ISCR Case No. 20-00993

}IB~l,►. ft ~ ~ fiit',7r.eJ .. ,:$ ______________ ______________ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) [Redacted] ) ISCR Case No. 20-00993 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Bryan Olmos, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se1 09/27/2022

FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines G (Alcohol Consumption), I (Psychological Conditions), and E (Personal Conduct). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on June 19, 2018. On November 6, 2020, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DCSA CAF) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guidelines G, I, and E. The DCSA CAF acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016). 1 Applicant was represented by an attorney in his response to the SOR, but he was pro se at the hearing. (Tr. 5.)

Applicant answered the SOR on December 31, 2020, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on March 30, 2021. Scheduling of the hearing was delayed by COVID-19 health precautions. The case was assigned to me on April 5, 2022. On April 22, 2022, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the hearing was scheduled for May 23, 2022. The hearing was cancelled on May 22, 2022, after Applicant suffered a stroke and was unable to participate. It was rescheduled for July 14, 2022. I convened the hearing as rescheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 7 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A through S. AX A through AX Q and AX S were admitted without objection. Department Counsel objected to AX R on the ground that the author of the exhibit was not qualified to conduct the evaluation or opine on the applicability of the adjudicative guidelines. I overruled the objection but informed the parties that I would consider the author’s qualifications in determining the weight to be given to her evaluation. (Tr. 12-13.) DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on July 25, 2022. Amendment of SOR Paragraph 3.a of the SOR originally alleged, “That information as set forth in subparagraphs 1.b and 1.f. above.” It was amended, without objection, to allege, “That information as set forth in subparagraphs 1.b and 1.e.” There is no subparagraph 1.f in the SOR.

In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, he admitted the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.b. He admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.c, 1.d, 2.a, and 3.a in part and denied them in part. He denied the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.d. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. Applicant is a 58-year-old aeronautical engineer employed by a defense contractor since August 2004. He served on active duty in the U.S. Navy from May 1984 to October 2004, retired as a chief petty officer (pay grade E-7), and received an honorable discharge. He started working for his current employer while on terminal leave from the Navy. (Tr. 32.) While on active duty, he was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal twice, the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal six times, the Navy Good Conduct Medal five times, and various service awards. (AX E.) He held a security clearance in the Navy and retained it as an employee of a defense contractor. Applicant married in February 1988 and divorced in April 2012. He remarried in July 2019. He has two adult children. Applicant earned an associate’s degree from an online university in July 2005. (AX D.) He attended a university from October 2007 to March 2012 but did not receive a degree. (GX 1 at 12.)

Applicant began consuming alcohol in high school. In March 1986, while he was on active duty in the Navy, he was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and sentenced to probation for two years. (GX 1 at 30-31.) He was required to complete a six- week alcohol rehabilitation program. He did not resume consuming alcohol until 1993. (Tr. 27-28.) Applicant testified that when he returned from a deployment to Iraq in 2003, he was depressed and distant. He turned to alcohol in an unsuccessful attempt to escape from his depression. He started seeing a counselor in 2005, because he was struggling with his feelings about his role in the taking of lives. After a shore duty assignment, he volunteered to deploy again with his old unit. When he returned, he talked to his wife about his depression, and her response was, “Don’t expect me to feel sorry for you; you volunteered for this.” (Tr. 30-31.) Between 2005 and 2010, he sometimes drank to excess, and he believed he was an alcoholic. (Tr. 33.) In May 2011, Applicant’s wife left him. He thought about suicide. When he told his primary physician about his suicidal thoughts, his physician told him he needed treatment. He completed a four-day inpatient program that he did not find helpful. His wife moved back into the home for a few days and then left again. In June 2011, he overdosed on a prescription sleep medication combined with alcohol. His wife found him unconscious when she came to the house on the following morning, and she took him to a hospital. Applicant was voluntarily admitted to a psychiatric hospital in July 2011 for psychiatric stabilization. He was discharged a week later and diagnosed with a major depressive disorder, recurrent, and alcohol abuse. He was prescribed a drug to reduce his craving for alcohol and a drug for his depression. His prognosis was “fair if compliant with the medicine.” (GX 3 at 11.) During 2011 and 2012, Applicant was drinking one or two drinks in the evening every day. His consumption on weekends was heavier. At the same time, he was taking medications for depression, even though he was advised to not consume alcohol while taking the antidepressants. (Tr. 35.) His depression and alcohol abuse worsened after his divorce. (Tr. 21-22.) He saw a psychologist regularly until July 2012, when he moved to another location. (Tr. 37-38.) Applicant’s alcohol consumption increased to five or six drinks at day. (Tr. 41.) In October 2015, he was arrested and charged with DWI. (GX 1 at 28.) He reported his arrest to his employer, as required. (GX 2 at 6.) His case was referred to a Veteran’s Court, where he pleaded guilty. He was required to compete a nine-month program that began in September 2016 and involved wearing an ankle monitor for alcohol, mentoring, counseling, random urinalysis, and victim impact panels. He was required to attend the program for three additional months because he consumed alcohol once during the program. He completed the program in May 2017. (AX J.) After he completed the program, the charges against him were dismissed, and record of his arrest and conviction was expunged. (GX 1 at 26 and 28; AX K; AX L; AX M.)

In early 2017, Applicant went to his employee assistance program (EAP) and asked for help. He was enrolled in an inpatient program for five or six weeks and completed it in April 2017. (AX L.) In late 2017, he resumed his alcohol consumption. (Tr. 31.) On February 14, 2018, Applicant was self-admitted to a psychiatric hospital for outpatient treatment after he developed suicidal ideation while intoxicated. He was diagnosed with a major depressive disorder. After two days, he was discharged at his request, because the treatment was not covered by his insurance. (GX 5; Tr. 52.) On February 19, 2018, which would have been Applicant’s 30th anniversary with his ex-wife, he began feeling severely depressed. He told his son how he was feeling, and his son took him to a hospital for outpatient treatment. He was discharged on March 9, 2018, at his request so that he could return to work. (GX 6.) He was advised to seek a mental health professional and to stop consuming alcohol. (Tr. 55.) When Applicant was interviewed by a security investigator in August 2018, he told the investigator that he and the woman who became his second wife both enjoyed going to draft breweries on weekends, and he usually consumed about two beers at one of the breweries. (GX 2 at 5; Tr. 56.) As they approached the date of their marriage, Applicant increased his alcohol consumption due to the stress of merging households. In July 2019, the CAF requested that Applicant undergo a mental health evaluation. He was evaluated in November 2019 by a licensed psychologist. He was diagnosed with a major depressive disorder, in partial remission, and an alcohol use disorder, moderate. The psychologist’s diagnostic impressions included the following comments: Clinical interview, psychological testing, and medical records converge to suggest [Applicant] experienced intermittent depressive symptoms for approximately 17 years. At times, since 2011, these symptoms have been coupled with suicidal ideation after his ex-wife moved out of their home. More severe depressive symptoms apparently tended to occur annually in February, the date of his previous anniversary with his ex-wife. However, he denies experiencing any significant symptoms of anxiety or depression at the present time. His psychological testing does not indicate any significant distress. His mental health symptoms appear to be managed presently with [a prescription drug], and he has apparently gained insight and coping skills through therapy. Any depressive symptoms he may be experiencing presently do not appear to be significantly impacting his occupational or social functioning. The psychologist stated, however, that Applicant’s decision to consume beer gave her pause, “given his history of alcohol abuse in conjunction with his previous treatment provider’s recommendation of abstinence.” (GX 7 at 6.) She concluded that Applicant’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness are impaired, “as evidenced by his decision to

continue to consume alcohol on a weekly basis, despite historically experiencing significant consequences as a result of his alcohol use, and in contradiction to his treatment provider’s recommendations.” The psychologist’s prognosis was “fair.” She commented that if Applicant “could provide information from a mental health practitioner familiar with his history of alcohol use disorder and related treatment which indicates his alcohol consumption falls within their recommended levels, this could improve his prognosis as well. . . .” (GX 7 at 6.) On December 7, 2020, Applicant was evaluated by a another medical professional who is a licensed clinical social worker, certified substance abuse counselor, and licensed substance abuse professional. Her evaluation states: The results of standardized testing revealed the client to have a low probability of an alcohol use disorder. The client has no problematic use, nor is there a pattern to the use. There are no clinical effects, and there is no interference in the patient’s life. The client has ceased all consumption of alcohol. This evaluator determined that Applicant has no alcohol use disorder and that no treatment is warranted. (AX R.) Although Department Counsel objected to consideration of her evaluation on the ground that she was not qualified to make it, I am satisfied that her credentials are sufficient to warrant consideration of her evaluation, although she may have exceeded the limits of her qualifications by expressing opinions about the applicability of the adjudicative guidelines. In late December 2020, Applicant completed an online four-hour behavior modification course and an online four-hour drug and alcohol awareness course. (AX P; AX Q.) In June 2022, he took a PETH test to determine the presence of alcohol in his blood, and it was negative. (AX R.) Applicant suffered a stroke on February 12, 2022, which he believes was due in part to his alcohol abuse, failure to control his diabetes, and hypertension. Since his stroke, he has changed his dietary and exercise habits, takes his medicines as prescribed, and has not consumed alcohol. (Tr. 21-24.) He testified that his primary care physician since the summer of 2013 had warned him that he had two choices: “stop drinking and live or keep drinking and die.” When Applicant saw his primary care physician after the stroke, she told him, “I told you so, and I’m only going to say that once.” (Tr. 59. At the hearing, Applicant testified that his last drink was on February 11, 2022, the night before his stroke. He did not describe the circumstances of his alcohol consumption on that date. (Tr. 66.) His vision and hearing were still impaired by the consequences of the stoke. Applicant has started seeing a new counselor. He has changed his diet, started exercising, and consistently takes his medications. He tried Alcoholics Anonymous in the past and found that it did not help him. To the contrary, he left the AA meetings wanting

to drink more than when he walked into the meeting. (Tr. 71.) He has two close friends, one of whom is a recovering alcoholic and the other recovering from addiction to methamphetamine, who have helped him. (Tr. 67-68.) Applicant’s wife continues to consume alcohol, and they keep it in their home, but he testified that he is not tempted by it. He testified that the thought of how close he came to death during his stroke is with him every day. He believes that every alcoholic has “a bottom,” and he hit bottom when he had a stroke. (Tr. 71-72.). In Applicant’s response to the SOR, he submitted a sworn statement declaring his intent to not use alcohol in the future. He agreed that any future involvement in alcohol use may be grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. (AX O.) Applicant’s immediate supervisor submitted a letter supporting reinstatement of his security clearance. His supervisor has worked with him for 15 years and is familiar with his struggles with depression and alcohol abuse. He states that Applicant “has earned the respect of his work community, especially the pilot community, due to his honesty, accountability, and integrity.” Applicant is regularly requested by name for tasks requiring a high degree of trust. The supervisor states, “He does not accept failure lightly, and works very hard to overcome failures at work and in his personal life.” (AX F at 1-2.) Applicant’s team members share his supervisor’s high regard for his technical skills, integrity, and honesty. (AX F at 3-31.) He has received numerous awards for his achievements and technical skills. (AX G; AX H.) Applicant’s performance evaluation for 2017 rated him as exceeding expectations for technical execution and integrity and achieving expectations in all other performance categories. (AX I at 1-7.) His 2018 performance evaluation rated him as exceeding expectations in all categories. (AX I at 8-14.) His performance evaluation for 2019 rated him as exceeding expectations in performance and achieving expectations in all other categories. (AX I at 15-20.)

“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense

decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.

Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 21: “Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness.”

Applicant’s admissions and the evidence submitted at the hearing establish the following disqualifying conditions. AG ¶ 22(a): alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of the frequency of the individual's alcohol use or whether the individual has been diagnosed with alcohol use disorder; AG ¶ 22(c): habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed with alcohol use disorder; AG ¶ 22(d): diagnosis by a duly qualified medical or mental health professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, psychiatrist, or licensed clinical social worker) of alcohol use disorder; AG ¶ 22(e): the failure to follow treatment advice once diagnosed; and AG ¶ 22(f): alcohol consumption, which is not in accordance with treatment recommendations, after a diagnosis of alcohol use disorder. The following mitigating conditions are potentially relevant: AG ¶ 23(a): so much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment; AG ¶ 23(b): the individual acknowledges his or her pattern of maladaptive alcohol use, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations; and AG ¶ 23(d): the individual has successfully completed a treatment program along with any required aftercare, and has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations. AG ¶ 23(a) is not established. Applicant’s maladaptive alcohol is recent, frequent, and has not occurred under circumstances making recurrence unlikely. AG ¶¶ 23(b) and 23(d) are not fully established. Applicant has acknowledged his maladaptive alcohol use and completed treatment, but he has not established a pattern of abstinence. It is possible that the devastating stroke he suffered on February 12, 2022, was a wake-up call sufficient to motivate him to totally abstain from alcohol, but insufficient time has passed to make that determination.

Guideline I, Psychological Conditions The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 27: Certain emotional, mental, and personality conditions can impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness. A formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required for there to be a concern under this guideline. A duly qualified mental health professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist) employed by, or acceptable to and approved by the U.S. Government, should be consulted when evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information under this guideline and an opinion, including prognosis, should be sought. No negative inference concerning the standards in this guideline may be raised solely on the basis of mental health counseling. Applicant’s admissions and the evidence presented at the hearing establish the following disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 28(b): an opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that the individual has a condition that may impair judgment, stability, reliability, or trustworthiness; AG ¶ 28(c): voluntary or involuntary inpatient hospitalization; and AG ¶ 28(d): failure to follow a prescribed treatment plan related to a diagnosed psychological/psychiatric condition that may impair judgment, stability, reliability, or trustworthiness, including, but not limited to, failure to take prescribed medication or failure to attend required counseling sessions. The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 29(a): the identified condition is readily controllable with treatment, and the individual has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment plan;

AG ¶ 29(b): the individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or treatment program for a condition that is amenable to treatment, and the individual is currently receiving counseling or treatment with a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified mental health professional; AG ¶ 29(c): recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional employed by, or acceptable to and approved by, the U.S. Government that an individual's previous condition is under control or in remission, and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;

AG ¶ 29(d): the past psychological/psychiatric condition was temporary, the situation has been resolved, and the individual no longer shows indications of emotional instability; and AG ¶ 29(e): there is no indication of a current problem.

AG ¶ 29(a) is established. AG ¶¶ 29(b), and 29(c) are partially established for Applicant’s depressive disorder. The mental health evaluation obtained by the CAF reflects that Applicant’s symptoms appear to be managed by a prescription drug and he has gained insight and coping skills through therapy. However, his prognosis was only “fair” because of his continued consumption of alcohol. AG ¶¶ 29(d) and 29(e) are partially established. Applicant’s depressive disorder is not temporary, although it was under control when he was evaluated by the psychologist selected by the CAF. Guideline E, Personal Conduct The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15: “Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. . . .” I have considered the following disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 16(c): credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information; AG ¶ 16(d): credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. . . ; and AG ¶ 16(e): personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress by a foreign intelligence entity or other individual or group. Such conduct includes . . . engaging in activities which, if known, could affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing.

AG ¶¶ 16(c) and 16(d) are not applicable. Applicant’s conduct is sufficient for an adverse determination under Guideline G and is explicitly covered under that guideline. AG ¶ 16(e) is established. Applicant’s maladaptive alcohol use is likely to affect his personal, professional standing, but his struggle with depression has not affected it. Those who are aware of it are sympathetic and admire him for his ability to perform well in spite of it. The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 17(c): the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; AG ¶ 17(d): the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and AG ¶ 17(e): the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. AG ¶ 17(c) is not established. Applicant’s alcohol abuse has had devastating consequences. It is recent and has been frequent. It has not occurred under unique circumstances making it unlikely to recur. AG ¶ 17(d) is not fully established. Applicant has acknowledged his behavior and obtained counseling, but insufficient time has passed to show that it is unlikely to recur. AG ¶ 17(e) is not fully established. Applicant has taken positive steps to overcome his alcohol problem, but it is too soon to determine if he has succeeded.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole- person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the

individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines G, I, and E in my whole- person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment. Applicant has served with distinction for many years, in and out of uniform, and he has held a security clearance during those years, apparently without incident. He was sincere, remorseful, and candid at the hearing. His depression is being controlled by medication and therapy. However, his latest episode of maladaptive alcohol consumption is too recent to overcome the likelihood of recurrence. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines G, I, and E, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security concerns raised by his psychological condition, but he has not mitigated the concerns raised by his alcohol consumption and personal conduct.

I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: Paragraph 1, Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a-1.e: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline I (Psychological Conditions): FOR APPLICANT Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant Paragraph 3, Guideline E (Personal Conduct): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 3.a: Against Applicant

I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. LeRoy F. Foreman Administrative Judge