ISCR Case No. 24-02163

______________ ______________ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: Applicant for Security Clearance ) ) ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 24-02163 Appearances For Government: Aubrey De Angelis, Esquire, Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 03/10/2026 Decision CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge: Statement of the Case On May 16, 2025, in accordance with Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, as amended (Directive), the DoD issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts that raise security concerns under Guidelines D, B, E and J. The SOR further informed Applicant that, based on information available to the government, DoD adjudicators could not make the preliminary affirmative finding it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance. 1

Applicant answered the SOR on June 16, 2025, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. (Answer.) The case was assigned to me on August 27, 2025. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on September 3, 2025, scheduling the hearing for November 13, 2025. However, when all Administrative Judges were furloughed from October 1 through November 12, 2025, the hearing had to be rescheduled for December 16, 2025, and convened as rescheduled. The Government offered Exhibits (GXs) 1 through 6, which were admitted without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf, and offered Applicant Exhibits (AppXs) A through E, which were admitted without objection. The record was left open until January 16, 2026, for receipt of additional documentation. Applicant submitted nothing further. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (TR) on March 4, 2026. The record then closed. Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts: DoD Instructions regarding Combating Trafficking in Persons, about the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and about Taiwan. Without objection, I have taken administrative notice of the facts contained in the requests. The facts are summarized in the written request and will not be repeated. Of note is the PRC will likely continue posturing to be in a position of advantage in a potential conflict with the United States. Taiwan is a significant potential flashpoint for a confrontation between the PRC and the United States. Findings of Fact Applicant admits the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.b. and 4.a. He denies the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 2.a and 3.a. After a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following findings of fact. Applicant is a 63-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He has a bachelor’s degree and has been employed with the defense contractor since 2005. Applicant is not married and has no children. (TR at page 5 line 11 to page 6 line 3, at page 15 line 16 to page 18 line 2, and GX 2 at pages 5 and 14~15.) Guideline D - Sexual Behavior, Guideline B - Foreign Influence, Guideline E - Personal Conduct & Guideline J - Criminal Conduct 1.a, 1.b, 2.a, 3.a. and 4.a. Applicant admits that from 2004 until 2010, he solicited and patronized prostitutes about once a month, over 70 times. About 80% of these prostitutes were foreign nationals (Chinese, Taiwanese, Korean, Malaysians, Vietnamese and British) living in the United States. From 2010 until the spring of 2024, he paid for their sexual services less frequently. Applicant knew his actions were illegal and only 2

ceased seeking their sexual services due to financial constraints. In August of 2016, his Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmental Information security clearance was revoked due to Applicant’s illegal solicitation and patronization of prostitutes. Despite this revocation, Applicant continued his illegal sexual behavior for another eight years. (TR at page 19 line 20 to page 21 line 22, at page 23 line 6 to page 50 line 2, GX 1 at pages 35~36, and AppX E.) Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 3

classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information). Analysis Guideline D - Sexual Behavior The security concern relating to the guideline for Sexual Behavior is set out in AG ¶ 12: Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense; reflects a lack of judgment or discretion; or may subject the individual to undue influence of coercion, exploitation, or duress. These issues, together or individually, may raise questions about an individual's judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Sexual behavior includes conduct occurring in person or via audio, visual, electronic, or written transmission. No adverse inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the individual. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 13. Three are potentially applicable in this case: (a) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted; (b) a pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high-risk sexual behavior that the individual is unable to stop; and (c) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress. 4

Applicant received sexual gratification from prostitutes over a period of about 20 years. His conduct is criminal and represents a pattern of high-risk sexual behavior that reflects a lack of discretion or judgment. It also creates a vulnerability to coercion. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions. AG ¶ 14 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 14 including: (a) the behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature; (b) the sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment; (c) the behavior no l onger serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress; (d) the sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual, and discreet; and (e) the individual has successfully completed an appropriate program of treatment, or is currently enrolled in one, has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment plan, and/or has received a favorable prognosis from a qualified mental health professional indicating the behavior is readily controllable with treatment. None of the above mitigating conditions apply. Applicant solicited prostitutes and received sexual gratification, more than 70 times over two decades. Applicant continued risky behavior even after losing his security clearance. He only ceased his conduct, about two years ago, due to lack of finances. Sexual Behavior is found against Applicant. Guideline B - Foreign Influence The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in AG ¶ 6: Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way 5

inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 7. Two are potentially applicable in this case: (a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and (c) failure to report or fully disclose, when required, association with a foreign person, group, government, or country. By his own estimation, about 80% of Applicant’s prostitutes were foreign nationals, living in the U.S. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions. AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and l oyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation 6

Applicant’s illegal contact with foreign nationals was not casual or infrequent. He lost his security clearance in 2016 because of these contacts, yet he continued this conduct. Foreign Influence is found against Applicant. Guideline E - Personal Conduct The security concern relating to the guideline for Personal Conduct is set out in AG ¶ 15: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 16. One is potentially applicable in this case: (e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress by a foreign intelligence entity or other individual or group. Such conduct includes: (1) engaging in activities which, if known, could affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing. Applicant received sexual gratification from illegal prostitutes, more than 70 times over a period of 20 years. As a result, he is vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation, and duress. The evidence is sufficient to raise this disqualifying condition. AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 17 including: (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 7

(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; (e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress; and (g) association with persons involved in criminal activities was unwitting, has ceased, or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and regulations. None of these apply. Applicant lost his security clearance in 2016 as a result of his personal conduct in hiring prostitutes. Despite this clear warning, he continued this questionable behavior for another eight years. He produced no evidence of counseling or positive steps that would alleviate the risks present from his fairly recent conduct. None of the above mitigating conditions apply. Personal Conduct is found against Applicant. Guideline J - Criminal Conduct The security concern relating to the guideline for Criminal Conduct is set out in AG ¶ 30: Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. The guideline at AG ¶ 31 contains five disqualifying conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. Two conditions apply, as discussed below: (a) a pattern of minor offenses, any one of which on its own would be unlikely to affect a national security eligibility decision, but which in combination cast doubt on the individual's judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; and (b) evidence (including, but not limited to, a credible allegation, an admission, and matters of official record) of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the individual was formally charged, prosecuted, or convicted. 8

Applicant paid for the illegal services of prostitutes from 2004 until about two years ago. This evidence raises security concerns under these disqualifying conditions, thereby shifting the burden to Applicant to rebut, extenuate, or mitigate those concerns. The guideline in AG ¶ 32 contains four conditions that could mitigate criminal conduct security concerns: (a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (b) the individual was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in the person's life; (c) no reliable evidence to support that the individual committed the offense; and (d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited to, the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, restitution, compliance with the terms of parole or probation, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community involvement. Sufficient time has not passed since Applicant’s most recent illegal sexual endeavor. He provided no evidence of rehabilitation. It appears that the only reason Applicant ceased this illegal conduct was a lack of funds. Based on these facts, the evidence continues to cast doubt on Applicant’s reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. The evidence does not establish mitigation under any of the above conditions. Criminal Conduct is found against Applicant. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 9

individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall common-sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines D, B, E and J in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment. Applicant remains vulnerable to coercion. Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant failed to mitigate the personal conduct, foreign Influence, sexual behavior, and criminal conduct security concerns. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline D: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a. and 1.b: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant Paragraph 1, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 3.a: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline J: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 4.a: Against Applicant 10

________________________ Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Richard A. Cefola Administrative Judge 11