CASE · Clearance Adjudication Search EngineCASE

Loading case…

ISCR Case 16-02522.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-02522.h1denied

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-02522.h1

deniedApr 6, 2017· Hon. Thomas M. Crean· hearing

Summary

A linguist born in Afghanistan was denied a security clearance due to concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). The applicant's parents are citizens and residents of Afghanistan, and the applicant also has friends residing in Afghanistan. These extensive family ties in Afghanistan and Pakistan were deemed to create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation and coercion, which the judge found the applicant failed to mitigate.

Additionally, during a counterintelligence polygraph examination, the applicant deliberately attempted to physically manipulate the polygraph data. This action was considered a serious concern under Guideline E, relating to personal conduct.

The judge concluded that the applicant's admission of foreign family connections raised significant security concerns under Guideline B, and the attempt to manipulate polygraph data was a serious concern under Guideline E. Consequently, the security clearance was denied.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

The applicant has extensive family ties in Afghanistan and Pakistan, creating a heightened risk of foreign exploitation and coercion.
The applicant's admission of foreign family connections raised significant security concerns under Guideline B.
The applicant's attempt to manipulate polygraph data during a counterintelligence examination was a serious concern under Guideline E.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedForeign Influence Disqualifying ConditionContact with foreign family members creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation.
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedForeign Influence Disqualifying ConditionConnections to foreign citizens create a potential conflict of interest.

Mitigating

AG ¶ 20(a)appliedPersonal Conduct Mitigating ConditionThe applicant was candid in his responses regarding his family ties.

Key Rule Quoted

“The mere existence of foreign relationships and contacts is not sufficient to raise the above disqualifying conditions.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedJul 27, 2016
Answer filedAug 14, 2016
Hearing held—Decided on the written record.
Decision dateApr 6, 2017

Cite For

Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B Due to Extensive Family Ties Abroad
Personal Conduct Issues Related to Polygraph Examination Results
The Importance of Candidness in Addressing Security Concerns

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The judge found against the applicant on the allegations of foreign influence due to extensive family ties in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which raised security concerns. The applicant admitted to having multiple family members who are citizens and residents of these countries, which the judge deemed a significant risk factor.

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business · Intent to Remain in U.S.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant's parents are citizens and residents of Afghanistan.	Against Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Afghanistan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
1.j	Applicant has friends who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan.	Against Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend	Afghanistan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline E (Personal Conduct) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: denied

The judge found that the applicant mitigated personal conduct security concerns under Guideline E. Specifically, the judge ruled in favor of the applicant on the allegation that he deliberately attempted to manipulate polygraph data, concluding that the applicant's actions did not constitute a deliberate attempt to deceive.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Conduct	Concealed Issue	Response	Disqualifying (¶16)	Mitigating applied (¶17)	Mitigation
2.a	During a counterintelligence polygraph examination Applicant deliberately attempted to physically manipulate the polygraph data.	For Applicant	Lack of Candor in Interview	—	Denied	(b) deliberately providing false information to an investigator or official	(a) prompt, good-faith correction before being confronted	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline E). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-02522 ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance

For Government: Mary M. Foreman, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

04/06/2017 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge:

Based on a review of the case file and pleadings, I conclude that Applicant failed to mitigate security concerns under Guideline B. He mitigated personal conduct security concerns under Guideline E. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Statement of the Case

On June 4, 2014, Applicant submitted his first Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) to obtain a security clearance for his employment as a linguist for a defense contractor. (Item 4) He was interviewed by a security investigator for the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on June 24, 2014 (Item 8). Applicant submitted another e-QIP on February 9, 2015 (Item 3), and was interviewed by an OPM security investigator on March 18, 2015 (Item 7). After reviewing the results of the OPM interviews and investigations, the Department of Defense (DOD) could not make the affirmative findings required to issue a security clearance. On July 27, 2016, DOD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns for foreign influence under Guideline B and personal conduct under Guideline E. (Item 1) The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective in the DOD on September 1, 2006.

Applicant answered the SOR on August 14, 2016. He admitted all of the allegations under Guideline B, except allegation 1.b, concerning his wife’s citizenship and residence. He denied the personal conduct allegation under SOR 2.a. He provided detailed information concerning the reasons for his admissions and denials. He elected to have the matter decided on the written record. (Item 2) Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on September 30, 2016. Applicant received a complete file of relevant material (FORM) on October 3, 2016, and was provided the opportunity to file objections and to submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the disqualifying conditions. (Item 12) He provided additional information in response to the FORM on January 11, 2017. (Item 13) Department Counsel had no objection to consideration of the additional material. (Item 14) I was assigned the case on April 4, 2017.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I thoroughly reviewed the case file and the pleadings. I make the following findings of fact. Applicant was born in Afghanistan in 1985 and moved with his family to Pakistan in 1994 because of the turmoil and instability in Afghanistan. He lived in Pakistan with his family and graduated from high school in 2002. The family returned to Afghanistan immediately after Applicant graduated from high school. After returning to Afghanistan. Applicant worked for Afghan businesses as an information technology manager or program manager, as a linguist and translator for U.S. forces, and as an information technology manager for a U.S. company doing business in Afghanistan. Applicant married in Pakistan on January 4, 2007. His wife is an Afghan citizen but she holds a United States alien registration card. She now resides with Applicant’s parents in Afghanistan. They have no children.

Applicant entered the United States on September 19, 2008. Applicant worked in various information technology positions in the United States and attended a community college until August 2009. From August 2009 until September 2013, Applicant was a linguist for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. He was unemployed from September 2013 until February 2014, when he became self-employed or worked as an Uber driver in the United States. He became a United States citizen on April 1, 2014, and received his United States passport on April 14, 2014. He then worked as a laboratory technician before returning to Afghanistan in February 2015 as a translator/linguist for U.S. Forces. He is still employed in Afghanistan by a government contractor as a linguist. (Item 3, e- QIP, dated March 2, 2015; Item 4, e-QIP, dated June 4, 2014; Item 7, PSI dated November 15, 2015; Item 8, PSI dated June 24, 2014)

Applicant has many family members, relatives, and friends who are residents and/or citizens of Afghanistan or Pakistan. The SOR alleges, and Applicant admits that his parents (SOR 1.a), four brothers (SOR 1.c), three sisters-in-law (SOR 1.e), his sister (SOR 1.g), two uncles (SOR 1.i), and friends (SOR 1.j) are residents and citizens of Afghanistan. The SOR alleges that his wife is a citizen of Afghanistan living in India. However, Applicant admits, and available evidence shows, that his wife is a citizen of Afghanistan residing with his parents in Afghanistan (SOR 1.b). The SOR alleges, and Applicant admits, that he has two brothers (SOR 1.d), a sister-in-law (SOR 1.f), and in- laws (SOR 1.h) who are citizens of Afghanistan residing in Pakistan. It does not appear from the case file that there are any family members residing in the United States.

The SOR alleges that during a counterintelligence polygraph examination Applicant deliberately attempted to physically manipulate the polygraph data. (SOR 2.a) Applicant denied this allegation.

Applicant has been very candid in his response to the SOR in providing information about his family members and relatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His wife has been an approved resident alien of the United States since December 2010. She is living with his parents in Afghanistan. He talks to his wife daily using a variety of electronic media. Applicant admits that his wife has visited India a number of times recently to receive fertility treatments.

His mother is a house wife and his father a self-employed physician living in Afghanistan. He talks to his parents about twice a week concerning family members and family matters. He provides them financial support when requested. He applied for his parents to come to the United States and they have received the first level of approval.

Two of Applicant’s brothers are high school students living at home with his parents. He talks to them a few times a week about their schoolwork. His third brother and his family lives with his parents and works for a UN agency in Afghanistan. He talks to him by phone for a few minutes about once every two weeks. His fourth brother is a director for an agency of the Afghan House of Representatives. He does not talk to this brother often since the brother had an argument with Applicant’s wife.

Applicant has two brothers who are citizens of Afghanistan but students residing in Pakistan. On is a medical student who plans to return to Afghanistan shortly to resume his medical training there. He talks to this brother every few weeks. The other brother recently graduated from college with a business degree. He is in the process of moving to Afghanistan to live with his parents. Applicant financially supported this brother education. Applicant talks to this brother about once a week.

Applicant has four sisters-in-law in Afghanistan who are house wives. Two live with his parents and he talks to them for a few minutes about every two weeks about family matters. The third sister-in-law just moved back to Afghanistan from Pakistan and lives with his parents. He does not see or communicate with the fourth sister-in-law because of the estrangement from his brother, her husband. His sister is a student in Afghanistan and lives with his parents. She is close to his wife. He talks to the sister once a week. Applicant’s father-in-law was a long time resident of Pakistan working as a driver for a company but is now deceased. His mother-in-law is a house wife who still lives in Pakistan. Applicant talks to her every few weeks, but his wife talks to her more frequently. Applicant has two uncles. He does not see or communicate with one of his uncles very often, but talks to the other uncle every few weeks. He has friends who were citizens and residents of Afghanistan. However, the friends worked as linguists for the U.S. forces and they are now living in the United States. He communicates with them over electronic media.

The SOR alleges that Applicant deliberately attempted to physically manipulate polygraph data. The polygraph examiner’s comments concerning the test states:

“All issues were favorably resolved. Initially, EXAMINEE was uncooperative and displayed unusual physiological responses. During, the beginning of testing, atypical physiological responses were observed, indicative of a deliberate attempt to physically manipulate the polygraph data. EXAMINEE was directly confronted and admitted to deliberately attempting to create physiological responses to specific questions during the polygraph examination. However, EXAMINEE would not furnish any further details such as why HE was doing this or where HE learned such practices. Thereafter, the physiology appeared to be acceptable.” (Item 9 at 2)

Applicant denies that he attempted to physically manipulate the polygraph data during his counterintelligence examination. He did his best to comply with the instructions of the examiner. He did nothing that was against the rules of the polygraph process. He admits he was nervous and may have had some involuntary body tremors. He did not take any actions at the examination with an intent to affect the polygraph data. Applicant also stated that the test was successfully completed and he passed. (Response to SOR)

An Army colonel, the senior adviser in Afghanistan working with Applicant, commented that if it were not for Applicant’s dedication to duty, his unit would not have been able to advise the Afghan military on mission critical tasks. Applicant is an integral link between his advisor team and Afghan counterparts. Applicant is a compassionate and morally upstanding person. Applicant is motivated, dedicated, and contributes strongly to the organization. He has never questioned Applicant’s loyalty. Applicant’s expertise in translation and interpretation is greatly needed. He recommends that Applicant be granted eligibility for access to classified information. (Response to FORM, Letter, dated November 25, 2016)

In his response to the SOR, Applicant pointed out that he has worked with the U.S. military as a local national linguist since 2005. He is proud to be associated and dedicated to serving the U.S. military and government. He has received many Certificates of Appreciation, Letters of Commendation, Letters of Recommendation, and performance wards. Afghanistan has been an independent nation since 1919, and it was a monarchy until a military coup in 1973. Following a second military coup in 1978, a Marxist government emerged. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan, but they were resisted by the mujahedeen. The Soviet Union withdrew in February 1989 pursuant to an agreement signed by Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The mujahedeen were not a party to the agreement and refused to abide by it. The result was a civil war among several factions, including the Taliban. By the end of 1998, the Taliban controlled most of Afghanistan, committed atrocities against minority populations, and provided sanctuary to terrorist organizations. U.S. military forces, along with forces from a coalition partnership, forced the Taliban out of power by November 2001. With the assistance and support of the United States, a new democratic government took office in 2004.

Afghanistan formed a democratic government in 2004. The United States and its coalition partners have over 50,000 troops serving in Afghanistan assisting the Afghan government in maintaining peace and stability in the country. Even though progress has been made since then, Afghanistan faces many challenges including defeating terrorists and insurgents, recovering from decades of civil strife, and rebuilding an economy and infrastructure. The Taliban insurgency has continued with frequent, sophisticated, dangerous, and destabilizing activities in spite of United States and coalition military operations. Civilians continue to bear the brunt of the violence. The Taliban continues to maintain momentum in spite of losses to their leadership. Armed conflict has spread to almost one-third of the country. The lack of security in many areas and generally low government capacity and competency has hampered efforts at self-governance and economic development. There is continued government corruption and substantial drug trade.

Afghanistan’s human rights record is generally poor with extrajudicial killings, torture, poor prison conditions, official impunity, prolonged pretrial detention, restrictions on freedom of press and religion, violence against women, sexual abuse against children, and human trafficking. Its poor human rights record is due to the continuing insurgency, the weak government, and ongoing recovery efforts from two decades of war. In spite of efforts by the United States and the government of Afghanistan, it continues to be a violent, unsafe, unstable country. The weak government and internal instability have enabled hostile states, non-state actors, terrorists, and insurgents to continue operating in Afghanistan, including groups hostile to the United States. Insurgents use narcotics trafficking and kidnapping to finance their military and technical capabilities. Suicide bombing attacks continue to inflict casualties. The Taliban has strengthened its activities because of Pakistan funding sources, the drug trade, and kidnappings. The Taliban insurgent operations result in numerous attacks and deaths targeted at non-government organizations, journalists, government workers, and United Nation workers. There are militant attacks by rockets, vehicle-born explosive devices, and suicide bombing, even in the capital city, Kabul. The United States Department of State classifies the situation in Afghanistan as a critical security threat to United States citizens. (Item 10) Pakistan and India were British colonies until after World War II. In 1947, India and Pakistan were granted independence by Great Britain. Pakistan today has a parliamentary form of federal government with a population of over 170 million, almost all of which are Muslims. The country has very low income, half the population is illiterate, and the life expectancy is only 64 years. Pakistan has the eighth largest armed forces in the world. It is well trained and disciplined. However because of budget cuts, the armed forces have not been able to maintain their equipment as needed. Pakistan is one of the world's nuclear powers.

There are extensive terrorist activities in Pakistan. Pakistan was one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban regime in its neighbor Afghanistan. However, after September 11, 2001, Pakistan reassessed its relationships with the Taliban and pledged support for the United States and international efforts to remove the Taliban from power. However, the Taliban is known to be active in parts of Pakistan especially along the Afghan and Iranian borders. Financial resources from Pakistan have permitted the Taliban in Afghanistan to exist and gain strength. Al Qaida is believed to be headquartered in the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan's Army tried to control this area but met with major resistance. The United States considers these terrorist safe areas as ungoverned. The terrorists pose a threat to United States national security because of their ability to organize, plan, raise funds, and recruit, train and operate in the area. The State Department warns United States citizens to curtail non-essential travel to Pakistan because of the terrorist threats. Terrorists have demonstrated their willingness and capability to attack targets where Americans are known to congregate or visit. Pakistan’s human rights situation and record are poor.

Pakistan and the United States established diplomatic relationships in 1947 and the United States provided economic and military assistance to Pakistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 highlighted the common interests of the United States and Pakistan. They agreed to a large economic and military assistance program. However, there continues to be incidents of violence against American interests. Since September 2001, Pakistan provided extensive assistance in the war on terror and the United States stepped up its economic assistance. In 2004, the United States recognized Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally. The United States sold fighter aircraft to Pakistan thereby deepening their strategic relationship. The United States and Pakistan strategic partnership is based on the shared interests of the United States and Pakistan in building stable and sustainable democracy, and in promoting peace, stability, prosperity, and democracy in South Asia and across the globe. However, in recent years, this relationship has become very strained. (Item 11)

POLICIES

When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record.

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security decision.

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

ANALYSIS

Foreign Influence

Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in the U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including but not limited to, such consideration as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6)

Applicant has extensive immediate family members who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. He also has family member who are citizens of Afghanistan but residents of Pakistan. Applicant’s spouse, parents, four brothers, a sister, three sisters-in-law, and two uncles have been citizens and residents of Afghanistan all of their lives. Applicant’s two brothers, a sister-in-law, and his mother-in-law are citizens of Afghanistan but reside in Pakistan. Applicant has some level of personal, or through electronics, contact with these relatives. Applicant’s family members in Afghanistan and Pakistan are a security concern and raise the following Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions under AG ¶ 7:

(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.

The mere existence of foreign relationships and contacts is not sufficient to raise the above disqualifying conditions. The nature of Appellant’s contacts and relationships must be examined to determine whether it creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. “Heightened” is a relative term denoting increased risk compared to some normally existing risk that can be inherent anytime there are foreign contacts and relationships. The totality of an applicant’s ties to a foreign country as well as to each individual family tie must be considered. The foreign influence security concern is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States. Even friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in economic, scientific, and technical fields. The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an Applicant is at risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress.

Applicant has contact with family members who are residents and citizens of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both countries experience dangerous, destabilizing terrorist’s activities. Both countries have an increase in violence against civilians, a general lack of security, and a poor human rights record. There is a growing sense of violence creating unsafe and unstable conditions. The United States Department of State issued travel warning for U.S. citizens in both countries based on terrorist activities and both countries inability to provide security. These factors place a heightened risk of exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion on Applicant.

I considered Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions under AG ¶ 8:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and

(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.

None of these mitigating conditions apply. There is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for or obligation to immediate family members. Applicant has extensive contact with his family member in Afghanistan and Pakistan that re- enforce the presumption. The facts show close and continuing contact between Applicant and his spouse, parents, siblings and their families, and uncles. Applicant has extensive telephonic and other electronic contact with his spouse daily and with his parents and some siblings a few times a week. He has contact with other siblings less frequently, a few times a monthly. He provides financial support for some of his siblings and family members. This level of contact is not casual or infrequent, and indicates that Applicant’s sense of loyalty to the family members is high rather than minimal.

I am not convinced that he still has friends in Afghanistan that are a security concern as alleged in SOR 1.j. Applicant noted that his friends are former linguists who are now U.S. citizens living in the United States. I find for Applicant on SOR 1.j.

Applicant’s ties and sense of loyalty to the United States in not as extensive. He spent only a short time actually living in the United States. He came to the United States in September 2008, and returned to Afghanistan in August 2009 and worked for U.S. Forces as a linguist until October 2013. He only became a U.S. citizen a few years ago on April 1, 2014. He left again for Afghanistan to work as an interpreter in February 2015 and has been in Afghanistan since then. All of his immediate family member are in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. He has no family members in the United States. In determining his sense of loyalty to the United States, I have considered that he is sponsoring his parents and some siblings for entry into the United States.

Applicant’s family members in Afghanistan and Pakistan can place him in a position to have to choose between the interest of the family members and the interests of the United States. The information presented by Applicant does not negate the heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion because of the circumstances in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even though his family members are ordinary citizens, the situation in both countries is such that anyone living in the countries are vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or inducement to provide protected information. His connection to and loyalty to the United States is not so deep and longstanding that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of United States interests. Accordingly, Applicant has not met his heavy burden to show that his relationships with his family members in Afghanistan and Pakistan are not a security concern. I conclude Appellant has not mitigated security concerns for foreign influence.

Personal Conduct

Personal conduct is a security concern because conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified and sensitive information. Personal conduct is always a security concern because it asks whether the person’s past conduct justifies confidence that the person can be trusted to properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. A security concern is raised when an Applicant refuses to provide full, frank, and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials, or other official representatives in connection with a personal security or trustworthiness determination. (AG ¶ 15)

Applicant was administered a counterintelligence polygraph examination in June 2016. The polygraph examiner reported that Applicant exhibited unusual physiological responses indicating a deliberate attempt to physically manipulate the polygraph data. The report of Applicant’s conduct from the polygraph examiner raises Personal Conduct Disqualifying Condition under AG ¶ 16(b) (deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other official government representative).

I considered the following Personnel Conduct Mitigating Conditions under AG ¶ 17:

(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur.

The polygraph examiner’s report stated that Applicant admitted he deliberately attempted to create physiological responses to certain questions. Applicant denied a deliberate attempt to manipulate the examination. Applicant admitted to being nervous about the polygraph examination. The polygraph examiner also reported that the test was successfully completed. Applicant is not so sophisticated that he would know and be able to use a means to manipulate a polygraph examination. Based on this information, I am not convinced that Applicant deliberately attempted to manipulate the polygraph examination as opposed to just being nervous about the examination. Applicant presented sufficient information to mitigate personal conduct security concerns.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for access to sensitive information must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. The whole-person concept requires consideration of all available information about Applicant to reach a determination concerning Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. I considered that Applicant has worked as a linguist for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan for many years with no reported security issues. I have considered the recommendation of the senior military adviser.

The presence of Applicant’s immediate family members and other relatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan creates a heightened risk of foreign influence leading to the potential for vulnerability, pressure, or coercion of Applicant by Afghan or Pakistani officials. These facts leave me with questions and doubts about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for access to classified information. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of national security. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated foreign influence concerns based on his family members in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Applicant mitigated personal conduct security concerns. Because Applicant has not mitigated security concerns arising foreign influence, access to classified information is denied.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a – 1. i: Against Applicant

Subparagraph 1.j: For Applicant

Paragraph 2, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

_________________ THOMAS M. CREAN Administrative Judge