foreign Connections

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The Applicant was found to have extensive foreign contacts with her husband's family in Iran and had previously obtained and used an Iranian passport for travel. The judge determined that these ties raised significant security concerns, and the Applicant failed to provide sufficient mitigation. Consequently, the security clearance was denied.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	The Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has family members and/or persons to whom she may be bound by affection or obligation who are not American citizens or who may be subject to duress.	Against Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Iran HEIGHTENED RISK	Unknown	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
1.b	The Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has family members and/or persons to whom she may be bound by affection or obligation who are not American citizens or who may be subject to duress.	Against Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Iran HEIGHTENED RISK	Unknown	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
1.c	The Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has family members and/or persons to whom she may be bound by affection or obligation who are not American citizens or who may be subject to duress.	Against Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Iran HEIGHTENED RISK	Unknown	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
1.d	The Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has family members and/or persons to whom she may be bound by affection or obligation who are not American citizens or who may be subject to duress.	Against Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Iran HEIGHTENED RISK	Unknown	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
1.e	The Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has family members and/or persons to whom she may be bound by affection or obligation who are not American citizens or who may be subject to duress.	Against Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Iran HEIGHTENED RISK	Unknown	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
1.f	The Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has family members and/or persons to whom she may be bound by affection or obligation who are not American citizens or who may be subject to duress.	Against Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Iran HEIGHTENED RISK	Unknown	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
2.a	The Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has acted in such a way as to indicate a preference for another country over the United States.	Against Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	Iran HEIGHTENED RISK	Unknown	(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	—	—
2.b	The Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has acted in such a way as to indicate a preference for another country over the United States.	Against Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	Iran HEIGHTENED RISK	Unknown	(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	—	—
2.c	The Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has acted in such a way as to indicate a preference for another country over the United States.	Against Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	Iran HEIGHTENED RISK	Unknown	(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline C (Foreign Preference) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The Applicant has shown a preference for a foreign country by obtaining and using an Iranian passport for travel to Iran. Despite the passport being expired, the judge found insufficient mitigation of the security concerns raised by this conduct. The Applicant's prior use of the foreign passport and her connections to Iran were deemed significant enough to deny her security clearance.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶10)	Mitigating applied (¶11)	Mitigation
2.a	The Applicant, though not Iranian by birth, acquired an Iranian passport in 1993 or 1994 and had the passport renewed in 1998.	Against Applicant	Foreign Passport Possession or Use	Admitted	(b) failure to report, or fully disclose when required, possession of a passport or identity card issued by any country other than the U.S.	—	—
2.b	The Applicant traveled to and from Iran three times between 1994 and 2000 using her Iranian passport.	Against Applicant	Foreign Passport Possession or Use	Admitted	(b) failure to report, or fully disclose when required, possession of a passport or identity card issued by any country other than the U.S.	—	—
2.c	The expired passport has not been surrendered in accordance with Government Exhibit 8.	Against Applicant	Failure to Renounce or Surrender Foreign Status	Admitted	(b) failure to report, or fully disclose when required, possession of a passport or identity card issued by any country other than the U.S.	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline C). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DATE: June 14, 2004

In Re:

-----------------------------

SSN: ---------------

Applicant for Security Clearance

ISCR Case No. 03-12349

DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

WILFORD H. ROSS

SYNOPSIS

The Applicant has extensive foreign contacts with her husband's family in Iran. The Applicant also obtained and used an Iranian passport for travel to Iran. The passport has expired, but under the particular circumstances of this case that fact is not determinative. Insufficient mitigation is shown. Adverse inference is not overcome. Clearance is denied.

STATEMENT OF CASE

On November 24, 2003, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), pursuant to Executive Order 10865 (as amended) and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to the Applicant, which detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the Applicant and recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine whether a clearance should be denied or revoked.

The Applicant responded to the SOR in writing on December 16, 2003, and requested that the Decision be made without a hearing. The Department Counsel submitted the File of Relevant Material (FORM) to the Applicant on February 18, 2004. The Applicant was given 30 days after receipt of the FORM to submit any additional information to the Administrative Judge. The Applicant received the FORM on February 25, 2004, and submitted no additional information. The case was received by the undersigned for Decision on April 6, 2004.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Applicant is 46 and married. She is employed by a defense contractor as an ENG Administrator/Data Manager, and she seeks to obtain or retain a DoD security clearance in connection with her employment in the defense sector.

The Government opposes the Applicant's request for a security clearance, based upon the allegations set forth in the Statement of Reasons (SOR). The following findings of fact are entered as to each paragraph and guideline in the SOR. They are based on the Applicant's Answer to the SOR and the exhibits.

Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Connections). The Government alleges in this paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has family members and/or persons to whom she may be bound by affection or obligation who are not American citizens or who may be subject to duress.

The Applicant is a native born American citizen. Her husband is a naturalized American citizen of Iranian extraction. He obtained his American citizenship in 1987.

The Applicant's husband's family continues to live in Iran. This includes the husband's father, as well as three sisters and two brothers. (Government Exhibit 4, question 9, items 12 through 18.) There is no information in the file as to whether any of these people have connections to the Iranian government.

Paragraph 2 (Guideline C - Foreign Preference). The Government alleges in this paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has acted in such a way as to indicate a preference for another country over the United States.

The Applicant, though not Iranian by birth, acquired an Iranian passport in 1993 or 1994 and had the passport renewed in 1998. Based on the state of the record, it is unclear whether the Applicant had to acquire Iranian citizenship in order to obtain a passport. The passport expired on July 16, 2003. According to the Applicant, she only acquired the passport in order to travel safely to and from Iran with her children. (Government Exhibit 4 at question 15, Government Exhibit 5.) The Applicant traveled to and from Iran three times between 1994 and 2000 using her Iranian passport.

She further states in her Answer that the passport was not renewed again and has expired. Finally, she states, "Next time we go I will use my US passport." (Government Exhibit 3 at 2.) The expired passport has not been surrendered in accordance with Government Exhibit 8 ("Guidance to DoD Central Adjudication Facilities (CAF) Clarifying the Application of the Foreign Preference Adjudicative Guideline" ("Money Memorandum")).

The Government submitted extensive documentation from the Department of State concerning the difficulties that Americans and dual national Iranian/Americans have in exiting Iran. (Government Exhibit 7.) Based on that documentation, it is an open question whether the Applicant would be allowed to enter or leave Iran with only an American passport. This is particularly true since she is the wife of an American citizen of Iranian descent, who is viewed by the Iranian government as only being an Iranian. Government Exhibit 7 at page 2 states, "Because of Islamic law, compounded by the lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran, the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran can provide very limited assistance if an American woman encounters difficulty in leaving Iran."

POLICIES

Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum. Accordingly, the Department of Defense, in Enclosure 2 of the 1992 Directive, has set forth policy factors which must be given "binding" consideration in making security clearance determinations. These factors should be followed in every case according to the pertinent guideline. However, the factors are neither automatically determinative of the decision in any case, nor can they supersede the Administrative Judge's reliance on his own common sense, as well as his knowledge of the law, human nature and the ways of the world, in making a reasoned decision. Because each security clearance case presents its own unique facts and circumstances, it cannot be assumed that these factors exhaust the realm of human experience, or apply equally in every case. Based on the Findings of Fact set forth above, the factors most applicable to the evaluation of this case are:

Guideline B (Foreign influence)

Condition that could raise a security concern:

(1) An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (None of the stated conditions have application in this case.)

Guideline C (Foreign preference)

Condition that could raise a security concern:

(2) Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(None of the stated conditions have application in this case.)

In addition, as set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive at pages 16-17, "In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the [Administrative Judge] should consider the following factors [General Factors]:

a. The nature, extent and seriousness of the conduct

b. The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation

c. The frequency and recency of the conduct

d. The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct

e. The voluntariness of participation

f. The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavior changes

g. The motivation for the conduct

h. The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress

i. The likelihood of continuation or recurrence."

The eligibility guidelines established in the DoD Directive identify personal characteristics and conduct which are reasonably related to the ultimate question of whether it is "clearly consistent with the national interest" to grant an Applicant's request for access to classified information.

In the defense industry, the security of classified industrial secrets is entrusted to civilian workers who must be counted upon to safeguard such sensitive information twenty-four hours a day. The Government is therefore appropriately concerned where available information indicates that an Applicant for clearance may have foreign connections and expressed a foreign preference that demonstrates untrustworthiness or unreliability on the Applicant's part.

The DoD Directive states, "Each adjudication is to be an overall common sense determination based upon consideration and assessment of all available information, both favorable and unfavorable, with particular emphasis placed on the seriousness, recency, frequency, and motivation for the individual's conduct; the extent to which conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or undertaken with the knowledge of the circumstances or consequences involved; and, to the extent that it can be estimated, the probability that conduct will or will not continue in the future." The Administrative Judge can only draw those inferences or conclusions that have a reasonable and logical basis in the evidence of record. The Judge cannot draw inferences or conclusions based on evidence which is speculative or conjectural in nature. Finally, as emphasized by President Eisenhower in Executive Order 10865, "Any determination under this order...shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned."

CONCLUSION

It is the Government's responsibility to present substantial evidence to support the finding of a nexus, or rational connection, between the Applicant's conduct and the granting or continued holding of a security clearance. If such a case has been established, the burden then shifts to the Applicant to go forward with evidence in rebuttal, explanation or mitigation which is sufficient to overcome or outweigh the Government's case. The Applicant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him or her a security clearance.

In this case the Government has met its initial burden of proving by substantial evidence that the Applicant has extensive family connections with her husband's family in Iran (Guideline B); and that she has obtained and used an Iranian passport in the recent past (Guideline C).

The Applicant, on the other hand, has not introduced persuasive evidence in rebuttal, explanation or mitigation which is sufficient to overcome the Government's case against her. Turning first to Guideline B, the record shows that the Applicant's husband, an Iranian/American, has several family members who continue to reside in Iran. The record is silent as to what these people do for a living; if any of them have connections to the Iranian government, military or security services; and what the Applicant would or would not do if pressure was brought to bear by the Iranian government on her relatives. Disqualifying condition 1 applies to this case. (An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country.) It is the Applicant's burden to show that any of the mitigating conditions apply to the facts in this case. She has not met her burden. Paragraph 1 is found against the Applicant.

The Applicant obtained an Iranian passport in order to travel to and from Iran to visit her husband's family. Disqualifying condition 1 applies. (Possession and/or use of a foreign passport.) The Iranian passport has expired, and she states the passport shall not be renewed. The Applicant has not surrendered the expired passport. Though not directly discussed by the Money Memorandum, expired passports have utility as a way for someone to obtain a new passport. Iran is a nation whose government is not friendly to the United States. The Applicant has a heavy burden to show that her possession of even an expired Iranian passport, as well as her travels to Iran, do not have continuing security significance. This is especially so given the difficulties inherent in an American woman attempting to exit Iran on an American passport. Her statement that she will only use her American passport to enter Iran in the future is not sufficient to overcome the security significance of her prior conduct. Paragraph 2 is found against the Applicant.

On balance, it is concluded that the Applicant has failed to overcome the Government's information opposing her request for a security clearance. Accordingly, the evidence supports a finding against the Applicant as to the conclusionary allegations expressed in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Government's Statement of Reasons.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings For or Against the Applicant on the allegations in the SOR, as required by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1: Against the Applicant.

Subparagraphs 1.a. through 1.f.: Against the Applicant.

Paragraph 2: Against the Applicant.

Subparagraphs 2.a. through 2.c.: Against the Applicant.

DECISION

In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the Applicant.

Wilford H. Ross

Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

03-12349.h1 FOR GOVERNMENT Jennifer I. Campbell, Esquire, Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Pro Se file:///usr.osd.mil/...Computer/Desktop/DOHA%20transfer/DOHA-Kane/dodogc/doha/industrial/Archived%20-%20HTML/03-12349.h1.html[6/24/2021 3:20:22 PM] 03-12349.h1