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______________ ______________ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 25-00516 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Daniel O’Reilley, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 02/05/2026

CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guidelines H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse), J (Criminal Conduct), and E (Personal Conduct). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case On July 17, 2025, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guidelines H, J, and E. Applicant responded to the SOR on July 25, 2025, and requested a decision based on the written record in lieu of a hearing. The Government’s written case was submitted on September 25, 2025. The Governments case was misidentified as an ADP when it was an ISCR and was decided as such. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was provided to Applicant, who was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns. Applicant received the FORM on October 24, 2025. Applicant elected not to respond to the Government’s FORM. The period for his response lapsed on December 8, 2025. The case was assigned to me on January 29, 2026. The Government exhibits included in the FORM are admitted in evidence without objection.

Applicant is a 22-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He served in the U.S. Navy from June 2021 to June 2023, when he was discharged with a General Discharge (Under Honorable Conditions) for testing positive for marijuana on a drug test. He is a high school graduate and is single with no children. Applicant was granted a security clearance while serving in the Navy. (Items 3 - 6) In his Answer, Applicant admitted to all the Allegations in the Statement or Reasons (SOR). These include using marijuana with varying frequency from June 2016 to at least November 2022 and using while holding a security clearance. Applicant admitted to testing positive for marijuana, receiving Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP), and being discharged from the Navy as a result. Applicant also admitted to lying under “Section 23 – Illegal use of Drugs or Drug Activity, on the security clearance application, he executed on July 30, 2024. In his Answer, Applicant took responsibility and apologized for his dishonesty and lack of integrity. (Item 2)

This case is adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), which became effective on June 8, 2017. When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.”

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision. A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The security concern for drug involvement and substance misuse is set out in AG ¶ 24: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an i ndividual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 25. The following are potentially applicable in this case: (a) any substance misuse (see ab

ove definition); (b) testing positive for an illegal drug; and

(f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position; On October 25, 2014, the Director of National Intelligence (the Security Executive Agent (SecEA)) issued DNI Memorandum ES 2014-00674, “Adherence to Federal Laws Prohibiting M

arijuana Use,” which states: [C]hanges to state laws and the laws of the District of Columbia pertaining to marijuana use do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines . . . . An individual’s disregard of federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations. As always, adjudicative authorities are expected to evaluate claimed or developed use of, or involvement with, marijuana using the current adjudicative criteria. The adjudicative authority must determine if the use of, or involvement with, marijuana raises questions about the individual’s judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and willingness to comply with law, rules, and regulations, including federal laws, when making eligibility decisions of persons proposed for, or occupying, sensitive national security positions. On December 21, 2021, the SecEA promulgated clarifying guidance concerning marijuana-related issues in security clearance adjudications. It states in pertinent part: [Federal] agencies are instructed that prior recreational marijuana use by an individual may be relevant to adjudications but not determinative. The SecEA has provided direction in [the adjudicative guidelines] to agencies that requires them to use a “whole-person concept.” This requires adjudicators to carefully weigh a number of variables in an individual’s life to determine whether that individual’s behavior raises a security concern, if at all, and whether that concern has been mitigated such that the individual may now receive a favorable adjudicative determination. Relevant mitigations include, but are not limited to, frequency of use and whether the individual can demonstrate that future use is unlikely to recur, including by signing an attestation or other such appropriate mitigation. Additionally, in light of the long-standing federal law and policy prohibiting illegal drug use while occupying a sensitive position or holding a security clearance, agencies are encouraged to advise prospective national security workforce employees that they should refrain from any future marijuana use upon initiation of the national security vetting process, which commences once the individual signs the certification contained in the Standard Form 86 (SF-86), Questionnaire for National Security Positions. Applicant admitted having used marijuana from about June 2016 to at least November 2022. He also admitted to using marijuana while having a security clearance and holding a sensitive position. Appellant admitted to testing positive for marijuana on

a urinalysis test administered in November of 2022. AG ¶¶ 25(a), (b), and (f) are applicable. AG ¶ 26 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. The following are potentially applicable: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. There is no evidence of any marijuana use after November 2022, and applicant took responsibility for his conduct. These are positive steps. However, Applicant used marijuana over a number of years to include, while having a security clearance and holding a sensitive position. There is no “bright-line” rule for when conduct is recent. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” With additional time without illegal drug use, Applicant may warrant a security clearance. He is not there yet. None of the mitigating conditions are sufficiently applicable to overcome concerns about Applicant’s drug use, reliability, trustworthiness, and judgment. Guideline J, Criminal Conduct The security concern for criminal conduct is set out in AG ¶ 30: Criminal activity creates doubt about an Applicant’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.

AG ¶ 31 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. The following is potentially applicable: (b) evidence (including, but not limited to, a credible allegation, an admission, and matters of official record) of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the individual was formally charged, prosecuted, or convicted. Applicant received NJP under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for using marijuana while on active duty in the U.S. Navy. The above disqualifying condition is applicable. Conditions that could mitigate criminal conduct security concerns are provided under AG ¶ 32. The following are potentially applicable: (a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited to, the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, restitution, compliance with the terms of parole or probation, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community involvement. The discussion above under drug involvement and substance misuse applies equally here. I cannot find successful rehabilitation or that criminal conduct is unlikely to recur. His criminal conduct continues to cast doubt on his current reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. The above mitigating conditions are not applicable. Guideline E, Personal Conduct The security concern for personal conduct is set out in AG ¶ 15, as follows: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security clearance investigative or adjudicative processes. The following will normally result in an unfavorable national security eligibility determination, security clearance action, or cancellation of further processing for national security eligibility:

(a) refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or cooperate with security processing, including but not limited to meeting with a security investigator for subject interview, completing security forms or releases, cooperation with medical or psychological evaluation, or polygraph examination, if authorized and required; and (b) refusal to provide full, frank, and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials, or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination. AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. The following disqualifying condition is potentially applicable: (a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities. SOR ¶ 3.a, band c, allege that Applicant intentionally falsified his security clearance application, executed on July 30, 2024, by lying under “Section 23 – Illegal use of Drugs or Drug Activity.” In his Answer, Applicant took responsibility and admitted to the Guideline and the three allegations under it. His personal conduct is not mitigated and continues to cast doubt on his current reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. None of the mitigating conditions, individually or collectively, are sufficiently applicable to overcome Appellant’s falsifications. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.”

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation

___________________ for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines H, J and E in my whole-person analysis. I also considered Appellant’s military service and contrition. Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. I conclude Applicant did not mitigate the security concern under Guidelines H, J, and E.

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline H: Against Applicant Subparagraph 1.a -1.c: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline J: Against Applicant Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant Paragraph 3, Guideline E: Against Applicant Subparagraph 3.a – 3.c: Against Applicant

It is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Richard A. Cefola Administrative Judge