ISCR Case No. 23-01743

______________ ______________ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ---------------------- ) ISCR Case No. 23-01743 ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Mark D. Lawton, Esquire, Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 07/31/2024

ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge: Statement of the Case Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e- QIP) on May 10, 2022. (Item 2.) On October 23, 2023, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency Central Adjudication Services issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse). (Item 1.) The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position, effective within the Department of Defense on June 8, 2017.

Applicant answered the SOR in writing (Answer) on November 8, 2023, and requested his case be decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. (Item 1.) In his Answer he admitted both allegations in the SOR, with explanations. On December 8, 2023, Department Counsel submitted the Department’s written case. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM), consisting of Items 1 to 3, was provided to Applicant, who received the file on February 20, 2024. Applicant was given 30 days from receipt of the FORM to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation. He did not submit any additional information. The case was assigned to me on June 24, 2024. Based upon a review of the pleadings and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Applicant is a 26-year-old unmarried employee of a defense contractor, where he works as a mechanical technician. He is a high school graduate. He is seeking to retain national security eligibility for a security clearance in connection with his employment in the defense industry. (Government Exhibit 1 at Sections12, 13A, 17, and 25.) Paragraph 1 (Guideline H – Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for clearance due to his use of illegal drugs. Applicant admitted allegations 1.a and 1.b under this paragraph. 1.a. Applicant has used marijuana on an occasional basis from about June 2020 until at least October 2023. He stated that he used marijuana in various forms to handle the pain related to a full lumbar spinal fusion. The surgery was necessary after he was involved in an automobile accident earlier in 2020. During this entire time period he was employed in a sensitive position and held a security clearance. (Item 2 at Sections 23 and 25; Item 3.) 1.b. Regarding his current and future use Applicant stated in his Answer: I do understand that it is not a federally acceptable way to manage pain, but I do not believe that my use of marijuana should raise question[s] about my reliability and trustworthiness as I have held a security clearance for over six years with zero infractions. The use of this has been mitigated to topical creams which are applied directly to the site of discomfort and low dosage edible applications to help alleviate inflammation of the surrounding areas. Exercises based on my doctors’ advice has helped alleviate much of the

discomfort and in the future may rid [me] of all discomfort in the affected area resulting in no further use. (Item 1 at 5.)

When evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”

See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.)

Paragraph 1 (Guideline H – Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) The security concern relating to Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse is set forth in AG ¶ 24: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. §802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. I have examined the disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 25 and especially considered the following: (a) any substance misuse (see above definition); (f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position; and (g) expressed intent to continue drug involvement and substance misuse, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue such misuse. Applicant has a history of using illegal drugs. He has used marijuana in various forms since being injured in an automobile accident in 2020. Applicant stated that he intends to continue to use marijuana since its use has helped him manage pain. All three of the disqualifying conditions apply, thereby transferring the burden to Applicant to mitigate them. The following mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 26 have also been considered: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and

(b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug-involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. Applicant admitted his regular and recent use of marijuana and his intent to continue its use into the future. He stated that he understands the federal proscription regarding drug use, but does not believe it should apply to him because it is in relation to pain management. That is an insufficient reason, particularly when there is no evidence that he has attempted any other type of pain management not involving illegal drugs. None of the mitigating conditions apply to Applicant’s use. Applicant has not met his burden of persuasion to mitigate the security concerns arising from his history of drug involvement. This allegation is found against Applicant.

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant has not mitigated the

security concerns resulting from his regular, recent, and continuing drug involvement, which includes using marijuana while granted access to classified information. Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant’s present suitability for national security eligibility and a security clearance.

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b: Against Applicant

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s national security eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. WILFORD H. ROSS Administrative Judge