ISCR Case No. 21-00401

______________ ______________ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 21-00401 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Adrienne M. Driskill, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

HALE, Charles C., Administrative Judge: This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on February 27, 2020. On October 26, 2021, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DCSA CAF) sent her a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline H. The DCSA CAF acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016). Applicant answered the SOR on November 11, 2021, and requested a decision on the written record without a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government’s

written case on July 20, 2022. On July 22, 2022, a complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was sent to Applicant, who was given an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s evidence. She received the FORM on August 4, 2022, and did not respond. The case was assigned to me on October 3, 2022.

In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, she admitted the allegation that she used marijuana with varying frequency from about June 1995 to April 2020. Her admission is incorporated in my findings of fact. Applicant is a 42-year-old. She has been employed by a defense contractor in information technology (IT) since February 2020. She has never held a security clearance. Applicant believes she received her GED in September 1999. She attended some college courses in 1999 but did not receive a degree. She married in 2000 and has three children. When Applicant submitted her SCA in February 2020, she disclosed that she used marijuana from about June 1995 to February 2020. She described her use from June 1995 until 2000 as daily. She stated her more recent use was on occasion and that she did not intend to use marijuana in the future because she did not want it to interfere with her career. (FORM Item 2 at 33.) When Applicant was interviewed by a security investigator in April 2020, she told the investigator that from 2000 to the present she smoked marijuana three to four times a week at her house. She disclosed she used hemp pills in 2019 to mitigate the pain from a car accident and had stopped use when she no longer needed them. She was given an opportunity to verify her April 2020 interview. She affirmed her interview in February 2021 and stated she had not used marijuana since “April 2020, nor do [I] have the want or need to.” (FORM Item 3 at 3.)

“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules

of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.

Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 24: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. Applicant’s admission in her answer to the SOR and the information in the FORM are sufficient to raise the following disqualifying condition under this guideline: AG ¶ 25(a): any substance misuse (see above definition). The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 26(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and AG ¶ 26(b): the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security. Neither mitigating condition is established. Applicant’s marijuana use was frequent and did not occur under circumstances making recurrence unlikely. She acknowledged her marijuana use in her SCA and in her response to the FORM, but she continued her use of marijuana after completing her SCA. She has used marijuana for 24 years on a regular basis into her 40s. While it may have ended in the last two years, her continued use for approximately two months after she had completed her SCA is indicative not enough time has passed.

The first prong of AG ¶ 26(a) (happened so long ago) focuses on whether the drug involvement was recent. There are no bright-line rules for determining when conduct is recent. The determination must be based on a careful evaluation of the totality of the evidence. If the evidence shows a significant period of time has passed without any evidence of misconduct, then an administrative judge must determine whether that period of time demonstrates changed circumstances or conduct sufficient to warrant a finding of reform or rehabilitation. ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2004). Applicant’s abstinence from marijuana use since her April 2020 interview is a “significant period of time.” The mitigating impact of her abstinence is limited by her admitted use of marijuana for 24 years, including for two months after she had completed her SCA and stated in the SCA she did not intend to smoke marijuana in the future because it would interfere with her career path. Her long-term use of marijuana in violation of federal law raises questions about her ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. She has not provided a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse and acknowledged that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security. Because she requested a determination on the record without a hearing, I had no opportunity to evaluate her credibility and sincerity based on demeanor. See ISCR Case No. 01-12350 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Jul. 23, 2003). Based on the totality of the evidence, I am not convinced that she will continue her abstinence from marijuana use once the pressure of qualifying for a security clearance is removed.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole- person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline H in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline H, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of

the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by her drug involvement.

I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: Paragraph 1, Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant

I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. Charles C. Hale Administrative Judge