ISCR Case No. 25-00587

______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS ___________________________________

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In the matter of: )

) ISCR Case No. 25-00587

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) Applicant for Security Clearance ) ___________________________________ ) Appearances For Government: Mark D. Lawton, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 06/18/2026 Decision FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guideline F (Financial Considerations). The security concern under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) was not established. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on August 30, 2024. On July 2, 2025, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guidelines F and E. On July 18, 2025, he requested a decision on the written record in lieu of a hearing, but he did not answer the SOR. On February 3, 2026, DCSA re-sent the SOR to Applicant. He answered the SOR on February 23, 2026. Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on March 20, 2026. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was sent to Applicant, who was given an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s evidence. He received the FORM on April 24, 2026, and he did not respond. The case was assigned to me on June 10, 2026. 1

The FORM consists of the pleadings in the case, Applicant’s answer to the SOR (Government Exhibit (GE) 1), and the documents in support of the allegations in the SOR (GE 2-7). GE 2 through 5 are admitted into evidence, without objection. Findings of Fact The SOR alleges under Guideline F that Applicant has 14 delinquent accounts totaling approximately $24,749 (SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.n), and that he misused his company credit card in the approximate amount of $2,500 (SOR ¶ 1.o). The alleged debts are reflected in his credit bureau reports (CBR) accessed in March 2026, April 2025, and September 2024. (GE 5-7) The SOR alleges under Guideline E that he was terminated from employment in July 2024 because of the credit card misuse alleged in SOR ¶ 1.o. (SOR ¶ 2.a). He admits all the allegations under Guidelines F and E. (GE 1) Applicant is 38 years old and earned an associate’s degree in 2016. He has no prior military service, is married, previously divorced, and has two children. He is sponsored for a security clearance by his current government contractor employer, for whom he has been working since July 2024. In response to government interrogatories, he explained that he took a pay cut of $25,000 a year in February 2024, and the money he was making didn’t leave much room to pay his bills and other debts. His pay cut along with poor financial decisions and poor money management resulted in his financial delinquencies. He submitted no documentation in support of resolution of any of the debts outlined in SOR ¶¶ 1.a-n. Applicant disclosed in his SCA that he was fired from employment in July 2024 due to “misuse of company resources” involving “unauthorized use of the company card.” (GE 2 at 13, 38-39). He provided additional details during his subject interview, stating that “he began to use his employer issued credit card to buy food and pay bills,” charging about $2,500. When his employer found out about the unauthorized charges, he was fired. (GE 4 at 5). Policies This case is adjudicated under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on June 8, 2017. “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. 2

Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 3

Analysis Guideline F, Financial Considerations The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18: Failure to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. . . . An individual who is financially overextended is at greater risk of having to engage in illegal or otherwise questionable acts to generate funds. Applicant’s admissions and the evidence in the FORM establish the following disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 19(a): inability to satisfy debts; AG ¶ 19(c): a history of not meeting financial obligations; and AG ¶ 19(d): deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, expense account fraud, mortgage fraud, filing deceptive loan statements and other intentional financial breaches of trust. Applicant’s inability to satisfy debts, history of not meeting financial obligations, and his misuse of his former employer’s company credit card, indicate a lack of judgment and an unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations. AG ¶¶ 19(a), 19(c) and 19(d) apply. The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 20(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; AG ¶ 20(b): the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the p

erson’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; AG ¶ 20(c): the individual has received or is receiving financial counseling for the problem from a legitimate and credible source, such as a non-profit 4

credit counseling service, and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control; and AG ¶ 20(d): the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts; and Mitigation under AG ¶ 20 is not established. Applicant has largely ignored his significant financial obligations. He has not provided any information or documentation to establish that he is responsibly addressing his debts in good faith, that his financial condition is under control, or that the delinquencies occurred under such circumstances that are unlikely to recur and therefore no longer cast doubt on his current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment. Guideline E, Personal Conduct The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. The following disqualifying conditions are potentially applicable under this guideline: AG ¶ 16(c): credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information; AG ¶ 16(d): credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: 5

(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or government protected information; (2) any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule v iolations; and (4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer’s time or resources. Applicant’s misuse of his company issued credit card for personal reasons constitutes a serious security concern. His termination, however, was simply a consequence of his poor conduct. The underlying conduct of concern alleged in SOR ¶ 2.a is the misuse of the credit card (SOR ¶ 1.o), which is appropriately addressed under Guideline F, infra. Because the conduct of concern is explicitly covered under Guideline F and is sufficient for an adverse determination under Guideline F, neither AG ¶¶ 16(c) nor 16(d) apply to SOR ¶ 2.a. Whole-Person Concept Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole- person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines F in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). Because Applicant requested a determination on the record without a hearing, I had no opportunity to evaluate his credibility and sincerity based on demeanor. See ISCR Case No. 01-12350 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Jul. 23, 2003). After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines F and E and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations). 6

Formal Findings I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive: Paragraph 1, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 1.a-o: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline E:

FOR APPLICANT Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant Conclusion I conclude it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. LeRoy F. Foreman Administrative Judge 7