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ISCR Case 25-00460 · CASE

Case record

A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

Decision Date5/11/2026
Statusdenied
LevelHEARING
TypeWRITTEN RECORD FORM
Participants
Applicant Representation: Pro Se
Government Counsel: Nicole A. Smith
Judge: Richard A. Cefola
Guidelines Evaluated
- BForeign Influence · Against Applicant
Questions about ISCR 25-00460, answered from its own record: what was alleged, what the judge found, where it says so. Descriptive only; never advice.

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ISCR Case 25-00460denied

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 25-00460

deniedMay 11, 2026· Hon. Richard A. Cefola· hearing

Synopsis

The applicant, a 48-year-old senior consultant who immigrated from Taiwan and is a dual citizen, faced security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) due to his extensive contacts with individuals in Taiwan, including family members with military backgrounds. The judge found that the applicant did not mitigate the security concerns, leading to a denial of his security clearance.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

The applicant maintained significant contacts with foreign nationals, including family members with military ties to Taiwan.
The applicant failed to provide evidence to mitigate the security concerns raised by his foreign contacts.
The applicant's assertion that his relationships were casual and infrequent was insufficient given the heightened risks associated with China.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons Creating Potential Conflict of Interest

Key Rule Quoted

“The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedJun 27, 2025
Answer filedAug 18, 2025Requested decision on written record.
Hearing held—No hearing; decision based on written record.
Decision dateMay 11, 2026

Cite For

Denial of Security Clearance Due to Foreign Influence Under Guideline B
Insufficient Mitigation of Foreign Contacts
Significant Risk Associated with Foreign Family Ties in a Hostile Country Context

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The judge found that the applicant did not mitigate the security concerns related to foreign influence due to his contacts with family members and other individuals in Taiwan. The applicant's father, a retired military officer, and numerous other contacts in Taiwan raised significant concerns about potential foreign influence. Consequently, the application for a security clearance was denied.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Career or Business

1.a Applicant’s father retired as a Lieutenant Colonel from the Taiwan Air Force: Applicant’s 80-year-old father was born in China but resides in Taiwan. He retired from the Taiwan Air Force in 1990, where he rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Applicant maintains weekly contact with this father. His mother passed away some time ago and his father now has a girlfriend, with whom Applicant maintains monthly contact.
Finding: Against Applicant
Relationship: Parent in Foreign Country Immediate FamilyGOVT-AFFILIATED
Country: TaiwanHEIGHTENED RISK
Response: Denied
Disqualifying (¶7):
(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation
(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest
Mitigating applied (¶8): —
Mitigation: —
1.b Applicant’s aunt is a dual U.S. – Taiwan citizen residing in Taiwan: Applicant’s 77-year-old aunt was born in China but resides in Taiwan. She is a dual U.S.-Taiwan citizen who has been a housewife for most of her life. Applicant maintains semi-annual contact with her.
Finding: For Applicant
Relationship: Spouse Dual or Foreign Citizen Extended Family
Country: TaiwanHEIGHTENED RISK
Response: Denied
Disqualifying (¶7): —
Mitigating applied (¶8): —
Mitigation: —
1.c Applicant has close and/or continuing relationships with multiple citizens / residents of Taiwan: Applicant maintains contact with at least 55 individuals who were born in either China or Taiwan. All of the individuals have Taiwanese citizenship and some have dual citizenship with the United States (save for one with dual U.S. – U.K. citizenship). Applicant’s contact frequency ranges from as often as weekly to as infrequently as annually. Of the 55 individuals listed by Applicant, 30 still reside in Taiwan. Their vocations range from housewife to data scientist, from teacher to software developer. Applicant avers most of the relationships are via social media and all are casual / infrequent.
Finding: Against Applicant
Relationship: Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other
Country: TaiwanHEIGHTENED RISK
Response: Denied
Disqualifying (¶7):
(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation
(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest
Mitigating applied (¶8): —
Mitigation: —

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant’s father retired as a Lieutenant Colonel from the Taiwan Air Force: Applicant’s 80-year-old father was born in China but resides in Taiwan. He retired from the Taiwan Air Force in 1990, where he rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Applicant maintains weekly contact with this father. His mother passed away some time ago and his father now has a girlfriend, with whom Applicant maintains monthly contact.	Against Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family GOVT-AFFILIATED	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	—	—
1.b	Applicant’s aunt is a dual U.S. – Taiwan citizen residing in Taiwan: Applicant’s 77-year-old aunt was born in China but resides in Taiwan. She is a dual U.S.-Taiwan citizen who has been a housewife for most of her life. Applicant maintains semi-annual contact with her.	For Applicant	Spouse Dual or Foreign Citizen Extended Family	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	—	—	—
1.c	Applicant has close and/or continuing relationships with multiple citizens / residents of Taiwan: Applicant maintains contact with at least 55 individuals who were born in either China or Taiwan. All of the individuals have Taiwanese citizenship and some have dual citizenship with the United States (save for one with dual U.S. – U.K. citizenship). Applicant’s contact frequency ranges from as often as weekly to as infrequently as annually. Of the 55 individuals listed by Applicant, 30 still reside in Taiwan. Their vocations range from housewife to data scientist, from teacher to software developer. Applicant avers most of the relationships are via social media and all are casual / infrequent.	Against Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text, footnotes and signatures included, is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

ernment: Nicole A. Smith, Esq, Department Counsel

For Applican

DECISION

Pro se

5/11/2026 Decision CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge: Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised under the Foreign Influence guid

STATEMENT OF CASE

ine. National security eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions on September 22, 2022 (Questionnaire). On June 27, 2025, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within DoD after June 8, 2017. On August 18, 2025, Applicant responded to the SOR in writing (Answer) and requested that the case be decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. In his Answer, Applicant denied each allegation. On February 2, 2026, Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case in a File of Relevant Material (FORM). In that

same document, the Government withdrew SOR ¶¶ 1.d – 1.g., which therefore will not be considered herein. A complete copy of the FORM, consisting of Government Exhibits (GE) 1 to 5 and the Government’s arguments in support of the remaining SOR allegations, was received by the Applicant on February 26, 2026. He was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns, but he did not respond within the period specified to do so. The case was assigned to me on May 1, 2026, and GE 1 to 5 were admitted without objection. In the FORM, Departme

FINDINGS OF FACT

long-standing “One China” policy of the United States, Taiwan cannot be viewed in a vacuum when conducting a Guideline B analysis. The facts are summarized in the written request and will not be repeated verbatim here however I take particular note of the following: China is a large and economically powerful country, with a population of over a billion people. China has an authoritarian government dominated by the Chinese Communist Party, and it exercises consistent diplomatic, political, and military pressure on Taiwan. China has a poor record with respect to human rights, suppresses political dissent, and engages in arbitrary arrests and detentions, forced confessions, torture, and mistreatment of prisoners. China is one of the most aggressive countries in seeking sensitive and protected U.S. technology and economic intelligence. It targets the United States with active intelligence gathering programs, both legal and illegal. As a result, it is a growing threat to U.S. national security. There are several recent cases involving actual or attempted espionage, as well as the illegal export of information. Findings of Fact Applicant is 48-year-old senior consultant with the sponsoring DoD contractor where he has worked since August 2022. He submitted the Questionnaire in conjunction with his employment. Born in Taiwan, he immigrated to the United Stat

POLICIES

in 2002 and naturalized in 2017, while still maintaining Taiwanese citizenship. He earned a bachelor’s degree in Taiwan in 1999, then a master’s degree in the United States in 2005. Applicant completed his compulsory two years of military service for Taiwan in 2001. He is unmarried and has no children. (Answer; GE 3 at 5-7, 10-12, 16, 18-19) SOR Paragraph 1, Guideline B ( Foreign Influence) The Government alleged that Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance due to foreign influence. I find the following facts regarding this allegation and Applicant’s admissions: 2

1.a. Applicant’s father retired as a Lieutenant Colonel from the Taiwan Air Force: Applicant’s 80-year-old father was born in China but resides in Taiwan. He retired from the Taiwan Air Force in 1990, where he rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Applicant maintains weekly contact with this father. His mother passed away some time ago and his father now has a girlfriend, with whom Applicant maintains monthly contact. (Answer; GE 3 at 19-20; GE 4 at 1) 1.b. Applicant’s aunt is a dual U.S. – Taiwan citizen residing in Taiwan: Applicant’s 77-year-old aunt was born in China but resides in Taiwan. She is a dual U.S.- Taiwan citizen who has been a housewife for most of her life. Applicant maintains semi- annual contact with her. (Answer; GE 4 at 1) 1.c. Applicant has close and/or continuing relationships with multiple citizens / residents of Taiwan: Applicant maintains contact with at least 55 individuals who were born in either China or Taiwan. All of the individuals have Taiwanese citizenship and some have dual citizenship with the United States (save for one with dual U.S. – U.K. citizenship). Applicant’s contact frequency ranges from as often as weekly to as infrequently as annually. Of the 55 individuals listed by Applicant, 30 still reside in Taiwan. Their vocations range from housewife to data scientist, from teacher to software developer. Applicant avers most of the relationships are via social media and all are casual / infrequent. (Answer, GE 4 at 1-4) 1.d. – 1.g. [Withdrawn by the Government] Whole-Person and Mitigating Evidence Applicant did not respond to the FORM and offered no evidence in mitigation. Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used

ANALYSIS

evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 3

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis SOR Paragraph 1, Guideline B, Foreign Influence The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG ¶ 6: Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 4

The facts of this case establish the following potentially disqualifying conditions set forth in AG ¶ 7 to all the allegations under Guideline B: (a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by prov

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

ing that information or technology. The burden therefore shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline B. And in the case of a hostile country like China, the burden is very heavy. [ISCR 17-04208 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 7, 2019)]. The guideline includes the following conditions in AG ¶ 8 that can mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s foreign contacts: (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and l oyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and (c) contact or communic

FORMAL FINDINGS

ion with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In this case, the record evidence fails to establish AG ¶¶ 8(a), (b),

CONCLUSION

r (c) for the contacts alleged, with the exception of Applicant’s aunt, given her age, vocation, and the nature of Applicant’s contact. Applicant’s father, on the other hand, served as a senior officer in the armed forces of a foreign nation that continues to receive pressure from the Chinese government. 5